Call for compilation of accident reports from ethylbenzene and styrene plants. Listen to good advice and learn from past accidents.
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Call for compilation of accident reports from ethylbenzene and styrene plants. Listen to good advice and learn from past accidents. Requirements: 1. Account of the accident, 2. Cause analysis, 3. Solutions and preventive measures. This way, everyone can learn from each other, aiming to take action such as checking stoves when a neighbor’s house catches fire or fixing vulnerabilities when someone loses their sheep, in order to minimize unnecessary harm and losses. Please share your ideas and speak up actively
I would also like to ask everyone: when designing the systems for loading benzene and toluene into vehicles, is it necessary to install gas detection and alarm devices on the loading platforms? What is the basis for this?
Inhaling benzene vapor at 20,000 ppm for 5–10 minutes can be fatal; hence, there is a claim that one can die from being exposed to benzene vapor. It is appropriate to install on-site gas alarms on the loading island, but I haven’t seen any specific regulations regarding this.
A worker from Dushanzi died of poisoning while handling a leak in the flanges of an ethylbenzene and styrene plant, having worn a gas mask
1. Accident sequence: The crude styrene tower had severe water contamination; first, someone went to the tank area to drain the water, and then they went to the liquid accumulation section of the reflux tank to drain water there as well. 2. Cause analysis: The failure to drain water from the tank area in a timely manner was the root cause of the accident. 3. Solutions and preventive measures: Drain water from the tank area regularly
1. Accident sequence: The temperature at the bottom of the crude benzene ethylene tower increased, the amount of polymer present increased, and the amount of inhibitor decreased. It was found that there was a fault with the inhibitor feed pump, and the inhibitor flow meter was inaccurate; moreover, the liquid level in the inhibitor tank did not decrease over a period of more than ten hours. 2. Cause of the accident: The failure of the main operator to prepare the schedule in a timely manner was the direct cause, while the malfunction of the inhibitor feed pump was the root cause. 3. Solution: Enhance employees’ sense of responsibility and regularly check the accuracy of instruments.
On the occasion of its 10th anniversary of operation, the Qilu Styrene Plant compiled and published a case study book.
Gas alarms are installed in the equipment area; pump and machinery are inspected regularly. All key hazard control points are integrated into the DCS system. Operators’ safety awareness is enhanced through training on proper operating procedures.