What are the safety risks associated with the use of burst discs and safety valves in regenerators and reactors?
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Recently, on one unit, I saw that a safety valve was installed in front of the double-acting slide valve of the regenerator flue gas pipeline; this safety valve vents to the chimney. A burst disc was also installed at the top of the regenerator, with exhaust going directly into the atmosphere. Similarly, rupture discs were found at the top of the reactor as well, and they also vented to the atmosphere. What are the potential harms of such a design, and what measures can be taken to address them? I earnestly ask all of you for your guidance.
Is it a private enterprise? There’s no way such a design would exist these days. The catalytic cracking process has been developed in China for 50 years now, and the technology is quite mature; the MIP process invented by the Chinese Academy of Petroleum Sciences is world-leading. The blowout disc at the top of the regenerator can be replaced by a double-acting slide valve with a pre-set gap between its two valve plates ； The rupture disc at the top of the reactor has been replaced by a safety valve installed at the top of the separation tower, which discharges the fluid to the flare system. It ensures safety while being environmentally friendly.
No way! I’ve been working in catalysis for 17 years – I’m hearing about this for the first time! Support the opinion above!
In the past, I really haven’t seen any installations with rupture discs and safety valves. However, as anti-recompression pressure increases, relevant regulations may impose requirements. If it is to be improved further, it is best to seek the opinion of the original design team. However, there is no separation device between the double-acting slide valve and the regenerator; therefore, even if one were to be installed, it is not necessary to have both a burst disc and a safety valve.
I didn’t understand what the moderator upstairs wrote; could you be more specific? Learn* some knowledge
There’s no need for that; a gap is left when the double-acting slide valve is fully closed, and a safety valve is installed at the top of the fractionation tower, which is sufficient. Venting from the top of the reactor is equivalent to setting off a fire.
With the advice from the rogues upstairs, it can be determined that this is a very dangerous action that will come at a cost.