Let’s summarize the mistakes in production operations

Simple operational mistakes – I’ll mention whatever comes to mind: 1. Incorrect operation of the start/stop buttons for pumps. 2. Incorrect operation due to unclear conditions regarding process valves. 3. Operators fail to make proper judgments when the indications of parameters such as level, temperature, flow rate, and pressure from instruments are inaccurate or incorrect, leading to faulty operations. 4. Incorrect operations carried out when process parameters are not clear. 5. For equipment of the same type, the correct operation should be A, but an error results in operation B, causing system fluctuations or shutdowns. 6. Operators, especially those in the control room, make mistakes in operating valves due to unfamiliarity with the site conditions or stress in emergency situations. 7. Control room personnel issue incorrect instructions or make mistakes due to unclear site conditions or poor judgment. 8. Faulty operations occur as a result of following incorrect instructions

Empiricism leads to mistakes； Carelessness leads to incorrect operations ； Lack of concentration leads to mistakes ；

Working the early shift, extremely tired. Careless and distracted

Hehe, let me tell you about a mistake I made once. At that time, I was adjusting the temperature control of the reactor; after opening the SP setpoint menu, I entered new parameters. But I forgot to check them again before submitting them, and as a result, the new parameters were incorrect – a decimal point was missing. This meant that the setpoint differed significantly from the original one, which caused the steam valve to open fully. Fortunately, I reacted quickly by switching to manual mode and adjusting the valve position. As a result, the temperature fluctuated a bit. Since then, I’ve been using the arrow keys on the keyboard to adjust parameters in the control room – these arrows are used to change the values after the decimal point, so there’s no need to worry about any major issues

I’m a beginner~~but I’ll be starting work soon~~I’d like to learn from the mistakes made by those who came before me in order to gain some experience; there are certain responsibilities that one simply cannot take on. Could you tell me about some major incidents at home and abroad that resulted from careless handling? The lessons of blood draw more attention from others. :lol

1. When starting the compressor, the 2-3 direct connection or 6-7 direct connection should be closed, but it remains open or not fully closed, resulting in substandard refined gas or the direct feeding of untreated raw material gas to the synthesis unit, which causes poisoning of the synthesis catalyst. 2. Inadequate or excessive ammonia release during synthesis leads to liquid carryover or gas leakage in the synthesis tower.

Yesterday, I was present at the FCC startup. During the process of transferring gasoline, the level gauge in V203 malfunctioned, and due to negligence on the part of the operators, gasoline flowed back from V203 into the compressor inlet. Gasoline also leaked from the gasket around the safety valve behind the flare valve in DG250; upon coming into contact with the medium-pressure steam pipeline, this caused a flash explosion and fire. Fortunately, no one was at the site at the time. The fire lasted for about 10 minutes; the actuators for the three flare valves were damaged, as well as the temperature compensation wires for the medium-pressure steam and the signal wires for those flare valves. Thankfully, the valves themselves were not affected, and no injuries occurred – only the startup time was delayed. At that time, the compressor was running at low speed for warming up; the inlet butterfly valve of the DG500 opened after a fire broke out, and gasoline was poured into the machine – fortunately, the rotor was not damaged. This post was last edited by sunhow on 2008-1-25 09:25.]

Due to inadequate inspection efforts, insufficient monitoring of shaft temperature by the operators, and too low oil level in the bearings (as refilling was not carried out on time during inspections), the fan bearings seized, burned out, and the shaft surfaces were damaged； For example, accidents such as those where the coal feeding port of a circulating fluidized bed boiler was not operated in accordance with the procedures, and it was not closed after coal had been fed, resulting in positive pressure backfire and the destruction of the coal conveyor belt, were all caused by improper operations that should serve as a warning.

In the water treatment workshop, misalignment of valves allowed steam to enter the process pipelines (PVC pipes), resulting in pipe bursts; emergency repairs were carried out for a day.

In a chlor-alkali plant, during the supply of hydrogen and chlorine to the HCl synthesis section, the operator entered one decimal place too few when typing in the opening degree of the chlorine valve; as a result, 28.5% was entered as 285%, which led to a high concentration of chlorine in the HCl. In subsequent stages, chlorine mixed with acetylene, causing an immediate explosion. Two hours after the fire was extinguished, a second explosion occurred, injuring several people; it took over a week before production could resume. The losses were severe.

The operator in the warehousing workshop was unloading material into the oil tank; he should have opened the inlet valve for tank A, but mistakenly used the valve for tank B. As a result, the level of liquid in tank B rose too high, causing it to overflow, and the oil and gas came into contact with an open flame, leading to an explosion. The losses are enormous.

Here’s another extremely stupid one, but it’s true. During major repairs, replace the float of the extractor tower level gauge and the connection valve of the tower. After starting the vehicle, no level reading was displayed; the process team believed it was a problem with the instrument and asked the instrument technicians to fix it. The technicians said there was no issue, and the two parties couldn’t reach an agreement. Eventually, the float was removed… and everyone was shocked to find that the plastic covers at both ends of the new valve were still in place. The leader was furious.

Cross-operation: When replacing the process safety valve, another team started the equipment, causing the process gas to flow back out through the vent pipe

During normal production in my workshop’s main equipment, the circulating water system is required to discharge and replenish water as well as add chemicals according to regulations； After draining the water, the operator failed to close the valve properly nor conducted a thorough inspection (the drain valve is located at the bottom of the drainage channel, and it is a butterfly valve). After adding water and chemicals, he returned to the control room without carrying out the required routine inspections, which led to a shortage of water in the circulation tank and ultimately caused a serious accident resulting in the shutdown of the production facility. Summary: 1. The operators have low quality and lack a strong sense of responsibility ； 2. The routine inspection system was not strictly implemented ； 3. The operators have low capacity to handle emergency incidents ； 4. Inadequate management of workshops and work teams ； 5. Strengthen self-learning, improve various management systems, and ensure their effective implementation.

When stopping the heating for the equipment, I didn’t notice that one unit was still in operation (one in use and one as backup), and I simply stopped the unit that was running.

Due to mental complacency, some routine actions are sometimes not performed properly, forcing a stop to make corrections, which causes disruptions and inconvenience to subsequent production processes. Fortunately, it’s not a workshop where continuous production requires the machine to keep running; otherwise, things would be terrible:L