Is hydrogen sulfide a hazardous chemical?

Natural gas itself is a hazardous chemical, hazardous chemicals number 21007, see the "List of Hazardous Chemicals".

Absolutely, it is in the 2002 list of hazardous chemicals, dangerous goods number 21006. It is a flammable liquid in Category 2 compressed gases and liquefied gases, and has the title of flash point death. It is very toxic. There are many cases of hydrogen sulfide causing death. Shandong Province issued the Lu'an Jianfa No. 51 notice on the issuance of the "Hydrogen Sulfide Protection Safety Management Regulations (Trial)".

Notice on Issuing the "Regulations on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection (Trial)" Lu'an Jianfa No. 51 Municipal Safety Supervision Bureaus, Provincial Relevant Departments: In recent years, there have been many hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents in our province, resulting in many deaths. According to statistics, since 2001, there have been 17 hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents in the province, resulting in 44 deaths. These accidents are caused by the lack of safety management of enterprises (units), imperfect safety facilities, insufficient training and education for employees, illegal command, violation of operating procedures, violation of labor discipline, and improper rescue after accidents and dangers. In order to carefully learn the lessons from the accident and take effective measures to strictly prevent the occurrence of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, in accordance with the instructions of Vice Governor Wang Junmin, the Provincial Work Safety Bureau organized forces and drew on the regulations of relevant units to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, starting from sulfur-containing oil and gas fields, metal and non-metal mines, and oil refining. The "Hydrogen Sulfide Protection Safety Management Regulations (Trial)" (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") have been formulated in seven key areas, including chemical enterprises, other sulfur-related chemical enterprises, metallurgical enterprises, paper enterprises, food, textile, leather tanning, sewage treatment and other industries and other hydrogen sulfide hazardous places. It is hereby issued to you with the following requirements. Please implement them accordingly. 1. Comprehensively investigate and control potential safety hazards of hydrogen sulfide poisoning. Safety supervision departments at all levels, relevant departments and units should regard the prevention of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents as an important part of this year's "Year of Hidden Hazard Investigation and Control" activities. Based on last year's special management action to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, 29 industries and 96 professional positions involving hydrogen sulfide were organized. The focus is on sulfur-containing oil and gas fields, petrochemicals, mining, non-ferrous metals, papermaking, sewage treatment and other industries and units. Processes, equipment and pits, pools, tanks, underground mines, pipelines and other places prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning will be investigated one by one, and hidden danger files will be established one by one to comprehensively control the safety hazards of hydrogen sulfide poisoning. For the identified safety hazards, relevant enterprises (units) must formulate rectification measures, clarify the time limit for rectification, and allocate funds for rectification to ensure that rectification is in place. For major safety hazards, rectification responsibilities must be implemented item by item, and follow-up supervision must be carried out. Anyone who overlooks major safety hazards due to carelessness and lack of meticulousness in the investigation work, or fails to seriously rectify the discovered accident hazards, shall be held accountable. 2. Extensively publicize and implement the Regulations and popularize hydrogen sulfide prevention knowledge. Safety supervision, health, construction, petrochemical, light industry, metallurgy and other departments at all levels must make full use of television, radio, newspapers, publications, the Internet and other media to widely publicize the "Regulations", publicize methods to identify hydrogen sulfide gas, prevent poisoning accidents and first aid and other safety knowledge, and improve the public's safety awareness to prevent hydrogen sulfide and other poisoning accidents. Enterprises (units) involved in hydrogen sulfide poisoning must conscientiously implement the "Regulations", refine the requirements of the "Regulations" based on the actual situation of the enterprise (unit), and propose the safety production management measures and requirements for the enterprise (unit) to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. It is necessary to conduct safety training on the prevention and control of hydrogen sulfide, so that the main persons in charge of production and operation units, safety management personnel and employees can understand the possible places and dangerous characteristics of hydrogen sulfide gas, master basic knowledge, and improve safety awareness and self-rescue and mutual rescue capabilities. 3. Implementation in accordance with the law * * Safety supervision and enterprise safety production are the "two main bodies" responsibilities. Safety supervision departments at all levels and relevant departments must strengthen supervision and inspection of units involved in hydrogen sulfide production and operation. If problems are found, they must urge the enterprises to make rectifications immediately. Those who fail to make rectifications on time will be severely punished in accordance with the law. ； If the technology is backward, the on-site management is chaotic, there are major safety hazards, and safety cannot be guaranteed, the company will be ordered to stop production for rectification. ； Those that still fail to meet the requirements after rectification will be resolutely closed. Production and business units must conscientiously implement the "Safety Production Law", "Occupational Disease Prevention and Control Law" and "Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplaces Using Toxic Substances" (State Council Order No. 352), increase investment in safety, continuously improve working conditions, install toxic and harmful gas alarm detectors in toxic and hazardous workplaces, and equip employees with labor protection supplies ； At the same time, employees should be truthfully informed of the hazards, preventive measures and emergency measures for accidents in the workplace and workplace, and safety instructions should be implemented before and during work, reminding employees of safety measures and guiding employees to correctly use occupational protective equipment and supplies, and strengthening labor protection in toxic and hazardous workplaces in accordance with the law. 4. Establish and improve safety management systems. Production and business units must, in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations, establish safety management systems and safe operating procedures for workplaces poisoned by hydrogen sulfide. Anyone who enters pits, pools, tanks, underground mines, pipelines and other places for work should formulate construction plans, entry permit systems, operating procedures and corresponding safety measures, and clarify the responsibilities of "operation leaders", "operators" and "guardians". Warning signs should be set up in places where hydrogen sulfide gas is likely to be generated. During the operation, once the construction unit and supervisory personnel find that the situation does not comply with the safety production regulations, they should stop it immediately. It is necessary to strengthen the training and education of employees and strengthen their awareness of working according to regulations. On-site managers and operators should memorize various operating regulations and prevent illegal command, illegal operations, and violations of labor disciplines. It is necessary to formulate an emergency plan for hydrogen sulfide poisoning, equip necessary rescue equipment, and clarify and implement rescue personnel, rescue equipment, and disposal procedures. 5. Strict access to work. For places where hydrogen sulfide gas is likely to be generated, production and business units shall not outsource work items entering these places to units and individuals who do not meet the relevant conditions. When signing a project contract, each unit should sign a safety production agreement, inform the contractor of the dangerous factors in the workplace, and require the contractor to formulate a safe construction plan. In view of the fact that most hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents occur in small and medium-sized enterprises with relatively backward production processes and poor safety protection conditions, all levels of * * and relevant departments should strengthen the supervision and management of small and medium-sized enterprises, strictly enforce operating access, force small and medium-sized enterprises to equip anti-virus facilities and on-site ventilation devices, and continuously improve the level of safety and security. 6. Strict project review. Safety supervision, development and reform, economic and trade, foreign trade, environmental protection, health and other departments at all levels must strictly review and control new projects in accordance with the provisions of the Occupational Disease Prevention and Control Law. Any project that can produce toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide during the production process must conduct a pre-evaluation of occupational disease hazards and completion acceptance of safety protection facilities. Otherwise, new projects will not be approved, completed projects will not be allowed to be produced, and the industrial and commercial department will not register and issue business licenses. 7. Strengthen emergency rescue work. Relevant departments at all levels should further strengthen the construction of emergency rescue systems and establish and improve * * , departments and enterprises should formulate emergency rescue plans for hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. Health, safety supervision, occupational disease prevention and control and other departments should strengthen communication and cooperation, gradually establish information linkage and resource sharing mechanisms, and disclose to the public the names and contact numbers of toxic and harmful gas poisoning treatment units to ensure prompt, scientific and effective rescue after the accident. Production and business units involved in hydrogen sulfide poisoning must regularly conduct targeted rescue drills to effectively improve their emergency rescue capabilities for hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. Once a poisoning accident occurs during operations, on-site rescuers must wear professional protective masks to carry out rescue operations. They must resolutely stop blind rescue operations that do not meet the conditions to avoid more casualties. At the same time, they must immediately report to medical institutions and * * Relevant departments report, gain time, conduct scientific rescue, and seek professional rescue to minimize casualties. Municipal work safety bureaus, relevant departments and production and business units involved in hydrogen sulfide should promptly report the problems discovered during the trial implementation of the "Regulations" and their opinions and reasons for revisions to the provincial work safety bureau. Contact person: Fan Changhua, Xu Bin, Zhang Dong contact number (fax): 0531-82881189, 82881175 Email: whc@sdaj.gov.cn Provisions on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection on April 1, 2008 (Trial) Catalog of Shandong Provincial Work Safety Administration Part 1 * * and provincial documents on hydrogen sulfide accident prevention 1. People of Shandong Province * * Notice of the General Office on profoundly learning from the lessons learned from the "10.11" accident of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Company and immediately carrying out special treatment to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents (Lu Zhengban Fangfa [2007] No. 159)··························· 4 2. * * Notice from the State Administration of Supervision on the expansion of casualties caused by blind rescue due to hydrogen sulfide poisoning that occurred this year (Work Safety Supervision Bureau [2007] No. 187)··10 3. * * Notice from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of the State Administration of Supervision on two recent poisoning accidents (Work Safety Supervision Supervisor No. 1 [2007] No. 217)·························· 16 IV. * * Opinions of the State Administration of Supervision on Strengthening Well Control Management and Prevention of Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning in High-pressure Oil and Gas Fields (Safety Supervision General Administration No. 1 [2006] No. 103)··············· 24 5. Emergency Notice from the Shandong Provincial Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau on Strengthening Production Safety Management in the Processing, Storage and Transportation of High-Sulfur Crude Oil in Petrochemical Enterprises (Lu’an Jianfa No. 62)·········································· 31 第二部分硫化氢防护安全管理规定一、含硫油气田硫化氢防护安全管理规定·················· 35 事故案例1: PetroChina’s “12.23” huge natural gas blowout accident in Kaixian, Chongqing····· 47 Accident Case 2: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in Well 48, Zhao County, Shijiazhuang City, North China Oilfield···· 49 Accident Case 3: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in Well Wen 4 of Sichuan Petroleum Administration Bureau··· 51 2. Safety management regulations for hydrogen sulfide protection in metal and non-metal mines············ 54 Accident case 1: Shandong Province Sanhekou Mining Co., Ltd. (Lunan Prison) Taiwen Gypsum Mine "10.8" Hydrogen Sulfide Eruption Poisoning Accident················ 62 Accident Case 2: Hunan Chenzhou Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. "9.13" accident··· 64 3. Safety management regulations for hydrogen sulfide protection in refining and chemical enterprises··············· 67 Accident Case 1: 山东海化集团有限公司石油化工分公司“3.24”硫化氢泄漏事故································ 79 事故案例2: The “5.11” hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in the hydrorefining joint workshop of Urumqi Petrochemical Company Refinery··························· 80 4. Safety management regulations on hydrogen sulfide protection in other sulfur-related chemical enterprises············ 82 Accident Case 1: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident at Taiyuan Huayuan Chemical Co., Ltd. in Shanxi Province·· 89 Accident Case 2: Poisoning and suffocation accident at Chongqing Tesla Chemical Raw Materials Co., Ltd.···· 91 5. Safety Management Regulations on Hydrogen Sulfide Protection in Papermaking Enterprises··················· 92 Accident Case 1: Yanzhou Xinglong Paper Co., Ltd. Major poisoning and casualty accident··· 94 Accident Case 2: Linqing Galaxy Paper Co., Ltd. Poisoning Accident·········· 96 Accident Case 3: Poisoning accident in Shandong Guihe Xianxing Paper Co., Ltd.······ 98 6. Safety management regulations for hydrogen sulfide protection in metallurgical enterprises··················· 99 Accident case 1: Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. "10.11" poisoning accident········· 102 Accident Case 2: Hydrogen sulfide gas poisoning accident in Dongguashan Copper Mine dressing workshop of Tongdu Copper Co., Ltd.······························ 105 7. Safety management regulations for food, textile, leather tanning, sewage treatment and other industries and other hydrogen sulfide hazardous places······························ 107 Accident case 1: The "5.31" major poisoning accident at Guangsha Hotel in Huangdao District, Qingdao···· 112 Accident Case 2: "9.1" hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province············ 114 Accident Case 3: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident at United Leather Factory, Huizhou City, Guangdong Province·····116 Accident Case 4: Acute hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide and other mixed highly toxic gas poisoning accident at a sewage treatment station of a printing and dyeing enterprise in Jingjiang City, Jiangsu Province...117 Part 3 Appendix 1, Physical and chemical properties and toxicological effects of hydrogen sulfide...119 2. 29 industries and 96 occupational positions prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning... 121 3. Safety Management Regulations for Operations in Confined Spaces····················· 124 Part One, One: People of Shandong Province * * Notice of the General Office on profoundly learning from the lessons learned from the "10.11" accident of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Company and immediately carrying out special treatment to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. Lu Zhengban Fafa [2007] No. 159 People's * * , the people of each county (city, district) * * ,Province * * All departments, all directly affiliated institutions, all major enterprises, all institutions of higher learning: On October 11, 2007, in the second material preparation workshop of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. (a private enterprise) in Xingfu Town Industrial Park, Zhifu District, Yantai City, an operator suffered a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident during the loading process, resulting in five deaths. After preliminary analysis, it was caused by backward production technology, inadequate on-site safety management and safety protection facilities, and improper operation by employees. After the accident, the provincial party committee and provincial * * The leaders attach great importance to it, and the provincial party committee * * , Vice Governor Wang Junmin immediately issued important instructions and presided over a special meeting to conduct an in-depth analysis of the cause of the accident and study specific measures to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning. According to statistics, since 2001, a total of 17 hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents have occurred in our province, resulting in 44 deaths. These accidents were all caused by inadequate safety management of enterprises, insufficient training and education for employees, and operational errors. Improper on-site rescue also led to increased casualties. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless gas with a special smell of rotten eggs. It is easily soluble in water and has a specific gravity greater than that of air. It easily accumulates in low-lying places such as poorly ventilated pulp ponds, sewage ponds, urban sewage pipes, mines, and in the processes of petroleum processing, chemical manufacturing and non-ferrous metal mining. It is an asphyxiating gas and a strong neurotoxin. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exceeds 760 mg/cubic meter, it can cause life-threatening danger in a short period of time. In order to conscientiously learn lessons from accidents in recent years, draw inferences from one instance and take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, the province * * It is determined that from now until the end of December, a special campaign to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents will be carried out across the province. 1. Scope of governance and division of work The scope of governance includes industries and occupations prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents (see attachment for details). Among them, papermaking, petrochemicals, mining, nonferrous metals, and sewage treatment are the focus of this special governance. This special governance operation in the province * * Under unified leadership, the provincial * * Organization and coordination of the Security Committee Office. Safety supervision, coal, construction, light industry, petrochemical, metallurgy, building materials and other departments shall carry out special governance work in coal mines, sewage treatment, papermaking, petrochemicals, non-coal mines and other industries according to their respective responsibilities. Other departments should also compare the industries and occupations that are prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning, and conscientiously carry out special management work for their own units, systems, and industries. Health supervision and occupational disease prevention and control agencies must actively cooperate and assist relevant departments in carrying out inspections and management of places prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning. The health department must strengthen supervision and inspection of occupational health in workplaces, seriously investigate and punish illegal activities, and be responsible for pre-assessment and review of occupational disease risks, design hygiene review of occupational disease protection facilities, and completion acceptance of construction projects. 2. Control measures (1) Popularize prevention knowledge. All levels * * Departments such as safety supervision, health, construction, petrochemicals, light industry, metallurgy, radio and television, etc. should make full use of television, radio, newspapers, publications, the Internet and other media to publicize methods of identifying common toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide, prevention of poisoning accidents and first aid and other safety knowledge in an easy-to-understand manner, so as to improve the public's safety awareness of preventing poisoning accidents such as hydrogen sulfide. Enterprises and units such as sewage treatment, papermaking, municipal construction, chemical industry, and mining must carry out a special education and conduct safety training on the prevention and control of hydrogen sulfide, so that the main persons in charge of the production and operation units, safety managers and employees can understand the possible places, odor characteristics and dangerous characteristics of hydrogen sulfide gas, master basic knowledge, and improve safety awareness and self-rescue and mutual rescue capabilities. (2) Fulfill the main responsibilities. Relevant departments at all levels must urge production and business units to conscientiously implement the Production Safety Law, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases, and the Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplaces Using Toxic Substances (State Council Order No. 352), and strengthen labor protection in workplaces in accordance with the law. Production and business units must increase investment in safety and continuously improve working conditions. They must install toxic and harmful gas alarm detectors in toxic and harmful workplaces such as hydrogen sulfide, and equip employees with labor protection supplies. At the same time, they must truthfully inform employees of the dangerous factors, preventive measures, and accident emergency measures that exist in workplaces and jobs. They must also implement safety instructions before and during work, remind employees of safety measures, and guide employees in the correct use of occupational protective equipment and supplies. (3) Improve the management system. Production and business units must establish safety management systems for toxic and harmful workplaces such as hydrogen sulfide. To operate in a confined space, the production and operation unit shall implement a safe operation permit. For those who enter pits, pools, tanks, underground mines, pipelines and other places to operate, the production and operation unit should formulate construction plans, entry permit systems, operating procedures and corresponding safety measures, and clarify the responsibilities of "operation leaders", "operators" and "guardians". At the same time, an emergency rescue plan for hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents was formulated. According to on-site operation requirements, rescue personnel, rescue equipment and disposal procedures are clarified and implemented. (4) Strict operation access. For places where toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide are likely to be produced, production and business units shall not outsource work items entering these places to units and individuals who do not meet the relevant conditions. When signing a project contract, each unit should sign a safety production agreement, inform the contractor of the dangerous factors in the workplace, and require the contractor to formulate a safe construction plan. In view of the fact that most hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents occur in small and medium-sized enterprises with relatively backward production processes and poor safety protection conditions, all levels of * * and relevant departments should strengthen the supervision and management of small and medium-sized enterprises, strictly enforce operating access, force small and medium-sized enterprises to equip anti-virus facilities and on-site ventilation devices, and continuously improve the level of safety and security. (5) Strengthen on-site management. Production and operation units must strengthen training and education for employees and strengthen their awareness of operating according to regulations. On-site managers and operators should memorize various operating regulations and prevent illegal command, illegal operations, and violations of labor disciplines. Production and business units must set up poisoning warning signs in places where toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide are likely to be produced, and operations must be carried out under the supervision of dedicated personnel and equipped with protective masks. During the operation, once the construction unit and supervisory personnel discover anything that does not comply with safety production regulations, they must stop it immediately. Once a poisoning accident occurs during operations, on-site rescuers must wear professional protective masks to carry out rescue operations. They must resolutely stop blind rescue operations that do not meet the conditions to avoid more casualties. At the same time, they must immediately report to medical institutions and * * Relevant departments report, gain time, conduct scientific rescue, and seek professional rescue to minimize casualties. (6) Strict project review. All levels * * It is necessary to organize the development and reform, economic and trade, foreign trade and health departments to conduct a thorough investigation of new projects since last year. All projects that can produce hydrogen sulfide gas during the production process and have not been pre-evaluated and completed for acceptance in accordance with the requirements of the "Occupational Disease Prevention and Control Law" must be re-evaluated and accepted. In the future, all new construction projects must carry out pre-evaluation of occupational disease hazards and completion acceptance of protective facilities in accordance with regulations. Otherwise, the industrial and commercial department will not register and issue a business license. 3. Work Requirements (1) Strengthen organizational leadership. All departments at all levels must attach great importance to this special rectification activity, establish a special governance leading group, clarify departmental responsibilities and tasks, formulate work plans, and study and deploy special governance work. All departments must give full play to the fine tradition of mutual support and cooperation, and in accordance with their respective responsibilities, effectively carry out special rectification work for their own departments, systems, and industries to prevent the occurrence of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. (2) Strengthen supervision and inspection. Departments at all levels should combine the special treatment of hydrogen sulfide poisoning with the "look back" work of the fourth quarter's special treatment of hidden dangers, as an important part of the "look back" activity, and further increase supervision and inspection efforts. All enterprises in industries prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning must be inspected. If problems are found, enterprises must be urged to rectify immediately. Those who fail to rectify on time will be severely punished in accordance with the law. ； If the technology is backward, the on-site management is chaotic, there are major safety hazards, and safety cannot be guaranteed, the company will be ordered to stop production for rectification. Those that fail to meet the requirements after rectification will be resolutely closed. (3) Strengthen emergency rescue work. Relevant departments at all levels have further strengthened the construction of emergency rescue systems and established and improved * * , departments and enterprises should formulate emergency rescue plans for hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. Health, safety supervision, occupational disease prevention and control and other departments and units should strengthen communication and cooperation, gradually establish information linkage and resource sharing mechanisms, and disclose to the public the names and contact numbers of toxic and harmful gas poisoning treatment units to ensure prompt, scientific and effective rescue after poisoning accidents. After the special governance action is over, cities * * and relevant provincial departments will conduct a comprehensive summary of the governance situation and form a formal written report, which will be submitted to the province before December 30. * * Security Committee Office. Contact number: (0531)82881192. October 19, 2007 Part 1, 2: * * Notice of the General Administration of Supervision on the expansion of casualties caused by blind rescue due to hydrogen sulfide poisoning that has occurred this year. General Administration of Work Safety [2007] No. 187 All provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau, relevant central enterprises: On September 1, when Jianbao Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Jianbao Company) of Guangyanghu Town, Baoying County, Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province organized workers to clean the pickling pool for lotus root products, one person was poisoned by hydrogen sulfide, and eight people blindly participated in the rescue, resulting in six deaths and three serious injuries. This was a serious accident in which casualties increased due to blind rescue efforts. Leading comrades of the State Council issued important instructions on this accident, requiring it to be reported to the whole country and reminding all localities to prevent similar accidents from happening. Since the beginning of this year, there have been 17 accidents across the country due to improper or blind rescue efforts, resulting in increased casualties. 57 people were initially involved, and eventually 85 people were killed and 46 injured. Among these 17 accidents, 4 were accidents in mining companies and 13 were accidents in other industries. Among the 13 accidents in other industries, only 17 people were initially involved, and 24 more people died and 22 were injured due to blind rescue.: There were 9 cases of hydrogen sulfide poisoning, resulting in 28 deaths and 14 injuries, accounting for 68.3% and 63.6% of the total casualties in these 13 accidents respectively. In order to implement the important instructions of the leading comrades of the State Council and learn from the painful lessons of recent blind rescue operations such as the "9.1" hydrogen sulfide poisoning in Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province, which resulted in increased casualties, the relevant situation is hereby notified as follows.: 1. The "9.1" hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province Jianbao Company is a rural enterprise that mainly produces pickled lotus root products. Before September 1, the company had suspended production for more than three months. In order to resume production, the pickling pool needs to be cleaned. The pickling tank is located in a factory building with a fiberglass roof and is open. The pickling pool is 3.2 meters deep, 4 meters long and 4 meters wide, and the salt water in the pool is 0.3 meters deep. At around 16:00 on September 1, a worker from Jianbao Company felt uncomfortable when he went down to the pickling pool for cleaning operations, so he stopped working and fell while climbing up to the pool. After another person by the pool discovered it, he immediately called for help, and then eight people went into the pool to rescue the poisoned person. After the accident, sampling and testing revealed that the concentration of hydrogen sulfide gas in the marinating pool reached 24 mg/cubic meter (the maximum allowable concentration in the air is 10 mg/cubic meter). According to preliminary investigation and analysis, hydrogen sulfide gas generated by salt liquid and other residues at the bottom of the pickling pool during the high temperature period in summer was deposited in the pool, and the concentration exceeded the standard. Jianbao Company did not conduct harmful gas detection before organizing workers to clean the marinating pool, and there was no toxic and harmful gas detection equipment on site. ； During the cleaning process, no forced ventilation measures were taken and only natural ventilation was used. ； The workers did not wear protective equipment and were not equipped with portable toxic and harmful gas alarms. ； The eight rescuers also did not wear protective equipment and took risks to rescue, resulting in increased casualties. 2. Places where hydrogen sulfide is easily generated and typical accidents that have occurred this year that have resulted in increased casualties due to blind rescue efforts. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) is a colorless gas with a special odor (rotten egg smell) and is easily soluble in water. ； The specific gravity is larger than that of air, and it is easy to accumulate in low-lying places such as poorly ventilated urban sewage pipes, manholes, septic tanks, sewage tanks, pulp tanks, and other types of fermentation tanks and vegetable pickling tanks. Hydrogen sulfide is an asphyxiating gas and a strong nerve poison. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide is 0.4 mg/cubic meter, people can clearly smell the smell of hydrogen sulfide. ； At 70 to 150 mg/cubic meter, olfactory fatigue occurs within a few minutes of inhalation and no odor can be smelled. The higher the concentration, the faster the olfactory fatigue, and the easier it is for people to lose vigilance. ； When it exceeds 760 mg/cubic meter, pulmonary edema, bronchitis, and pneumonia can occur within a short period of time, which may be life-threatening. ； Exceeding 1000 mg/cubic meter can cause electric shock-like death. Several hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents that have occurred this year are as follows:: (1) Hydrogen sulfide will be produced during the processing of sour crude oil. On May 27, two workers at the Yitu Refinery in Huikou Town, Susong County, Anhui Province were cleaning the refining tank and died of poisoning after inhaling a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas wafting out of the tank. A visiting relative tried to rescue them blindly, but also died of poisoning one after another. (2) Some natural gas contains hydrogen sulfide. On July 7, during the construction of the Lanzhou natural gas pipeline installation project undertaken by the Lanzhou Branch of China Eighth Metallurgical Construction and Installation Engineering Co., Ltd., one person was poisoned and was knocked down. Later, four people were also knocked down due to blind rescue, resulting in three deaths and two people being poisoned and injured. (3) Fermentation of organic matter * * Places such as sugar, paper, leather and other industries are prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. On August 7, an employee of Huaxia Paper Industry and Trade Co., Ltd. in Jingyuan County, Gansu Province was poisoned by hydrogen sulfide while cleaning the pulp tank. Another five employees suffered a chain poisoning accident during the rescue process, resulting in 3 deaths and 3 injuries. (4) Hydrogen sulfide will also be produced during the pickling process of pickles and salted fish. On July 11, an employee of Deqing Haoying Biological Yeast Factory, Xinshi Town, Deqing County, Huzhou City, Zhejiang Province, was poisoned by hydrogen sulfide and fainted while cleaning garbage bags in the fermentation tank of the yeast workshop. Two other employees did not take protective measures and entered the fermentation tank to rescue blindly. They were poisoned and fainted, resulting in three deaths. (5) Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents may also occur during dredging and maintenance operations such as sewage pipes, manholes, sewage pumping stations, sewage pipes, sewage tanks, refineries, pulp tanks, fermentation tanks, garbage dumps, and cesspools. On May 5, when Tianjin Jinnan District Zhenxing Industrial Co., Ltd. was cleaning sewage and sludge from the sewage treatment tank of Heizi Food Co., Ltd. in the district, it entered the poorly ventilated sewage tank without testing. Two construction workers were poisoned by hydrogen sulfide and fainted while working. The other two construction workers blindly went into the pool to rescue and also fainted one after another, resulting in a total of 2 deaths and 2 injuries. (6) Ship cabins, underground hidden projects, sealed containers, facilities that have not been used for a long time or places with poor ventilation are also places where hydrogen sulfide poisoning and suffocation are easy to occur, and poisoning and casualty accidents are extremely easy to occur. On April 25, a crew member of the "Zheling Yuyun No. 243" fishing boat in Ruoshan, Shitang Town, Wenling, Zhejiang Province was poisoned by hydrogen sulfide while washing the cabin in the cabin. Five other people were poisoned one after another due to improper rescue, resulting in 2 deaths and 4 injuries. 3. Relevant requirements and measures to prevent similar accidents (1) Extensively publicize safety knowledge about preventing poisoning and suffocation, and raise the awareness of the public and enterprises and institutions to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning. It is necessary to make full use of television, radio, newspapers, publications, the Internet and other media to publicize in an easy-to-understand manner the methods of identifying common toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide, prevention of poisoning accidents and first aid and other safety knowledge, and improve the public's safety awareness of preventing hydrogen sulfide and other poisoning accidents. Give full play to the role of experts and professional associations, guide and help communities carry out safety training to prevent poisoning and suffocation accidents, improve the public's emergency response capabilities, and prevent the expansion of casualties or secondary accidents caused by improper rescue or blind rescue. It is necessary to strengthen safety education and first aid training for workers, so that relevant personnel understand the possible locations, hazards and characteristics of toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide, master self-rescue and mutual rescue knowledge, and prevent blind rescue. In particular, it is necessary to strengthen safety training for temporary workers, migrant workers, and outsourcing unit personnel engaged in dredging and maintenance operations. (2) Establish and improve a safety management system to prevent poisoning and suffocation, and equip with corresponding safety protection equipment. Relevant industries, enterprises and institutions should conduct a general survey of the units, equipment, facilities and key locations that generate and easily accumulate hydrogen sulfide, establish a poisoning and suffocation hazard identification system before operations, and a gas sampling and analysis system before entering confined or restricted spaces for operations. Anyone who enters pits, pools, tanks, cauldrons, trenches, underground mines, pipelines and other confined spaces or poorly ventilated places where hydrogen sulfide gas exists or may exist to operate should formulate operating permit procedures, operating safety procedures, safety measures and emergency plans, and clarify the responsibilities of the person in charge of the operation, operating personnel and external guardians. ； Dredging operations that enter underground wells, trenches, pipelines, and other places where toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide may be produced are not allowed to be contracted out to units and individuals that do not meet the relevant conditions. Conduct a comprehensive inspection of the workplace. Places that may produce toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide must hang anti-poisoning warning signs and install hydrogen sulfide and other toxic gas detection alarms. It is necessary to inform workers of the dangerous factors at the work site, and the work site should have means to detect harmful gas concentrations, oxygen content, etc. Workers must be equipped with portable alarms, oxygen respirators or long-tube respirators that meet actual needs, and protective facilities such as rescue belts and rescue ropes. (3) Carry out emergency drills for scientific rescue. Based on the characteristics of toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide, formulate targeted emergency plans to clarify the escape, self-rescue, and mutual rescue methods for workers in emergencies. On-site workers and managers must be familiar with the contents of the plan and the use of rescue facilities. It is necessary to strengthen the drills of emergency plans to enable workers to improve their self-rescue, mutual rescue and emergency response capabilities. Before entering a dangerous place, workers must sample and analyze the air in the dangerous place to determine the oxygen content, types and concentrations of toxic and harmful gases, and formulate poisoning accident prevention and emergency response measures. For workplaces containing toxic and harmful gases, measures such as forced ventilation and replacement must be adopted and passed the inspection. Operators must wear gas masks, fasten rescue belts, and be familiar with emergency plans, escape routes, and manual first aid methods. (4) Designate a dedicated person to supervise workers during operations and provide scientific rescue when in danger. When carrying out dangerous operations, it is necessary to arrange on-site safety monitoring personnel with emergency rescue knowledge and equip them with communication and rescue equipment. On-site safety monitoring personnel are responsible for checking that workers are wearing protective equipment and understanding emergency plans, informing workers in advance of possible danger factors, methods of calling for help and escape methods in emergencies, implementing supervisory safety measures, and promptly stopping unsafe behaviors. During the operation, on-site safety guardians are not allowed to leave their posts without authorization. When poisoning by toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide occurs, respond calmly, handle it calmly, call the police in time, and seek professional rescue. ； Rescuers should wear professional protective masks when performing rescue operations, and blind rescue operations that do not meet the conditions are prohibited to avoid further casualties. September 8, 2007 Part 1, Part 3: * * Notice of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of the General Administration of Supervision on two recent poisoning accidents No. 217 of the General Administration of Work Safety [2007] of all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau, the Department of Labor and Social Security (Bureau), and relevant central enterprises: On September 13, 2007, a poisoning accident occurred in the residual ore operation team of Jiugong District of Chenzhou Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. in Hunan Province while conducting ore dressing operations in the No. 69 vein prospecting tunnel in the middle section of 15, resulting in 14 people being poisoned, and 5 of them died. ； On October 11, an operator in the second material preparation workshop of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. in Shandong suffered a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident during the loading process, resulting in the death of five people. After the accident, the leading comrades of the State Council attached great importance to it and issued important instructions, requiring careful verification, learning lessons from the accident, strengthening safety production protection measures and employee safety education, and notifying various localities to prevent similar accidents from occurring. * * The main leaders of the General Administration of Supervision and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security made arrangements for the work related to the "9.13" accident in Chenzhou, Hunan, and sent personnel to the scene together with relevant experts from the Ministry of Health to verify the accident and guide the accident investigation. * * Leaders of the State Administration of Supervision have put forward requirements for the "10.11" accident in Yantai, Shandong Province. Similar enterprises must carry out in-depth investigation and management of hidden dangers to prevent similar accidents from happening, and track and supervise the accidents. Based on preliminary investigation and analysis, the relevant circumstances of the two accidents are now reported as follows:: 1. Relevant information about the accident unit and the course of the accident (1) The “9.13” accident of Hunan Chenzhou Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. is affiliated to Hunan Nonferrous Metals Holding Group Co., Ltd. Its predecessor is Yaogang Xian Tungsten Mine. It has complete mining licenses, safety production licenses and other licenses, and has an annual output of more than 2,000 tons of first-class wolframite concentrate. In September 2004, the mine was included in the bankruptcy and closure plan due to insolvency. On March 8, 2007, the Chenzhou Intermediate People's Court declared Yaogang Xian Tungsten Mine bankrupt. On the same day, Yaogang Xian Mining Co., Ltd. officially took over the assets of operating Yaogang Xian Tungsten Mine. From January to August this year, Yaogang Xian Mining Co., Ltd. produced 1,695 tons of black tungsten concentrate, of which 751 tons of residual ore was recovered. In March 2007, Wang Xifang, a native of Guangxi, with the consent of Liu Wei, the team leader of the 9th Working Area of ​​the 15th Middle Section of the company, brought his own personnel to carry out chemical mineral processing operations in the 15th Middle Section without authorization. The process flow is to collect and crush the tailings, then use a chute to wash away the waste sand and gravel, leaving behind heavy sand containing sulfur and arsenic (gross concentrate), and then use butyl xanthate and concentrated sulfuric acid to desulfurize and remove arsenic from the heavy sand, turning the crude concentrate into concentrate. Butyl xanthate is a commonly used mineral processing agent. Its chemical name is hydrocarbyl dithiocarbonate. It reacts chemically with sulfuric acid to produce hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide and carbon disulfide gas. At 8 o'clock in the morning on September 13, after Wang Xifang received the notice of Liu Weijiao concentrate, he led Wang Xiaolong and other 6 people to the middle of the No. 69 vein prospecting tunnel. They first roughly selected the tailings, and then spread them on the cement floor together with the 2,000 kilograms of heavy sand originally stored. They spread butyl xanthate and stirred evenly. Finally, two small ditches were dug out of the flat heavy sand and poured with concentrated sulfuric acid. The personnel evacuated to a guard point with fresh wind for lunch. At around 13:00, 7 people who had had lunch arrived at the accident site in two groups. Unknown to the fact that the toxic gas at the accident site had seriously exceeded the standard, 7 people were poisoned and fell to the ground one after another. At around 13:10, after the worker who was responsible for guarding heard the cry, he immediately called eight people working nearby to participate in the rescue. Seven of them were poisoned and fell down one after another without taking any measures. Rescue workers who arrived later covered their faces with soaked clothes, rescued the poisoned people in two batches, and sent them to the hospital for rescue. At present, 14 people have been poisoned by the accident, 5 of whom died due to ineffective rescue, and the other 9 poisoned people are out of danger. (2) The "10.11" accident of Shandong Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. is a Sino-foreign joint venture established in 2001 by Yantai Taihai Investment Group Co., Ltd. and Bokai (South Africa) Company. It is a non-ferrous metal smelting enterprise with complete licenses. The enterprise was officially put into operation in April 2003, with a total investment of 248 million yuan, and an annual output of 600 tons of metallic cobalt. The raw material is nickel sulfide concentrate, all purchased from Yunnan Yunjiang Yunxi Nickel Co., Ltd. The main production process of this enterprise is to first go through the leaching process, add an appropriate amount of clean water and waste acid to the leaching tank, and add slag (nickel concentrate) while stirring. During this process, a small amount of hydrogen sulfide gas is generated. After the nickel concentrate slag is added, sodium chloride oxidant is slowly added to decompose ionized nickel, copper, cobalt, and zinc. ； Secondly, the solution containing ionic nickel, copper, cobalt and zinc is separated into individual nickel, copper, cobalt and zinc. ； Finally, the metal plate is made by electrolysis. When the accident occurred, the five people working on site were all responsible for feeding materials at the leaching position. Due to too much feeding at one time, a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas was generated instantly, causing the five people to be poisoned and collapsed within a few seconds. After the personnel guarding the filter press in the same workshop discovered this situation, they immediately reported the situation to the person in charge of the company. The person in charge of the company led relevant personnel to carry gas masks and rescued the five people and sent them to the hospital. However, the rescue efforts failed and they died. 2. Preliminary analysis of the cause of the accident (1) Cause of the "9.13" accident of Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. People of Hunan Province * * An accident investigation team was established on September 16. After preliminary analysis of the cause of the accident, it was determined that this was a liability accident. direct cause of accident: The operators violated regulations and standards such as the "Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals", the "Safety Regulations for Metal and Non-Metal Mines", as well as the company's relevant regulations on the recovery of residual ores, entered the abandoned blind alley without permission, and conducted chemical mineral processing operations underground in violation of regulations. During the operation, the toxic gas produced by the reaction between butyl xanthate, concentrated sulfuric acid and ore seriously exceeded the standard, causing acute poisoning. The rescue personnel lacked safety knowledge and equipment and performed rescue operations blindly, leading to further expansion of the accident. indirect cause of accident: 1. Safety management is managed by contract, and the management of the residual mining operation site is chaotic. The enterprise's safety management network is not sound, safety officers are not deployed at the operating surface, and illegal underground operations are not discovered and stopped in a timely manner. The safety production of the residual ore recycling team has not been included in the unified management of the enterprise, and no "three-level" safety education has been provided to the operating personnel. 2. Poor ventilation management. Due to the implementation of residual mining operations in recent years and the lack of effective management, the original ventilation system in the operation area was destroyed, and some blind alleys were not closed in time as required. ； The fan was placed in the wrong position and the air duct fell off, causing a dirty air circulation. As a result, there was no fresh air flow at the accident site and toxic and harmful gases could not be discharged. 3. Occupational disease prevention and control work is absent, and labor management is not standardized. There is no pre-job physical examination or pre-job training for the workers who take up the job, and there is no regular testing of toxic substances in the workplace. The phenomenon of private recruitment of workers in work teams is serious. The company has not signed a labor contract with the privately recruited workers, and the privately recruited workers have not participated in work-related injury insurance. 4. There is no emergency rescue plan for poisoning accidents, no personal protective equipment for emergency rescue of poisoning accidents, no training for workers on emergency rescue of poisoning accidents, and no relevant emergency drills. (2) The cause of the "10.11" accident of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. According to preliminary investigation and analysis, the company's production process flow was designed by the company itself and did not have design qualifications. Nickel concentrate, the main raw material used in the leaching process, contains a certain amount of iron sulfide. Under normal production conditions, iron sulfide chemically reacts with the hydrochloric acid aqueous solution in the leaching tank to generate a small amount of hydrogen sulfide gas, which is harmlessly treated by an alkali neutralization device. If handled improperly, too much or too frequently, a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas will be produced. In order to avoid this phenomenon from happening, the operating procedures of this process stipulate that the nickel concentrate raw materials must be added slowly and intermittently in small amounts. The direct cause of the accident was that the operator violated the operating procedures during the feeding process and fed too much material at one time. A large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas was generated after the trough phenomenon occurred, resulting in the poisoning and death of the personnel. The cause of the accident is under further investigation. 3. Relevant Requirements In order to conscientiously implement the spirit of the important instructions of the leading comrades of the State Council, deeply learn from the lessons learned from the accident, and prevent the recurrence of similar poisoning accidents, the following requirements are hereby put forward to further strengthen the safety production work of metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises.: (1) All metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises must further implement the main responsibilities for production safety, improve safety management institutions, allocate sufficient safety management personnel, improve safety operating procedures, establish and improve the safety production responsibility system, and effectively ensure that horizontally to the edge, vertically to the end, and no dead ends are left ； Strictly enforce * * In accordance with relevant laws, regulations, standards and procedures, units with design qualifications must be selected for construction project design. Construction projects that have not been designed or are not qualified to design shall not be put into production and use. ； Strengthen employee safety awareness education and safety skills training in key process links, implement the requirements of safety standards and procedures to every employee and every position, and eliminate illegal operations ； In the process of enterprise restructuring, it is necessary to ensure that the basic safety management system remains unchanged, the intensity of safety management is not reduced, and the phenomenon of outsourcing management and illegal subcontracting at different levels is prevented. (2) All metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises should continue to carry out in-depth investigation and management of hidden dangers, organize and carry out "look back", especially small and medium-sized enterprises below the designated size and units that have had accidents in the past two years, carry out "remedial lessons" on hidden danger investigation and management, conduct in-depth investigation and rectification of various accident hazards and unsafe factors, and further implement various safety precautions. It is necessary to further rectify and standardize the order of mineral resource development in metal mines, and resolutely crack down on illegal activities such as over-layering and transgression, indiscriminate mining and excavation, etc. ； Mechanical ventilation must be compulsorily implemented in underground mines and preventive measures to prevent endangering personal safety and poisoning and suffocation accidents ； In underground in-situ leaching mining and mineral processing, a basic balance between the amount of liquid pumped out and the amount of liquid injected should be maintained. After the stope heap is leached and drained, clean water and neutralization should be carried out in a timely manner. 　　Nonferrous metal smelting enterprises involve high temperature, high pressure, strong acid, and strong alkali links. They must focus on combining relevant safety regulations to investigate and control safety hazards in production links and parts such as lifting, hoisting, casting, and smelting. Focus on strengthening the monitoring and implementation of protective measures for toxic and harmful gases generated by chemical reactions in the smelting process and production links. For major hidden dangers identified, responsibilities, funds and plans must be implemented, rectifications must be made within a time limit, and unsafe production must be resolutely avoided. (3) All metal mining enterprises should strengthen safety management and supervision and inspection at the work site, establish a complete ventilation system in accordance with the requirements of regulations, strengthen daily ventilation management, and regularly detect underground air volume, wind speed, air quality and related harmful substances. ； Implement the well registration system for employees entering and leaving the well to prevent illegal bringing of hazardous chemicals underground ； Strengthen the management of goaf areas, promptly close goaf areas and abandoned tunnels, and hang safety warning signs ； It is strictly prohibited to carry out chemical mineral processing operations underground without formal design. ； The tailings sand produced by underground roughing must be properly handled to avoid accident hazards and environmental pollution. (4) All metal mining enterprises must strengthen labor management and occupational disease prevention and control, strictly enforce underground labor quotas, and shall not increase temporary employment at will. ； Strictly enforce the recruitment and enrollment system for new workers, conduct pre-job physical examinations and pre-job training for new workers, and conduct regular health monitoring of employees ； Timely handle work-related injury insurance procedures for all types of employees of the enterprise, especially migrant workers. (5) All metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises should further strengthen emergency rescue work, formulate operable special emergency plans based on the hazardous factors existing in the enterprise, equip them with personal protective equipment and other emergency equipment to deal with poisoning accidents, conduct special emergency training for employees, and organize regular drills to improve employees' emergency response capabilities. (6) Local labor and security departments at all levels should strengthen supervision and inspection of employment in metal mining enterprises, ensure that migrant workers participate in work-related injury insurance, coordinate with safety supervision departments to prevent work-related injuries, and effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of workers. (7) Local safety supervision departments at all levels should strengthen the safety supervision and occupational health supervision and inspection of metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises within their jurisdiction, especially for metal mining enterprises that use underground heap leaching mining and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises that use leaching processes. In local * * Under the leadership of the organization, we will work with relevant departments to immediately carry out hidden danger inspections and "look back" on relevant enterprises. Production equipment that does not have formal design and does not meet process requirements shall not be put into production and use. ； For metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises that use chemical agents and accident-prone processes in the production process, enterprises must be urged to immediately investigate and eliminate accident hazards in a timely manner. If the hidden hazards are not adequately investigated and managed, they must be ordered to suspend production for rectification and make rectifications within a time limit to prevent and contain the occurrence of similar major accidents. All provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) are requested to quickly forward this notice to their relevant departments and local metal mines and non-ferrous metal smelting enterprises. October 22, 2007 Part 1, 4: * * Opinions of the General Administration of Supervision on Strengthening Well Control Management and Preventing Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning in High-Pressure Oil and Gas Fields No. 103 of the General Administration of Work Safety [2006] of all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau, and relevant central enterprises: In recent years, with the joint efforts of all parties, the overall situation of oil and gas production safety has been stable. However, with the intensification of oil and gas exploration and development, the resulting safety production risks are also increasing. Many major and extremely large blowouts, out-of-control blowouts and hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents have occurred across the country, causing a large number of casualties or leading to a large number of people being evacuated, which has had a serious negative impact on society. The frequent occurrence of out-of-control blowouts and hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents in high-pressure oil and gas fields has become a prominent issue affecting the safety of oil and gas production. In order to prevent the occurrence of major accidents and ensure the safe production of oil and gas, the following opinions are hereby put forward on strengthening well control management and prevention of hydrogen sulfide poisoning in high-pressure oil and gas fields. 1. Adhere to the principle of "safe development" and implement the main responsibility of enterprises for safety production. Safety production is related to the safety of people's lives and property, and is related to the overall situation of reform, development and stability. Human life is the most precious, and development cannot be at the expense of human life. Attaching great importance to and effectively doing a good job in production safety is an inevitable requirement for persisting in building the party for the public good and governing for the people, and is an inevitable requirement for implementing the Scientific Outlook on Development. All oil and gas enterprises must firmly establish the people-oriented concept, further enhance their awareness of the importance of safe oil and gas production, insist that development speed is subordinated to safety production, cost-effectiveness is subordinated to safety quality, and safety investment is ensured. Safety measures are never allowed to be reduced or weakened in order to control costs, and any procedures and links in safety production are never allowed to be ignored in pursuit of project progress. They insist on doing a good job in detail and doing a good job, and effectively achieve scientific and safe development. The enterprise is the main body responsible for safety production, and the main person in charge is fully responsible for the safety production work of the unit. All oil and gas enterprises must establish and improve a safety responsibility system with job responsibilities as the main content and the main person in charge as the center. Safety responsibilities should be decomposed and implemented to various departments, teams, positions and personnel, so as to ensure that no dead ends are left horizontally and vertically. ； Improve standards, specifications, management systems and operating mechanisms, and fully implement safety responsibilities ； In light of reality, we should implement quantitative assessment of production safety performance, strictly reward and punish people, and establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism. 2. Strengthen production organization and strictly supervise the safety of high-pressure oil and gas fields. Production safety is a systematic project that involves the entire process of exploration and development. All oil and gas companies must implement well control management and hydrogen sulfide prevention throughout the entire design and construction process of drilling, geology, logging, logging, oil (gas) testing, well workover, oil (gas) and other operations. ； When developing oil and gas fields in high-pressure, high-sulfur, and high-risk areas, we must take safe production as the premise, plan rationally, and comprehensively evaluate the development plan. ； According to different geological conditions, geological structures, gas storage mechanisms, surface environment and other characteristics, strengthen geological exploration, construction organization, on-site management, production process, equipment and facilities selection, emergency plan preparation and drills, etc., and provide sufficient well control facilities, equipment and hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments and instruments ； Establish a strict technical management system and construction design approval procedures, and implement strict technical demonstration and approval procedures for construction design and technical measures in drilling, oil testing and downhole operations, especially well control, cementing, perforating and fracturing. ； Conduct strict safety risk assessments on the engineering quality of completed drilling wells and development wells, disposal of abandoned wells, and conversion of exploration wells to development wells. Local safety supervision departments at all levels should attach great importance to oil and gas safety supervision, strengthen safety supervision forces, equip corresponding professional supervisors, establish relevant technical support systems, and include safety supervision of oil and gas fields in high-pressure, high-sulfur, and high-risk areas on their important agenda. ； Organize professional technical lectures and training to improve the professional level and performance capabilities of safety supervision personnel ； Strict safety review and administrative licensing work, strengthen on-site supervision and inspection, seriously deal with various violations of production safety laws and regulations, and urge enterprises to fully implement their main responsibilities. 3. Strictly implement the "Three Simultaneities" system and standardize the production safety licensing work "Safety Production Law", "Safety Production License Regulations" and "Measures for Design Review and Completion Acceptance of Safety Facilities in Non-Coal Mining Mine Construction Projects" (formerly * * Supervisory Authority Order No. 18), etc. * * Relevant laws, administrative regulations and rules have made clear provisions on safety production review and licensing work. The safety facilities of oil and gas construction projects must be designed, constructed, and put into production and use at the same time as the main project. Safety pre-evaluation reports, safety chapters, and acceptance evaluation reports must be prepared in accordance with relevant regulations, and safety facility design review and completion acceptance procedures must be performed. The design of safety facilities shall not be constructed without the review and approval of the safety supervision department. ； It shall not be put into production and use without passing the acceptance inspection. Oil and gas production units and units that provide professional technical engineering services such as geophysical prospecting, well logging, well logging, drilling, underground operations, storage and transportation should comply with the "Implementation Measures for Safety Production Licenses for Non-Coal Mining Enterprises" (formerly * * Supervision Bureau Order No. 9) and other regulations stipulate the application for a safety production license. Those who have not obtained a safety production license before June 30 this year shall not continue to engage in professional technical engineering services. Oil and gas production units shall not contract professional technical projects to units that have not obtained a production safety license. If an accident occurs due to contracting a project to a unit that has not obtained a production safety license, Party A and Party B and relevant personnel must be held seriously accountable. 4. Rely on scientific and technological progress, improve intrinsic safety levels and accident prevention capabilities, actively integrate my country’s oil and gas safety technology research forces, and establish a high-quality oil and gas safety technology research team. In terms of oil and gas safety production technical consultation, emergency rescue, testing and inspection, legislation, training, evaluation, etc., we will actively play the role of relevant scientific research institutes, industry associations, intermediary organizations, etc., and gradually form a complete technical support system. according to * * The overall deployment is to implement the integration of industry, academia and research, actively promote and apply new scientific and technological achievements in production safety, and adopt new technologies, new processes, new equipment and new materials with high scientific and technological content and reliable safety performance to improve the ability to withstand accident risks and enhance the level of intrinsic safety. All oil and gas companies should increase investment in science and technology in response to the major problems existing in the company in terms of process technology, material application technology, etc., organize relevant scientific research units and technical experts to tackle key problems, and strive to achieve results in solving key technical problems. It is necessary to actively study and support the construction of laws and regulations for oil and gas safety production, and put forward opinions and suggestions on the goals of legal system construction for oil and gas safety production. In particular, it is necessary to formulate relevant departmental regulations on preventing hydrogen sulfide poisoning and preventing out-of-control blowouts, revise relevant standards, and transform some recommended standards into mandatory standards in a timely manner in response to prominent issues such as well blowouts. All oil and gas companies must conscientiously implement relevant laws, regulations and standards, actively adopt international advanced technical standards, and work according to the new * * Standards and industry standards: Re-examine the company's exploration and development technical specifications and related standards to technically curb the occurrence of accidents such as out-of-control blowouts and hydrogen sulfide poisoning. 5. Strengthen employee safety education and training and promote the construction of safety culture. All oil and gas companies should focus on preventing out-of-control blowouts and hydrogen sulfide poisoning, vigorously publicize and implement new standards and procedures such as the "Technical Regulations for Drilling Well Control" (SY/T6426-2005), and strengthen safety training on new technologies, new process applications and new standards implementation, so that employees can master new knowledge and skills in a timely manner. ； Safety training will be strengthened with emphasis on various supervisors, grassroots managers and operators. Personnel engaged in drilling production, technology and safety management, and personnel operating in a hydrogen sulfide environment must undergo well control technology training, hydrogen sulfide monitoring technology and personal safety protection measures training in accordance with regulations. They must pass the examination and obtain corresponding certificates before they can take up their posts. Adopt various forms to strengthen safety awareness education for all employees and social responsibility education for managers, and strive to achieve the goal of "zero harm, zero accidents, and zero pollution" ； We should conscientiously solve the actual difficulties of employees, fully mobilize everyone's subjective initiative to participate in safety management, actively cultivate corporate safety culture, and enable employees to change from "I want safety" to "I want safety", consciously implement various rules and regulations into actual work, make safety production a belief and a corporate culture, and promote the implementation of the basic elements of safety production. 6. Improve the emergency rescue system and seriously investigate and handle accidents. All oil and gas companies must strengthen emergency rescue work, improve the allocation and equipment of emergency rescue teams, equipment, materials, technology and other resources, prepare accident emergency plans in different levels, and enhance the scientificity and operability of the plans. ； strengthen ties with local * * , contact relevant departments, and conduct publicity and education to surrounding people who may be affected to improve the level of emergency response ； Adhere to prevention first, combine peacetime with wartime, and carry out blowout prevention drills under various working conditions * and emergency drills, and promptly summarize the problems discovered during the drills, revise and improve the plans, and improve emergency response capabilities. All oil and gas companies must establish the concept that an out-of-control blowout is a responsible accident and that accidents are preventable and controllable. They should start from near-miss accidents, minor injury accidents and serious injury accidents, seek truth from facts, conduct in-depth investigations, carefully analyze the causes, draw inferences from one instance, and take preventive measures in a timely manner to reduce ordinary fatal accidents and prevent major accidents. Further standardize the step-by-step reporting system for casualty accidents and complex dangers. Casualty accidents or accidents with a large social impact, involving more than 50 people, and attempted accidents with serious injuries disclosed by the media must be reported to the safety supervision department in accordance with prescribed procedures, time limits and other requirements. For fatal accidents, in accordance with the principle of hierarchical management, safety supervision departments at all levels must work together with relevant departments and in accordance with the principle of "four no-misses" to seriously investigate and deal with, strictly investigate responsibilities, and supervise the implementation of preventive measures. 7. Carry out special safety inspections to eliminate hidden dangers of accidents * * The State Administration of Supervision has listed the prevention of hydrogen sulfide poisoning and the prevention of uncontrolled blowouts as one of the key tasks in the next few years. In the second half of this year, * * The State Administration of Supervision will organize PetroChina, Sinopec, China National Offshore Oil and relevant provincial (regional and municipal) safety supervision bureaus to conduct spot inspections of high-pressure, high-sulfur, high-risk oil and gas fields as well as oil and gas fields that have experienced out-of-control blowout accidents and hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents in recent years. Focus on checking the implementation of key equipment, major measures and systems. All oil and gas companies are requested to organize self-inspections to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning and blowout out of control based on actual conditions, and conduct accident hazard inspections in reservoir engineering, drilling engineering, oil testing and downhole operations, etc., and focus on checking whether the safety facilities and safety distances at well sites, sites and gathering and transportation systems meet the requirements of relevant standards and procedures. Immediate rectification of hidden dangers that may endanger safety ； If rectification cannot be carried out immediately, work must be stopped immediately. At the same time, a specific rectification plan shall be formulated, the person responsible for rectification of hidden dangers and the rectification timetable shall be clearly defined to ensure that the rectification measures are implemented in place. Safety regulatory authorities at all levels and all oil and gas companies are requested to conscientiously implement this. May 31, 2006 Part 1, 5: Urgent Notice from the Shandong Provincial Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau on Strengthening the Safety Production Management in the Processing, Storage and Transportation of High-Sulfur Crude Oil in Petrochemical Enterprises Lu'an Jianfa No. 62 Municipal Work Safety Supervision Bureaus: In recent times, hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents have occurred continuously in some petrochemical companies in our province, causing several casualties and causing heavy losses to people's lives and property. On December 15 last year, a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident occurred when a hazardous chemicals transport vehicle in the high-level loading area of ​​Gaoqing Hongyuan Asphalt Co., Ltd. was loading 60# naphtha processed with high-sulfur crude oil, causing one death and another poisoning. ； On December 18, a hydrogen sulfide leakage and poisoning accident occurred in the atmospheric workshop of Shandong Hengyuan Petrochemical Co., Ltd. due to illegal operations, resulting in 2 deaths and 2 poisonings. On January 28 this year, a leakage valve in the desulfurization tower reflux pump in the refining workshop of the Petrochemical Branch of Shandong Haihua Group Co., Ltd. caused a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident, resulting in one death. ； On March 24, a high-concentration hydrogen sulfide was emitted from the vent hole of an internal floating roof tank containing hydrogenation raw materials at the company, causing hydrogen sulfide poisoning among construction workers near the tank area. Two people died and three others were poisoned. In order to learn lessons from the accident, strengthen safety management in the processing, storage and transportation of high-sulfur crude oil, and strictly prevent hazardous chemical accidents in petrochemical enterprises, the following is an urgent notice:: 1. Attach great importance to the production safety management in the processing, storage and transportation of high-sulfur crude oil. In recent years, with the continuous increase in imported high-sulfur crude oil, the processing volume of high-sulfur crude oil in our province's petrochemical enterprises has increased significantly. Most of the existing refining units designed mainly for domestic low-sulfur crude oil cannot meet the requirements for processing high-sulfur crude oil. The hydrogen sulfide content has increased significantly during the production process. Acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents are on the rise, and hidden dangers such as sulfur corrosion and spontaneous combustion of ferrous sulfide have also been discovered from time to time. In the future, as domestic energy demand continues to increase, the processing proportion of imported high-sulfur crude oil will further expand, and safety issues in the processing, storage and transportation of high-sulfur crude oil will become increasingly prominent. In this regard, safety supervision departments at all levels and relevant enterprises must attach great importance to the safety management of high-sulfur crude oil processing, storage and transportation as an important part of the safety management work of petrochemical enterprises, strengthen leadership, clarify responsibilities, formulate and implement various preventive measures, resolutely prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning and other accidents from occurring, and ensure that the safety production situation of hazardous chemicals in the province continues to be stable. 2. Further improve the safety management system and operating procedures. All petrochemical enterprises that process, store and transport high-sulfur crude oil must strictly abide by relevant laws, regulations and standards such as the Production Safety Law, the Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals, the Safety Standardization Specifications for Hazardous Chemicals Business Units, and based on or refer to the "Safety Management Regulations for Processing High-Sulfur Crude Oil", "Safety Management Regulations on Hydrogen Sulfide Protection" and "Ten Regulations on Preventing Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning" formulated by China Petrochemical Corporation " and "Notice on Phased Results of Research on the Self-heating and Autoignition Properties of Ferrous Sulfide" (attached) and other systems and regulations, combined with its own actual conditions, further improve the safety management system and operating procedures for high-sulfur crude oil processing, storage and transportation, and standardize the safety production management of enterprises and the job operating behaviors of employees from aspects such as crude oil procurement, process control, equipment management, on-site operations, storage and transportation, reconstruction and expansion projects, safety education, emergency rescue, etc. 3. Strict safety management at the work site. All relevant enterprises must formulate and implement corresponding safety measures for areas where hydrogen sulfide leakage may occur, especially for operations such as disassembly of equipment and instruments, installation and removal of blind plates, entry into restricted spaces, dehydration and condensation, sampling analysis, filling, unloading, and measurement of equipment prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning, and strict safety management at the work site. It is necessary to organize and understand the distribution of hydrogen sulfide, draw a sulfur concentration distribution map along the process flow, and set up eye-catching warning signs at dangerous points. ； Fixed hydrogen sulfide monitoring and alarm devices must be installed in accordance with regulations in production equipment, tank areas, etc. that produce, store and transport hydrogen sulfide, and be equipped with portable hydrogen sulfide monitors. ； It is necessary to equip complete and suitable protective equipment to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning according to the different characteristics of production positions and environments. ； It is necessary to formulate practical accident emergency plans and organize regular drills to improve the company's emergency rescue capabilities and employees' self-prevention and self-rescue capabilities to ensure personal safety at the work site. 4. Strengthen safety training for employees. Safety supervision departments at all levels and relevant enterprises must strengthen safety education and training for employees in the processing, storage and transportation of high-sulfur crude oil, enhance the safety awareness of enterprise leaders, safety managers and employees, and continuously improve safety management levels and operational skills. All employees must receive safety education and training in accordance with regulations, be familiar with safety technical operating procedures and various safety management systems, and can only work with a certificate after passing the assessment. The training content should include basic knowledge about hydrogen sulfide, the distribution of hydrogen sulfide at the work site, relevant safety operating procedures and operation management regulations, regulations on the use of protective equipment such as hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments, filtering gas masks, isolation respirators, emergency treatment procedures and first aid measures for acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning, etc. 5. Increase efforts in safety technology transformation. When existing refining units designed mainly for domestic low-sulfur crude oil process high-sulfur crude oil, measures such as changing the sampling and water cutting operations of all hydrogen sulfide-containing media to closed methods as soon as possible, improving the material selection level of hydrogen sulfide enrichment equipment and pipelines, and adding alarms or shutdown chain protection during the production process should be adopted to speed up the updating and transformation of process technology, and continuously improve the intrinsic safety level of production technology and process equipment. Facilities to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning in new construction, reconstruction, and expansion projects must be designed, constructed, and put into use at the same time as the main project, so that the concentration of hydrogen sulfide in the operating environment and downstream products meets the requirements. * * Standard regulations. It is necessary to increase safety investment, increase scientific and technological research efforts, adopt advanced anti-corrosion technology, continuously optimize process safety technical conditions, and eliminate accident hazards from the source. 6. Strengthen supervision and inspection of production safety. All relevant enterprises must act quickly, carefully carry out self-examination and self-correction activities, conduct in-depth searches for potential safety hazards and problems in the processing, storage and transportation of high-sulfur crude oil, and implement rectifications in accordance with the above requirements. All relevant safety evaluation agencies should further enhance their sense of responsibility in their work, regard the above requirements as an important part of the safety evaluation of petrochemical enterprises, conduct careful inspections, and strictly control ； It is necessary to review the completed evaluation report and take timely remedial measures for possible omissions to ensure the quality of the evaluation work. Safety supervision departments at all levels must strengthen safety inspections on the processing, storage and transportation of high-sulfur crude oil, and order those who fail to meet the above requirements to suspend operations for rectification. ； If the requirements are still not met after rectification, please report * * be closed. For accidents caused by illegal production and safety evaluation, relevant units and personnel must be held accountable in accordance with the law. All municipal safety supervision bureaus are requested to quickly convey this notice to all county (city, district) safety supervision bureaus and relevant enterprises within their jurisdiction, and implement it conscientiously. March 30, 2007 Part 2, 1: Regulations on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection in Sulfur-Containing Oil and Gas Fields (Trial) These regulations apply to the safety technical management of hydrogen sulfide gas protection during the exploitation and production of onshore oil and gas fields containing hydrogen sulfide in natural gas and petroleum associated gas within the administrative region of Shandong Province. Chapter 1 Personnel Training Article 1 All personnel working in hydrogen sulfide-containing environments must receive training before taking up their posts, and must obtain a certificate after passing the assessment. Article 2 Training institutions are responsible for training personnel working in hydrogen sulfide-containing environments on hydrogen sulfide safety protection measures. Training institutions should exchange information horizontally at any time and understand international and domestic trends. The qualification identification and management of training institutions are in accordance with the "Production Safety Training Management Measures" (formerly * * The provisions of Work Safety Supervision Bureau Order No. 20) shall be implemented. Article 3 Training materials developed by training institutions should include the following contents:: a) Basic knowledge about hydrogen sulfide ； b) Hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments and methods ； c) Personal safety protection methods and devices ； d) First aid measures for acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning ； e) Safety management regulations for operations in hydrogen sulfide-containing environments. Article 4 Each training time for operating personnel shall not be less than 30 hours, and refresher training shall be conducted every three years. Article 5 Operators should meet the following requirements after training and assessment ； a) Understand the various physical and chemical properties of hydrogen sulfide and its hazards to the human body ； b) Be familiar with the performance, use and maintenance methods of hydrogen sulfide monitors ； c) Be familiar with the structure and performance of various personal safety protection devices, and be able to use and maintain them correctly ； d) Be familiar with the safety regulations and operating procedures for operating in environments containing hydrogen sulfide ； e) In the event of hydrogen sulfide leakage or acute personal poisoning accidents, workers should take self-rescue and mutual rescue measures. Article 6 Education, training and guidance should be provided to outsiders who enter temporary work sites containing hydrogen sulfide, and should be supervised and monitored by dedicated personnel. Chapter 2 Design Management Article 7 In the geological design, the locations of residents, schools, highways and other permanent buildings within 3km around the exploration wells and 2km away from the production wells should be marked, and the nearby geography, landforms, environmental conditions, etc. should be described in detail. Article 8 In the construction design, the road traffic, climate characteristics, and the location of the temporary safety area in the construction area should be described. ； When determining the location of the temporary safety zone, seasonal wind direction should first be considered. A temporary safety zone should always be available when the wind direction changes by 90°. Article 9 In drilling and operation design, the hydrogen sulfide-containing formation, depth and expected hydrogen sulfide content should be indicated. ； It is clear that the casing, drill pipe, blowout pipeline and other pipes and tools used should have sulfur resistance and sulfur resistance grade. Article 10 In drilling design, the depth of technical casing should cover complex formations such as prone to collapse formations, abnormally high pressure formations, and gypsum formations. Article 11 In drilling and operation design, the construction team should be required to install equipment such as blowout preventer combinations and well control manifolds with corresponding pressure levels according to the pressure gradient of the formation. In the design of acidification and fracturing projects for oil (gas, water) wells, the possible production of toxic and harmful gases and preventive measures should be noted. Article 12 In drilling and operation design, the reserve requirements for weighted materials, heavy mud, and sulfur removal agents should be clearly defined ； Specific requirements and explanations should be made for technical parameters such as the PH value (above 9.5) and safety additional density (the upper limit value) of drilling fluid and workover fluid. Article 13 In the design of oil and gas field surface engineering, according to the safety pre-evaluation report, there should be technical safety measures for hydrogen sulfide protection in the special safety chapter. Article 14 In the surface construction and design of oil and gas fields, desulfurization devices or hydrogen sulfide corrosion prevention technology should be designed according to the design specifications. Chapter 3 Risk Identification and Assessment Article 15 The production and construction unit shall conduct a hydrogen sulfide risk assessment on the construction project, delineate a warning range in the construction area, and make obvious warning signs. It is necessary to establish technical files on the hydrogen sulfide-containing construction well numbers, oil and gas gathering and transportation pipelines, and oil and gas gathering and transportation fields (stations) within their respective scopes. Managers at all levels should be familiar with the hydrogen sulfide risk situation within their respective scopes. Article 16 Operators should understand the geography, landform, climate and other conditions of the operating area, and be familiar with escape routes and safety areas. Article 17 The production and construction unit shall conduct risk identification of the work content of each position and take preventive measures for dangerous links. Chapter 4 Operational Safety Management Article 18 When entering an area with unknown hydrogen sulfide concentration, a designated person should be assigned to wear a positive pressure air respirator and carry a portable hydrogen sulfide detector to conduct hydrogen sulfide safety testing. Article 19 In the warning zone, all persons entering must be registered, and irrelevant persons are strictly prohibited from entering. Article 20 Construction units entering hydrogen sulfide-containing areas shall have corresponding qualifications and be reviewed and filed. Before the operation, an instruction book for hydrogen sulfide-containing site operations should be prepared, a briefing on construction technology should be made, safety protection measures should be clarified, and a construction operation permit should be signed. There must be at least two (including two) on-site construction personnel, and on-site guardians must be identified. Article 21 During drilling and operation, pressure tests on blowout preventers and well control manifolds shall be carried out as required. Article 22 Welding is not allowed on site for drilling, operating wellhead and casing connections, and blowout lines. Article 23 Before drilling 100 meters of hydrogen sulfide-containing oil and gas layers, the drilling team should conduct drills in accordance with the hydrogen sulfide prevention emergency plan, and only after receiving acceptance approval can the oil and gas layers be drilled. Before drilling the oil and gas layer in a hydrogen sulfide-containing well, the operation team should conduct drills according to the hydrogen sulfide prevention emergency plan. Article 24 Before tripping in or through oil and gas layers, short-range tripping should be performed first to observe the aftereffects. Article 25 During the drilling and operation process, drilling fluid, workover fluid or clean water should be poured into the wellbore in a timely manner to maintain the fluid column pressure. ； Strengthen on-site monitoring to achieve "early detection, early treatment, and early closure of wells." Article 26 Overflow treatment and well killing operation measures shall comply with the provisions of Chapter 7 of the "Technical Regulations for Drilling Well Control" (SY/T 6426-2005). The treatment of uncontrolled blowout should comply with the provisions of Chapter 9 of the "Technical Regulations for Drilling Well Control" (SY/T 6426-2005). Article 27 During well completion oil testing (testing) construction operations, the direction of the test pipeline should avoid private houses and residential areas. The safe distance between the discharge ignition pit and private houses should be maintained at more than 100 meters. Evacuation measures should be taken when site conditions are restricted. Article 28 During the acidification and pickling process, the pipeline outlet should face the downwind outlet, and a dedicated person should wear an air respirator to detect hydrogen sulfide at the outlet. Article 29 The wellhead, surface process equipment, test pipelines, etc. shall be installed and fixed firmly according to the design requirements, and the pressure test shall be qualified. The drainage pipeline of the separator should be connected to the sewage pool. It is strictly forbidden to not connect the sewage pipeline or directly to the well site. Article 30: Each oil gathering station, gas gathering station, light hydrocarbon station, and oil unloading station involved in the mining of hydrogen sulfide-containing blocks should establish safety records, including production status, hydrogen sulfide content, possible leakage locations, plan location maps, protective measures, etc. Article 31 A combination of fixed and portable hydrogen sulfide detectors should be used for hydrogen sulfide detection at various oil gathering and transportation stations, gas gathering stations, light hydrocarbon stations, oil unloading stations and other stations involved in the mining of hydrogen sulfide-containing blocks. Areas prone to hydrogen sulfide leakage, such as natural gas compression areas, oil and gas sampling areas, and sewage venting areas, should be equipped with eye-catching signs and wind vanes, and fixed detection probes should be installed. Article 32 Inspection personnel in stations (stations) should wear portable hydrogen sulfide detectors when entering the production area. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide in the air exceeds 15 mg/m3 (10ppm), they should be alerted and wear positive pressure air respirators before entering the site. ； When the concentration exceeds 30mg/m3 (20ppm), you should evacuate immediately and take corresponding protective measures. Article 33 The hydrogen sulfide content of natural gas supplied to urban areas for civil use shall comply with * * According to relevant standards, those that fail to meet the standards should be desulfurized at gas (oil) stations or light hydrocarbon stations. The processed natural gas will be used after sampling and testing to meet the standards. Article 34 For key installations that store and process high-sulfur crude oil, such as crude oil storage tanks, stabilization tower devices, sulfur-containing sewage stripping devices, etc., eye-catching hydrogen sulfide warning signs should be installed at the water cutting places of crude oil tanks, floor drains, grease traps, hydrogen sulfide-containing storage tanks, etc. to indicate the characteristics and protection requirements of hydrogen sulfide. Article 35 It is prohibited to carry out manual on-site ruler measurement, temperature measurement (except fixed temperature measurement on the tank wall), replacement, disassembly and inspection of safety accessories on the top of sulfur storage tanks without hydrogen sulfide protection. Article 36 The casing gas process should be connected to the single well production process pipeline network ； Personnel who perform cannula placement on a regular basis should wear a portable hydrogen sulfide detector and a positive pressure air respirator. Article 37 Oil and gas gathering and transportation stations containing hydrogen sulfide should be equipped with eye-catching signs and weather vanes. ； Fixed hydrogen sulfide detection instruments should be installed in the metering room, oil pump room, valve group room, sewage pump room and compressor room of the gas compressor station. It is prohibited to enter the above places alone for maintenance, measurement or process switching and other operations. Article 38 The wellhead installation procedures for production wells, long-stop wells, open wells, and support wells containing hydrogen sulfide should be complete, and wellhead and well site warning signs and weather vanes should be complete. During construction operations, job personnel should be equipped with portable hydrogen sulfide detection instruments and positive pressure air breathing apparatus. Article 39 Oil and gas well stations with a hydrogen sulfide concentration exceeding 15mg/m3 (10ppm) should set up dangerous point source maps that are prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning and emergency evacuation route maps. Article 40 If an oil and gas pipeline ruptures and oil and gas leak, a positive pressure air respirator should be worn during emergency repairs in the work area. Article 41 All oil and gas sampling ports in sealed areas containing hydrogen sulfide should be ventilated ； During drilling and workover operations in hydrogen sulfide-containing oil and gas areas, explosion-proof fans should be installed at the well sites. Chapter 5 Hydrogen Sulfide Detection and Personnel Protection Article 42 Hydrogen sulfide monitors should be fixed or portable monitors. Article 43 When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide needs to be continuously monitored 24 hours a day at the work site, a fixed hydrogen sulfide monitor should be used. The number of probes can be determined based on the number of on-site gas sample measurement points. The monitor probes are placed in areas prone to hydrogen sulfide leakage on site, and the host computer can be installed in a control room away from the site. Operators in hazardous locations should wear portable hydrogen sulfide monitors to monitor changes in hydrogen sulfide concentration in the work area. Article 44 What to do before using the hydrogen sulfide monitor: Main parameters such as a) full-scale non-response time, b) alarm response time, c) alarm accuracy were tested. The hydrogen sulfide monitor must be calibrated regularly during use. Fixed hydrogen sulfide monitors should be calibrated once a year, and portable hydrogen sulfide monitors should be calibrated once every six months. Verification should be done by * * Conducted by the Legal Metrology Department. Article 45 Hydrogen sulfide monitoring shall be carried out in accordance with the Regulations for Hydrogen Sulfide Monitoring and Personal Safety Protection in Sulfur-Containing Oil and Gas Fields (SY/T 6277-2005). Article 46: Configuration of hydrogen sulfide protective equipment for teams involved in hydrogen sulfide area operations and construction: a) Each drilling team is equipped with at least 15 sets of positive pressure respirators, at least 5 portable hydrogen sulfide detectors, 6 fixed probes, and 1 air pump. b) Each operation team is equipped with at least 5 positive pressure respirators and 4 portable hydrogen sulfide detectors. c) Develop and collect hydrogen sulfide protective equipment for units: Each well is equipped with 1 set of positive pressure air breathing apparatus and 1 portable hydrogen sulfide detector. ； The metering station (transfer station) is equipped with 2 sets of positive pressure air respirators and 1-2 portable hydrogen sulfide detectors. The metering room and external pump room are equipped with 2-4 sets of fixed detectors depending on the situation. ； The gathering and transportation station is equipped with 2-5 sets of positive pressure air respirators and 2-5 portable hydrogen sulfide detectors. The export pump room and natural gas compression pump room are equipped with 2-4 sets of fixed hydrogen sulfide detectors depending on the situation. ； The test well team is equipped with 2-5 sets of positive pressure air breathing apparatus and 1-2 portable hydrogen sulfide detectors. ； The maintenance team is equipped with 2-5 sets of positive pressure air respirators and 1-2 portable hydrogen sulfide detectors. ； Other construction units should be equipped with sufficient hydrogen sulfide detection equipment and facilities according to the number of workers. Article 47 On-site hydrogen sulfide detection results should be recorded and archived in a timely manner. Article 48 In the event of a leakage accident during the mining of sulfur-containing oil and gas fields, protective equipment should be worn immediately. Article 49 When working in an environment with high or unclear hydrogen sulfide concentration, positive pressure air respirators should be used. When multiple people work in a sulfur-containing environment for a long time, a positive pressure air supply system should be established. The air compressor pressure of the air supply system is 0.5~0.7MPa, and the air supply volume is calculated as not less than 50L/min per person. Used in conjunction with the air supply system is a positive pressure air breathing device that can be externally connected to the air supply system, or a gas mask with a quick connector. The air supply system should be equipped with an alarm device. Article 50 The following safety protection measures should be adopted when operating in an environment containing hydrogen sulfide: a) Equip corresponding hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments and protective devices according to different operating environments, and have dedicated personnel to manage them so that the hydrogen sulfide monitors and protective devices are in standby state ； b) Wind vanes should be set up in the working environment ； c) The air compressor of the air supply device should be placed on the upwind side ； d) Eye-catching signs, hydrogen sulfide monitoring probes, alarms and exhaust fans should be set up in key monitoring areas. ； e) When entering key monitoring areas for work, hydrogen sulfide monitors and positive pressure air respirators should be worn, and at least two people should travel together.: One person works, one person supervises ； f) When the concentration reaches 10 mg/m3 and the alarm occurs, the operator should check the leak point and prepare protective equipment ； When the concentration reaches 50 mg/m3 and the alarm occurs, quickly turn on the exhaust fan and evacuate people in the downwind direction. Workers should wear protective gear and prohibit the use of electric and gas welding. Rescue personnel should be on alert to identify the cause of the leak, take quick measures to control the leak, and report the situation to superiors. ； g) When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide continues to rise beyond control, enter an emergency state, evacuate irrelevant personnel immediately and implement emergency plans. The personal safety protection requirements during drilling and oil testing, gathering and transportation stations, natural gas purification plants, oil and gas field water treatment stations and reinjection stations shall be implemented in accordance with the relevant regulations in the "Hydrogen Sulfide Monitoring and Personal Safety Protection Regulations for Sulfur-Containing Oil and Gas Fields" (SY/T 6277-2005). Article 51 When entering a confined space with known or potential hydrogen sulfide hazards, a "Confined Space Entry Permit" should be obtained, safety monitoring of toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide and oxygen content should be carried out, and necessary rescue equipment should be equipped. Chapter 6 Emergency Management Article 52 When operating in hydrogen sulfide-containing areas or new exploration areas, an emergency plan for preventing hydrogen sulfide should be established and reported to the local county and township. * * Review and filing. The hazards of hydrogen sulfide, safety matters, evacuation procedures, etc. should be informed in the plan to people within 3 kilometers. Article 53 Units constructing in areas containing hydrogen sulfide should provide on-site personnel with professional emergency training in accordance with the emergency plan and master the relevant contents of the emergency plan. Article 54 The construction unit shall regularly conduct emergency drills to prevent hydrogen sulfide, be proficient, fast, and standardized, and keep emergency drill records. Article 55 Residents within 100 meters of hydrogen sulfide hazard sources should be relocated, residents within 500 meters should sign a relocation agreement, and safety notices should be posted at prominent locations within 3,000 meters. Article 56 Emergency Plan Startup Procedure When the hydrogen sulfide concentration reaches the threshold limit value of 10ppm, a first-level alarm will be activated. At this time, the: a) Check whether the safety equipment functions normally and ensure it is available at any time ； b) Be alert to changes in circumstances ； c) Comply with the instructions of on-site supervision or superiors. When the hydrogen sulfide concentration reaches 20ppm, a secondary alarm will be activated. On-site workers should immediately wear positive pressure respirators and should: a) Immediately arrange for a dedicated person to observe the wind direction and speed to determine the dangerous area affected by the damage ； b) Cut off non-explosion-proof electrical appliances in dangerous areas ； c) Non-operating personnel evacuate the dangerous area ； d) Comply with on-site supervision and instructions from superiors. When the hydrogen sulfide concentration reaches 100ppm (or above), a three-level alarm will be activated. At this time, the: a) Immediately organize the evacuation of on-site personnel and residents in the danger zone ； b) Wear positive pressure respirator protective equipment ； c) Report to superiors (first responsible person and authorized person) ； d) Immediately arrange for dedicated personnel to monitor hydrogen sulfide 100 meters away from the main downwind outlet ； e) Implement well shut-in procedures to control hydrogen sulfide leakage ； f) Notify rescue agencies. Article 57 Warning Range When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide is greater than 10PPm and less than 20ppm, a warning zone is set up within 500 meters from the wellhead. ； When the hydrogen sulfide concentration is greater than 20PPm and less than 100ppm: Set up a warning zone within 1,000 meters from the wellhead ； When the hydrogen sulfide concentration is greater than 100PPm, a warning zone is set up within 3,000 meters from the wellhead. 58. Emergency communication should prepare and keep an emergency communication list, including emergency rescue service agencies, * * Institutions and contact departments, other relevant units, etc. Article 59: Emergency ignition: When there is no hope of on-site control and the safety of life and property needs to be ignited and released, the well site should first ignite the fire and then release the blast. The ignition procedures for oil and gas wells and the ignition decision-maker should be specified in the emergency plan. The well site should be equipped with automatic ignition devices and backup manual ignition devices. Firefighters should wear protective equipment and be no less than 10m away from the fire outlet in the upwind direction. After ignition, the concentration of sulfur dioxide in the downwind direction, especially in the living area of ​​the well site, surrounding residential areas, hospitals, schools and other places where people gather, should be monitored. Article 60 The classification, treatment and contraindications of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning shall be implemented in accordance with the "Diagnostic Standards and Treatment Principles of Occupational Acute Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning" (GB8789-1988). Article 61 These regulations shall be implemented from the date of issuance. Matters not covered and that conflict with relevant laws, regulations and standards shall be governed by relevant laws, regulations and standards. Accident case 1: The "12.23" extremely large natural gas blowout accident at the Northeast Sichuan Gas Mine of Chongqing Kaixian Southwest Oil and Gas Field Branch of PetroChina At 22:15 on December 23, 2003, Luojia 1, Sichuan Northeast Gas Mine of Chongqing Kaixian Southwest Oil and Gas Field Branch of China National Petroleum Corporation A natural gas blowout accident occurred in Well 6H, causing hydrogen sulfide poisoning in the natural gas. 243 residents and well team employees around the well site were poisoned to death, 2,142 people were hospitalized, more than 90,000 people were evacuated in an emergency, and direct economic losses reached 64.3231 million yuan. The huge casualties caused by this accident are rare in the history of gas well blowouts in China and even the world. Well Luojia 16H of PetroChina Sichuan Northeast Gas Mine is located in Xiaoyang Village, 1km east of Gaoqiao Town, Kaixian County, Chongqing. The well site is located in a small mountain depression. There are more than 60 farmers scattered within 300m around the well site, and the nearest one is less than 50m away from the well site. The local area belongs to the mountainous area of ​​​​Bunzhou, and the road traffic conditions are very poor. Well Luojia 16H is a horizontal development well arranged on a cluster well field. It is planned to drill and exploit high-sulfur natural gas (hydrogen sulfide content 7~10.44%) in the Feixianguan oolitic shoal gas reservoir in Luojiazhai. At 2:52 on December 23, 2003, Well Luojia 16H was drilled to a depth of 4049.68m. Due to the replacement of drilling tools, the drilling began normally. At 21:55, the mud logger found that the mud logging instrument showed abnormalities in the density, conductivity, outlet temperature, and hydrocarbon components of the drilling fluid, and the total volume of the drilling fluid increased. The mud crew immediately ran onto the platform through the outlet of the drilling fluid conduit to report a blowout to the driller, who issued a blowout alarm. The driller stopped tripping, lowered the drilling tool, and prepared to connect the top drive shut-off cock. However, when lowering the drilling tool more than ten meters, a blowout occurred and the lower part of the top drive caught fire. The blowout preventer is fully closed through the remote console, the drill pipe is flattened, the fire intensity is reduced, and the drilling fluid sprayed from the drill pipe that is not completely flattened extinguishes the top drive fire. It was planned to lift the top drive and break the drill pipe above the fully enclosed area, but failed. The drilling pump was started to inject weighted drilling fluid into the annulus pump inside the wellbore. Because the valve of the wellsite blowout line connected to the wellbore annulus was not closed, the weighted drilling fluid sprayed out from the blowout prevention line. The internal blowout continued. At around 22:04, the blowout was completely out of control. The ignition was successful at around 15:55 on the 24th. The unignited release of high-sulfur natural gas lasted for about 18 hours. After careful deployment and full preparation, on-site rescue personnel successfully killed the well on December 27, ending this huge blowout accident. After investigation by the Accident Investigation Team of the State Council, the accident was determined to be a liability accident. Relevant personnel underestimated the extremely high gas volume in Luojia Well 16H ； High sulfur content and high yield natural gas water * * The drilling technology is immature ； Before tripping, the drilling fluid circulation time is seriously insufficient. ； During the drilling process, illegal operations were performed, and the filling of drilling fluid did not comply with regulations. ； Failure to detect overflow signs in time are the main factors leading to blowouts. Relevant personnel illegally removed the back pressure valve on the drill string, which was the direct cause of the out-of-control blowout. Failure to take timely measures to ignite the nozzle line caused a large amount of natural gas containing high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide to erupt and spread. The emergency plan was not perfect, safety protection facilities were insufficient, and surrounding people were not evacuated in a timely manner, resulting in increased accident casualties and a large number of poisoning casualties. Accident case 2: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in Well 48, Zhao County, Shijiazhuang City, North China Oilfield. At 15:00 on September 28, 1993, a pilot well (numbered Well Zhao 48) in the North China Oil Field located in Zhao County, near Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province, suffered a blowout during the oil test perforation operation. A large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas in the formation erupted from the wellhead, and the poisonous gas spread to more than 80 villages in 10 towns. Seven people died, 24 were moderately poisoned, and more than 440 people were mildly poisoned. 226,000 nearby villagers were evacuated. Well Zhao 48 is located 700m north of Songcheng Village, Gezi Township, Zhao County, Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province. It is a pre-exploration well. Good oil-bearing indications were seen during drilling. In order to clarify the underground situation, it was decided to conduct layer-by-layer oil testing of the well. On the afternoon of September 28, 1993, the perforating team of the physics station of the North China Oilfield Downhole Operation Company perforated the oil well and detonated the perforating bomb 10 minutes later. When starting to lift the cable, an overflow occurred at the wellhead. The amount of overflow gradually increased, and there were bubbles in the overflow water. After all the cables were lifted out of the well, Li, the deputy captain of the operation team, immediately led the five workers on duty to grab the main gate that had been prepared in advance. When preparing to close the casing gate, hydrogen sulfide gas was ejected along with the killing fluid, light oil and natural gas, causing a worker on site to be poisoned and passed out. Other personnel quickly lifted the worker away from the site. When others tried to return, the concentration of sulfide gas erupted increased and the workers had to evacuate from the wellhead. After withdrawing from the well site, Li promptly reported to his superiors and notified the villagers of the transfer. From the night of the 28th to the morning of the 29th, the rescue headquarters organized experts to conduct in-depth field inspections, formulate rescue plans, and prepare rescue equipment and machinery. On the morning of the 29th, a 16-member rescue team from the Drilling and Combination Bureau of the National Petroleum Corporation approached the wellhead wearing gas masks. With the support of the local garrison's chemical defense troops and the well hydrocarbon mine rescue team, five rescue team members from the North China Oilfield closed the casing gates on the left and right wings of the wellhead. At 9:20, the rescue team completely controlled the blowout. It took 18 hours from the blowout to controlling the blowout. According to the investigation, the main cause of the accident was: During the oil testing operation, it was not foreseen that the well contained hydrogen sulfide. ； The execution system of the work team is not strict ； Construction was not organized strictly in accordance with design requirements. Accident case 3: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident in Wenquan 4 Well of Sichuan Petroleum Administration Bureau At 17:00 on March 22, 1998, when the Wenquan 4 Well (gas well) of Sichuan Petroleum Administration Bureau was drilling to about 1869 meters, an overflow occurred. After shutting in, during the process of preparing well killing mud and plugging leakage, 3 At around 5:40 a.m. on September 23, natural gas naturally escaped through coal mine mining fissures into the Hantianba Coal Mine and small township coal mines in Kaijiang, Sichuan Province near the well site, causing the death of 11 miners working in the small township coal mines, 13 people being poisoned, and one person being burned. This well is an exploratory well drilled by the 6020 team of the Chuandong Drilling Company of the Sichuan Petroleum Administration Bureau on the high point of the Carboniferous structure in the footwall of the western section of the Wenquan Well structure. The designed well depth is 4,650 meters. The drilling target layer is the Carboniferous. During the drilling process of the Xiangxi to Jiasan section (609.5 to 1747m) using ρml.07 to 1.14g/cm3, multiple well leakage occurred, with the leakage rate ranging from 2.5 to 30m3/h, with a cumulative loss of drilling fluid of 473.6m3 and bridge plug drilling fluid of 105.8m3. On March 18, when drilling with mud with a density of 1.09g/cm3 to a depth of 1835.9m, there was a slight surge at the wellhead, and there was no obvious change in the logging parameters. The gas collection ignited and did not burn. There was a slight fluctuation during drilling. The density increased from 1.09 to 1.14g/cm3 and the leakage rate was 2 to 8m3/h. A weak aftereffect was seen during drilling, and the lithology was dolomite. At 17:35 on March 22, a well surge occurred when the well was drilled to a depth of 1869.60m. The liquid level rose by 5m3, and the drilling fluid density dropped from 1.13 to 1.11g/cm3. The surge was violent and the well was shut down at 17:40. The well was shut down for observation at 7:02 on March 23. The vertical pressure ranged from 0 to 8.5MPa and the casing pressure ranged from 0↗7.9Mpa. ； Ignition and blowout at 8:40, reverse injection from 10:46 to 12:15, 30m3 of bridge plug drilling fluid with a density of 1.45g/cm3 ； The well killing was invalid and shut in at 13:00. The blowout was ignited at 3:50 on March 24. Hydrogen sulfide was present in the ejection. Due to the shallow depth of the casing, long open holes and many leakage layers, intermittent blowout had to be carried out. ； At 3:10 on the 25th, orange-red flames with a height of 7 to 15 meters were released to prepare for well killing. At 8:00 on March 26, the cement truck pipeline pressure test was 20MPa. A mud pump was used to inject 6m3 of clean water. The pump pressure was Pd7.9↗16Mpa. The positive circulation was blocked. The mud pump was used to inject clean water intermittently and hold back the pressure. The unloading kelly pipe connected the lower cock, back pressure valve and pressure hold tee, and used a 70 The Type 0 fracturing truck intermittently held back 3.6m3 of clean water into the drilling tool, and the pump pressure was from 0↗20MPa↘0. After holding down the pressure, the nozzle line was opened and the spray was violent. Between 17:55 and 18:30, a lot of liquid was seen spraying out of the outlet, and the sound of rock debris impacting in the nozzle line was heard. Because there was no passage inside the drilling tool, it was decided to shoot the drilling tool open and establish a circulation channel to create conditions for killing the well. Use 41 rounds of Type 51 perforating projectiles to open the drill pipe in the drilling tool at the depth of 1693.7~1689.93m. The outlet spray power fluctuates from weak to strong. Due to insufficient mud displacement and total volume, the well killing was unsuccessful. On March 29, 3 cement trucks were used to inject 54m3 of clean water into the drilling tool. Two mud pumps and one 986 cement truck were used to inject 158m3 of mud with ρml.80g/cm3. The spray force weakened and the two blowout lines were closed. ； Inject 55m3 of bridge slurry with a concentration of 10% ρml.45g/cm3 and 82m3 of mud with ρm1.80g/cm3. The spray potential continues to weaken, but no mud returns. Five cement trucks were used to inject 180t of quick-drying cement and pure gas was sprayed at the outlet. The fire intensity weakened. Two 986 cement trucks were used to replace 14m3 of clean water. There was no spray potential at the outlet and the nozzle line was closed. A cement truck was used to backfill 19m3 of bridge grout. After 10 times of back-injection (grouting), the leakage was plugged by 62.22m3 of bridge slurry. As of 8:00 on April 3, the well was shut down for observation. The vertical pressure and casing pressure were both zero, and the accident was resolved. The accident lasted 254 hours. During the well killing process, sulfur-containing natural gas (sulfur content 0.379~0.539g/m3) entered the nearby coal kiln, causing the death of 11 migrant workers, 1 burn, and 13 poisoning. What this accident tells us: When determining the location of a well, workplaces for mining underground resources such as coal mines should be thoroughly understood and calibrated, and detailed and feasible preventive measures should be formulated to avoid associated accidents with the well accident. Before the formation to be drilled, especially the carbonate formation, is not fully understood, the design of drilling projects is full of uncertainties and risks. During construction, corresponding design adjustments must be made in a timely manner according to changes in underground conditions. If this well could have run the Ф244.5mm casing in advance after the first overflow was shown, the complicated situation of underground blowout caused by overflow shut-in and forced blowout on the ground might not have occurred. There are at least three leakage layers in the large section of the open hole above the production layer of this well. The consequences of drilling the production layer without eradicating the leakage layer will of course be serious. part two, two: Provisions on the safety management of hydrogen sulfide protection in metal and non-metal mines (Trial) Article 1 These regulations apply to the safety technical management of hydrogen sulfide protection in metal and non-metal mines containing hydrogen sulfide gas within the administrative region of Shandong Province. Article 2 For new construction, reconstruction, and expansion projects of mining enterprises with hydrogen sulfide gas, hydrogen sulfide protection safety facilities shall be designed, constructed, and put into production and use at the same time as the main project. Investment in safety facilities should be included in the project budget. Article 3 Metal and non-metal mines containing hydrogen sulfide gas should establish and improve information including geological maps containing hydrogen sulfide distribution, mine general layout plans, ventilation system maps, disaster evacuation route maps and other information. Article 4 Relevant knowledge of hydrogen sulfide, monitoring instruments and usage methods, personal safety protection methods and devices, first aid measures for hydrogen sulfide poisoning, relevant safety management regulations, etc. shall be an important part of the safety training for workers before taking up their posts. After passing the assessment, they can start work with a certificate. Article 5: For areas where geological data provide water or where there are many faults or fissures, and where hydrogen sulfide gas is expected to accumulate, drill advance drilling to release or block hydrogen sulfide gas in advance. The water produced in the mine will be accompanied by the overflow of a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas. Therefore, areas where water may be produced should be drilled in advance to avoid sudden overflow of hydrogen sulfide. Article 6 Advance drilling to explore hydrogen sulfide gas: ⑴In new mining sites, 1×1 meter hydrogen sulfide encryption holes must be drilled within 5 meters from the door. ； There are complete hydrogen sulfide releases within 20 meters of the excavation or mining room during normal construction (only release eyes are installed on the rake loader surface and scraper surface but no releasers are installed). The release material is made of soft pipes (such as used bicycle tires, etc.), and the length must not be less than 0.5 meters. ⑵During the excavation and mining process, drill a row of hydrogen sulfide release holes every 1.3m in the tunnel or mining room floor, 2 holes in each row, with the hole depth not less than 1.4m (or 0.2m deep into the shale), one hole 1.0m away from the two holes. ⑶When drilling head-on, drill two advanced release holes on the base plate with an angle of 45° forward. When drilling holes, the personnel should stand in the fresh air flow (upwind side) of the blower outlet, keep their faces away from the eye openings, and use a hydrogen sulfide detector to continuously check the concentration of hydrogen sulfide gas in the tunnel on site. Article 7 Water exploration, geological drilling, grouting and other work must have special prevention and control measures for hydrogen sulfide ； There must be a special design. Personnel must be located upwind of the incoming air flow or fresh air and must not face construction drilling holes. ； On-site communications, rescue facilities, monitoring instruments, etc. are complete and reliable. When water or gas is discovered, personnel must evacuate immediately and must not pull out drilling tools. Signs of water (hydrogen sulfide) produced during drilling: ①Sweat on the wall of the tunnel ② The temperature at the site drops ③ Fog appears ④ Water comes out of the borehole or the water volume increases ⑤ Water comes out of the borehole or is accompanied by bubbles ⑥ The drill is jacked or dropped ⑦ There is the sound of water flow ⑧ The drilling sound becomes brittle and lighter. Article 8 Improve the ventilation system to ensure 24-hour air supply in the mine. The mining surface (room) must form a reasonable ventilation system before mining. It is strictly forbidden for fans to generate circulating wind and prevent unplanned wind outages. Once the power is cut off, the staff must be evacuated. After the power is turned on, the hydrogen sulfide content must be checked before starting work. Article 9 Strengthen local ventilation management. The distance between the air cylinder mouth and the head-on hydrogen sulfide anomaly area shall not exceed 5 meters. Before restoring ventilation to a tunnel that has been temporarily shut down, hydrogen sulfide must be checked. (1) The local fan that supplies air to the mining room must be located in the fresh air flow, and the distance from the return air outlet of the mining room must not be less than 30m, and the power of the local fan must not be less than 11kw ； The head end of the excavation must adopt a mixed ventilation method. A 5.5kw local fan is used to supply air to the head end, and an 11kw local fan is used to discharge sewage air outward. The distance from the incoming local fan to the head end is 50-80m, and the distance between two local fans must not be less than 20m. (2) For newly started excavation working faces and mining houses, the construction unit must install local fans in advance and connect the air ducts to ensure that the local fans can operate normally. Diffusion ventilation is strictly prohibited when the length of tunnels or mining rooms exceeds 6 meters. (3) Local fan installation and air duct management: a) The local fan is fully equipped, the air suction inlet has a windshield and a rectifier, and the high-voltage part has a liner to prevent air leakage. The local fan is placed on the stand or on the shelf, and the height above the ground is greater than 0.3 meters. b) Local fans must have part-time drivers and be managed with signs. During construction, it is strictly prohibited to stop the wind at will. When the wind stops, people must be evacuated. The local fan starting device must be located in the (full negative pressure) fresh air flow (other than the local fan). c) The distance from the end of the air duct to the head should not be greater than 10m (in special locations where the hydrogen sulfide concentration is greater than 5ppm, it should not be greater than 5m). d) The air duct must be hung flat, straight, stable and tight, with a height of not less than 1.5 meters from the bottom plate, and must be hung at every turn without extrusion. e) The air duct joint is tight and does not leak air (no feeling is felt 0.1m away from the joint), has no breaks (except 20m from the end), and has no inverted joints. The soft air duct joint must have double back pressure edges. f) The air duct should be turned with an elbow or a slow turn. It is strictly forbidden to make a dead turn less than 90o. A transition joint should be used in the air duct with different diameters. Larger first and then smaller, no splicing is allowed. Use an iron hair dryer to pass the wall. Article 10 If hydrogen sulfide flows out of an abnormal area, series ventilation is prohibited. Article 11 When restoring ventilation in a closed tunnel, ventilation restoration measures should be formulated to prevent any wind from blowing. Article 12 It must be at least 30 minutes after the blast is fired to enter the hydrogen sulfide anomaly area. It is strictly prohibited to remove the air blower when firing. After the warning for firing is lifted, the squad leader and the firing crew will jointly go in and check the hydrogen sulfide gas, roof, etc. from the outside in. ； Only when the blasting is confirmed to be normal and the hydrogen sulfide concentration in the tunnel is below 10mg/m3 can the operator enter the workplace. Article 13 Hydrogen sulfide should be regularly tested, dynamically monitored and managed, and the hydrogen sulfide shift inspection system should be strictly implemented. Strict hydrogen sulfide inspection handover system and hydrogen sulfide report approval system. ⑴Mines and mining operations with hydrogen sulfide gas should be equipped with qualified hydrogen sulfide detection alarms and implement continuous detection. ； ⑵Hydrogen sulfide inspection boards should be set up in mining work. Hydrogen sulfide inspectors should check at least twice per shift and fill in the inspection boards and inspection manuals in a timely manner. ； ⑶The daily hydrogen sulfide inspection report should fill in the inspection time, location, concentration and inspector of all underground mining operations. The mine chief engineer and the mine manager in charge must review and sign the daily report. ⑷The part-time hydrogen sulfide gas inspector of the mining unit is served by the shift leader, who is responsible for checking the concentration of hydrogen sulfide gas in and around the construction site at any time. Article 14 When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exceeds the limit (reaching 10 mg/m3 and above), it is strictly prohibited to operate, evacuate personnel, and strengthen ventilation. Production can only be resumed when the concentration of hydrogen sulfide drops below the safe concentration. Article 15 The hydrogen sulfide detector should be a portable detector, which must be hung within 5 meters of the working place, with a hanging height of about 1.5 meters. ； A hydrogen sulfide detector is fixed (suspended) near the driver's head at the work site where a scraper is used. ； Where a rake loader is used, a hydrogen sulfide detector is fixed at the driver's office. Article 16. Quantity of hydrogen sulfide gas detectors. Each underground mining construction site should be equipped with at least 1 unit, and the mining working surface using scrapers should be equipped with 2-3 units (check based on actual conditions) ； 1 small-shift safety supervisor on duty ； While the mine can meet the needs of the mining site, there should be no less than 2 backup units. When there is a temporary surplus of hydrogen sulfide detectors in the mining working face, the surplus detectors should be hung in the stage tunnel (in the air inlet direction of the workers on the return air side). Article 17 Mine safety management departments and supply companies must pay close attention to the updated development of hydrogen sulfide detectors, and promptly select hydrogen sulfide detectors that are small, economical, durable, responsive, and have loud alarm sounds. Article 18 Strengthen roof and floor management. Ensure sufficient roof protection paste thickness, and leave a paste layer of no less than 0.5m as a protective layer on the floor to ensure the integrity of the mine room. Under special circumstances, when the thickness of the floor protective layer cannot be guaranteed, mining can be carried out along the floor. Article 19 Strictly limit the number of mining rooms and mining methods on the working face. That is, a maximum of 4 mining rooms can be mined simultaneously along the direction of each working face and retreat mining must be adopted. Article 20 When the mining working face is in production, it is strictly prohibited to construct other tunnels on the working face. Article 21 The completed mining area must be evacuated within 5 days and sealed within 10 days. Warning signs should be set before sealing. Measures should be taken to prevent people from accidentally entering unventilated mining rooms or tunnels. Article 22 If it is really necessary to work in a non-ventilated or return air tunnel, special measures must be formulated and coordinated by the mine dispatching room. At least 2 people must be 5-6m apart from the front and rear. A hydrogen sulfide detector (carry an oxygen detector if necessary) must be used to check harmful gases in the tunnel. When the hydrogen sulfide concentration reaches 10 mg/m3, personnel must evacuate immediately. Article 23 When entering the goaf area, the concentration of harmful gases and oxygen must be checked, and entry can only be made after confirming safety. Article 24 Sporadic underground construction tasks must have hydrogen sulfide prevention measures that are consistent with the actual conditions on site. Article 25 When hearing the alarm of the hydrogen sulfide detector, personnel must evacuate immediately and take measures to confirm whether hydrogen sulfide is prominent after arriving at a safe place. Article 26 When a hydrogen sulfide outburst accident occurs, the person who discovered it must immediately issue a warning to the on-site personnel, quickly evacuate along the disaster evacuation route, and at the same time call the mine dispatching room to call the police. ； Alarm content: Time, location, degree of hazard, rescue requirements, contact number, caller, etc. Article 27 After receiving an alarm, the mine dispatching room must immediately report to the mine leaders, mine duty personnel, production technology, safety management and other departments, and notify the medical office and vehicle management department to complete rescue and vehicle preparations. If necessary, the injured shall be sent to higher-level hospitals for rescue. Article 28 Upon receiving a warning or evacuation order for a hydrogen sulfide outburst accident, all personnel should remain calm, hold their breath, and quickly evacuate to a safe location (full wind pressure into the air flow). If the distance is too long, open the air inlet duct for rapid ventilation. Article 29 Necessary oxygen breathing apparatus and self-rescuers should be equipped up and down the well to prevent the scope of accidents from expanding during hydrogen sulfide poisoning rescue. In the hydrogen sulfide abnormality area, each mining working face is equipped with 2 oxygen respirators as required, and the well is lifted and inspected once every 5 days. The use of oxygen respirators is as follows: (1) Wear an oxygen respirator and tie a belt ； (2) Turn on the oxygen outlet switch (turn counterclockwise) ； (3) Remove the rubber plug inside the mask ； (4) Wear a mask ； (5) If you feel that the oxygen supply is insufficient, press the manual air supply valve (black button on the air lung) ； (6) If rescuers need to communicate with each other, they can press the whistle on the strap (the number of presses is agreed upon by yourself). Article 30: When someone is found to be poisoned, personnel at the accident scene must wear oxygen respirators and other rescue equipment (at least 2 people) under the unified command of the squad leader or on-site management personnel, or use a local fan installed in the fresh air flow followed by an air duct to enter and transport the poisoned person to the fresh air flow. It is strictly prohibited to enter blindly and cause the accident to amplify. Article 31: After the poisoned person is transported to a safe place, the condition of the poisoned person should be checked immediately. If breathing stops, the mucus, dentures, blood clots, sediment, powder, etc. in the mouth and nose of the poisoned person should be quickly dug out and artificial respiration should be performed. If you are breathing, get yourself to the hospital quickly. Article 32 The chief engineer of the mine (main technical person in charge) shall regularly organize professional and technical personnel to analyze and study the occurrence patterns of hydrogen sulfide gas in mines, outburst signs and prevention and control measures, and constantly improve the emergency rescue plan for hydrogen sulfide gush accidents. Article 33 These regulations will be implemented from the date of issuance. Any matters not covered and that conflict with the provisions of relevant laws, regulations and standards will be implemented in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws, regulations and standards. Accident case 1: Shandong Province Sanhekou Mining Co., Ltd. (Lunan Prison) Taiwen Gypsum Mine "10.8" hydrogen sulfide eruption poisoning accident At about 3:45 a.m. on October 8, 2006, Shandong Province Sanhekou Mining Co., Ltd. (Lunan Prison) Taiwen Gypsum Mine (constructed by China Coal No. 71 Engineering Office) was digging underground * * When exploring water in the wind tunnel of the reservoir, hydrogen sulfide gas erupted instantly, causing poisoning and suffocation, resulting in one death. The Taiwen Gypsum Mine of Shandong Province Sanhekou Mining Co., Ltd. (Lunan Prison) is located in Mazhuang Town, Daiyue District, Tai'an City. The total reserves of the mining area are 461.5086 million tons. The mine is designed to have a service life of 70 years. The mining scale is 300,000 tons/year. The total area of ​​the mining area's ground buildings is 22,666 square meters. Currently, the mine is being constructed by the China Coal No. 71 Engineering Office and is currently undergoing the second phase of the project, which is mainly uphill and * * Development and construction of the library ； It belongs to the infrastructure construction period and has one certificate and one license. The "Mining License" number is 3700000320190 and the "Business License" registration number is 3709001901187. It is expected to be completed in 2007. On the night shift on October 8, 2006, the 71st Engineering Office of China Coal was working underground in the Taiwen Gypsum Mine. * * The reservoir enters the wind tunnel to conduct water exploration work before excavation. There were 3 people on duty. After checking various safety protection measures, they started drilling the 3# hole. At about 1 a.m. on October 8, the company's safety inspector went to the working surface to conduct a hydrogen sulfide patrol. At that time, the hydrogen sulfide detector read 3 ppm and made a record. around 3: When the probe reached 55m in about 45 minutes, suddenly high-concentration H2S gas in the hole was sprayed out instantly along with water (the water volume was about 50m3/h, the H2S concentration exceeded the instrument range, and the instrument was damaged. Sun Yubao, the monitor on duty, immediately yelled after finding out: “Out of water” ； When the two workers evacuated after hearing the shouting, they turned around and saw Sun Yubao lying on his back. They immediately called to report to the ground. Then they took the ventilator and went to the front. They took Sun Yubao's arm and dragged him to a fresh place in the alley. Then they took turns to carry Sun Yubao on their backs and started to carry him to the wellhead. At the same time, the personnel on duty of the 71st Engineering Office of China Coal Group immediately organized personnel to go down to the mine for rescue after receiving the report, and promptly contacted the 120 emergency center. The ground rescue personnel encountered the poisoned person while going up the mountain in the 1# return wind. They transported them to the ground together and were immediately sent to Tai'an Affiliated Hospital by ambulance for rescue. After resuscitation failed, Sun Yubao died at around 9:10 am on October 8, 2006. After investigation by the accident investigation team, the mine did not have problems with inadequate safety management, improper safety measures, or illegal operations by workers. According to the analysis of relevant experts, the hydrogeological conditions in the Dawenkou area where the Taiwen Gypsum Mine is located are complex and there is a lack of clear rules for the occurrence of hydrogen sulfide. The direct cause of the accident was: High-concentration hydrogen sulfide (or hydrogen sulfide gas coexisting with water) under a certain pressure and dissolved in water is suddenly ejected, causing on-site personnel to inhale high-concentration hydrogen sulfide gas and be poisoned. The accident was caused by high-pressure hydrogen sulfide gas and water encountered during water exploration, and was obviously unpredictable. It is a non-responsible accident. Accident case 2: Hunan Chenzhou Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. "9.13" accident On September 13, 2007, the residual ore operation team of the Jiugong District of Hunan Chenzhou Yaogangxian Mining Co., Ltd. was poisoned during ore dressing operations in the No. 69 vein exploration tunnel in the 15th middle section. 14 people were poisoned, and 5 of them died. Hunan Yaogang Xian Mining Co., Ltd. is affiliated to Hunan Nonferrous Metals Holding Group Co., Ltd. Its predecessor is Yaogang Xian Tungsten Mine. It has complete mining licenses, safety production licenses and other certificates, and has an annual output of more than 2,000 tons of first-class wolframite concentrate. In September 2004, the mine was included in the bankruptcy and closure plan due to insolvency. On March 8, 2007, the Chenzhou Intermediate People's Court declared Yaogang Xian Tungsten Mine bankrupt. On the same day, Yaogang Xian Mining Co., Ltd. officially took over the assets of operating Yaogang Xian Tungsten Mine. From January to August this year, Yaogang Xian Mining Co., Ltd. produced 1,695 tons of black tungsten concentrate, of which 751 tons of residual ore was recovered. In March 2007, Wang Xifang, a native of Guangxi, with the consent of Liu Wei, the team leader of the 9th Working Area of ​​the 15th Middle Section of the company, brought his own personnel to carry out chemical mineral processing operations in the 15th Middle Section without authorization. The process flow is to collect and crush the tailings, then use a chute to wash away the waste sand and gravel, leaving behind heavy sand containing sulfur and arsenic (gross concentrate), and then use butyl xanthate and concentrated sulfuric acid to desulfurize and remove arsenic from the heavy sand, turning the crude concentrate into concentrate. Butyl xanthate is a commonly used mineral processing agent. Its chemical name is hydrocarbyl dithiocarbonate. It reacts chemically with sulfuric acid to produce hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide and carbon disulfide gas. At 8 o'clock in the morning on September 13, after Wang Xifang received the notice of Liu Weijiao concentrate, he led Wang Xiaolong and other 6 people to the middle of the No. 69 vein prospecting tunnel. They first roughly selected the tailings, and then spread them on the cement floor together with the 2,000 kilograms of heavy sand originally stored. They spread butyl xanthate and stirred evenly. Finally, two small ditches were dug out of the flat heavy sand and poured with concentrated sulfuric acid. The personnel evacuated to a guard point with fresh wind for lunch. At around 13:00, 7 people who had had lunch arrived at the accident site in two groups. Unknown to the fact that the toxic gas at the accident site had seriously exceeded the standard, 7 people were poisoned and fell to the ground one after another. At around 13:10, after the worker who was responsible for guarding heard the cry, he immediately called eight people working nearby to participate in the rescue. Seven of them were poisoned and fell down one after another without taking any measures. Rescue workers who arrived later covered their faces with soaked clothes, rescued the poisoned people in two batches, and sent them to the hospital for rescue. The accident caused 14 people to be poisoned, 5 of whom died after resuscitation failed, and the other 9 poisoned people were out of danger after rescue. People of Hunan Province * * An accident investigation team was established on September 16. After preliminary analysis of the cause of the accident, it was determined that this was a liability accident. The direct cause of the accident was: The operators violated regulations and standards such as the "Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals", the "Safety Regulations for Metal and Non-Metal Mines", as well as the company's relevant regulations on the recovery of residual ores, entered the abandoned blind alley without permission, and conducted chemical mineral processing operations underground in violation of regulations. During the operation, the toxic gas produced by the reaction between butyl xanthate, concentrated sulfuric acid and ore seriously exceeded the standard, causing acute poisoning. The rescue personnel lacked safety knowledge and equipment and performed rescue operations blindly, leading to further expansion of the accident. The indirect cause of the accident was: 1. Safety management is managed by contract, and the management of the residual mining operation site is chaotic. The enterprise's safety management network is not sound, safety officers are not deployed at the operating surface, and illegal underground operations are not discovered and stopped in a timely manner. The safety production of the residual ore recycling team has not been included in the unified management of the enterprise, and no "three-level" safety education has been provided to the operating personnel. 2. Poor ventilation management. Due to the implementation of residual mining operations in recent years and the lack of effective management, the original ventilation system in the operation area was destroyed, and some blind alleys were not closed in time as required. ； The fan was placed in the wrong position and the air duct fell off, causing a dirty air circulation. As a result, there was no fresh air flow at the accident site and toxic and harmful gases could not be discharged. 3. Occupational disease prevention and control work is absent, and labor management is not standardized. There is no pre-job physical examination or pre-job training for the workers who take up the job, and there is no regular testing of toxic substances in the workplace. The phenomenon of private recruitment of workers in work teams is serious. The company has not signed a labor contract with the privately recruited workers, and the privately recruited workers have not participated in work-related injury insurance. 4. There is no emergency rescue plan for poisoning accidents, no personal protective equipment for emergency rescue of poisoning accidents, no training for workers on emergency rescue of poisoning accidents, and no relevant emergency drills. Part Two, Three: Regulations on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection in Refining and Chemical Enterprises (Trial) In order to prevent the occurrence of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, refining and chemical enterprises and design and construction units should strictly implement these regulations during the production process. ； Business units should refer to these regulations for implementation. Chapter 1 Design Management Article 1 Strengthen the safety management of the design department and implement the safety production responsibility system of design units and designers. Article 2 All new construction, reconstruction and expansion projects shall be strictly carried out in accordance with * * Design in accordance with relevant provincial laws, regulations and standards. Article 3 The design must consider the impact of uneven sulfur content in crude oil (non-uniformity). The matching capabilities of processing equipment should be considered according to the harsh conditions that may be achieved. Equipment and pipeline materials should be reasonably selected in accordance with the "Guidelines for the Design and Selection of Main Equipment for Key Equipment for Processing High-Sulfur Crude Oil" (SH/T3096----2001) and "Guidelines for the Design and Selection of Main Pipelines for Key Equipment for Processing High-Sulfur Crude Oil" (SH/T3129-2002). Article 4 The design capabilities of liquefied gas, dry gas desulfurization devices, sulfur-containing sewage stripping devices, and acid gas recovery and sulfur production devices shall ensure that product quality is qualified and environmental protection standards are met. Article 5 Equipment anti-corrosion measures should be taken into consideration during design. For equipment and pipelines rich in hydrogen sulfide, the material selection should be of a higher grade to prevent hydrogen sulfide corrosion and leakage. Article 6 When designing new equipment, appropriate equipment anti-corrosion testing, inspection tools, hydrogen sulfide and combustible gas detection alarms, safety protection equipment, etc. should be equipped. Article 7 The hot and cold high-temperature liquid level meters and interface meters of the hydrogenation unit should adopt a dual-instrument measurement system. Chapter 2 Production Management Article 8 In new construction, reconstruction, and expansion projects where hydrogen sulfide hazards exist, facilities to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning should be designed, constructed, and put into use at the same time as the main project. Article 9 The crude oil purchasing department should rationally organize resources based on the ability to process high-sulfur crude oil, and the crude oil resource allocation department should do a balanced job of entering the plant so that the sulfur content does not exceed the device design specification. Article 10 The production process containing sulfides should start with the analysis and evaluation of the sulfur content in the raw materials. Based on the analysis and evaluation of the hydrogen sulfide concentration in the production environment and operating points during the production process, dynamic hydrogen sulfide distribution maps such as total sulfur and hydrogen sulfide distribution should be established. The distribution map of hydrogen sulfide along the process flow should be drawn according to different types of crude oil. Corresponding processing plans, processes, equipment, safety management measures and regulations should be formulated, strict job operating procedures or operating methods should be implemented, and process anti-corrosion technical measures should be reasonably adopted. Article 11 When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exceeds the allowable content due to changes in raw material components, processing procedures, equipment modifications or changes in operating parameters, the production, technical equipment and safety management and other competent departments should promptly notify the relevant workshops, teams or positions of changes. The main device control room should be equipped with a dynamic display board for the sulfur or hydrogen sulfide content of sulfur-containing raw materials (medium). Article 12 Enterprises that process high-sulfur crude oil must formulate corresponding processing technology plans based on the conditions of crude oil entering the factory. When production is allowed, measures for mixing high-sulfur crude oil and low-sulfur crude oil should be adopted to control the sulfur content of crude oil processed by distillation units below the design value. At the same time, the production balance is optimized to ensure sufficient desulfurization capacity, so that the sulfur content of raw materials in downstream devices is also controlled within the design value, and the sulfur content of the product reaches the standard. Article 13 When processing new types of crude oil with a sulfur content higher than the device design value, a processing plan should be formulated based on the crude oil evaluation report. The plan should include the distribution of sulfur throughout the entire process from the crude oil entering the tank area to the liquid and gas product storage tanks, and propose safety protection measures. Article 14 Devices that process high-sulfur crude oil (raw materials) should perform anti-corrosion work such as "one removal and three injections" of the distillation unit and the injection of corrosion inhibitors at the top of the hydrogen sulfide-containing fractionation tower and stripping tower according to specifications. Article 15 The hydrogen sulfide-containing gas produced by devices that process high-sulfur crude oil (raw materials) must be desulfurized before use. Direct use as fuel without desulfurization is prohibited. The sulfur content of fuel oil (gas) used in heating furnaces and boilers should be controlled below the design level. Article 16 For distillation units that process high-sulfur crude oil, the "three tops" condensed sewage must be processed by the sewage stripping unit. Article 17 Enterprises that process high-sulfur crude oil should improve process measures and strictly control processes to ensure that the sulfur content of liquefied gas and light oil does not exceed the standard. Under normal circumstances, it is strictly prohibited to put liquefied gas without desulfurization into the ball tank. ； If the sulfur content of the liquefied gas exceeds the standard due to device shutdown or other abnormal conditions, it should be replaced with an unqualified special spherical tank, and special monitoring, inspection, maintenance and use regulations should be formulated for the spherical tank. Article 18 When equipment that processes high-sulfur crude oil (raw materials) is shut down for maintenance, effective measures should be taken to chemically clean the ferrous sulfide accumulated in the equipment and storage tanks, and the equipment should be closely monitored to avoid equipment damage or fire accidents caused by spontaneous combustion of ferrous sulfide after the equipment is opened. Article 19 Sulfur-containing sewage should be sent to a sewage stripping device in a sealed manner for treatment and is prohibited from being discharged into other sewage systems. All enterprises with insufficient sewage stripping (including ammonia refining) capacity must make rectifications within a time limit. Strengthen the safety management of desulfurization, sulfur production, tail gas recovery, and sewage treatment equipment, ensure the normal operation of desulfurization and sulfur recovery equipment, seal equipment and pipelines, strictly prohibit unorganized emissions, and prohibit the direct discharge of hydrogen sulfide gas into the atmosphere to prevent hydrogen sulfide leakage from harming personnel. Article 20 The sour gas in a refinery must be 100% recovered for sulfur production, and the sulfur production tail gas should reach * * and local emission standards. Article 21 According to * * Relevant regulations strengthen the monitoring and comprehensive analysis of enterprise pollution sources, discharge outlets and factory environment during the processing of high-sulfur crude oil to ensure accurate data. Article 22: Accelerate the innovation and transformation of process technology and equipment, and change the sampling and water cutting operations of all hydrogen sulfide-containing media to closed methods to fundamentally reduce the harm of hydrogen sulfide. Article 23 Refining enterprises should organize technical research on safety problems encountered in processing high-sulfur crude oil. Chapter 3 Equipment Management Article 24 Do a good job in verifying and confirming the materials of equipment and pipelines. In accordance with the provisions of the "Guidance on Selection of Equipment and Pipelines for Partial Units Processing High-Sulfur Crude Oil" (Trial) (Sinopec Group Petrochemical Co., Ltd. No. 89), existing problems shall be rectified within a time limit, and a detailed material upgrade plan shall be formulated according to the specific situation to eliminate hidden dangers and ensure the safe operation of the unit. Article 25 In accordance with the "Administrative Regulations on Thickness Measurement of Equipment and Pipelines for Processing High-Sulfur Crude Oil Units" (Trial) and "Administrative Regulations on Strengthening Corrosion Inspection of Refining Units" (Trial) (Sinopec Group Petrochemical Co., Ltd. No. 89), effectively monitor the corrosion status of equipment and pipelines, and understand the corrosion patterns of equipment and pipelines. Article 26 Strictly implement the regulations and requirements for equipment maintenance and strengthen safety monitoring of equipment and pipelines. Fully consider the characteristics and mechanisms of sulfur corrosion, adopt advanced anti-corrosion technology, strengthen corrosion monitoring and preventive maintenance work, and immediately take corresponding treatment measures for workplaces that do not meet the requirements for preventing hydrogen sulfide poisoning. Article 27 Some sulfur-related production devices that have been shut down for a long time or have not been started temporarily should be chemically cleaned or passivated to reduce the sulfur content in the equipment, and effective protective measures such as nitrogen protection should be adopted to prevent serious corrosion of the device and equipment damage caused by long-term shutdown. Article 28: Implement anti-corrosion measures for sulfur-containing oil tanks in accordance with the "Administrative Regulations on Anti-corrosion Technology for Storage Tanks for Processing High-Sulfur Crude Oil" (Trial) (Sinopec Group Petrochemical Co., Ltd. No. 89). Corresponding anti-corrosion measures should be taken for crude oil tanks, intermediate product tanks, product tanks, dirty oil tanks, sulfur-containing sewage tanks and gas tanks to avoid accidents caused by corrosion. Article 29 For storage tanks where the production of ferrous sulfide is unavoidable, internal anti-corrosion treatment should be carried out, and the use of internal floating roof tanks with nitrogen sealing should be considered. Article 30: Enterprises should attach great importance to equipment and pipelines that may produce low-temperature hydrogen sulfide stress corrosion cracking and dew point corrosion caused by sulfur media, strictly implement specifications and standards, and take effective measures. Chapter 4 Safety Management Article 31 Units where hydrogen sulfide leakage may occur should formulate corresponding work process protection management regulations and establish a regular hidden danger inspection and rectification system. Regularly monitor, analyze and evaluate hydrogen sulfide concentration in workplaces where hydrogen sulfide may exist, archive the results and announce them to workers. The company's monitoring instruments and personal protective equipment should be managed by dedicated personnel and equipment files should be established. Article 32 The concentration of hydrogen sulfide exceeds * * Workplaces that meet standards or where hydrogen sulfide poisoning has occurred should be monitored as key locations and a monitoring and inspection log should be established. Article 33 Eye-catching warning signs in Chinese about hazardous factors should be set up at the main entrances and exits where hydrogen sulfide poisoning may occur, and eye-catching warning signs in Chinese should be set up at work sites and dangerous points. When the sources of occurrence are numerous and concentrated, and the scope of influence is large, according to the provisions of GB2893-2001, red or red and black zebra crossings can be used on the ground to indicate dangerous areas to prevent people from entering at will. Equipment and pipelines involving hydrogen sulfide should be painted with yellow or yellow and black color rings to remind people to pay attention. A wind vane should be set up inside the device. The wind vane should be set with a high point and a low point. The high point should be set at the highest point of the device, and the low point should be set in the control room, lounge and other areas where people are relatively concentrated. Article 34 For fixed and portable hydrogen sulfide monitoring and alarm devices used in workplaces where hydrogen sulfide may leak, the low alarm points should be set at 10mg/m3, and the high alarm points should be set at 50mg/m3. When the hydrogen sulfide concentration needs to be continuously monitored on-site for 24 hours, a fixed hydrogen sulfide monitoring alarm should be used. A display alarm panel with audible and visual alarm functions should be set up in the control room or operating room. Its audible alarm sound should be different from other process chain alarms. The number and location of on-site hydrogen sulfide detection probes should be arranged in accordance with relevant design specifications. Article 35 According to the working environment of different positions, workers should be equipped with the same number of filtering gas masks and appropriate positive pressure respiratory protection equipment as the number of workers. Regular inspection and maintenance should be carried out to ensure cleanliness and integrity, and usage management regulations should be formulated. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide is lower than 50mg/m3, filter-type anti-virus equipment can be used. In areas where the concentration of hydrogen sulfide is greater than 50mg/m3 or media leakage occurs and the concentration is unknown, positive-pressure respiratory protection equipment should be used. The air suction port of the air supply device should be placed on the upwind side. When installing multiple types of filter protective equipment, applicable substances should be indicated on the surface of the canister. It is prohibited for anyone to enter areas where hydrogen sulfide poisoning may occur without wearing appropriate protective equipment, and it is prohibited to take off gas protective equipment in toxic areas. Chapter 5 Operation Protection Article 36 Before entering equipment and instruments in hydrogen sulfide-containing media, all materials should be cut off, thoroughly rinsed, purged, and replaced, and blind plates should be installed. After sampling and analysis are qualified, safety protection measures should be implemented. At the same time, appropriate gas masks or positive pressure respiratory protection equipment, communication equipment (walkie-talkies) should be worn according to the operating conditions, rescue belts (ropes) should be fastened, safety protection measures should be implemented, and operations should be carried out under supervision. Article 37 In principle, workers should not enter industrial sewers (wells), sewage wells, closed containers, underground open or semi-open pits, troughs, trenches and other dangerous places to operate. If operations are required, the "Safety Management Regulations for Operations in Confined Spaces" should be followed. Article 38 When working on oil tanks containing hydrogen sulfide, crude gasoline tanks, light dirty oil tanks and equipment containing acid gas gas media, you must wear appropriate protective equipment and be supervised during the operation. Article 39: A licensing system for inspection and maintenance of high-risk equipment and instruments should be established when it comes to equipment and instrument inspection and maintenance operations involving toxic media such as hydrogen sulfide, chlorine, ammonia and other dangerous conditions such as high temperature, high pressure, flammable, explosive, toxic and asphyxiating conditions. For high-risk equipment and instrument inspection and maintenance operations, a safety technical plan for handling (construction) must be formulated in advance, and a safety license for inspection and maintenance operations must be obtained and signed. Article 40 General safety requirements for work protection: 1. Before disassembling, dismantling and replacing equipment and instruments, the last equipment venting inspection and low point venting inspection should be performed. And ensure that the equipment's vent line and low point vent line are always open and clear. 2. When dismantling, dismantling, replacing equipment, instruments, or conducting venting and emptying inspections, the personnel standing should be upwind. 3. When disassembling equipment, instruments or flange screws, first loosen the screws on the flange side of the equipment, instruments or pipelines, and then remove other screws after all residual pressure in the equipment is exhausted. When working, the body should be turned away from the equipment or the opening direction of the flange to avoid being hurt by the impact and splash of the remaining pressurized medium. 4. When dismantling, dismantling and replacing equipment, instruments or valves containing toxic materials such as hydrogen sulfide and chlorine, air respirators must be worn throughout the process. On-site guardians must wear air respirators to provide close guidance and supervision in the same working area. When to remove the air respirators, the on-site guardians will issue confirmation instructions. At the same time, monitoring personnel should be equipped with portable hydrogen sulfide detection and alarm instruments to confirm the safety and health conditions of the site. 5. During the disassembly, disassembly and replacement of equipment, flammable and toxic liquids remaining in the equipment or produced by internal leakage of valves must be recovered in a timely manner. It is strictly prohibited to discharge flammable and explosive materials and chemical hazardous materials on site. 6. When high-risk equipment inspection and maintenance operations such as hydrogen sulfide, chlorine, hydrogen, liquefied gas, and gas are involved, the competent department should organize workshops and construction units to jointly participate in the formulation of handling (construction) safety technical plans and emergency plans. Conduct a comprehensive and systematic risk analysis of the operation timing, implementation process, implementation methods, etc., and fully demonstrate its safety, reliability, and compliance with laws and regulations. 7. The processing (construction) safety plan must make specific provisions and arrangements for safety preparation, purging and replacement, safety isolation, sampling analysis, dynamic detection, safety protection, safety monitoring, safety contact, escape and evacuation, first aid and mutual rescue and other measures. 8. High-risk equipment inspection and maintenance operations should be arranged during the day when the weather is fine. Unless there are extraordinary circumstances, arrangements are prohibited at night. 9. After the safety plan for high-risk equipment inspection and maintenance operations (construction) has been approved and countersigned, the workshop should promptly issue the determined plan to the specific execution personnel and construction units. At the same time, the handling plan and operating procedures should be explained to the workshop executives, construction unit leaders, and specific construction workers, and signed for confirmation. 10. After all the safety preparations required for high-risk equipment inspection and maintenance operations are completed, the safety personnel of the inspection and maintenance construction unit shall check and confirm the safe operating conditions on site and sign the safety permit for inspection and maintenance operations. Safety personnel in the production workshop shall check and confirm compliance with the safety measures and safety protection of construction unit personnel and sign the safety permit for inspection and maintenance operations. Chapter 6 Personnel Training and Health Monitoring Article 41 All workers working in hydrogen sulfide-containing environments should receive education and training on preventing the hazards of hydrogen sulfide. After passing the assessment and passing the pre-job occupational health examination, they can work with a certificate. The training content should include basic knowledge about hydrogen sulfide, relevant safe operating procedures and operation management regulations, the use and regulations of hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments and personal protective equipment, first aid measures for acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning, etc. Each training time shall be no less than 24 hours. Retrain once a year. Supervisors and supervisors at all levels, and high-risk workers (who may be exposed to high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide ； Entering equipment, containers or other limited spaces) should undergo corresponding safety knowledge training and obtain a work permit. Outsiders (including construction workers and informal workers) should receive relevant training and abide by these regulations. Article 42 Workers working in hydrogen-containing environments should undergo regular occupational health examinations and establish health monitoring files. Occupational health examinations should be conducted by qualified occupational health technical service agencies. Chapter 7 Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning Treatment Article 43 Units that may have hydrogen sulfide leakage should formulate and establish emergency rescue plans and first aid networks to ensure the smooth flow of on-site first aid, evacuation escort, and transfer rescue channels, so that poisoned persons can receive timely treatment in the shortest possible time. The plan should be drilled regularly and revised and improved in a timely manner. Article 44 When the hydrogen sulfide monitor alarms at the low alarm point, the operator should check the leak point and prepare protective equipment. When the high-level alarm point alarms, workers should wear protective equipment before entering the work site and report to superiors. At the same time, people in the downwind direction should be evacuated, fire and other operations are prohibited, and the cause of the leakage should be promptly identified and controlled. Rescue workers are on alert. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide continues to rise and cannot be controlled, report to the local authorities immediately * * Report and activate corresponding emergency plans to evacuate downwind residents. Article 45: Formulate specific response plans and measures for emergencies such as sudden power outages. When handling emergencies, operators must wear personal protective equipment and carry a portable hydrogen sulfide alarm. ； On-site process disposal should be carried out by two or more people, and it is strictly prohibited for one person to handle it. Article 46: When large-scale high-concentration hydrogen sulfide diffuses under abnormal production conditions, on the premise of ensuring normal production operations, operators should minimize and suspend inspections of locations downwind of the leakage source, and make relevant records. Personnel working downwind of a large area of ​​high-concentration hydrogen sulfide diffusion should immediately evacuate to a safe area upwind. ； Personnel in the control room or operating room immediately close doors and windows and suspend the operation of local ventilation facilities to prevent the continued intrusion of high-concentration hydrogen sulfide. Article 47 If personnel in other positions within the scope of the impact of hydrogen sulfide leakage and spread do not have gas masks, they can immediately soak their mouths and noses with towels or other cotton fabrics soaked in water to absorb the diffusing hydrophilic poisons such as hydrogen sulfide, chlorine, and ammonia. Article 48 When hydrogen sulfide poisoning occurs, rescue (custody) personnel should wear appropriate protective equipment, immediately remove the poisoned person from the danger area, go to the upwind vent to perform on-site artificial respiration or cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the poisoned person, and deliver it to a medical unit with conditions for rescue. At the same time, notify the gas prevention station and relevant units. Article 49: In workplaces where hydrogen sulfide poisoning may occur, no unit or individual should force workers to perform operations without appropriate protective measures. At the same time, workers have the right to refuse such operations and can report directly to the superior safety department. Chapter 8 Supplementary Provisions Article 45 High-sulfur crude oil referred to in these regulations refers to crude oil with a sulfur content greater than or equal to 1% (mass). Article 46 These regulations shall come into effect from the date of issuance. Any matters not covered and that conflict with the provisions of relevant laws, regulations and standards shall be governed by the provisions of relevant laws, regulations and standards. Accident case 1: Shandong Haihua Group Co., Ltd. Petrochemical Branch "3.24" hydrogen sulfide leakage accident March 24, 2007 20: On March 30, a hydrogen sulfide leak occurred in the light oil tank area of ​​the Petrochemical Branch of Shandong Haihua Group Co., Ltd., resulting in the death of two employees of Shandong Sifang Installation Engineering Co., Ltd. who were constructing the catalytic tank area, and three others were poisoned. On March 24, construction workers from Sifang Installation Engineering Co., Ltd. were conducting ladder and platform prefabrication and welding operations on the open space south of the pump room of the 800,000-ton/year catalytic cracking tank area of ​​Shandong Haihua Group Co., Ltd. Petrochemical Branch. 20: When they were about to call it a day at about 20, five workers working on the site were poisoned and fainted. After rescue, 3 people were out of danger, and 2 people died after rescue failed. When search and rescue personnel used instruments to test, they found that the concentration of hydrogen sulfide around the G-4210 tank in the light oil tank area exceeded 200PPM, and the concentration of hydrogen sulfide on the road between the light oil tank area and the catalytic tank area also exceeded 80PPM. Toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide in the G-4210 tank of the light oil tank farm of the Petrochemical Branch of Shandong Haihua Group Co., Ltd. volatilized in large quantities from the hydrogenation raw materials and spread through the breathing holes on the upper part of the tank to the construction site of Sifang Installation Engineering Co., Ltd., causing the construction workers to be poisoned, which was the direct cause of the accident. Shandong Haihua Group Co., Ltd. Petrochemical Branch's on-site management is not strict, safety hazards exist for a long time, and the safety production management system is not implemented ； Shandong Sifang Installation Engineering Co., Ltd.’s safety education and training is poor. On-site construction workers generally lack knowledge on hydrogen sulfide poisoning protection. The lack of safety protection equipment at the construction site is also an important reason for the accident. Accident case 2: "5.11" Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning Accident in the Hydrotreating and Refining Joint Workshop of the Urumqi Petrochemical Company's Refinery On May 11, 2007, a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident occurred during the shutdown of the diesel hydrotreating unit in the Hydrotreating and Refining Joint Workshop of the Urumqi Petrochemical Company's Refinery. Five people were poisoned, and two of them fell from a height after being poisoned. On May 11, the hydrogenation and refining joint workshop of Urumqi Petrochemical Company's refinery shut down the diesel hydrogenation unit for maintenance. At 14:50, stop the new hydrogen compressor of the reaction system, cut off the boundary valve of the new hydrogen tank of the new hydrogen inlet device, and prepare to install a blind plate behind the valve (the valve is located on the pipe gallery, 4.3 meters above the ground). 15: 30. Depressurize the new hydrogen tank. 18: 30. The pressure of the new hydrogen tank rises, and the new hydrogen tank is depressurized again. At 18:50, the maintenance and construction team leader led four construction workers to the site. The maintenance and construction team leader and a staff member from the workshop were on the ground to monitor the situation. At 19:15, after the workers loosened all eight bolts and removed the upper two bolts, airflow suddenly spurted out. One worker on the downwind side immediately fainted on the pipe gallery, and other workers immediately came to rescue. An operator fell from a gap in the pipe gallery after passing out while removing his safety belt. Two supervisors immediately went to the workshop to call for help. A process technician and two operators from the workshop rushed to the scene to rescue. The process technician was poisoned and fell from the scaffolding during the rescue process, and the two operators were also poisoned one after another. Other rescuers who arrived wore air respirators and climbed up the pipe gallery to rescue the poisoned people to the ground and sent them to Urumqi Petrochemical Workers Hospital for rescue. After investigation and analysis, the main reason for the accident was: When the flange of the boundary valve of the new hydrogen tank was disassembled and connected to the atmosphere, the drain valve at the bottom of the new hydrogen tank connected to the low-pressure gas venting liquid separation tank was not closed tightly or the valve leaked internally, causing low-pressure gas with high hydrogen sulfide content to enter the new hydrogen tank and be discharged from the disconnected flange, causing poisoning of workers and rescuers. The accident reflected that some grassroots units in the factory did not have strong safety awareness. After the abnormal increase in the pressure of the new hydrogen tank, they blindly arranged operations without checking and confirming according to the production control procedures. ； Construction workers blindly work without adequate identification of hazards in construction operations ； The rescuers blindly conducted emergency rescue without taking any preventive measures, causing secondary injuries and expanding the consequences of the accident. At the same time, it also exposed the existence of weak links in safety management, loopholes in production control management, insufficient attention to preventing hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, and ineffective measures. Part Two, Four: Provisions on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection in Other Sulfur-Involved Chemical Enterprises (Trial) These regulations apply to the safety technical management of hydrogen sulfide gas protection in chemical production enterprises other than refining and chemical enterprises in Shandong Province that are involved in the production (generation) of hydrogen sulfide (inorganic sulfide acidification, partial catalyst synthesis and chemical fiber manufacturing processes, gas desulfurization, carbon disulfide, sulfur dyes, sulfur-containing pesticide preparation and rubber vulcanization processes, monosodium glutamate factory refining, etc.). Chapter 1 Production Management Article 1 In new construction, reconstruction, and expansion projects where hydrogen sulfide hazards exist, equipment and facilities to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning shall be designed, constructed, and put into use at the same time as the main project. Article 2 For production processes that are accompanied by sulfides, we should start with the analysis and evaluation of the sulfur content of the raw materials. Based on the analysis and evaluation of the hydrogen sulfide concentration of the production environment and operating points during the production process, we should establish dynamic hydrogen sulfide distribution maps such as total sulfur and hydrogen sulfide distribution, determine dangerous operating points and dangerous areas, and formulate corresponding production technology plans, processes, equipment, and safety management measures. Article 3 When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exceeds the allowable content due to changes in raw material components, process flows, equipment modifications, or changes in operating parameters, the production, technology, equipment, and safety management departments should promptly notify the relevant workshops, teams, or positions of the changes. The main device control room should be equipped with a dynamic display board for the sulfur or hydrogen sulfide content of sulfur-containing raw materials (medium). Article 4 Sulfur-containing sewage should be sent to sewage gas stripping and other devices in a sealed manner for centralized treatment and is prohibited from being discharged into other sewage systems. Acidic gases and waste gases that may contain hydrogen sulfide should be centrally recovered or incinerated, and it is prohibited to discharge hydrogen sulfide gas directly into the atmosphere. Ensure the normal operation of desulfurization and sulfur recovery devices, seal equipment and pipelines, and strictly prohibit the random discharge of hydrogen sulfide-containing gas in the workplace. Article 5 Strictly implement the regulations and requirements for equipment maintenance. For parts prone to corrosion, the detection and anti-corrosion of equipment and pipelines should be strengthened. Corresponding control measures should be taken immediately for production, storage facilities, equipment and workplaces that do not meet the requirements for preventing hydrogen sulfide poisoning. Article 6 Some production devices that have been shut down for a long time or are temporarily not in operation should be chemically cleaned or passivated to reduce the sulfur content in the equipment, and effective protective measures such as nitrogen protection should be adopted to prevent serious corrosion of the device and equipment damage caused by long-term shutdown. Article 7 Accelerate the innovation and transformation of process technology and equipment, change the sampling, feeding, separation, mixing and transportation of all hydrogen sulfide-containing media to closed methods, and upgrade easily corrosive materials to fundamentally reduce the harm of hydrogen sulfide. Chapter 2 Operation Process Protection Article 8 Units where hydrogen sulfide leakage may occur should formulate corresponding operation process protection management regulations and establish a regular hidden danger inspection and rectification system. Regularly monitor, analyze and evaluate hydrogen sulfide concentration in workplaces where hydrogen sulfide may exist, archive the results and announce them to workers. The company's monitoring instruments and personal protective equipment should be managed by dedicated personnel and equipment files should be established. Article 9 The concentration of hydrogen sulfide exceeds * * Workplaces that meet standards or where hydrogen sulfide poisoning has occurred should be monitored as key locations and a monitoring and inspection log should be established. Article 10 Eye-catching warning signs in Chinese about hazardous factors should be set up at major entrances and exits where hydrogen sulfide poisoning may occur, and eye-catching warning signs in Chinese should be set up at work sites. When the sources of occurrence are numerous and concentrated, and the scope of influence is large, according to the provisions of GB2893-2001, red or red and black zebra crossings can be used on the ground to indicate dangerous areas to prevent people from entering at will. Equipment and pipelines involving hydrogen sulfide should be painted with yellow or yellow and black color rings to remind people to pay attention. A wind vane should be set up inside the device. The wind vane should be set with a high point and a low point. The high point should be set at the highest point of the device, and the low point should be set in the control room, lounge and other areas where people are relatively concentrated. Article 11 For fixed and portable hydrogen sulfide monitoring and alarm devices used in workplaces where hydrogen sulfide may leak, the low alarm points should be set at 10mg/m3, and the high alarm points should be set at 50mg/m3. When the hydrogen sulfide concentration needs to be continuously monitored on-site for 24 hours, a fixed hydrogen sulfide monitoring alarm should be used. A display alarm panel with audible and visual alarm functions should be set up in the control room or operating room. Its audible alarm sound should be different from other process chain alarms. The number and location of on-site hydrogen sulfide detection probes should be arranged in accordance with relevant design specifications. The monitoring equipment used should be * * Approved by relevant departments, it shall be regularly verified by departments with testing qualifications in accordance with technical specifications, and the verification results shall be recorded for future reference. The installation rate, usage rate and intactness rate of hydrogen sulfide detection alarms should reach 100%. Timely detection should be conducted when there are fluctuations in production, when odors like rotten eggs are produced, when people faint for unknown reasons, and when people are moving around areas where poisoning may occur (including acidic water and gas escape sites, drainage ports, sampling ports, storage tank measurement, underground open and semi-open pits, troughs, tanks, trenches, etc.). Article 12 Equip workers with appropriate protective equipment according to the working environment of different positions, conduct regular inspections and maintenance to ensure it is clean and intact, and formulate management regulations for use. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide is lower than 50mg/m3, filter-type anti-virus equipment can be used. In areas where the concentration of hydrogen sulfide is greater than 50mg/m3 or media leakage occurs and the concentration is unknown, positive-pressure respiratory protection equipment should be used. The air suction port of the air supply device should be placed on the upwind side. When installing multiple types of filter protective equipment, applicable substances should be indicated on the surface of the canister. It is prohibited for anyone to enter areas where hydrogen sulfide poisoning may occur without wearing appropriate protective equipment, and it is prohibited to take off gas protective equipment in toxic areas. Article 13 Employees should be truthfully informed of the danger factors, preventive measures and accident emergency measures that exist in the workplace and workplace. Safety instructions should be implemented before and during work, reminding employees of safety measures and guiding employees to correctly use occupational protective equipment and supplies. Article 14 In principle, workers should not enter industrial sewers (wells), sewage wells, closed containers, underground open or semi-open pits, troughs, tanks, ditches and other dangerous places to operate. If operations are required, the "Safety Management Regulations for Operations in Confined Spaces" should be followed. Article 15 Before entering the equipment containing hydrogen sulfide medium, all materials should be cut off, and forced ventilation, nitrogen purging, air replacement, blind plates, etc. should be adopted until the test is qualified. ； At the same time, you must wear gas masks, communication equipment (walkie-talkies), fasten rescue belts (ropes), implement safety protection measures, and perform operations under supervision to ensure that safety is always under control during the entire operation period. There should be no less than two on-site workers (one person working and one person supervising). Article 16 When working on storage tanks containing hydrogen sulfide (including raw material storage tanks, intermediate product and finished product storage tanks, etc.) and equipment containing acid gas, waste gas gas media and hydrogen sulfide waste gas, you must wear appropriate protective equipment, and there should be supervision during the operation. Article 17 When the hydrogen sulfide monitoring instrument alarms at the low alarm point, the operator should check the leak point and prepare protective equipment. When the high-level alarm point alarms, workers should wear protective equipment before entering the work site and report to superiors. At the same time, people in the downwind direction should be evacuated, fire and other operations are prohibited, and the cause of the leakage should be promptly identified and controlled. Rescue workers are on alert. When the concentration of hydrogen sulfide continues to rise and cannot be controlled, report to the local authorities immediately * * Report and activate corresponding emergency plans to evacuate downwind residents. Chapter 3 Personnel Training and Health Monitoring Article 18 All personnel working in an environment containing hydrogen sulfide should receive education and training, pass the assessment, and pass the pre-job occupational health examination before they can work with a certificate. The training content should include basic knowledge about hydrogen sulfide, relevant safe operating procedures and operation management regulations, the use and regulations of hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments and personal protective equipment, first aid measures for acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning, etc. Each training time shall be no less than 24 hours. Retrain once a year. Supervisors and supervisors at all levels, and high-risk workers (who may be exposed to high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide ； Entering equipment, containers or other limited spaces) should undergo corresponding safety knowledge training and obtain a work permit. Outsiders (including construction workers and informal workers) should receive relevant training and abide by these regulations. Article 19: Implement the Occupational Disease Prevention and Control Law, the Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplaces Using Toxic Substances (State Council Order No. 352) and other laws and regulations, strengthen labor protection in workplaces, ensure investment in safe production, and improve safe production conditions. Article 20 Workers working in hydrogen-containing environments should undergo regular occupational health examinations and establish health monitoring files. Occupational health examinations should be conducted by qualified occupational health technical service agencies. Chapter 4 Emergency Treatment Article 21 Units that may have hydrogen sulfide leakage should formulate and establish emergency rescue plans and first aid networks to ensure the smooth flow of on-site first aid, evacuation escort, and transfer rescue channels, so that poisoned persons can receive timely treatment in the shortest possible time. The plan should be drilled regularly and revised and improved in a timely manner. Article 22: Formulate specific response plans and measures for emergencies such as sudden power outages. When handling emergencies, operators must wear personal protective equipment and carry a portable hydrogen sulfide alarm. ； On-site process disposal should be carried out by two or more people, and it is strictly prohibited for one person to handle it. Article 23 When hydrogen sulfide poisoning occurs, rescue (custody) personnel should wear appropriate protective equipment, immediately remove the poisoned person from the danger area, go to the upwind vent to perform on-site artificial respiration or cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the poisoned person, and deliver it to a medical unit with conditions for rescue. At the same time, notify the company or related company gas prevention stations and surrounding relevant units. Article 24 In workplaces where hydrogen sulfide poisoning may occur, without appropriate protective measures, no unit or individual should force workers to perform operations. At the same time, workers have the right to refuse such operations and can report directly to the superior safety department of the enterprise. Chapter 5 Supplementary Provisions Article 25 These regulations shall come into effect from the date of issuance. Any matters not covered and that conflict with the provisions of relevant laws, regulations and standards shall be governed by the provisions of relevant laws, regulations and standards. Accident case 1: Hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident at Taiyuan Huayuan Chemical Co., Ltd. in Shanxi Province On January 1, 2008, a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident occurred at Taiyuan Huayuan Chemical Co., Ltd. in Taiyuan City, Shanxi Province, resulting in three deaths. Taiyuan Huayuan Chemical Co., Ltd. is a hazardous chemicals manufacturer engaged in coal tar processing. Its main products are industrial naphthalene, asphalt, etc. Before the incident, the company had been in a state of semi-stop production for a long time due to environmental reasons and planned to relocate. Only a small number of managers and workers were on duty to be responsible for equipment maintenance and repairs. In preparation for the demolition, on January 1, the company's tar processing workshop organized the cleaning of the fuel oil intermediate storage tank. The storage tank is a horizontal tank 7.1 meters long and 2.3 meters in diameter. At about 16:00, without isolating the working storage tank and without analyzing the toxic, harmful gases and oxygen content in the tank, a worker responsible for cleaning only wore a filtering gas mask (non-isolated protective equipment) and entered the fuel oil intermediate storage tank to clean the tank. After entering the tank, he was poisoned and fainted. The worker in charge of monitoring and another nearby worker blindly rescued people. They entered the tank one after another without wearing any safety protection equipment to save people. They also fainted due to poisoning. Three people died after resuscitation failed. Afterwards (on the 4th), samples were taken from two product storage tanks connected to the accident storage tank and the hydrogen sulfide content was as high as 56ppm and 30ppm respectively. According to preliminary analysis and investigation, when cleaning the storage tank, the operators failed to isolate the fuel oil intermediate storage tank from other storage tanks, failed to purge, replace, and ventilate according to safe operating procedures, and failed to detect toxic and harmful gases and oxygen content in the tank. Wrong use of safety protective equipment. Isolated protective equipment should be used when working with toxic or harmful gases, which may cause hydrogen sulfide poisoning. On-site personnel performed rescue operations blindly, and the rescuers entered the tank to save people without wearing safety protective equipment, resulting in increased casualties. The company's safety management is seriously inadequate. Although it has formulated safety regulations for entering confined spaces, it does not implement them. ； Failure to use protective equipment correctly ； Without detecting and analyzing toxic and harmful gases and oxygen content in operating storage tanks, and without taking effective protective measures, illegally entering dangerous workplaces to operate, leading to accidents. Accident case 2: Poisoning and suffocation accident at Chongqing Tesla Chemical Raw Materials Co., Ltd. On January 9, 2008, a poisoning and suffocation accident occurred at Chongqing Tesla Chemical Raw Materials Co., Ltd., resulting in the death of 5 people and poisoning of 13 people (including 3 serious injuries). Chongqing Tesla Chemical Raw Materials Co., Ltd. mainly produces and sells soft magnetic ferrite and its products. The workshop where the accident occurred is the company's ferrite particle production workshop. On January 9, the company conducted a pilot test on the reaction of rhodochrosite and dilute sulfuric acid in the ferrite particle production plant. At about 14:00, two workers went down to the circulating pool to close the bottom valve of the reaction tank. They were poisoned and suffocated and fainted, falling into the 1.6-meter-deep circulating pool. Neighboring workers entered the circulating pool one after another without wearing any personal protective equipment to rescue them, but they were also poisoned and suffocated and fainted. The accident resulted in 3 workers dying on the spot, 2 workers dying due to ineffective rescue, 11 minor injuries, and 3 serious injuries. According to preliminary investigation and analysis, the carbon dioxide gas containing hydrogen sulfide generated by the reaction of rhodochrosite and dilute sulfuric acid during the pilot test escaped from the feed port of the reaction tank and the agitator connection port, and accumulated in the circulating water system at the lower part of the reaction tank. When the operator went down to the circulating pool to close the bottom valve of the reaction tank, he was poisoned and suffocated and fainted. The enterprise had poor safety awareness, did not identify dangerous and harmful factors in the pilot tests, lacked understanding of the gas composition and hazards generated by the pilot tests, and did not take necessary ventilation measures. The workers lacked emergency rescue knowledge, and the rescuers blindly rescued without taking any protective measures, resulting in increased casualties. Safety training is not in place and employees have poor safety awareness. Part Two, Five: Provisions on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection in Papermaking Enterprises (Trial) Article 1 Papermaking and paper products enterprises should strengthen the safety management of chemical pulping, black liquor evaporation, black liquor combustion, pulp cleaning, cellophane production and other processes that are prone to generate hydrogen sulfide gas and their workplaces. Article 2: Slurry pools and their transportation pipeline systems, sewage treatment system pipelines, culverts, shafts and other places that are prone to generate hydrogen sulfide are included in the focus of safety monitoring, and obvious warning signs are set up at these sites to prohibit personnel from entering at will. Article 3 A special education and training on hydrogen sulfide prevention and control will be carried out once a year, so that the main person in charge of the enterprise, safety management personnel and employees can understand the possible locations, dangers and odor characteristics of hydrogen sulfide gas, and master the knowledge of self-rescue and mutual rescue. Clearly inform employees of the hazards, preventive measures, and accident emergency measures in the workplace and workplace. Article 4 Establish a declaration and signature system before maintenance and clean-up operations involving hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations. Before carrying out operations, the operating unit should submit an application to the enterprise's safety management department. The safety management department and relevant inspection personnel should check the safety conditions and safety measures at the operation site. After confirming that the operation conditions are met, the main person in charge of the enterprise must sign and approve before the operation can begin. Whoever signs is responsible. Anyone who fails to follow this procedure will not be allowed to work. Safety management personnel must keep complete written records for future reference when inspecting and approving operating safety conditions and measures. Article 5 Before cleaning and repairing work at dangerous points such as slurry pools where hydrogen sulfide accumulation is prone to occur, effective forced ventilation must be carried out. After testing, the hydrogen sulfide concentration reaches * * Operation can only be carried out when the specified value is less than 10mg/m3. Article 6 The number of people working in dangerous places where hydrogen sulfide gas accumulates shall not be less than 4, and the number of backup supervisors must not be less than the number of direct workers. When the number of direct workers exceeds 4, full-time medical rescue personnel and equipment shall be present. During the operation, the workshop director and full-time safety management personnel must supervise the operation site throughout the entire process. Article 7 Slurry pools and other operating sites must be equipped with * * Standard hydrogen sulfide gas detection equipment, equipped with sufficient protective equipment such as gas masks and safety belts for more than the number of workers. Article 8 Operators must wear gas masks, safety belts and other safety protection equipment at the same time, and operate in strict accordance with operating procedures. Article 9 Once workers experience signs of hydrogen sulfide gas poisoning, they should correctly implement rescue operations according to the following procedures to prevent multiple casualties due to illegal rescue operations.: 1. On-site monitoring personnel should quickly remove the poisoned workers from the poisoning scene and place them in a ventilated place. If guardians need to enter the poisoned area to provide rescue, they must wear a gas mask with an oxygen supply device. 2. Immediately give oxygen to the poisoned person, provide artificial respiration to those with weak breathing, and notify medical rescue personnel and professionals from the health and epidemic prevention department to come to the scene for rescue. 3. When the situation at the poisoning scene is unclear and protective measures are not perfect, unrelated personnel must be resolutely prevented from blindly entering the accident scene for rescue, so as to avoid a vicious accident that causes multiple casualties. Accident case 1: Major poisoning and casualty accident at Yanzhou Xinglong Paper Co., Ltd. On June 18, 2001, when Li Weiguo and five other employees of Yanzhou Xinglong Paper Co., Ltd. were dredging the pipes of the sewage concentration tank in the water treatment workshop, three people were killed one after another. They were poisoned by inhaling toxic gases and fainted in the pool. Two workers who came to save people were also poisoned and passed out in the pool. Later, five people were rescued from the pool and sent to the hospital for rescue. Three of them died due to excessive injuries, and the remaining two escaped through rescue. The sewage concentration tank of Xinglong Paper Co., Ltd. is a toxic and harmful key place in our company. When cleaning and dredging the pipelines of the sewage concentration tank, the water treatment workshop should implement the requirements of "How to Prevent Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning" stipulated in the rules and operating procedures formulated by the company, and personal protection should be strengthened before operation. When workers enter a hydrogen sulfide workplace, they should first monitor the environment on-site, take ventilation replacement, wear gas masks and other measures. When entering wells and pits to work, they should wear and fasten safety belts, wear oxygen breathing apparatus, use signal communication, and be supervised by a dedicated person. However, Li Weiguo and other five people neither followed the operating procedures to take ventilation replacement and other safety measures before working, nor did they prepare personal protection in advance. After the dredging work of the sewage concentration tank began, when Zuo Gongsheng discovered that Wang Huaiqing, the first person to go down into the pool, suddenly fainted, he did not realize that it was poisoning, so he went down the ladder. Ding Xinmin also went down subsequently. After two people had fainted one after another, he did not realize that the pool contained toxic gases, and still did not take safe and reliable measures. He blindly and disorderly carried out rescue work, which led to the accident. This is a typical major fatal accident caused by illegal command, illegal operations, and lack of employee safety knowledge. The sewage pool dredging personnel entered the work site without monitoring the site, without ventilation and replacement, and without wearing necessary gas masks, which was the direct cause of the accident. Although the company has relatively sound rules and regulations and conducts regular employee assessments, accidents like this still occur, which shows that the company does not implement various safety systems effectively, fails to implement strict regulations, and lacks strict management. It also lacks construction plans and eye-catching warning signs for key toxic parts such as sewage pools. Employees' weak safety awareness and lack of necessary self-protection knowledge and abilities are important reasons for the expansion of accidents. Accident case 2: Linqing Galaxy Paper Co., Ltd. Poisoning Accident At 11:30 on August 2, 2003, a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident occurred in the sewage filtering tank of Linqing Galaxy Paper Co., Ltd., resulting in four deaths. Linqing Galaxy Paper Co., Ltd. (formerly Linqing Paper Mill) was founded in 1958 and is a large-scale state-owned pulp and paper enterprise. The sewage treatment plant of this plant is the company's original middle section water workshop. It was set up as a branch plant in May 2003 and is mainly used to treat the intermediate sewage from each pulping and bleaching workshop. The open-air sewage filter tank (6 meters long, 4 meters wide and 4 meters deep) in the factory's sewage treatment plant was clogged. When it could not be cleared at around 22:00 on the evening of August 1, on the morning of August 2, the director of the factory Li Shuyong arranged for the workshop section chief Pan Yong to take the temporary worker in charge Shan Chenghua and the temporary worker Wang Shenming to continue unblocking. During the dredging work, Shan Chenghua went out for business, Pan Yong monitored the pool, and Wang Shenming used tools such as shovels and bamboo poles to dredge the pool (water depth 0.5 meters). At around 11:20, the grille was opened, and sewage and toxic gases instantly rushed into the pool. Wang Shenming was immediately poisoned and fell into the pool, submerged in the water. Pan Yong immediately called for help. Li Shuyong rushed to the edge of the pool and went down the ladder to rescue him. As soon as he bent down, he fainted in the pool. Pan Yong tried to save him again, but he also fell on Li Shuyong. Shan Chenghua and others continued to rescue blindly, which caused an accident. The direct cause of the accident was: In a sewage filter tank containing toxic gases, without taking any protective measures, exposure to toxic gases during sewage dredging construction may cause poisoning. Blindly rescuing people, causing many people to be poisoned. The indirect reason is: The design and construction of the sewage filtering tank have not been verified and have serious flaws, and the sewage filtering tank is open to the public. ； Linqing Galaxy Paper Co., Ltd. has an imperfect production safety responsibility system, insufficient safety training for employees, and no emergency rescue plan. Employees have indifferent safety awareness and poor safety quality. They blindly rescue after an accident, resulting in increased casualties and losses. ； Linqing City * * and inadequate supervision by relevant departments. Accident case 3: Poisoning accident in Shandong Guihe Xianxing Paper Co., Ltd. At 15:50 on May 28, 2004, a hydrogen sulfide poisoning and suffocation accident occurred in the No. 1 underground slurry pump room in the squeezing section of the steam preparation workshop of Shandong Guihe Xianxing Paper Co., Ltd., resulting in three deaths. Shandong Guihe Xianxing Paper Co., Ltd. suspended production for maintenance on May 28. At 15:50 in the afternoon that day, pulp squeezers Sun Fengshu and Zhang Xiucheng went to the No. 1 pump room of the underground slurry tank to deal with problems such as poor slurry on the slurry pump and small amount of slurry. The two people removed the pump head of the slurry pump without connecting the gate valve of the feed pipe to the slurry pool before closing the slurry pump, causing hydrogen sulfide gas to gush out from the slurry pool, causing two people to be poisoned. Song Fu, a slurry worker in the slurry squeezing section of the steam preparation workshop who then rushed to the scene, went down to the pump room to save people, and was also poisoned by inhaling hydrogen sulfide gas, causing poisoning and suffocation of three people. The direct cause of the accident was: The workers in the steam preparation workshop removed the pump head of the slurry pump without connecting the gate valve of the feeding pipe of the slurry pool before turning off the pump, causing hydrogen sulfide gas to gush out from the slurry pool, causing poisoning. The indirect reason is: The safety management of Shandong Guihe Xianxing Paper Co., Ltd. is not in place. The company lacks regulations on safety management systems, operating procedures, and safety precautions for underground slurry pool pump room operations. ； The pump room of the slurry pool has no ventilation facilities and no safety warning signs. ； There is insufficient safety training and education for employees and poor self-protection awareness. Part Two, Six: Provisions on Safety Management of Hydrogen Sulfide Protection in Metallurgical Enterprises (Trial) Article 1 Metallurgical enterprises should include mineral burning, sulfur-containing ore smelting and other workplaces that are prone to produce hydrogen sulfide and other harmful gases as key safety monitoring points, and set up obvious warning signs on site. Article 2 Enterprises should clearly inform employees of the dangerous factors, preventive measures and accident emergency measures that exist in the workplace and at work stations. Article 3 All workers working in an environment containing hydrogen sulfide should receive education and training on preventing the hazards of hydrogen sulfide. Only after passing the assessment and passing the pre-job occupational health examination can they work with a certificate. The training content should include basic knowledge about hydrogen sulfide, relevant safe operating procedures and operation management regulations, the use and regulations of hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments and personal protective equipment, first aid measures for acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning, etc. Article 4 When designing, enterprises should try not to use or use as little as possible the processes and raw materials that may produce hydrogen sulfide gas in order to achieve the safest production conditions. If they must invest in or implement raw materials and production processes that may produce hydrogen sulfide gas, they should limit the conditions for the generation of hydrogen sulfide gas caused by human factors to the greatest extent. Article 5 Fixed hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments should be set up in workplaces where hydrogen sulfide may leak. The low alarm point of the fixed and portable hydrogen sulfide monitoring instruments used should be set at 10mg/m3, and the high alarm point should be set at 50mg/m3. Article 6: Accelerate the sealing and automation of sulfur-containing production processes. When process conditions permit, the source of hydrogen sulfide should be sealed as much as possible, and the air containing hydrogen sulfide should be sucked out through the ventilation pipe, sent to the purification device, and then discharged into the atmosphere after purification. Article 7 If gases containing sulfides are emitted during coal gas and coal coking or non-ferrous metal smelting, desulfurization devices must be equipped or other desulfurization measures must be taken. Strengthen the safety management of the desulfurization device to ensure the normal operation of the desulfurization device, seal the equipment and pipelines, strictly prohibit unorganized emissions, and prohibit the direct discharge of hydrogen sulfide gas into the atmosphere to prevent hydrogen sulfide leakage from harming personnel. Article 8 The hydrogen sulfide content of civil gas supplied to urban areas shall comply with * * According to relevant standards, those that do not meet the standards should be desulfurized, and the treated gas can be used after sampling and testing to meet the standards. Article 9 The sulfide leaching process that may produce hydrogen sulfide reaction gas must be sealed as a whole, and hydrogen sulfide gas monitoring and alarm equipment must be reasonably configured. Once an instrument alarm occurs and the hydrogen sulfide gas content exceeds the standard, the feeding operation should be stopped immediately, and the forced exhaust system should be started in a chain. When the harmful gas returns to normal values, the operator should wear special labor protection supplies to check and troubleshoot. Article 10 Leaching and other equipment that may produce hydrogen sulfide should be connected to a hydrogen sulfide gas absorption system. Before the leaching operation, various equipment in the absorption system should be carefully checked. After confirming that they are in good condition, start the absorption system first. Only after the operation is normal can the leaching operation be carried out. ； Ensure that during the production process, the hydrogen sulfide leaching equipment is maintained in a negative pressure operating state to prevent trace amounts of hydrogen sulfide gas from accidentally escaping. Article 11 The production process of the leaching site should adopt remote monitoring operations. Chemical auxiliary materials should be transported from the high-level tank outside the sealing area to the closed area. The testing of the process parameters of the production process should be carried out through sampling and testing through the solution circulation system set up outside the sealing area, and monitored through the video system in the operating area. Realize the separation of man and machine to ensure safe production. Article 12 In order to eliminate external exhaust gas and environmental pollution, the exhaust gas of each leaching tank and the forced exhaust air in the sealed area are connected to the sodium hydroxide spray absorption tower. The exhaust gas containing hydrogen sulfide will be discharged into the atmosphere after harmless neutralization treatment. Article 13 During equipment maintenance, waste residue cleaning and other work, effective forced ventilation must be carried out before the operation. * * After complying with the prescribed safety standards, work can only be carried out under supervision. Article 14 In order to prevent accidents, relevant personnel of the enterprise's safety management agency should conduct comprehensive inspections at regular intervals and at fixed points in accordance with the requirements of the hazard source management regulations, so that safety management can meet the requirements of dynamic control and continuous control. Article 15 Equip workers with appropriate amounts of protective equipment based on the working environment of different positions, and formulate management regulations for their use. Article 16: Establish and improve emergency rescue and rescue organizations, strengthen safety training, conduct drills with complete rescue equipment and supplies, and implement emergency plan drills to ensure safety. Accident case 1: Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd.'s "10.11" poisoning accident At 13:00 on October 11, 2007, in the second material preparation workshop of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd., an operator suffered a hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident during the loading process, resulting in the death of five people and a direct economic loss of 2.4 million yuan. Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. is located at No. 215 Xingfu Middle Road, Zhifu District, Yantai City. It is a non-ferrous metal smelting enterprise with more than 280 employees, including 80 professional and technical personnel of various types. The company's total assets are 248 million yuan. It covers an area of 100 acres, with a building area of 26,100 square meters. It has an annual output of 600 tons of metallic cobalt. All raw materials are purchased from the nickel sulfide concentrate of Yunjiang Yunxi Nickel Co., Ltd. in Yunnan Province. It was officially put into production in April 2003. In 2006, sales revenue was 79 million yuan. The company's nickel sulfide leaching process now adopts an acidic oxidation leaching process that is widely used in the extraction of non-ferrous metals. It mainly adds 1.2 tons to 1.5 tons of refined nickel ore into 8 cubic meters of hydrochloric acid aqueous solution with a pH value of 0.5-1, and then adds sodium chlorate oxidant to generate nickel chloride and cobalt chloride solutions. After testing and meeting standards, it is sent to the purification and purification process. Hydrogen sulfide gas will be generated during the production process, and the generated hydrogen sulfide gas will be treated harmlessly using an alkali neutralization and absorption device. On October 11, 2007, in the second material preparation workshop of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd., squad leader Xue Guoyong and five workers Jiang Hebo, Jiang Ming, Liu Jianhua, Zhang Wuzi, and Geng Jiping worked the day shift. Geng Jiping was responsible for looking after the filter press, and Xue Guoyong and four other workers were responsible for adding nickel sulfide concentrate powder to the No. 2 leaching tank. At around 13:00, Geng Jiping suddenly felt a strong smell of rotten eggs, so he went to the south end of the filter press to get a gas mask. At this time, he found Jiang Ming and Liu Jianhua staggering to the ground next to the No. 2 leaching tank. Then, three other people fainted next to the No. 2 leaching tank. After seeing this, Geng Jiping quickly ran to the company's safety and environmental protection department to report. Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. immediately organized rescue personnel to quickly send five people, including Xue Guoyong and Jiang Hebo, to Yantai Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital. At 13:10, the emergency department of Yantai Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital received five people suffering from hydrogen sulfide poisoning sent by Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. Due to the patient inhaling an overdose of toxic gas hydrogen sulfide at one time, despite all efforts to rescue him, he finally died at 14:40 after rescue efforts failed. Through investigation and analysis: There was a power outage for two hours that morning. After the call came in, in order to rush for time, Xue Guoyong and others, when adding nickel sulfide concentrate powder to the No. 2 leaching tank, hoisted a 1.5-ton nickel sulfide concentrate powder package at one time with an electric hoist over the leaching tank, and used a shovel to break the packaging bag. 1.5 tons of nickel sulfide concentrate powder instantly fell into the tank, causing a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas to be produced in a short period of time. The absorption tower could not completely absorb it, causing a tank leakage phenomenon, causing a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas to overflow, resulting in the death of five people due to acute poisoning by hydrogen sulfide gas. The accident investigation team determined that the accident was a production safety accident. The direct cause of the accident was: On-site workers violated job safety technical operating procedures when operating, adding too much material too quickly and too much, resulting in a leakage phenomenon and a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas overflowing. ； The leaching tank used in the nickel sulfide leaching process is not a closed container. The indirect reason is: (1) The nickel sulfide leaching process design of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. is not qualified and no safety evaluation has been conducted. (2) There is no hydrogen sulfide gas detector and leak alarm device in the second material preparation workshop. When hydrogen sulfide gas leaks with a certain concentration, the on-site operators cannot detect it in time and lose the opportunity to escape. (3) The nickel sulfide leaching operating procedures and safety technical operating procedures of Yantai Kaishi Industrial Co., Ltd. only stipulate that "feeding should be slow, even, and intermittently" without stipulating the specific amount of feeding. The safety technical operating procedures are incomplete, and the company's safety education and training for employees are insufficient. (4) The Xingfu Subdistrict Office of Zhifu District, Yantai City has insufficient supervision over production safety, and supervision and inspections are not in place. Accident case 2: A hydrogen sulfide gas poisoning accident occurred in the Dongguashan copper ore dressing workshop of Tongdu Copper Co., Ltd. At around 17:45 on December 18, 2005, a major hydrogen sulfide gas poisoning accident occurred in the Dongguashan copper ore dressing workshop of Tongdu Copper Co., Ltd., resulting in 4 deaths and 6 people being hospitalized due to poisoning. The accident also caused slight environmental pollution and caused economic losses of approximately 17.87 million yuan, of which direct economic losses were more than 2 million yuan. In the production system of the flotation workshop of Tongling Nonferrous Dongguashan Copper Mine Concentrator, sulfuric acid is needed for sulfur separation operations. Its main function is to adjust the pH value of the slurry to meet the needs of sulfur flotation. Concentrated sulfuric acid with a concentration of 98% is used. The adding location is the mixing tank of the sulfur selection operation. The sulfuric acid is added using a DN80 electric regulating valve. The sulfuric acid storage tank can store about 80 tons of sulfuric acid, and uses pipelines to flow automatically to the mixing tank for sulfur selection operations. At 17:52 on December 18, the sulfuric acid flow rate at the sulfuric acid addition point of the mixing tank in the flotation workshop of the Dongguashan Copper Mine Concentrator suddenly increased, causing the reaction between the slurry and sulfuric acid in the mixing tank to intensify, producing a large amount of harmful gas hydrogen sulfide. Four operators, including Zhu Hongxing and Fei Bin, were poisoned and fainted one after another when they were dealing with the problem near the mixing tank of the sulfur beneficiation operation. The remaining nine people on duty that day were also rescued by Yang Ping, * * Six others were poisoned and fainted one after another. After the accident, while seeking help from the 110 and 120 emergency centers and the municipal mine rescue brigade, the mine leaders actively organized people to carry out self-rescue. With the cooperation of all parties in society, the 10 poisoned persons were quickly sent to the Municipal People's Hospital and the Nonferrous Metal Workers General Hospital for rescue. At the same time, relevant personnel from the Ministry of Mines quickly closed the main outlet valve of the sulfuric acid storage tank, evacuated all personnel on site, and sealed off the accident site. Subsequently, the nonferrous metal company and the municipal safety supervision, environmental protection and other departments organized professionals to urgently cut off the sulfuric acid pipeline in the accident workshop at around 2 a.m. on the 19th, controlling the leakage of sulfuric acid and the generation of toxic gases. Monitoring personnel from the Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau entered the site to detect the concentration of atmospheric toxic gases in the factory and surrounding areas every half hour. As of 4 a.m. on the 19th, the average concentration of hydrogen sulfide at the accident site was 0.056-1.52 mg per cubic meter. ； The flotation system adds water to dilute the sulfuric acid. The accident investigation revealed that the direct cause of this major accident was: The positioner of the electric-controlled ball valve in the acid adding control system that was being debugged in conjunction with the heavy truck failed, causing the ball valve to be in the normally open position, causing a large amount of concentrated sulfuric acid to gush out. The excessive sulfuric acid reacted violently with the sulfide slurry in the mixing tank, producing a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas, leading to a poisoning accident. At the same time, there are also contradictions and problems in the Dongguashan Copper Mine construction project and the mine's safety production work. Part Two, Seven: Regulations on Safety Management in Food, Textile, Leather Tanning, Sewage Treatment and Other Industries and Other Hydrogen Sulfide Hazardous Places (Trial) Article 1 In order to effectively prevent the occurrence of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents, strengthen the safety management of operations in toxic and hazardous places, and ensure the safety and health of employees, these regulations are formulated in accordance with the "Work Safety Law of the People's Republic of China", "Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals", "Shandong Province Safety Production Regulations" and other relevant laws, regulations and standards. Article 2 In sewage tanks, drainage pipes, water collection wells, cable wells, cellars, biogas tanks, septic tanks, distiller's grain tanks, fermentation tanks and other limited spaces where hazardous hydrogen sulfide poisoning may exist (hereinafter collectively referred to as hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations), these regulations shall apply to those engaged in construction or repair, maintenance, cleaning and other operations (hereinafter collectively referred to as operations). Article 3 Production, operation or management units with hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations (hereinafter referred to as "production, operation or management units") shall, in accordance with these regulations and relevant laws, regulations and standards, formulate safety management regulations and safe operating procedures for hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations, inform employees of the dangerous factors, preventive measures and accident emergency measures in the workplace and workplace, and equip employees with necessary operational protective equipment ； If a project or project is contracted to an operating unit, the production, operation or management unit shall bear the responsibility for supervision. Article 4 In accordance with the principle of "whoever works, who is responsible", the operating unit is fully responsible for the implementation of hydrogen sulfide gas prevention measures at the work site and is responsible for formulating the operation plan, which includes corresponding safety precautions and emergency plans. ； Responsible for handling operation approval procedures and informing workers of safe operations ； Responsible for equipping workers and supervisors with protective equipment that meets regulations. Article 5 Production, operation or management units shall carry out investigation and identification of hydrogen sulfide hazardous sites and establish management files. Article 6 Production, operation or management units shall set up warning signs in hydrogen sulfide hazardous areas to inform operating units and personnel of the hazardous characteristics of hydrogen sulfide gas, safe operating practices, accident prevention measures, emergency measures, and the correct use of protective equipment. Article 7 If a production, operation or management unit contracts out operations in hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations to operating units, it shall strictly review the operating safety conditions of the contracting unit, and shall not outcontract operations in hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations to operating units that do not have the corresponding qualifications and do not meet the requirements for safe production conditions. The production and operation unit and the operating unit should sign an operation contract and a safety production management agreement to clarify the safety production responsibilities of both parties. Production, operation or management units should strengthen monitoring of the entire operation process, and contracting units are strictly prohibited from subcontracting projects to unqualified operating units and individuals. The operating unit shall not arrange personnel who have not obtained the work certificate without training and assessment to work in hydrogen sulfide hazardous areas, and it is strictly prohibited to use temporary personnel. Article 8 The person in charge and production safety management personnel of the operating unit shall undergo special training and assessment on production safety knowledge and management capabilities and obtain qualification certificates ； The person in charge of the operation, on-site safety management personnel, and operating personnel should receive specialized training on hydrogen sulfide gas prevention knowledge. The training content includes the dangerous and harmful characteristics of hydrogen sulfide gas, the causes of dangerous factors, symptoms of poisonous and harmful gas poisoning, occupational contraindications, preventive measures, the correct use of protective equipment, and poisoning first aid knowledge, etc. The training and assessment work is responsible for the industry authorities or entrusted specialized training institutions, and those who pass the training will be issued employment certificates. Article 9 Units engaged in operations in hydrogen sulfide hazardous locations must be equipped with the following safety equipment and facilities: (1) Detection analyzer for toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide, oxygen, and combustible gases ； (2) Mechanical air supply (exhaust) equipment ； (3) The number of air respirators that meets the operational requirements ； (4) Necessary communication tools ； (5) Rescue equipment. like: Respirators, ladders, ropes, and other necessary appliances and equipment. Article 10 When entering toxic and hazardous places for work, the following safety precautions must be implemented: (1) Refer to the "Safety Management Regulations for Operations in Confined Spaces", implement the work ticket system, and only operate after approval by the person in charge of the operation. (2) Adequate ventilation measures must be taken, and work can only be carried out after passing the inspection and analysis. Sampling and analysis must be carried out continuously during the operation to prevent emergencies from harming personnel. (3) For places where adequate ventilation is difficult to achieve due to operating environment restrictions, workers must be equipped with and use isolation respiratory protective equipment such as air respirators or hose masks. The use of filter masks is strictly prohibited. (4) Diving operations such as unsealing the manhole head should be undertaken by diving operations units that meet safety production conditions. (5) When the danger of toxic and harmful gases such as hydrogen sulfide is discovered, operations must be stopped immediately and workers must be urged to evacuate the work site quickly. (6) Open flames are strictly prohibited in underground operations ； (7) When working below 2 meters underground, operators must use safety belts. (8) Arrange two trained and familiar monitoring personnel and equip them with two sets of air respirators to closely monitor the operating conditions. Operators and guardians should agree on clear contact signals in advance, and take effective measures promptly when abnormal conditions are discovered. (9) Safety work signs and warning signs should be set up in conspicuous places, clearly announcing the name of the operating unit, the filing and review department, the approver of the work ticket, the person in charge of on-site operations, the contact number of the unit, the reporting hotline of the safety supervision department, etc. ； The content of the warning sign should clearly state "Dangerous place! Unauthorized personnel are strictly prohibited from entering. ” Article 11 Production and operation or management units and operating units shall formulate emergency rescue plans for toxic and harmful gas poisoning accidents such as hydrogen sulfide, provide training to relevant personnel, and organize drills twice a year. The operating unit should also formulate emergency measures and implement emergency personnel, equipment and equipment based on specific operating conditions. In the event of an accident, rescuers must use isolation respiratory protective equipment to perform rescue operations. Article 12 When hydrogen sulfide poisoning occurs, rescue (custody) personnel should wear suitable protective equipment, immediately remove the poisoned person from the danger area, go to the upwind vent to perform on-site artificial respiration or cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the poisoned person, and deliver it to a medical unit with conditions for rescue. At the same time, notify the superior department and relevant units. Article 13 Workers should use labor protection equipment correctly and strictly abide by the regulations on safety management of operations in toxic and hazardous places. ； If it is discovered that safety precautions are not implemented or operating safety conditions are not met, the company has the right to refuse construction operations. If an emergency is discovered during the construction process, the company has the right to stop operations and evacuate the workplace. Article 14 Safety supervision departments, municipal administration, water affairs, real estate, city appearance and environmental sanitation and other relevant industry authorities shall establish management files for toxic and hazardous places such as hydrogen sulfide. Urge construction units to establish safety management systems for operations in toxic and hazardous places, effectively strengthen supervision and inspection of construction and operations in hazardous places, and severely deal with and report companies that do not meet safety conditions or operate in violation of regulations. Article 15 The production, operation or management unit shall formulate specific regulations for the unit's hydrogen sulfide gas protection and safety management in accordance with these regulations. Article 16 These regulations will be implemented from the date of promulgation. If relevant laws, regulations, and rules have other provisions on the safety management of hydrogen sulfide gas protection, those provisions shall prevail. Accident case 1: The "5.31" major poisoning accident at Guangsha Hotel in Huangdao District, Qingdao City. At 8:30 on May 31, 2002, when Guangsha Hotel in Huangdao District, Qingdao City was organizing maintenance workers to clear the hotel's sewage pipes, a hydrogen sulfide gas poisoning accident occurred, killing three people. On May 29, staff from Huangdao Development Zone Thermal Power and Gas Corporation notified Guangsha Hotel that the hotel’s sewage pipe was blocked and sewage had seeped into the underground thermal pipe ditch, requiring it to be cleared immediately. At around 16:00 on May 30, deputy general manager Xu Qingxuan of the hotel asked Xiang Guobin, the deputy general manager in charge of hotel work, for permission, and arranged for hotel maintenance worker Song Baofu to contact the person who used to clear the sewage pipes in the hotel to clear the sewage pipes. After making contact, Song reported to Xu. At about 8:30 on May 31, Song Baofu, Li Zhaolin, and Shao Minghua came to the sewage inspection well in the northwest corner of Guangsha Hotel. Li Zhaolin and Song Baofu went down into the sewage inspection well one after another. They both fainted at the bottom of the well due to inhalation of toxic gases. Upon seeing this, Shao Minghua hurriedly called for help. Guangsha Hotel employees immediately tried to rescue and called 110, 119, and 120 to call the police. Shao Minghua was eager to save people, but refused to listen to others' dissuasion. During the process of going down the well, she inhaled toxic gas and fell into coma and fell to the bottom of the well. The development zone patrol police and fire brigade police officers rushed to the scene after receiving the report. Firefighters wearing protective masks went down the well and lifted the three people out. Medical staff from the Emergency Center of the First People's Hospital of the Development Zone immediately rescued the poisoned persons at the scene. By 9 a.m., it was confirmed that three people died after the rescue efforts failed. The "Acute Poisoning Accident Investigation Report" from the Health Supervision Office of the Qingdao Municipal Health Bureau, the "Autopsy Report" from the Huangdao Branch of the Qingdao Municipal Public Security Bureau, and the "Rescue Process Report" from the First People's Hospital of Qingdao Economic and Technological Development Zone proved that Song Baofu, Li Zhaolin, and Shao Minghua all died of poisoning by inhaling high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide gas. The direct cause of the accident was: Song Baofu, Li Zhaolin, and Shao Minghua lacked safety knowledge in dredging sewage pipes and had weak safety concepts. They did not take any preventive measures and ventured into dangerous places. The indirect reason is: When Guangsha Hotel arranged the work of clearing sewage pipes, it failed to explain safety precautions and take necessary safety measures, and failed to provide corresponding safety education and training to employees as required. ； Illegal self-employed owner Li Zhaozhen has been engaged in dredging sewage pipes for a long time. During the process of dredging sewage pipes, he failed to teach workers relevant safety knowledge, explain safety precautions, and provide necessary protective equipment. ； The personnel who unblocked the sewage pipes lacked the safety knowledge to prevent hydrogen sulfide poisoning and did not take necessary precautions. Accident case 2: The "9.1" Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning Accident in Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province On September 1, 2007, when Jianbao Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Jianbao Company) of Guangyanghu Town, Baoying County, Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province organized workers to clean the pickling pool for lotus root products, one person was poisoned by hydrogen sulfide, and eight people blindly participated in the rescue, resulting in six deaths and three serious injuries. This was a serious accident in which casualties increased due to blind rescue efforts. The company is a rural enterprise that mainly produces pickled lotus root products. Before September 1, 2007, the company had suspended production for more than three months. In order to resume production, the pickling pool needs to be cleaned. The pickling tank is located in a factory building with a fiberglass roof and is open. The pickling pool is 3.2 meters deep, 4 meters long and 4 meters wide, and the salt water in the pool is 0.3 meters deep. At around 16:00 on September 1, a worker from Jianbao Company felt uncomfortable when he went down to the pickling pool for cleaning operations, so he stopped working and fell while climbing up to the pool. After another person by the pool discovered it, he immediately called for help, and then eight people went into the pool to rescue the poisoned person. After the accident, sampling and testing revealed that the concentration of hydrogen sulfide gas in the marinating pool reached 24 mg/cubic meter (the maximum allowable concentration in the air is 10 mg/cubic meter). According to preliminary investigation and analysis, the accident was caused by organic matter in the pool. * * The deterioration produces a large amount of toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide and ammonia, causing poisoning accidents such as electric shock death of workers. The hydrogen sulfide gas generated by the salt liquid and other residues at the bottom of the pickling pool during the high temperature period in summer is deposited in the pool, and the concentration exceeds the standard. Jianbao Company did not conduct harmful gas detection before organizing workers to clean the marinating pool, and there was no toxic and harmful gas detection equipment on site. ； During the cleaning process, no forced ventilation measures were taken and only natural ventilation was used. ； The workers did not wear protective equipment and were not equipped with portable toxic and harmful gas alarms. ； The eight rescuers also did not wear protective equipment and took risks to rescue, resulting in increased casualties. This accident tells us that relevant units must strictly abide by operating procedures when cleaning lotus root, pickles, salted fish and other pickling tanks, sewers, manure pits, fish storage warehouses, mines, bottoms of wells, pulp tanks and other workplaces that are prone to accumulation of gas and have poor ventilation. They must ventilate and detoxify first, and pay attention to protection before working to prevent similar poisoning incidents from happening again. Accident case 3: The "6.2" hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident at the United Leather Factory in Huizhou City, Guangdong Province. On June 2, 2006, an employee at the United Leather Factory in Huizhou City, Guangdong Province was fumigated by hydrogen sulfide while cleaning the sewage pre-settlement tank. Four other employees went into the pool for rescue and were also poisoned one after another, resulting in a total of 4 deaths and 1 serious injury. The accident occurred at the Huizhou United Leather Factory in Baigang Village, Huicheng District, Huizhou City. The factory is a large-scale leather manufacturing enterprise. At around 4 p.m. that day, the factory was renovating the sewage pool in the factory (the sewage pool is about 8 meters deep, the pool surface is nearly 20 square meters, and it is open-air). Several workers were cleaning the sewage pool. At that time, the workers went into the pool without testing the hydrogen sulfide gas in the sewage pool. The first worker was poisoned by hydrogen sulfide gas when he went to the bottom of the pool, and the other two workers were also poisoned when they rescued others. At this time, the management personnel of the sewage pool were still unaware of the danger under the pool, and they also collapsed when they went to the pool to save people. The workers nearby heard the cry for help and immediately called the police. Local fire fighters arrived quickly and started rescue operations. However, 4 of the 5 people rescued died and 1 was unconscious. The company discharged sewage and pumped out sludge without taking preventive measures. The workers lacked basic awareness of safety precautions and entered the workplace rashly without taking necessary ventilation measures or using gas masks. This was the main reason for the accident. After the accident, other people present did not take correct and effective measures for emergency rescue, but blindly "went on" one after another, which was the main reason for the expansion of the consequences of the accident and the increase in the number of casualties. Accident case 4: An acute poisoning accident involving highly toxic mixed gases such as hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen sulfide occurred at a sewage treatment station of a printing and dyeing enterprise in Jingjiang City, Jiangsu Province. On October 1, 2003, an acute poisoning accident involving highly toxic mixed gases such as hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen sulfide occurred at a sewage treatment station of a printing and dyeing enterprise in Jingjiang City, Jiangsu Province, resulting in five deaths. The sewage treatment station was built in 1987 and is used to treat sewage such as indigo dye, sulfur dye, insurance powder, sodium hydroxide, vegetable oil emulsifier, etc. for printing and dyeing. At 2 p.m. on October 1, staff at the sewage treatment station cleaned the company’s concentrated sewage storage tank. During the cleaning process, due to the failure of the water pump, the water pump was taken out for repair. Two workers went into the pool and used high-pressure water guns to dilute the sludge at the bottom of the pool for easy drainage. About 20 minutes later, one of the workers climbed up the ladder at the entrance of the pool and asked the ground staff to turn off the water. He fainted in the pool as soon as he finished calling. The next three ground staff went down to rescue, but they all fainted in the pool. The fifth worker put on an ordinary mask and tied a rope to go down to pull the person. He felt dizzy and uncomfortable and did not dare to go down any further. The first four people were later rescued from the pool by firefighters and sent to the Municipal People's Hospital for emergency treatment. Four people were dead when they arrived at the hospital, and the other died after resuscitation failed. Since the sewage regulating tank has been sealed for a long time, the printing and dyeing sewage contains indigo, sodium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide, sulfur dyes, vegetable oil emulsifiers, etc. Among them, indigo, sodium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide, and sulfur dyes can precipitate underwater, while the vegetable oil emulsifier floats on the water. The storage tank has been sealed for many years and has become an anaerobic environment. Indigo, insurance powder, and sodium hydroxide produce gases such as NH3, CH4, H2S, and CO under the action of anaerobic microorganisms. When cleaning personnel use high-pressure water guns to dilute the sludge, a large amount of NH3 and CH4 are quickly released into the air in the tank and a chemical reaction immediately occurs to generate HCN. Before flushing, the concentration of HCN and H2S in the air in the pool was low, and the workers who went into the pool did not immediately faint from poisoning. After 20 minutes of cleaning, as the sludge dilution work progressed, the sewage could not be pumped out immediately, and there was no ventilation and detoxification. The concentrations of HCN and H2S increased sharply. The workers were poisoned and suffocated and passed out, and the rescuers who went into the pool also suffocated and fainted immediately. Based on the patient's clinical manifestations of poisoning and the on-site HCN and H2S concentration detection results, it was determined that the poisoning was caused by mixed highly toxic gases such as hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen sulfide. The sewage treatment station was built in 1987. It was not reviewed by the health department before and after its completion. The unit was not aware of the harmful and toxic substances discharged. The operators were not trained and did not know how to operate it correctly. In addition, the water pump failed during operation, ventilation and detoxification were not carried out in the pool, and gas masks were not worn when entering the pool, which led to the accident. This accident reminds us: Primary prevention must be done during this operation, and hazardous gas alarm facilities should be installed when necessary to prevent accidents. Part Three, One: Physical and chemical properties and toxicological effects of hydrogen sulfide 1. Physical and chemical properties Hydrogen sulfide is a flammable, colorless gas with a typical smell of rotten eggs, a relative molecular mass of 34.08, a relative density of air of 1.19, a melting point of -82.9°C, a boiling point of -60.3°C, and is easily soluble in water. At 20°C, 2.9 volumes of gas dissolve in 1 volume of water. It is also soluble in alcohols, carbon disulfide, petroleum solvents and crude oil. The vapor pressure at 20°C is 1874.5kPa, the explosion limit in air is 4.3%~45.5% (volume ratio), the auto-ignition temperature is 260°C, and its final oxidation product in the air is sulfuric acid and/or sulfate anions. 2. Toxicological effects Hydrogen sulfide is a strong neurotoxin and has obvious irritating effects on mucous membranes. 2.1 Acute toxicity: Lower concentrations can cause local irritation to the respiratory tract and eye mucosa. ； The higher the concentration, the more obvious the systemic effects, manifesting as central nervous system symptoms and asphyxiation symptoms. The harm of hydrogen sulfide to the human body is shown in Table 1. 2.2 Chronic toxicity: Long-term exposure to hydrogen sulfide at low concentrations can cause conjunctivitis and corneal damage. 2.3 Poisoning mechanism: Hydrogen sulfide can dissociate into HS-, S2- and H+ ions in aqueous solution. Under physiological pH, 2/3 of the total amount of hydrogen sulfide in the body dissociates into HS- ions, about 1/3 is undissociated hydrogen sulfate (H2S), and only a small amount dissociates into S2-, all of which have local stimulating effects. Hydrogen sulfide can combine with alkaline substances in tissues to form sodium sulfide, which is also corrosive and can cause damage to the eyes and respiratory tract. Hydrogen sulfide mainly enters the human body through the respiratory tract. When the free hydrogen sulfide and sulfide in the body have no time to oxidize, it paralyzes the central nervous system and causes systemic poisoning reactions. Table 1 Harm of hydrogen sulfide to human body Part 3, 2: 29 industries and 96 occupational positions prone to hydrogen sulfide poisoning 1. Coal mining and dressing industry: Blasting coal mining, mechanical coal mining, coal mining loading, coal mining support, underground ventilation 2. Oil and natural gas mining industry: Drilling, oil production, oil transfer, gas purification 3. Nonferrous metal mining and processing industry: Preparation of mineral processing chemicals 4. Food manufacturing industry: MSG refining 5. Textile industry: Raw hemp degumming 6. Leather, fur and products industry: Leather tanning 7. Paper and paper products industry: Chemical pulping, black liquor evaporation, black liquor combustion, pulp cleaning, cellophane production 8. Petroleum processing industry: Stable desulfurization, mercaptan removal, pre-hydro-refining, reforming hydro-refining, delayed coking, alkylation addition, alkylation fractionation, hydrogen desulfurization, gasoline hydro-refining, gasoline refining separation, hydrotreatment, liquid hydrocarbon desulfurization, gas desulfurization, amine liquid flash evaporation, acid gas combustion, sulfur capture and conversion, paraffin hydro-refining, coal gas desulfurization and decyanation 9. Inorganic acid manufacturing industry: Hydrogen sulfide combustion 10. Alkali product manufacturing: Arginine salt carbonization 11. Inorganic salt manufacturing industry: Carbon disulfide electric furnace production, carbon disulfide methane production, molybdenum disulfide production, barium carbonate production, chloride production, zinc salt production, ammonium molybdate production, sodium metaborate production 12. Other basic chemical raw material manufacturing industry: sulfur production, sodium hydrosulfide production, barium hydroxide production, phosphor production 13. Chemical fertilizer manufacturing industry: Coal gasification, oil and gas conversion, synthetic ammonia purification 14. Chemical pesticide manufacturing industry: Dimethoate vulcanization, malathion synthesis, phorate vulcanization, parathion esterification 15. Organic chemical raw material manufacturing industry: Cracking of hydrocarbon raw materials, quenching of cracked gas, purification of cracked gas, extraction of aromatic hydrocarbons, hydrogenation of kerosene, dewaxing and dehydrogenation of alkyl benzene, synthesis of organic acids, synthesis of other organic raw materials 16. Paint and pigment manufacturing industry: Oxidation of cobalt-containing pigments, preparation of zinc-barium white, and preparation of titanium liquid 17. Dye manufacturing industry: Direct dye synthesis, vat dye synthesis, fractional dye synthesis, ether intermediate synthesis, other intermediate synthesis 18. Chemical reagent manufacturing industry: Organic reagent synthesis 19. Catalyst and various chemical additives manufacturing industry: Vulcanizing agent synthesis, softener preparation, accelerator M synthesis, ZDC accelerator synthesis, other additive synthesis 20. Synthetic fiber mono(polymer) manufacturing industry: Sodium thiocyanate addition, sodium thiocyanate refining 21. Pharmaceutical industry: Synthetic drug addition 22. Chemical fiber industry: Viscose fiber spinning, plasticizing, cutting and refining 23. Rubber products industry: Rubber vulcanization, edge vulcanization, old tire vulcanization 24. Brick, lime and light building materials manufacturing industry: Waterproof material dipping, waterproof material mixing 25. Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing industry: Carbon rod pitch melting 26. Wastewater treatment industry: Sewage treatment, urban construction and sanitation, manhole operations 27. Pickling industry: Pickled grains (pit) cleaning 28. Liquor industry: Liquor grain cleaning 29. Fishing industry: Fishing vessel cleaning part three, three: Regulations on Safety Management of Operations Entering Confined Spaces (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Sinopec Anzi No. 466) Article 1 To enter a restricted space, you must apply for a permit to enter a restricted space. Article 2 Before entering a confined space for work, hazards in the confined space should be identified based on the content of the work, and corresponding operating procedures and safety measures should be formulated. Article 3 When entering a restricted space that involves the use of fire, heights, temporary electricity, etc., you must apply for the corresponding operation permit. Article 4 The procedures for applying for a restricted space operation permit are as follows:: (1) The person in charge of the unit that enters the restricted space operation should hold the construction task list and go to the secondary unit or grassroots unit of the directly affiliated enterprise to apply for the "Sinopec Corp. Permit to Enter the Confined Space Operation". (2) The leader in charge of safety of the secondary unit or grassroots unit of the directly affiliated enterprise shall issue a "Sinopec Corp. Entry Permit for Restricted Space Operations" after confirming the operating procedures and safety measures. (3) Before applying for the "Sinopec Corp. Entry Confined Space Operation Permit", production and construction units should identify hazards in the confined space based on the content of the operation, analyze whether there are hazardous factors such as hypoxia, oxygen enrichment, flammable and explosive, toxic and harmful, high temperature, negative pressure, etc. in the confined space, and formulate corresponding operating procedures, safety precautions and emergency measures. (4) Before entering the restricted space for operations, the production unit must conduct an on-site inspection and disclosure with the construction unit. The leader of the production unit shall organize relevant professional and technical personnel to work with the on-site person in charge of the unit that enters the restricted space, relevant professional technicians, and guardians to conduct on-site inspections of the equipment and facilities that need to be entered for operation, and explain the contents of the operations in the restricted space, possible risks, and the construction environment. Confirm the relevant safety measures listed in the license item by item based on the construction operation environment, and fill in the corresponding columns after confirming the supplementary measures. (5) The person in charge of the construction unit should explain the operating procedures and safety measures to the construction workers, and appoint an operating guardian ； The on-site safety director of the directly affiliated enterprise's secondary unit or grass-roots unit and the construction unit shall conduct on-site supervision of the entire process of confined space operations. (6) When entering a restricted space that involves the use of fire, temporary use of electricity, or operations at height, you must comply with relevant safety regulations and apply for corresponding permits. The "Confined Space Entry Permit" cannot replace the above-mentioned operation permits. (7) After the operation in the restricted space is completed, the secondary unit or grassroots unit of the directly affiliated enterprise and the on-site safety person in charge of the construction unit shall sign in the completion acceptance column of the "Sinopec Corp. Permit for Entry into the Confined Space". Article 5 Safety measures for entering confined space operations are as follows:: (1) The on-site safety person in charge of the secondary units or grassroots units directly under the enterprise and the construction unit should provide necessary safety education to on-site guardians and workers. The content should include safety knowledge of the operations they are engaged in, emergency handling and rescue methods, etc. (2) Develop safety emergency plans as needed. The content includes escape routes and rescue methods for workers in emergencies, contact signals agreed between guardians and workers, life-saving facilities and fire-extinguishing equipment that should be equipped on site, etc. On-site personnel should be familiar with the contents of the emergency plan and be equipped with a certain number of emergency rescue equipment (including air respirators, air-supply protective masks, life-saving ropes, etc.) and fire-extinguishing equipment that meet the regulations on-site outside the restricted space. There should be no obstacles inside or outside the entrance and exit to ensure that it is unobstructed to facilitate personnel entry and exit, rescue and evacuation. (3) The "three no-entries" should be implemented when entering the restricted space. When the conditions of the restricted space change, workers should evacuate the site immediately. At the same time, to prevent people from entering by mistake, a "Danger! No entry" warning sign should be installed at the entrance of the restricted space or other closure measures should be taken. After processing, you need to apply for a new "Confined Space Entry Permit" before entering. (4) Before entering the confined space for work, process treatment should be carried out to ensure that the confined space is purged, cooked, and replaced. All pipelines and valves connected to the confined space that may contain flammable, explosive, toxic and hazardous materials should be isolated by blind plates. The valves must not be closed instead of installing blind plates. The blind plates should be marked with signs. (5) In order to ensure the air circulation and breathing needs of personnel in the confined space, natural ventilation can be used, and forced ventilation can be adopted when necessary. It is strictly prohibited to fill the space with oxygen. Workers who enter confined spaces should not work for too long each time, and should be arranged to rotate operations or take breaks. (6) For equipment with rotating parts such as agitators, the power supply should be cut off after shutdown, the fuse should be removed or the ground wire should be connected, and a warning sign "Someone is working, closing is strictly prohibited" should be hung on the switch, and a dedicated person should be assigned to monitor it if necessary. (7) Safety voltage and safety lights should be used when entering confined spaces. Enter metal containers (furnaces, towers, kettles, tanks, etc.) and non-metallic containers that are particularly humid and have narrow working areas. The lighting voltage should not be greater than 12V. ； When electric tools are used or the lighting voltage is greater than 12V, a leakage protector should be installed according to regulations, and its junction box (board) is strictly prohibited from being brought into the container for use. If the working environment originally contains explosive liquids, gases and other media, explosion-proof flashlights or explosion-proof safety portable lights with a voltage of no more than 12V should be used. The portable light transformer must not be placed in or on the container. ； Workers should wear anti-static clothing and use explosion-proof tools. It is strictly prohibited to carry mobile phones and other non-explosion-proof communication tools and other non-explosion-proof equipment. (8) Sampling and analysis should be representative and comprehensive. When the volume of the confined space is large, samples should be taken and analyzed from the upper, middle and lower parts to ensure that the combustible gas concentration and oxygen content in any part of the confined space are qualified (when the lower explosion limit of combustible gas is greater than 4%, the measured concentration is not greater than 0.5% to be qualified. ； When the lower explosion limit is less than 4%, the measured concentration is not greater than 0.2% to be qualified. ； Oxygen content 19.5%-23.5% is qualified), toxic and harmful substances shall not exceed * * The specified "maximum allowable concentration of toxic substances in workshop air" indicator (H: The maximum allowable concentration of S shall not be greater than 10 mg/m3). After the analysis results are reported, the samples shall be retained for at least 4 hours. The temperature in the confined space should be around normal temperature. During the operation, the temperature should be retested at least every 4 hours. If any item fails, the operation should be stopped immediately. (9) For equipment containers that have been used to produce autopolymers, process treatment should be carried out before operation, such as cooking, replacement, etc., and polymer heating and other tests should be conducted. (10) When working in a confined space, winches, cranes, etc. are not allowed to be used to transport workers. Tools and materials brought by workers must be registered. Personnel, objects and tools unrelated to the operation are prohibited from entering the confined space. (11) Under special circumstances (such as oil tanks being cleared and under nitrogen conditions), workers can wear air-supply masks, air respirators, etc. When using an air-supply mask, the air-supply equipment must be supervised by a dedicated person. (12) During operations in a confined space, it is strictly prohibited to conduct various test runs, pressure tests or tests related to the confined space at the same time. (13) In the event of an emergency such as poisoning or suffocation, rescuers must wear isolation protective masks to enter the restricted space, and at least one person must do contact work outside. (14) During the shutdown period, personnel should be prevented from entering accidentally, and a "Danger! No entry" warning sign should be placed at the entrance of the restricted space or other closing measures should be taken. After the operation is completed, a comprehensive inspection of the confined space should be carried out. After confirmation, both the construction unit and the production unit shall sign for acceptance. (15) If abnormal changes occur during the operation of the above measures, the operation should be stopped immediately, and the equipment operation can only be resumed after handling and reaching safe operation conditions. Article 6 The qualifications and authorities of the homework guardian are as follows:: (1) Operation guardians should be familiar with the environment and process conditions of the operation area, have the ability to judge and handle abnormal situations, and have first aid knowledge. (2) The operation guardian is responsible for checking the implementation of safety measures before workers enter the restricted space to operate. If they find that the safety measures are not implemented or incomplete, they have the right to refuse the operation. (3) Operation guardians should count the number of people working in and out of the restricted space, maintain contact with the workers at the entrance and exit, and are strictly prohibited from leaving their posts. When abnormal conditions are discovered, operations should be stopped promptly and rescue measures should be taken immediately. (4) The operation guardian should carry the restricted space operation permit with him and be responsible for keeping it. (5) Operation monitoring personnel are not allowed to leave the site or do anything unrelated to supervision during the operation. Article 7 Responsibilities of operating personnel include: (1) Only those who hold the approved and valid "Sinopec Corp.'s Confined Space Entry Permit" can carry out construction operations. (2) Before operating, you should fully understand the content, location (position number), time, and requirements of the operation, and be familiar with the hazardous factors during the operation and the safety measures in the "Sinopec Corp. Entry Confined Space Operation Permit". (3) The safety protection measures listed in the "Sinopec Corp. Permit to Enter Confined Space Operations" must be confirmed and approved by the guardian before entering the restricted space. (4) Operators have the right to refuse operations and report to superiors if they are forced to operate in violation of this system, safety measures are not implemented, or the operating guardian is not present. (5) You should obey the instructions of the operating guardian and it is prohibited to bring items other than operating equipment into the restricted space. If the work supervisor is found not to perform his duties, the work should be stopped immediately. (6) If an abnormal situation is discovered during operation or if you feel uncomfortable or have difficulty breathing, you should immediately send a signal to the operation supervisor and evacuate the scene quickly. It is strictly forbidden to take off the protective mask in a toxic or suffocating environment. Article 8 License management requirements are as follows:: (1) The "Sinopec Corp. Permit for Confined Space Operations" is the basis for entering restricted space operations and must not be altered. ； If modifications are really needed, the issuer must sign and confirm the modifications. If the safety measures, gas detection, assessment and other columns in the "Sinopec Corp. Entry Permit for Confined Space Operations" cannot be filled in, additional pages should be added. “Sinopec's Confined Space Operation Permit" and attachments should be kept properly and the retention period is one year. (2) The license to enter the restricted space must be in four copies. The first copy shall be retained by the safety technicians of the secondary units or grass-roots units of the directly affiliated enterprises for future reference. The second copy shall be held by the person in charge of the operation. The third copy shall be held by the guardian. The fourth copy shall be kept in the operation control room or post where the operation point is located. (3) Each column in the "Sinopec Corp.'s Confined Space Operation Permit" should be filled in by the corresponding responsible person, and no other person is allowed to sign on their behalf. The names of the operators and guardians should match those on the "Sinopec Confined Space Entry Permit". (4) The "Sinopec Corp. Entry Confined Space Operation Permit" is valid for one cycle of the operation project. When operations are interrupted for more than 4 hours, environmental conditions and safety measures should be re-confirmed before operations are resumed. ； When the operation content and environmental conditions change, it is necessary to re-apply for the "Sinopec Restricted Space Operation Permit". Article 9 These regulations involve relevant requirements for external units and external personnel, which should be clearly stated in writing in the relevant contracts between the two parties or through the other party's commitment. This regulation applies to internal employees * Customary requirements should be ensured that relevant employees are well aware of them through system announcements, safety education, work instructions, job responsibilities, labor contracts, etc. Article 10 Terms and Definitions (1) "Confined space" refers to closed and semi-closed facilities and places within the management area of ​​Sinopec Corp. where furnaces, towers, kettles, tanks, warehouses, tankers, pipes, flues, sewers, trenches, wells, pools, culverts, skirts, etc. have restricted entrances and exits, poor ventilation, toxic and harmful risks, and may pose a hazard to the health and life safety of those entering. (2) The "three no-entry" refers to no entry without an approved "Permit to Enter Confined Space Operations", no entry without safety measures being implemented, and no entry without a guardian present. (3) "Isolation" refers to the method of adding blind plates or disconnecting pipelines to completely cut off the flow of materials between equipment. Article 11 The Group Company’s Safety and Environmental Protection Bureau is responsible for interpreting these regulations. Article 12 These regulations will be implemented from the date of issuance, and the original "Safety Management Regulations for Operations in Confined Spaces" (Sinopec An (2004) No. 553) will be abolished at the same time. appendix: Sinopec’s Confined Space Operation Permit (omitted) This post was last edited by hw197358 on 2009-2-27 10:51 ]

I have been an expert in the safety standardization assessment of hazardous chemicals practitioners. According to the list of key regulated hazardous chemicals in Appendix 13 of the Safety Standardization Work Guide for Hazardous Chemicals Practitioners, hydrogen sulfide ranks third, with CAS code 7783-06-4, and natural gas ranks 14th, with CAS code 8006-14-2. Now that natural gas contains hydrogen sulfide, it should be considered a hazardous chemical.

Natural gas is a dangerous chemical, flammable gas, and its dangerous characteristics: Mixing with air can form an explosive mixture, which can easily burn and explode when exposed to open flames or high heat. Violent chemical reactions can occur with fluorine, chlorine, etc. Its vapor is heavier than air and can spread to a considerable distance from a lower place. It will cause backfire when exposed to an open flame. If exposed to high heat, the internal pressure of the container will increase and there is a risk of cracking and explosion. The UN number is 1971. hydrogen sulfide ； Dangerous goods number 21006, UN number 1053, is a flammable and toxic gas. Hazardous properties: It is flammable and can form an explosive mixture when mixed with air. It can cause combustion and explosion when exposed to open flame or high heat. Reacts violently with concentrated nitric acid, fuming nitric acid or other strong oxidants, causing an explosion. The gas is heavier than air and can spread to a considerable distance at a lower level. When encountering a fire source, it will ignite and backfire. Therefore, whether it is hydrogen sulfide, natural gas, or natural gas mixed with hydrogen sulfide, they are all dangerous chemicals.

A strong neurotoxin that has a strong irritating effect on mucous membranes. LC50618mg/m3 (rat inhalation) is very low. Hazardous properties: It is flammable and can form an explosive mixture when mixed with air. It can cause combustion and explosion when exposed to open flame or high heat. The maximum allowable concentration of harmful substances in the air in the workshop is 10 mg/m3. The maximum allowable concentration of harmful substances in the atmosphere in residential areas is 0.01 mg/m3. It is included in the 2002 list of hazardous chemicals, with dangerous goods number 21006. It is a flammable liquid in Class 2 compressed gases and liquefied gases, with "lightning death" characteristics

Natural gas and hydrogen sulfide are both hazardous chemicals. Of course, they are both hazardous chemicals when put together.

It must be a dangerous gas, and* * Strictly control its emission concentration.

The dangerous characteristics of hydrogen sulfide have been clearly explained on the 6th and 7th floors. Hydrogen sulfide is definitely a dangerous chemical as a substance.

Absolutely, it is clearly written in the safety standardization book

Hydrogen sulfide 2. Impact on the environment: 1. Invasion routes of health hazards: Inhaled. 　　health hazards: This product is a strong neurotoxin and has a strong irritating effect on mucous membranes. 　　2. Toxicological information and environmental behavior acute toxicity: LC50618 mg/m3 (rat inhalation) Subacute and chronic toxicity: Rabbits inhaled 0.01mg/L, 2 hours/day, for 3 months, causing functional changes in the central nervous system, irritation symptoms of trachea and bronchial mucosa, and pathological changes in the cerebral cortex. Mice exposed to low concentrations of fluorine sulfide for a long time have small airway damage. 　　Source of pollution: Hydrogen sulfide is rarely used in industrial production. It is generally a product of certain chemical reactions and natural protein decomposition processes as well as components and impurities of certain natural products. It often exists in various production processes and in nature. Such as mining and non-ferrous metal smelting. Hydrogen sulfide is produced in low-temperature coking of coal, mining and refining of sulfur-containing oil, rubber, tanning, dyes, sugar and other industries. Hydrogen sulfide is often present in operations such as excavation and improvement of swamps, ditches, printing and dyeing, sewers, tunnels, and removal of garbage and feces. Natural gas, volcanic fumes, and mineral springs are also often present. 　　Hazardous properties: It is flammable and can form an explosive mixture when mixed with air. It can cause combustion and explosion when exposed to open flame or high heat. Reacts violently with concentrated nitric acid, fuming sulfuric acid or other strong oxidants, causing explosion. The gas is heavier than air and can spread to a considerable distance at a lower level. It will cause backfire when exposed to an open flame. 　　Combustion (decomposition) products: Sulfur dioxide. 　　Chemical equation 2H2S+3O2==2H2O+2SO2 (excess O2) 2H2S+O2==2H2O+2S (insufficient O2) 3. On-site emergency monitoring method: ①Portable gas detection instrument: Hydrogen sulfide coulomb detector, hydrogen sulfide gas-sensitive electrode detector ； 　　②Commonly used rapid chemical analysis methods: Lead acetate detection tube method, lead acetate indicator paper method "Emergency Monitoring and Treatment Technology for Sudden Environmental Pollution Accidents" Wan Bentai Editor-in-Chief Gas Speed Test Tube (product of Beijing Labor Insurance Institute, product of Dräger Company of Germany) 4. Laboratory monitoring method: Monitoring method source category Gas chromatography GB/T14678-93 Air iodometric method GB/T11601.1-1998 Natural gas methylene blue method GB/T11601.2-1998 Natural gas methylene blue spectrophotometry "Method for determination of harmful substances in the air" (Second Edition), Air 5. Environmental standards compiled by Hang Shiping: China (TJ36-79) The maximum allowable concentration of harmful substances in workshop air is 10 mg/cubic meter China (TJ36-79) The maximum allowable concentration of harmful substances in the atmosphere of residential areas is 0.01 mg/cubic meter (primary value) China (GB14554-93) Factory boundary standard for odor pollutants (mg/cubic meter) Level 1 0.03 ； Level 2 0.06～0.10 ； Level 3 0.32～0.60 China (GB14554-93) odor pollutant emission standard 0.33～21kg/h 　　

Data source: Baidu Encyclopedia Hydrogen sulfide National Standard No. 21006 CAS No. 7783-06-4 Molecular formula H2S Molecular weight 34.08 1. Physical and chemical properties Colorless gas with a pungent odor, with the smell of rotten eggs. Vapor pressure 2026.5kPa/25.5℃, flash point:

The hydrogen sulfide in chemical equipment and the hydrogen sulfide in natural gas are the same items, and they are both dangerous goods as mentioned above.

I personally believe that natural gas itself is a hazardous chemical. Hazardous Regulation No. 21007, see the "List of Hazardous Chemicals", not to mention sulfur-containing natural gas.

Hydrogen sulfide; Hydrogen sulfide; CAS: 7783-06-4 The physical and chemical properties are colorless gas. Has a rotten egg smell. Molecular formula H2-S. Molecular weight 34.08. Relative density 1.19. Melting point -82.9℃. Boiling point -61.8℃. Easily soluble in water, also soluble in alcohols, petroleum solvents and crude oil. The upper flammability limit is 45.5% and the lower limit is 4.3%. Flash point 292℃. Opportunities for exposure: Hydrogen sulfide is produced in industries such as mining and refining copper, nickel, cobalt, etc. from ores, low-temperature coking of coal, mining and refining of sulfur-containing petroleum, rubber, rayon, tanning, sulfur dyes, papermaking, pigments, vegetable pickling, sugar beet sugar production, animal glue, etc.; Excavating and renovating swamps, ditches, wells, sewers, culverts, tunnels, and removing garbage, dirt, and feces, as well as workers in analytical chemistry laboratories have the opportunity to be exposed to hydrogen sulfide; natural gas, mineral water, volcanic vents, and underground mine water are often accompanied by the presence of hydrogen sulfide. Since hydrogen sulfide is soluble in water and oil, it can sometimes flow with the water or oil far away from the source, causing accidental poisoning. Invasion route: Hydrogen sulfide is absorbed quickly through the mucous membrane and very little is absorbed through the skin. Ingestion of sulfur-containing salts reacts with gastric acid to produce hydrogen sulfide, which can be absorbed through the intestines and cause poisoning. Toxicology Introduction Hydrogen sulfide is a nerve agent. It is also a suffocating and irritating gas. The main targets of its toxic effects are the central nervous system and respiratory system, and may also be accompanied by damage to multiple organs such as the heart. The most sensitive tissues to the toxic effects are the brain and mucosal contact areas. Human inhalation LCL0: 600 ppm/30M, 800 ppm/5M. Human (male) inhalation LCL0: 5700 ug/kg. Rat inhalation LC50: 444 ppm. Mouse inhalation LC50: 634 ppm/1H. Most hydrogen sulfide undergoes oxidative metabolism in the body to form thiosulfate and sulfate for detoxification. Glutathione may play a stimulating role during the metabolism process. ； A small amount can undergo methylation metabolism to form less toxic methyl mercaptan and methyl sulfide, but high concentrations of methyl mercaptan have harmful effects on the central nervous system. * * effect. Metabolites in the body can be excreted with urine within 24 hours, some are excreted with feces, and a small part is exhaled through the lungs in their original form. There is no accumulation in the body. The acute toxic effects of hydrogen sulfide on target organs and mechanisms of poisoning can vary depending on its concentration and exposure time. The higher the concentration, the more obvious the central nervous system inhibitory effect, and the mucosal irritation effect is obvious when the concentration is relatively low. People who inhale 70 to 150 mg/m3/1 to 2 hours will experience symptoms of respiratory tract and eye irritation. After 2 to 5 minutes of inhalation, they will feel olfactory fatigue and no longer smell the odor. Inhalation of 300 mg/m3/1 hour will cause acute eye irritation symptoms in 6 to 8 minutes, and prolonged exposure will cause pulmonary edema. Inhalation of 760 mg/m3/15 to 60 minutes may cause pulmonary edema, bronchitis and pneumonia, headache, dizziness, unsteady gait, nausea and vomiting. Inhalation of 1000 mg/m3/for a few seconds will quickly lead to acute poisoning, accelerated breathing, respiratory paralysis and death. Pathogenesis 1. High concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the blood can directly stimulate the chemoreceptors in the carotid sinus and aorta, causing reflex respiratory depression. 2． Hydrogen sulfide can directly act on the brain and has a stimulating effect at low concentrations. ； High concentrations act as inhibitors, causing coma and paralysis of the respiratory and vasomotor centers. Because hydrogen sulfide is a strong inhibitor of cytochrome oxidase, it can combine with the ferric ions in the oxidative cytochrome oxidase in the respiratory chain of the inner mitochondrial membrane, thereby inhibiting electron transfer and oxygen utilization, causing intracellular hypoxia and causing intracellular asphyxia. Because brain tissue is most sensitive to hypoxia, it is most vulnerable to damage. The above two effects occur quickly and can cause respiratory arrest and death like electric shock. If exposure can be stopped promptly at the onset of the disease, many cases can recover quickly and completely, possibly because hydrogen sulfide is quickly oxidized and inactivated in the body. 3. Secondary hypoxia is a decrease in blood oxygen content due to factors such as apnea or pulmonary edema caused by hydrogen sulfide, which can aggravate the condition, persist in neurological symptoms, and cause multiple organ failure. 4. Hydrogen sulfide decomposes when it meets the water on the surface of the eye and respiratory mucosa, and reacts with alkaline substances in the tissues to produce hydrogen sulfide radicals, sulfur and hydrogen ions, hydrosulfate and sodium sulfide, which has a strong irritating and corrosive effect on the mucous membranes and causes varying degrees of chemical inflammatory reactions. In addition, intracellular asphyxia causes the most serious damage to deeper tissues and can easily cause pulmonary edema. 5. The mechanisms of myocardial damage, especially late-onset damage, remain unclear. Myocardial infarction-like symptoms in acute poisoning may be caused by coronary vasospasm, myocardial ischemia, edema, inflammatory infiltration and oxidative disorders in myocardial cells caused by the direct effect of hydrogen sulfide. The autopsy results of fatal cases of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning are often related to the duration of the disease. Cerebral edema and pulmonary edema are common, followed by myocardial lesions. Generally, it can be seen that the corpse is obviously cyanotic, the smell of hydrogen sulfide is emitted during the autopsy, the blood is flowing, and the internal organs are slightly green. Cerebral edema is the most common, with punctate hemorrhage, necrosis and softening of brain tissue. ； Degeneration of spinal nerve tissue can be seen. Autopsies of electroshock-like deaths showed nonspecific asphyxia. Clinical manifestations: Acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning generally develops rapidly, with clinical manifestations mainly involving damage to the brain and/or respiratory system, and may also be accompanied by heart and other organ dysfunction. Clinical manifestations can vary significantly depending on factors such as the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exposure. 1． Central nervous system damage is most common: (1) Headache, dizziness, fatigue, ataxia, and mild disturbance of consciousness may occur after exposure to higher concentrations of hydrogen sulfide. Eye and upper respiratory tract irritation symptoms often appear first. (2) After exposure to high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, encephalopathy manifests as headache, dizziness, irritability, staggering gait, irritability, confusion, delirium, epileptic convulsions, and generalized tonic-clonic seizures. ； Coma can occur suddenly ； Dyspnea or cardiac arrest after cessation of breathing may also occur. Fundus examination may reveal papilledema in individual cases. Some cases may be accompanied by pulmonary edema. Symptoms of encephalopathy often appear earlier than respiratory symptoms. It may take some time for mucosal irritation to occur. (3) Electric shock-like death can occur after exposure to extremely high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, that is, respiratory arrest occurs within seconds or minutes after exposure, and cardiac arrest can occur a few minutes later. ； It can also lead to coma immediately or within a few minutes, and death due to respiratory arrest. Death can occur without alertness. When the smell of hydrogen sulfide is detected, the sense of smell can be lost immediately. In a few cases, a sickening sweet smell can be smelled moments before coma. There are generally no aura symptoms before death. Deep and rapid breathing may occur first, followed by respiratory arrest. In acute poisoning, coma often occurs at the accident scene. The degree varies depending on the concentration and time of exposure to hydrogen sulfide, and may occasionally be accompanied by or without respiratory failure. Some cases can be revived after leaving the accident scene or being transferred to the hospital. Patients who still maintain vital signs when arriving at the hospital, if they do not have hypoxic encephalopathy, tend to recover faster. People who have been comatose for a long time may have headaches, dizziness, vision or hearing loss, disorientation, ataxia or epileptic convulsions after resuscitation. Most cases can be fully recovered. There have been reports of 2 cases of delayed encephalopathy. They both recovered from deep coma 2 days later, fell into coma again 1.5 days and 3 days later respectively, and recovered again 2 weeks and 1 month later respectively. Central nervous system symptoms are extremely severe, but mucosal irritation symptoms are not obvious. This may be due to the short exposure time and irritation symptoms have not yet occurred. ； Or because the systemic symptoms are severe and easy to attract attention. Those in the early stage of acute poisoning or those with only brain dysfunction without morphological changes are less sensitive to electroencephalography and brain anatomy imaging techniques such as computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), while abnormalities in single-photon emission computed brain scans (SPECT)/positron emission scans (PET) are well correlated with clinical manifestations and neuroelectrophysiological examinations. For example, one patient was in a decortical state after deep coma due to poisoning, and CT showed reduced density in the globus pallidus on both sides. The brain CT and MRI of another poisoned and comatose patient showed no abnormalities. ； PET examination performed 3 years after the accident showed metabolic abnormalities in bilateral temporal lobes, inferior parietal lobes, left thalamus, and striatum. ； Six months later, SPECT showed reduced flow in the bilateral lentiform nuclei and no abnormality in the cerebral cortex. Patients have symptoms such as hyposmia, extrapyramidal signs, and memory deficits. Foreign reports reported 15 cases of people with a history of repeated acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning who suffered from symptoms such as fatigue, drowsiness, headache, agitation, anxiety, and memory loss. 2． Respiratory system damage: Chemical bronchitis, pneumonia, pulmonary edema, acute respiratory distress syndrome, etc. may occur. A small number of poisoning cases may have pulmonary edema as the main clinical manifestation, while the neurological symptoms are mild. May be accompanied by conjunctivitis. Keratitis. 3. Myocardial damage: During the course of poisoning, some cases may experience palpitations, shortness of breath, chest tightness or angina-like symptoms. ； In a few cases, myocardial infarction-like symptoms occurred one week after recovery from coma and improvement of poisoning symptoms. The electrocardiogram shows an acute myocardial death-like pattern, but it disappears quickly. The disease is mild, the course is short, and the prognosis is good. The diagnosis and treatment methods are different from myocardial infarction caused by coronary artery-like heart disease, so it is considered to be diffuse toxic myocardial damage. Myocardial enzyme spectrum examination may have varying degrees of abnormalities. Main basis for diagnosis of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning: 1. The smell of rotten eggs in the clothes and breath of patients with a clear history of exposure to hydrogen sulfide can be used as exposure indicators. Hydrogen sulfide may be produced or measured at the accident site. It can be used as a reference if the patient smells the smell of rotten eggs before the onset of the disease. 2. Clinical characteristics: The above-mentioned clinical manifestations mainly include damage to the brain and/or respiratory system. 3. laboratory tests: There are currently no specific laboratory test indicators. (1) Increased hydrogen sulfide or sulfide content in the blood can be used as an absorption indicator, but it is inconsistent with the severity of poisoning, and its half-life is short, so blood needs to be collected shortly after stopping contact. (2) Urinary thiosulfate content may increase, but it may be interfered by factors such as measurement time and sulfur content in diet. (3) Sulfhemoglobin (SHb) in blood cannot be used as a diagnostic indicator because hydrogen sulfide does not combine with normal hemoglobin to form sulfhemoglobin, which has nothing to do with the mechanism of poisoning. ； Many studies have shown no significant sulfhemoglobin concentrations in the blood of humans and animals killed by hydrogen sulfide. (4) The sulfur content in corpse blood and tissues may be interfered by factors such as corpse decomposition, affecting its reference value. 4. Differential diagnosis: Electric shock-like death at the accident site should be differentiated from acute poisoning by other chemicals such as carbon monoxide or cyanide, acute cerebrovascular disease, myocardial infarction, etc. It should also be differentiated from suffocation caused by entering an oxygen-deficient environment caused by chemicals such as high concentrations of methane or nitrogen. Other symptoms should also be differentiated from similar diseases caused by other causes or trauma caused by falls after coma. First aid treatment 1. On-site rescue is extremely important, because extremely high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the air often cause electric shock-like death of many people at the scene. Timely rescue can reduce the mortality rate, reduce the number of people transferred to the hospital, and alleviate the condition. The patient should be removed from the scene immediately to fresh air. Give oxygen immediately if possible. On-site rescue personnel should have knowledge of self-rescue and mutual rescue to prevent themselves from being poisoned after entering the scene. 2． Maintain vital signs. For those who have stopped breathing or cardiac arrest, cardiopulmonary and cerebral resuscitation should be performed immediately. If people who suffer from respiratory arrest at the accident scene can be given artificial respiration in time, subsequent cardiac arrest can be avoided. When performing mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration, the practitioner should prevent inhalation of hydrogen sulfide escaping from the patient's exhaled breath or clothes to avoid secondary poisoning. 3. Mainly symptomatic and supportive treatment. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy plays an important role in accelerating recovery from coma and preventing and treating hydrocephalus. All comatose patients, regardless of whether they have been revived, should be given hyperbaric oxygen therapy as soon as possible, but they need to be coordinated with comprehensive treatment. Those with obvious poisoning symptoms need to be given early, sufficient and short-term adrenal glucocorticoids to help prevent and treat cerebral edema, pulmonary edema and myocardial damage. To control convulsions and prevent and treat cerebral and pulmonary edema, see and. Severe patients need to undergo ECG monitoring and myocardial enzyme spectrum measurement in order to detect changes in their condition in time and handle them promptly. For those who have symptoms of eye irritation, rinse immediately with clean water and treat symptomatically. 4. There is no unified opinion on the indications and methods for using methemoglobin forming agents. Theoretically, methemoglobin-forming agents are suitable for treating intracellular asphyxia caused by hydrogen sulfide, but are ineffective for the reflex inhibition of respiration in the nervous system. Appropriate application of isoamyl nitrite, sodium nitrite or 4-dimethylaminophenol (4-DMAP), etc., can oxidize hemoglobin in the blood into methemoglobin, which can combine with free sulfhydryl groups to form sulfmethemoglobin (SMHb) for detoxification. ； It can also take away the sulfhydryl group combined with cytochrome oxidase to rejuvenate the enzyme and improve hypoxia. However, there are currently no simple and feasible indicators for judging intracellular suffocation, and sulfide is quickly oxidized and inactivated in the body. The use of the above drugs will actually aggravate tissue hypoxia. Methylene blue (methylene blue) should not be used because it can only form methemoglobin in large doses. Excessive doses may cause serious side effects. At present, the use of such drugs can only be determined by the clinical experience of the physician. Standard workshop air hygiene standards: China MAC 10 mg/m3; United States ACGIH TLV-TWA 14 mg/m3 (10 ppm), STEL 21 mg/m3 (15 ppm) Hydrogen sulfide; Hydrogen sulfide; CAS: 7783-06-4 The physical and chemical properties are colorless gas. Has a rotten egg smell. Molecular formula H2-S. Molecular weight 34.08. Relative density 1.19. Melting point -82.9℃. Boiling point -61.8℃. Easily soluble in water, also soluble in alcohols, petroleum solvents and crude oil. The upper flammability limit is 45.5% and the lower limit is 4.3%. Flash point 292℃. Opportunities for exposure: Hydrogen sulfide is produced in industries such as mining and refining copper, nickel, cobalt, etc. from ores, low-temperature coking of coal, mining and refining of sulfur-containing petroleum, rubber, rayon, tanning, sulfur dyes, papermaking, pigments, vegetable pickling, sugar beet sugar production, animal glue, etc.; Excavating and renovating swamps, ditches, wells, sewers, culverts, tunnels, and removing garbage, dirt, and feces, as well as workers in analytical chemistry laboratories have the opportunity to be exposed to hydrogen sulfide; natural gas, mineral water, volcanic vents, and underground mine water are often accompanied by the presence of hydrogen sulfide. Since hydrogen sulfide is soluble in water and oil, it can sometimes flow with the water or oil far away from the source, causing accidental poisoning. Invasion route: Hydrogen sulfide is absorbed quickly through the mucous membrane and very little is absorbed through the skin. Ingestion of sulfur-containing salts reacts with gastric acid to produce hydrogen sulfide, which can be absorbed through the intestines and cause poisoning. Toxicology Introduction Hydrogen sulfide is a nerve agent. It is also a suffocating and irritating gas. The main targets of its toxic effects are the central nervous system and respiratory system, and may also be accompanied by damage to multiple organs such as the heart. The most sensitive tissues to the toxic effects are the brain and mucosal contact areas. Human inhalation LCL0: 600 ppm/30M, 800 ppm/5M. Human (male) inhalation LCL0: 5700 ug/kg. Rat inhalation LC50: 444 ppm. Mouse inhalation LC50: 634 ppm/1H. Most hydrogen sulfide undergoes oxidative metabolism in the body to form thiosulfate and sulfate for detoxification. Glutathione may play a stimulating role during the metabolism process. ； A small amount can undergo methylation metabolism to form less toxic methyl mercaptan and methyl sulfide, but high concentrations of methyl mercaptan have harmful effects on the central nervous system. * * effect. Metabolites in the body can be excreted with urine within 24 hours, some are excreted with feces, and a small part is exhaled through the lungs in their original form. There is no accumulation in the body. The acute toxic effects of hydrogen sulfide on target organs and mechanisms of poisoning can vary depending on its concentration and exposure time. The higher the concentration, the more obvious the central nervous system inhibitory effect, and the mucosal irritation effect is obvious when the concentration is relatively low. People who inhale 70 to 150 mg/m3/1 to 2 hours will experience symptoms of respiratory tract and eye irritation. After 2 to 5 minutes of inhalation, they will feel olfactory fatigue and no longer smell the odor. Inhalation of 300 mg/m3/1 hour will cause acute eye irritation symptoms in 6 to 8 minutes, and prolonged exposure will cause pulmonary edema. Inhalation of 760 mg/m3/15 to 60 minutes may cause pulmonary edema, bronchitis and pneumonia, headache, dizziness, unsteady gait, nausea and vomiting. Inhalation of 1000 mg/m3/for a few seconds will quickly lead to acute poisoning, accelerated breathing, respiratory paralysis and death. Pathogenesis 1. High concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the blood can directly stimulate the chemoreceptors in the carotid sinus and aorta, causing reflex respiratory depression. 2． Hydrogen sulfide can directly act on the brain and has a stimulating effect at low concentrations. ； High concentrations act as inhibitors, causing coma and paralysis of the respiratory and vasomotor centers. Because hydrogen sulfide is a strong inhibitor of cytochrome oxidase, it can combine with the ferric ions in the oxidative cytochrome oxidase in the respiratory chain of the inner mitochondrial membrane, thereby inhibiting electron transfer and oxygen utilization, causing intracellular hypoxia and causing intracellular asphyxia. Because brain tissue is most sensitive to hypoxia, it is most vulnerable to damage. The above two effects occur quickly and can cause respiratory arrest and death like electric shock. If exposure can be stopped promptly at the onset of the disease, many cases can recover quickly and completely, possibly because hydrogen sulfide is quickly oxidized and inactivated in the body. 3. Secondary hypoxia is a decrease in blood oxygen content due to factors such as apnea or pulmonary edema caused by hydrogen sulfide, which can aggravate the condition, persist in neurological symptoms, and cause multiple organ failure. 4. Hydrogen sulfide decomposes when it meets the water on the surface of the eye and respiratory mucosa, and reacts with alkaline substances in the tissues to produce hydrogen sulfide radicals, sulfur and hydrogen ions, hydrosulfate and sodium sulfide, which has a strong irritating and corrosive effect on the mucous membranes and causes varying degrees of chemical inflammatory reactions. In addition, intracellular asphyxia causes the most serious damage to deeper tissues and can easily cause pulmonary edema. 5. The mechanisms of myocardial damage, especially late-onset damage, remain unclear. Myocardial infarction-like symptoms in acute poisoning may be caused by coronary vasospasm, myocardial ischemia, edema, inflammatory infiltration and oxidative disorders in myocardial cells caused by the direct effect of hydrogen sulfide. The autopsy results of fatal cases of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning are often related to the duration of the disease. Cerebral edema and pulmonary edema are common, followed by myocardial lesions. Generally, it can be seen that the corpse is obviously cyanotic, the smell of hydrogen sulfide is emitted during the autopsy, the blood is flowing, and the internal organs are slightly green. Cerebral edema is the most common, with punctate hemorrhage, necrosis and softening of brain tissue. ； Degeneration of spinal nerve tissue can be seen. Autopsies of electroshock-like deaths showed nonspecific asphyxia. Clinical manifestations: Acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning generally develops rapidly, with clinical manifestations mainly involving damage to the brain and/or respiratory system, and may also be accompanied by heart and other organ dysfunction. Clinical manifestations can vary significantly depending on factors such as the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exposure. 1． Central nervous system damage is most common: (1) Headache, dizziness, fatigue, ataxia, and mild disturbance of consciousness may occur after exposure to higher concentrations of hydrogen sulfide. Eye and upper respiratory tract irritation symptoms often appear first. (2) After exposure to high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, encephalopathy manifests as headache, dizziness, irritability, staggering gait, irritability, confusion, delirium, epileptic convulsions, and generalized tonic-clonic seizures. ； Coma can occur suddenly ； Dyspnea or cardiac arrest after cessation of breathing may also occur. Fundus examination may reveal papilledema in individual cases. Some cases may be accompanied by pulmonary edema. Symptoms of encephalopathy often appear earlier than respiratory symptoms. It may take some time for mucosal irritation to occur. (3) Electric shock-like death can occur after exposure to extremely high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, that is, respiratory arrest occurs within seconds or minutes after exposure, and cardiac arrest can occur a few minutes later. ； It can also lead to coma immediately or within a few minutes, and death due to respiratory arrest. Death can occur without alertness. When the smell of hydrogen sulfide is detected, the sense of smell can be lost immediately. In a few cases, a sickening sweet smell can be smelled moments before coma. There are generally no aura symptoms before death. Deep and rapid breathing may occur first, followed by respiratory arrest. In acute poisoning, coma often occurs at the accident scene. The degree varies depending on the concentration and time of exposure to hydrogen sulfide, and may occasionally be accompanied by or without respiratory failure. Some cases can be revived after leaving the accident scene or being transferred to the hospital. Patients who still maintain vital signs when arriving at the hospital, if they do not have hypoxic encephalopathy, tend to recover faster. People who have been comatose for a long time may have headaches, dizziness, vision or hearing loss, disorientation, ataxia or epileptic convulsions after resuscitation. Most cases can be fully recovered. There have been reports of 2 cases of delayed encephalopathy. They both recovered from deep coma 2 days later, fell into coma again 1.5 days and 3 days later respectively, and recovered again 2 weeks and 1 month later respectively. Central nervous system symptoms are extremely severe, but mucosal irritation symptoms are not obvious. This may be due to the short exposure time and irritation symptoms have not yet occurred. ； Or because the systemic symptoms are severe and easy to attract attention. Those in the early stage of acute poisoning or those with only brain dysfunction without morphological changes are less sensitive to electroencephalography and brain anatomy imaging techniques such as computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), while abnormalities in single-photon emission computed brain scans (SPECT)/positron emission scans (PET) are well correlated with clinical manifestations and neuroelectrophysiological examinations. For example, one patient was in a decortical state after deep coma due to poisoning, and CT showed reduced density in the globus pallidus on both sides. The brain CT and MRI of another poisoned and comatose patient showed no abnormalities. ； PET examination 3 years after the accident showed hydrogen sulfide in both temporal and parietal lobes; Hydrogen sulfide; CAS: 7783-06-4 The physical and chemical properties are colorless gas. Has a rotten egg smell. Molecular formula H2-S. Molecular weight 34.08. Relative density 1.19. Melting point -82.9℃. Boiling point -61.8℃. Easily soluble in water, also soluble in alcohols, petroleum solvents and crude oil. The upper flammability limit is 45.5% and the lower limit is 4.3%. Flash point 292℃. Opportunities for exposure: Hydrogen sulfide is produced in industries such as mining and refining copper, nickel, cobalt, etc. from ores, low-temperature coking of coal, mining and refining of sulfur-containing petroleum, rubber, rayon, tanning, sulfur dyes, papermaking, pigments, vegetable pickling, sugar beet sugar production, animal glue, etc.; Excavating and renovating swamps, ditches, wells, sewers, culverts, tunnels, and removing garbage, dirt, and feces, as well as workers in analytical chemistry laboratories have the opportunity to be exposed to hydrogen sulfide; natural gas, mineral water, volcanic vents, and underground mine water are often accompanied by the presence of hydrogen sulfide. Since hydrogen sulfide is soluble in water and oil, it can sometimes flow with the water or oil far away from the source, causing accidental poisoning. Invasion route: Hydrogen sulfide is absorbed quickly through the mucous membrane and very little is absorbed through the skin. Ingestion of sulfur-containing salts reacts with gastric acid to produce hydrogen sulfide, which can be absorbed through the intestines and cause poisoning. Toxicology Introduction Hydrogen sulfide is a nerve agent. It is also a suffocating and irritating gas. The main targets of its toxic effects are the central nervous system and respiratory system, and may also be accompanied by damage to multiple organs such as the heart. The most sensitive tissues to the toxic effects are the brain and mucosal contact areas. Human inhalation LCL0: 600 ppm/30M, 800 ppm/5M. Human (male) inhalation LCL0: 5700 ug/kg. Rat inhalation LC50: 444 ppm. Mouse inhalation LC50: 634 ppm/1H. Most hydrogen sulfide undergoes oxidative metabolism in the body to form thiosulfate and sulfate for detoxification. Glutathione may play a stimulating role during the metabolism process. ； A small amount can undergo methylation metabolism to form less toxic methyl mercaptan and methyl sulfide, but high concentrations of methyl mercaptan have harmful effects on the central nervous system. * * effect. Metabolites in the body can be excreted with urine within 24 hours, some are excreted with feces, and a small part is exhaled through the lungs in their original form. There is no accumulation in the body. The acute toxic effects of hydrogen sulfide on target organs and mechanisms of poisoning can vary depending on its concentration and exposure time. The higher the concentration, the more obvious the central nervous system inhibitory effect, and the mucosal irritation effect is obvious when the concentration is relatively low. People who inhale 70 to 150 mg/m3/1 to 2 hours will experience symptoms of respiratory tract and eye irritation. After 2 to 5 minutes of inhalation, they will feel olfactory fatigue and no longer smell the odor. Inhalation of 300 mg/m3/1 hour will cause acute eye irritation symptoms in 6 to 8 minutes, and prolonged exposure will cause pulmonary edema. Inhalation of 760 mg/m3/15 to 60 minutes may cause pulmonary edema, bronchitis and pneumonia, headache, dizziness, unsteady gait, nausea and vomiting. Inhalation of 1000 mg/m3/for a few seconds will quickly lead to acute poisoning, accelerated breathing, respiratory paralysis and death. Pathogenesis 1. High concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the blood can directly stimulate the chemoreceptors in the carotid sinus and aorta, causing reflex respiratory depression. 2． Hydrogen sulfide can directly act on the brain and has a stimulating effect at low concentrations. ； High concentrations act as inhibitors, causing coma and paralysis of the respiratory and vasomotor centers. Because hydrogen sulfide is a strong inhibitor of cytochrome oxidase, it can combine with the ferric ions in the oxidative cytochrome oxidase in the respiratory chain of the inner mitochondrial membrane, thereby inhibiting electron transfer and oxygen utilization, causing intracellular hypoxia and causing intracellular asphyxia. Because brain tissue is most sensitive to hypoxia, it is most vulnerable to damage. The above two effects occur quickly and can cause respiratory arrest and death like electric shock. If exposure can be stopped promptly at the onset of the disease, many cases can recover quickly and completely, possibly because hydrogen sulfide is quickly oxidized and inactivated in the body. 3. Secondary hypoxia is a decrease in blood oxygen content due to factors such as apnea or pulmonary edema caused by hydrogen sulfide, which can aggravate the condition, persist in neurological symptoms, and cause multiple organ failure. 4. Hydrogen sulfide decomposes when it meets the water on the surface of the eye and respiratory mucosa, and reacts with alkaline substances in the tissues to produce hydrogen sulfide radicals, sulfur and hydrogen ions, hydrosulfate and sodium sulfide, which has a strong irritating and corrosive effect on the mucous membranes and causes varying degrees of chemical inflammatory reactions. In addition, intracellular asphyxia causes the most serious damage to deeper tissues and can easily cause pulmonary edema. 5. The mechanisms of myocardial damage, especially late-onset damage, remain unclear. Myocardial infarction-like symptoms in acute poisoning may be caused by coronary vasospasm, myocardial ischemia, edema, inflammatory infiltration and oxidative disorders in myocardial cells caused by the direct effect of hydrogen sulfide. The autopsy results of fatal cases of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning are often related to the duration of the disease. Cerebral edema and pulmonary edema are common, followed by myocardial lesions. Generally, it can be seen that the corpse is obviously cyanotic, the smell of hydrogen sulfide is emitted during the autopsy, the blood is flowing, and the internal organs are slightly green. Cerebral edema is the most common, with punctate hemorrhage, necrosis and softening of brain tissue. ； Degeneration of spinal nerve tissue can be seen. Autopsies of electroshock-like deaths showed nonspecific asphyxia. Clinical manifestations: Acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning generally develops rapidly, with clinical manifestations mainly involving damage to the brain and/or respiratory system, and may also be accompanied by heart and other organ dysfunction. Clinical manifestations can vary significantly depending on factors such as the concentration of hydrogen sulfide exposure. 1． Central nervous system damage is most common: (1) Headache, dizziness, fatigue, ataxia, and mild disturbance of consciousness may occur after exposure to higher concentrations of hydrogen sulfide. Eye and upper respiratory tract irritation symptoms often appear first. (2) After exposure to high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, encephalopathy manifests as headache, dizziness, irritability, staggering gait, irritability, confusion, delirium, epileptic convulsions, and generalized tonic-clonic seizures. ； Coma can occur suddenly ； Dyspnea or cardiac arrest after cessation of breathing may also occur. Fundus examination may reveal papilledema in individual cases. Some cases may be accompanied by pulmonary edema. Symptoms of encephalopathy often appear earlier than respiratory symptoms. It may take some time for mucosal irritation to occur. (3) Electric shock-like death can occur after exposure to extremely high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide, that is, respiratory arrest occurs within seconds or minutes after exposure, and cardiac arrest can occur a few minutes later. ； It can also lead to coma immediately or within a few minutes, and death due to respiratory arrest. Death can occur without alertness. When the smell of hydrogen sulfide is detected, the sense of smell can be lost immediately. In a few cases, a sickening sweet smell can be smelled moments before coma. There are generally no aura symptoms before death. Deep and rapid breathing may occur first, followed by respiratory arrest. In acute poisoning, coma often occurs at the accident scene. The degree varies depending on the concentration and time of exposure to hydrogen sulfide, and may occasionally be accompanied by or without respiratory failure. Some cases can be revived after leaving the accident scene or being transferred to the hospital. Patients who still maintain vital signs when arriving at the hospital, if they do not have hypoxic encephalopathy, tend to recover faster. People who have been comatose for a long time may have headaches, dizziness, vision or hearing loss, disorientation, ataxia or epileptic convulsions after resuscitation. Most cases can be fully recovered. There have been reports of 2 cases of delayed encephalopathy. They both recovered from deep coma 2 days later, fell into coma again 1.5 days and 3 days later respectively, and recovered again 2 weeks and 1 month later respectively. Central nervous system symptoms are extremely severe, but mucosal irritation symptoms are not obvious. This may be due to the short exposure time and irritation symptoms have not yet occurred. ； Or because the systemic symptoms are severe and easy to attract attention. Those in the early stage of acute poisoning or those with only brain dysfunction without morphological changes are less sensitive to electroencephalography and brain anatomy imaging techniques such as computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), while abnormalities in single-photon emission computed brain scans (SPECT)/positron emission scans (PET) are well correlated with clinical manifestations and neuroelectrophysiological examinations. For example, one patient was in a decortical state after deep coma due to poisoning, and CT showed reduced density in the globus pallidus on both sides. The brain CT and MRI of another poisoned and comatose patient showed no abnormalities. ； PET examination performed 3 years after the accident showed metabolic abnormalities in bilateral temporal lobes, inferior parietal lobes, left thalamus, and striatum. ； Six months later, SPECT showed reduced flow in the bilateral lentiform nuclei and no abnormality in the cerebral cortex. Patients have symptoms such as hyposmia, extrapyramidal signs, and memory deficits. Foreign reports reported 15 cases of people with a history of repeated acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning who suffered from symptoms such as fatigue, drowsiness, headache, agitation, anxiety, and memory loss. 2． Respiratory system damage: Chemical bronchitis, pneumonia, pulmonary edema, acute respiratory distress syndrome, etc. may occur. A small number of poisoning cases may have pulmonary edema as the main clinical manifestation, while the neurological symptoms are mild. May be accompanied by conjunctivitis. Keratitis. 3. Myocardial damage: During the course of poisoning, some cases may experience palpitations, shortness of breath, chest tightness or angina-like symptoms. ； In a few cases, myocardial infarction-like symptoms occurred one week after recovery from coma and improvement of poisoning symptoms. The electrocardiogram shows an acute myocardial death-like pattern, but it disappears quickly. The disease is mild, the course is short, and the prognosis is good. The diagnosis and treatment methods are different from myocardial infarction caused by coronary artery-like heart disease, so it is considered to be diffuse toxic myocardial damage. Myocardial enzyme spectrum examination may have varying degrees of abnormalities. Main basis for diagnosis of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning: 1. The smell of rotten eggs in the clothes and breath of patients with a clear history of exposure to hydrogen sulfide can be used as exposure indicators. Hydrogen sulfide may be produced or measured at the accident site. It can be used as a reference if the patient smells the smell of rotten eggs before the onset of the disease. 2. Clinical characteristics: The above-mentioned clinical manifestations mainly include damage to the brain and/or respiratory system. 3. laboratory tests: There are currently no specific laboratory test indicators. (1) Increased hydrogen sulfide or sulfide content in the blood can be used as an absorption indicator, but it is inconsistent with the severity of poisoning, and its half-life is short, so blood needs to be collected shortly after stopping contact. (2) Urinary thiosulfate content may increase, but it may be interfered by factors such as measurement time and sulfur content in diet. (3) Sulfhemoglobin (SHb) in blood cannot be used as a diagnostic indicator because hydrogen sulfide does not combine with normal hemoglobin to form sulfhemoglobin, which has nothing to do with the mechanism of poisoning. ； Many studies have shown no significant sulfhemoglobin concentrations in the blood of humans and animals killed by hydrogen sulfide. (4) The sulfur content in corpse blood and tissues may be interfered by factors such as corpse decomposition, affecting its reference value. 4. Differential diagnosis: Electric shock-like death at the accident site should be differentiated from acute poisoning by other chemicals such as carbon monoxide or cyanide, acute cerebrovascular disease, myocardial infarction, etc. It should also be differentiated from suffocation caused by entering an oxygen-deficient environment caused by chemicals such as high concentrations of methane or nitrogen. Other symptoms should also be differentiated from similar diseases caused by other causes or trauma caused by falls after coma. First aid treatment 1. On-site rescue is extremely important, because extremely high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the air often cause electric shock-like death of many people at the scene. Timely rescue can reduce the mortality rate, reduce the number of people transferred to the hospital, and alleviate the condition. The patient should be removed from the scene immediately to fresh air. Give oxygen immediately if possible. On-site rescue personnel should have knowledge of self-rescue and mutual rescue to prevent themselves from being poisoned after entering the scene. 2． Maintain vital signs. For those who have stopped breathing or cardiac arrest, cardiopulmonary and cerebral resuscitation should be performed immediately. If people who suffer from respiratory arrest at the accident scene can be given artificial respiration in time, subsequent cardiac arrest can be avoided. When performing mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration, the practitioner should prevent inhalation of hydrogen sulfide escaping from the patient's exhaled breath or clothes to avoid secondary poisoning. 3. Mainly symptomatic and supportive treatment. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy plays an important role in accelerating recovery from coma and preventing and treating hydrocephalus. All comatose patients, regardless of whether they have been revived, should be given hyperbaric oxygen therapy as soon as possible, but they need to be coordinated with comprehensive treatment. Those with obvious poisoning symptoms need to be given early, sufficient and short-term adrenal glucocorticoids to help prevent and treat cerebral edema, pulmonary edema and myocardial damage. To control convulsions and prevent and treat cerebral and pulmonary edema, see and. Severe patients need to undergo ECG monitoring and myocardial enzyme spectrum measurement in order to detect changes in their condition in time and handle them promptly. For those who have symptoms of eye irritation, rinse immediately with clean water and treat symptomatically. 4. There is no unified opinion on the indications and methods for using methemoglobin forming agents. Theoretically, methemoglobin-forming agents are suitable for treating intracellular asphyxia caused by hydrogen sulfide, but are ineffective for the reflex inhibition of respiration in the nervous system. Appropriate application of isoamyl nitrite, sodium nitrite or 4-dimethylaminophenol (4-DMAP), etc., can oxidize hemoglobin in the blood into methemoglobin, which can combine with free sulfhydryl groups to form sulfmethemoglobin (SMHb) for detoxification. ； It can also take away the sulfhydryl group combined with cytochrome oxidase to rejuvenate the enzyme and improve hypoxia. However, there are currently no simple and feasible indicators for judging intracellular suffocation, and sulfide is quickly oxidized and inactivated in the body. The use of the above drugs will actually aggravate tissue hypoxia. Methylene blue (methylene blue) should not be used because it can only form methemoglobin in large doses. Excessive doses may cause serious side effects. At present, the use of such drugs can only be determined by the clinical experience of the physician. Standard workshop air hygiene standards: Chinese MAC 10 mg/m3; American ACGIH TLV-TWA 14 mg/m3 (10 ppm), STEL 21 mg/m3 (15 ppm) Metabolic abnormalities in the lower and left thalamus and striatum ； Six months later, SPECT showed reduced flow in the bilateral lentiform nuclei and no abnormality in the cerebral cortex. Patients have symptoms such as hyposmia, extrapyramidal signs, and memory deficits. Foreign reports reported 15 cases of people with a history of repeated acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning who suffered from symptoms such as fatigue, drowsiness, headache, agitation, anxiety, and memory loss. 2． Respiratory system damage: Chemical bronchitis, pneumonia, pulmonary edema, acute respiratory distress syndrome, etc. may occur. A small number of poisoning cases may have pulmonary edema as the main clinical manifestation, while the neurological symptoms are mild. May be accompanied by conjunctivitis. Keratitis. 3. Myocardial damage: During the course of poisoning, some cases may experience palpitations, shortness of breath, chest tightness or angina-like symptoms. ； In a few cases, myocardial infarction-like symptoms occurred one week after recovery from coma and improvement of poisoning symptoms. The electrocardiogram shows an acute myocardial death-like pattern, but it disappears quickly. The disease is mild, the course is short, and the prognosis is good. The diagnosis and treatment methods are different from myocardial infarction caused by coronary artery-like heart disease, so it is considered to be diffuse toxic myocardial damage. Myocardial enzyme spectrum examination may have varying degrees of abnormalities. Main basis for diagnosis of acute hydrogen sulfide poisoning: 1. The smell of rotten eggs in the clothes and breath of patients with a clear history of exposure to hydrogen sulfide can be used as exposure indicators. Hydrogen sulfide may be produced or measured at the accident site. It can be used as a reference if the patient smells the smell of rotten eggs before the onset of the disease. 2. Clinical characteristics: The above-mentioned clinical manifestations mainly include damage to the brain and/or respiratory system. 3. laboratory tests: There are currently no specific laboratory test indicators. (1) Increased hydrogen sulfide or sulfide content in the blood can be used as an absorption indicator, but it is inconsistent with the severity of poisoning, and its half-life is short, so blood needs to be collected shortly after stopping contact. (2) Urinary thiosulfate content may increase, but it may be interfered by factors such as measurement time and sulfur content in diet. (3) Sulfhemoglobin (SHb) in blood cannot be used as a diagnostic indicator because hydrogen sulfide does not combine with normal hemoglobin to form sulfhemoglobin, which has nothing to do with the mechanism of poisoning. ； Many studies have shown no significant sulfhemoglobin concentrations in the blood of humans and animals killed by hydrogen sulfide. (4) The sulfur content in corpse blood and tissues may be interfered by factors such as corpse decomposition, affecting its reference value. 4. Differential diagnosis: Electric shock-like death at the accident site should be differentiated from acute poisoning by other chemicals such as carbon monoxide or cyanide, acute cerebrovascular disease, myocardial infarction, etc. It should also be differentiated from suffocation caused by entering an oxygen-deficient environment caused by chemicals such as high concentrations of methane or nitrogen. Other symptoms should also be differentiated from similar diseases caused by other causes or trauma caused by falls after coma. First aid treatment 1. On-site rescue is extremely important, because extremely high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide in the air often cause electric shock-like death of many people at the scene. Timely rescue can reduce the mortality rate, reduce the number of people transferred to the hospital, and alleviate the condition. The patient should be removed from the scene immediately to fresh air. Give oxygen immediately if possible. On-site rescue personnel should have knowledge of self-rescue and mutual rescue to prevent themselves from being poisoned after entering the scene. 2． Maintain vital signs. For those who have stopped breathing or cardiac arrest, cardiopulmonary and cerebral resuscitation should be performed immediately. If people who suffer from respiratory arrest at the accident scene can be given artificial respiration in time, subsequent cardiac arrest can be avoided. When performing mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration, the practitioner should prevent inhalation of hydrogen sulfide escaping from the patient's exhaled breath or clothes to avoid secondary poisoning. 3. Mainly symptomatic and supportive treatment. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy plays an important role in accelerating recovery from coma and preventing and treating hydrocephalus. All comatose patients, regardless of whether they have been revived, should be given hyperbaric oxygen therapy as soon as possible, but they need to be coordinated with comprehensive treatment. Those with obvious poisoning symptoms need to be given early, sufficient and short-term adrenal glucocorticoids to help prevent and treat cerebral edema, pulmonary edema and myocardial damage. To control convulsions and prevent and treat cerebral and pulmonary edema, see and. Severe patients need to undergo ECG monitoring and myocardial enzyme spectrum measurement in order to detect changes in their condition in time and handle them promptly. For those who have symptoms of eye irritation, rinse immediately with clean water and treat symptomatically. 4. There is no unified opinion on the indications and methods for using methemoglobin forming agents. Theoretically, methemoglobin-forming agents are suitable for treating intracellular asphyxia caused by hydrogen sulfide, but are ineffective for the reflex inhibition of respiration in the nervous system. Appropriate application of isoamyl nitrite, sodium nitrite or 4-dimethylaminophenol (4-DMAP), etc., can oxidize hemoglobin in the blood into methemoglobin, which can combine with free sulfhydryl groups to form sulfmethemoglobin (SMHb) for detoxification. ； It can also take away the sulfhydryl group combined with cytochrome oxidase to rejuvenate the enzyme and improve hypoxia. However, there are currently no simple and feasible indicators for judging intracellular suffocation, and sulfide is quickly oxidized and inactivated in the body. The use of the above drugs will actually aggravate tissue hypoxia. Methylene blue (methylene blue) should not be used because it can only form methemoglobin in large doses. Excessive doses may cause serious side effects. At present, the use of such drugs can only be determined by the clinical experience of the physician. Standard workshop air hygiene standards: China MAC 10 mg/m3; US ACGIH TLV-TWA 14 mg/m3 (10 ppm), STEL 21 mg/m3 (15 ppm)

According to SY/T6137-2005 "Recommended Practices for Oil and Gas Production and Natural Gas Processing Unit Operations Containing Hydrogen Sulfide" Appendix C Appendix C (Informative Appendix) Physical Properties and Physiological Effects of Hydrogen Sulfide C.1 Physical Data Chemical Name: Hydrogen sulfide. Chemical Abstracts Service number: 7783-06-4. synonyms: Hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen sulfuric acid, dihydrogen sulfur. chemical classification: Inorganic sulfides. chemical formula: H2S。 usual physical state: Colorless gas, slightly heavier than air, with a vapor density (relative density) of 1.189 at 15°C (59°F) and 0.10133MPa (1atm). autoignition temperature: 260°C (500°F). boiling point: -60.2°C (-76.4°F). melting point: -82.9°C (-117.2°F). Explosive range: The volume fraction of vapor in the air is 4.3% to 46%. Solubility: Soluble in water and oil, the solubility decreases as the temperature of the solution increases. Flammability: When burning, the flame turns blue and sulfur dioxide is generated. See Appendix D. Odor and warning properties: Hydrogen sulfide has an extremely unpleasant rotten egg smell, which is easily identifiable at low concentrations. However, as it can quickly cause olfactory fatigue and paralysis, odor cannot be used as a warning measure. C.2 Exposure limits The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 1) stipulates that the acceptable upper limit concentration (ACC) of hydrogen sulfide is 30mg/m3 (20ppm), and 75 mg/m3 (50ppm) is the highest acceptable value per 8-hour shift that exceeds the acceptable upper limit concentration (ACC) (see 29CFR2) Part1910.1000, Subpart Z, table Z-2). USA * * The Association of Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) 3) recommends a threshold limit of 15 mg/m3 (10ppm) (8h TWA) and a 15min short-term exposure limit (STEL) of 22.5 mg/m3 (15ppm). The number of exposures to short-term exposure limits (STEL) should not exceed 4 times per day, and the interval between 2 consecutive exposures should be at least 60 minutes. For oil and gas operations on the Outer Continental Shelf, even occasional short-term exposure to hydrogen sulfide at 30 mg/m3 (20 ppm) requires the use of respiratory protection according to regulations of the Minerals Management Division of the United States Department of the Interior. For detailed information, see The NOISH Recommended Standard for Occupational Exposure to Hydrogen Sulfide. See Table C.2 for additional information on exposure values. Ask your employer about exposure values ​​for specific situations. 1) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (U.S. Department of Labor). Available from the US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. 2) US federal regulations. 3) United States * * Federation of Industrial Hygienists. C.3 Physiological effects warning: Inhaling hydrogen sulfide at a certain concentration can harm the body (see Table C.1) and even cause death. Hydrogen sulfide is a highly toxic, flammable gas that may be encountered in the production of natural gas, high-sulfur crude oil, crude oil fractions, associated gas and water. Because hydrogen sulfide is heavier than air, it can accumulate in low-lying areas. Hydrogen sulfide is colorless and has a rotten egg smell. At low concentrations, its presence can be detected by its odor characteristics. However, you cannot rely on smell to warn of dangerous concentrations, because in a hydrogen sulfide environment with high concentrations (more than 150 mg/m3 (100ppm)), people will quickly lose their sense of smell due to paralysis of the olfactory nerve. Prolonged exposure to an atmosphere low in hydrogen sulfide can also weaken olfactory sensitivity. warning: It should be fully recognized that hydrogen sulfide can disable the sense of smell and prevent people from detecting the presence of dangerous high concentrations of hydrogen. Excessive exposure to hydrogen sulfide can poison cells in the respiratory system, leading to death. There are instances where the presence of alcohol in the blood can exacerbate the toxicity of hydrogen sulfide. Even at low concentrations [15 mg/m3 (10ppm) ~ 75 mg/m3 (50ppm)], hydrogen sulfide can irritate the eyes and respiratory tract. Multiple short-term low-concentration exposures with short intervals can also irritate the eyes, nose, and throat. Symptoms caused by repeated low-concentration exposures often disappear within a period of time after leaving the hydrogen sulfide environment. Even if symptoms don't appear initially, frequent exposure can eventually cause irritation. C.4 Respiratory Protection The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration has reviewed positive-pressure air respirator testing standards and positive-pressure air respirator leakage sources and recommends that anyone exposed to hydrogen sulfide levels that exceed the acceptable upper limit concentrations specified by OSHA should wear a positive-pressure (supplied or self-contained) personal positive-pressure air respirator with a full face mask. See 6.5 for recommendations on appropriate positive pressure air breathing apparatus for use in oil and gas well service and workover operations. From the above information and the 2005 edition of the "List of Hazardous Chemicals", it can be seen that the hydrogen sulfide contained in the gas wells extracted from natural gas is a hazardous chemical. This post was last edited by lyhh9024 on 2009-3-26 14:38 ]

It must be a hazardous chemical. First of all, it is on the list, and secondly, it is a toxic substance.