Prize-winning competition: Prevention of personal injury accidents and case studies

I’m not sure if this meets the original poster’s requirements An injury accident involving 3 people getting electrocuted in succession: On July 5, 2001, maintenance workers at a facility in Jiangsu suffered an injury accident in which 3 people were electrocuted while painting the 35 kV switchgear of a 110 kV substation. 1. The production management system is lax. On June 27, a supervisor from the relevant department went to the site to check the progress of replacing the insulators on the 10kV busbar bridge of the main transformer No. 1, as well as to ensure power supply that night. Upon learning from the substation that the painting of the 35kV and 110kV circuit breaker frames had not been carried out, the head of the production department held an emergency meeting on the spot, arranged for the electrical maintenance team to paint those frames, and ordered the switch maintenance team to carry out this painting work between July 2 and 16, from 5:00 to 9:00 every morning, during power outages. Someone at the meeting suggested using a computer to generate operation tickets following the normal procedure, but it was feared that there wouldn’t be enough time, so it was decided to use handwritten operation tickets instead. 2 On-site work was carried out in violation of procedures; the painting work started on July 2. From July 2nd to 4th, department heads including those from the management team, safety supervision, production technology, and substation departments visited the work site one after another, but turned a blind eye to the serious violations at the site. The main violations on site include: work involving power outages should use Type 1 work permits, but Type 2 permits were used instead, which is equivalent to carrying out work without a permit ； The principles that must be adhered to for power outage reporting, application procedures, work permits, etc., have all become highly arbitrary. On July 2, Yang, the shift leader of the switchgear team at the substation, brought a Type 2 work order to the substation to obtain approval. The station manager felt that the tasks specified in the work order were not clear, so he issued a new Type 2 work order himself. It was agreed that he would inform Yang every afternoon about the areas that would be shut down and the tasks related to painting work for the following day; only after his approval and that of Zhang (another operator) could the painting team begin working, with no safety measures taken at the site. The station manager also agreed with the dispatch center supervisor to inform them of the areas that would experience power outages the day before, and to let the dispatchers know only after the operations at the substation were completed. No formal requests would be made, and neither the substation nor the dispatch center would keep any records; if any customers asked questions, it would be stated uniformly that it was an emergency repair work. 3. The frontline workers were indifferent to safety issues. At 4:30 on July 5, Yang (the person in charge of the work, and the third person to be electrocuted) led the team members Cao (the first person to be electrocuted) and Wu (the second person to be electrocuted) to the seven circuit breaker frames at a 35kV substation, where all connections except those on the auxiliary busbar were live. After a simple division of tasks, without formal written permission, Cao got an electric shock and collapsed on the frame of the No. 3232 main switchgear. Two other people also suffered electric shocks while climbing onto the framework to rescue people, before it was confirmed whether there was a complete power outage. According to the hospital’s diagnosis, Cao required an amputation 2 cm below the humerus in his left arm; he suffered 14% third-degree burns covering the entire left upper limb, the front of the right palm, parts of both lower legs, the left side of the back, and the right side of the face. Yang has 8% third-degree burns on the lower part of the right leg and both calves. Wu suffered 6% third-degree burns to the toes of both feet. 4 Improper handling of an emergency: After Cao was electrocuted, the people on site handled the situation improperly, which expanded the area affected by the power outage. Yang and Wu failed to confirm that all power had been cut off at the 3232 circuit breaker before recklessly climbing up the pole to rescue people, which led to the two of them getting electrocuted later on and further exacerbated the accident. After an electric shock, the first thing to do is to cut off the power supply, and then carry out rescue efforts. These seemingly simple questions have quite profound consequences and lessons.