Collection of accidents that have occurred in the tank farm and their handling methods

Why isn’t anyone responding? My heart is cold; I refuse to answer any questions anymore, haha

In June 2008, a 5,000-liter internal floating roof tank used for storing light contaminated oil at a petrochemical company’s storage and transportation department suffered a roof failure; large amounts of light contaminated oil spilled out through the vent holes on top of the tank. The cause of this was an inaccurate radar level gauge, which provided false readings of the liquid level. Handling method: 1. Stop collecting oil immediately ； 2. Close the oil separation valve within the tank area to prevent dirty oil from entering the rainwater system ； 3. Lower the storage tank to the normal liquid level ； 4. Use a pneumatic diaphragm pump to recover contaminated oil in the tank area, being careful to avoid hydrogen sulfide poisoning ； 5. Flush the tank walls and floor with a large amount of fire-fighting water ； 6. Check for any damage or deformation of the internal floating disk; cut it out for repair if necessary ； 7. Identify the causes of inaccurate radar level readings and address them, while improving the level verification system ； 8. Handle the accident and draw lessons from it. :)

In my design, it uses a radar level gauge together with a fork switch for high-level interlock; generally, overtopping does not occur

There are probably many such questions, and they cover a wide range of topics; I really don’t know how to answer them

Why isn’t the high liquid level alarm working on the 3rd floor? Is there no such facility there?

I’ll share an incident that carriers are very reluctant to talk about – the losses were severe and the lessons learned were profound; it’s a rather long story, so please be patient. Fire at Huangdao Oil Depot, Qingdao Port Authority. I. Basic Overview: Huangdao is located about 4.6 kilometers west of the downtown area of Qingdao, facing it across the sea; it used to be uncultivated land. It is backed by the vast Jiaodong Peninsula and faces the wide Jiaozhou Bay. In 1974, the Ministry of Petroleum built an oil storage area here as a supporting facility for the Shengli Oil Field ； The Qingdao Port Authority has also established an oil storage area and an export terminal here. Huangdao has become an important port for China’s oil exports, with over 10 million tons of oil being shipped through here each year. To build the oil storage area and export terminal here, **billions of yuan were invested. The first phase of the project saw the construction of 5 large oil tanks with a capacity of over 10,000 tons each, resulting in a total volume of 226,000 cubic meters ； 103 meters north of the first phase of the project, an additional 400 million yuan was invested to build 6 storage tanks with a capacity of 50,000 cubic meters each ； At the edge of the second-phase project, there is also an underground oil tank with a capacity of 150,000 cubic meters, bringing the total storage capacity of the tank area to 500,000 cubic meters. To the north of the second-phase project, separated by just one road, lies the refined oil tank complex operated by the Qingdao Port Authority; it consists of 15 oil tanks, the largest of which has a capacity of 10,000 cubic meters ； Next to these oil tanks are 2 berths with a capacity of 50,000 tons each; not far away, there are 2 berths with a capacity of 200,000 tons each, whose construction is currently in progress at a cost of over 300 million yuan ； There is also the Qianwan Deep Port that is under construction. Once these projects are completed, Huangdao will become China’s second-largest port after Shanghai. With the construction of oil depots and docks, Huangdao is showing a prosperous outlook. Tall buildings rose one after another, factories were built in large numbers, and the island’s population increased rapidly. However, with a large amount of oil stored on the island, what is the situation regarding fire safety? There are quite a few problems. The inherent flaws in the initial phase of the engineering design have left many fire hazards in the plant, causing concern among the public security and fire protection departments in Qingdao City and Shandong Province. After the fire in the Greater Khingan Range in 1987. The fire department sent an investigation team led by the deputy director to inspect the Huangdao oil depot, issued requests and recommendations to the relevant authorities for addressing fire hazards, and reported these issues in the newspapers. In fact, the Huangdao oil depot and port authorities have experienced multiple accidents since they were built and put into operation. By 1987, there had been a total of 7 major oil spills and fires here, but some people remained indifferent. On August 12, 1989, the disaster finally struck. II. Course of events: As soon as the thunder stopped, a dull noise that was even louder than the thundering was heard. Then, a mushroom-shaped cloud of dark smoke rose above the Huangdao oil depot. An explosion occurred at the Huangdao oil depot! At 9:55. It was tank No. 5 that exploded. The tank is a semi-underground rectangular reinforced concrete storage tank, 72 meters long and 48 meters wide, with a capacity of 23,000 cubic meters; at that time, it contained 16,037 cubic meters of crude oil. The tank roof was blown off during the explosion, triggering a massive fire whose flames reached heights of up to 100 meters. Adjacent to Tank No. 5 are four oil tanks: Tanks No. 1, 2, and 3 are above-ground storage tanks with steel vaults, each with a capacity of 10,000 cubic meters; at that time, they contained 7,330 tons, 7,370 tons, and 7,394 tons of crude oil respectively ； Tank No. 4 is a semi-underground reinforced concrete tank with a capacity of 23,000 cubic meters; it contained 4,294 tons of crude oil at that time. During the fire, the wind was blowing from the southeast; these tanks were all located upwind of the burning tank, so they were less at risk ； However, there is a gasoline depot downwind of Tank 5, which is under greater threat. After the explosion of Tank 5, a fire area of about 3,500 square meters was formed. The dedicated fire brigade at the oil depot immediately took action, opening the valves of the fixed foam fire suppression system installed on tank No. 4 to inject foam into the tank. At the same time, water was used to cool tanks No. 3 and No. 4, which are adjacent to tank No. 5, as well as the gasoline tanks located downwind. Personnel were also sent to seal the ventilation openings and breather valves on the tops of tanks No. 3 and No. 4 using wet blankets, and the valves for oil inlet and outlet were closed to prevent the fire from spreading through these areas. At 10:15, the Qingdao Public Security Fire Brigade received a call for help and immediately dispatched 2 fire trucks each from three fire stations located near the site of the fire: those in Huangdao Development Zone, Jiaozhou City, and Jiaonan County ； At the same time, 10 fire trucks from 8 fire stations in the urban area were dispatched to the ferry terminal. At 10:40, 7 fire trucks and 2 command vehicles from the city area boarded a ship to cross the sea. At that moment, black smoke could be seen billowing over Huangdao Island. Realizing the severity of the situation, the commander ordered that another 10 fire trucks be dispatched as a second wave of reinforcements. At the same time, preliminary arrangements for the battle were made on board. Given the complexity of fires in oil tank areas, it is not advisable to act rashly; therefore, the commander ordered that vehicles arrive and park outside the oil depot on standby, and that combat operations be coordinated only after an inspection of the fire scene. Upon the arrival of the first firefighting units, a fire command post was immediately established. The decisions made at that time were: (1) to evacuate urgently the people near the oil depot area. In a very short period of time, more than 1,800 households and over 10,000 people were evacuated. (2) Go deep into the reservoir area to determine the extent of the fire, and immediately deploy resources to enhance cooling of Tank No. 3, Tank No. 4, and the tanks located downwind, in order to prevent the fire from spreading and avoid new explosions. (3) Estimate the firefighting resources required to extinguish the fire and propose a firefighting plan. The liquid surface area of Tank No. 5 is nearly 3,500 square meters, and the foam supply rate is about 0.8 liters per meter·second; therefore, a foam supply volume of around 3,000 liters per second is required. This entails the use of 10 Yellow River foam trucks and 5 tons of foam solution. However, the fire trucks and foam agents available at the time did not meet such requirements; moreover, when fighting fires in crude oil tanks, using foam could fail to extinguish the fire immediately and instead pose a risk of accelerating boiling and splashing. Therefore, the command decided to postpone the attack to extinguish the fire, first cool it down, and wait for reinforcements. At that time, more than a dozen water guns were placed around Tank 5 to create a heat-insulating curtain. At the same time, the oil depot organized personnel to seal the pipeline shaft connecting tanks 4 and 5 by filling it with cement and sand, in order to prevent the fire from spreading from below ； In addition, an investigation was also conducted into the degree of threat to the 150,000-ton underground oil tank. At 11:49, a second batch of 10 fire trucks arrived at the scene, bringing the total number of fire trucks present to 38; tank No. 5 was still burning steadily. The command’s analysis suggested that, basically, at that time. The conditions for launching a fire-fighting attack are met, and the timing is favorable, with the wind direction posing little threat to the positions in the southeast. If delays occur, the fire will spread further, causing new explosions and complicating the situation even more ； Moreover, as time extends, there is also a risk of boiling over and splashing. Therefore, the command post decided to prepare for an attack to extinguish the fire, with fire trucks taking up positions at their respective locations. At 12:19, just as they were preparing to launch an attack to extinguish the fire, the intensity of the flames suddenly increased; the paint on the fire trucks parked in front was scorched, forcing them to withdraw and stop their efforts to put out the fire. The commander ordered some fire trucks to move back 150 meters, with their fronts turned away from the fire site; the drivers were to remain in their vehicles, ready to withdraw at any time ； And strengthen the monitoring of the fire, keeping an eye out for signs of boiling or splashing. At around 12:30, the wind direction changed suddenly, shifting from southeast wind to a northwesterly wind, with the wind strength increasing to force 5. In this way, numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all in a position downstream of number 5. Driven by the wind, the fireworks are pushed downward, resulting in a very small angle between the flame and the ground; this poses a serious threat to the tanks located downwind, especially tanks No. 3 and No. 4, with another explosion potentially occurring at any moment. At that time, the firefighters intensified the cooling of the tanks located downwind, and at the same time reduced the number of people in the front area; aside from 1-2 people assigned to each water gun, the rest were moved to a distance of 150 meters away as a precaution. At this time, 31 water guns were firing from the front, and 86 people remained on the front line, of whom 60 were in the most dangerous areas. Faced with the danger, the firefighters held their positions, demonstrating fearless heroism. At 14:35, the fire in Tank No. 5 suddenly intensified; the thick smoke emitted was replaced by flames, and the color of those flames changed from orange-red to red-white, bright and dazzling. Seeing this, the commander sensed that boiling and oil spraying might occur, and immediately ordered a retreat at loud voice. The firefighters took care of each other and began to retreat. But about 10 minutes after the order was given, Tank No. 4 exploded; the two layers of concrete plates on its top were sent flying into the air, and flames rose hundreds of meters high. Some of the firefighters who were retreating were knocked down by shockwaves, while others were crushed by the sheer volume of falling rocks and concrete blocks. It was at this moment that Tank 5 experienced splashing, followed by the explosions and fires in Tanks 1, 2, and 3; crude oil engulfed in flames flowed everywhere. Faced with the trials of life and death, the firefighters demonstrated a spirit of putting others first and being willing to make sacrifices; they supported one another and helped each other out. Some had managed to escape the dangerous area, but upon seeing their comrades still trapped in the flames, they went back to save them, only to fall victim to the intense fire themselves. At the moment of the spraying and explosion, 14 people lost their lives, 65 were injured, and the 8 fire trucks and 1 command vehicle that did not have time to evacuate were all destroyed in the flames. The shock wave from the explosion caused large cracks in the roof of the Friendship Hotel, located 100 meters away, and shattered the glass windows in thousands of residential homes within a 3-kilometer radius. The urban area of Qingdao also felt strong vibrations as a result. Following the splashing and explosions, large amounts of crude oil spilled out, flowed over roads, entered residential areas, and made its way toward Jiaozhou Bay. The scope of the fire spread rapidly, turning an area of 250,000 square meters into a sea of flames. The Huangdao fire touched the hearts of millions of people. The main Party and government leaders of Qingdao went to the fire scene in person ； The Naval Air Force sent helicopters and rescue teams to the scene, quickly transporting the injured to hospitals ； The North Sea Fleet urgently deployed fire-fighting rescue boats and seaplanes to assist in extinguishing the fire ； Responsible officials from the Jinan Military Region and the Beihai Fleet also rushed to the scene to organize rescue efforts. The militia at the oil depot and those in the vicinity gathered urgently to participate in the rescue efforts. Upon learning that more than 18,000 * tubes were stored in a warehouse not far from the oil depot, they quickly transferred these * tubes to a safe location, thereby eliminating a major hazard. News of the Huangdao fire reached Jinan, the capital city of Shandong Province, as well as the capital Beijing. Leaders from the province rushed to the scene of the fire, and the provincial public security fire brigade promptly dispatched teams from various locations to provide support at the fire site ； The State Council urgently allocated 20 tons of dry powder, which were transported to Qingdao overnight by 3 aircraft ； ****The Prime Minister made phone calls one after another to inquire about the situation at the fire scene ； At around 3 p.m. on the 13th, the **Prime Minister arrived at the fire scene to assess the situation and offer his condolences to the firefighters. The concern of leaders and the support of the public **strengthened the firefighters’ confidence and determination to extinguish the large fire. With spillage from Tank 5 and explosions in Tanks 1, 2, 3, and 4, the situation at the fire scene was extremely critical. The fire has spread to the new tank area of Phase II, approaching the port docks, and posing a threat to the Huangdao Power Plant and the waters of Jiaozhou Bay. Huangdao lies at the entrance to Jiaozhou Bay; all ships must pass through here. If the fire spreads further, it could even threaten the safety of the urban area in Qingdao. During the splashing and explosions, Qingdao’s fire services suffered severe losses, with many casualties and a large number of vehicles destroyed. Yet, they remained full of fighting spirit; enduring the pain of their wounds and the sorrow of losing their comrades, they were determined to continue fighting in order to protect Phase II of the project and the port facilities! In the fight against the raging fire, the staff at the oil depot remained at the forefront, fighting side by side with the public security fire fighters, and 5 of them sacrificed their lives heroically. After the splashing and explosions, in order to prevent oil and fire from spreading, the many workers at oil depots, port authorities, and other facilities built four dams several hundred meters long using sand between the old and new oil storage areas ； Asbestos walls over 10 meters high and more than 200 meters long were also built to block the thermal radiation from the flames. At around 16:00, when the firefighters were preparing to launch another attack to put out the fire, a second spill occurred in Tank No. 5, forcing the firefighters to withdraw once again. At around 21:00, large foam fire trucks from the Shengli Oil Field and Qilu Petrochemical Company arrived at the scene and extinguished some of the flames in the second-phase construction area. Next, the command center issued orders to extinguish the fire within the scope of Phase II works first, in order to eliminate the threat to the port docks. But at 1:20 a.m. on the 13th, a third spill occurred in Tank No. 5, and oil flames spread once again to the tank area of Phase II, forcing the firefighting operations to be suspended. Starting in the early hours of the 13th, reinforcements from various parts of the province arrived at the fire site one after another. The command decided to launch a full-scale attack on Tank 5 first. At that time, 10 large foam trucks, 3 dry powder trucks, and 27 pump trucks were involved, forming 5 water supply main lines. The general attack began at 8:30 a.m., and after successive battles, by 2:20 p.m., the open flames in Tank No. 5 were completely extinguished ； By 21:30, the open flames in tanks No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 had also been essentially extinguished, marking a decisive victory in the firefighting efforts. After several more attempts, the flames in multiple buildings as well as the hidden fires in the pipes were extinguished; by 17:00 on the 16th, all open flames had been put out ； At 18:30, all firefighters and vehicles withdrew, except for 5 fire trucks that remained to continue monitoring the scene. This intense 104-hour battle has now come to an end. In this life-and-death struggle filled with blood and fire, the brave, tenacious spirit and noble willingness to sacrifice of the firefighters have been highly praised by the Party, **, and the people. The 14 firefighters who lost their lives and the 5 workers at the oil depot were all recognized as martyrs. The Qingdao Municipal Party Committee and the municipal people’s government awarded the title of “Firefighting Heroes” to 38 people including Yan Zhenglian, while giving Liu Tao and 23 other individuals high honors. 172 individuals, including Wang Weidong, were honored for their contributions, and 17 organizations, such as the Qingdao Public Security Bureau, were designated as \"Units that contributed to extinguishing the fire at the Huangdao Oil Depot\"" ； The State Council issued a proclamation commending all those who participated in the fire-fighting and rescue operations at the Huangdao Oil Depot ； The Ministry of Public Security, **Headquarters, and the Fire Department have decided to award collective First-Class Merits to the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Public Security Fire Teams in Qingdao ； The State Council and the Central Committee awarded Yan Zhenglian the title of \"Hero of Fire Fighting\", while agencies such as the Ministry of Public Security presented him with a first-class Medal of Heroism ； Martyr Yang Yong was recognized as a first-class hero in the public security sector; Martyrs Wang Xingtian and three others were honored as \"heroes of fire fighting\", while Tian Shifang and four others were awarded first-class merits. Many other units and individuals who took part in the operations also received honors and awards. They made a tremendous contribution to protecting **property; honor belongs to them! After 5 days and 4 nights of intense fighting, a major victory was achieved in putting out the fire. The second phase of the project suffered no significant damage; the oil port was preserved, the 150,000-ton underground oil tanks and the Huangdao Power Plant remained intact, there were no fires on the water’s surface, and none of the residents were injured or killed. During the fire fighting effort, 26 fire trucks and 257 firefighters from Qingdao were involved in the operation ； Shandong Province deployed 121 fire trucks and nearly a thousand people to fight the blaze ； The victory was hard-won, at a great cost of over 80 casualties and 12 fire trucks destroyed. III. Fire losses: In this fire, 14 firefighters lost their lives, 65 people were injured, and 8 fire trucks along with 1 command vehicle that were unable to evacuate were completely destroyed by the flames. The economic losses incurred are also extremely severe. Over 40,000 tons of crude oil were burned, more than 4,000 square meters of residential buildings were destroyed, and 20,000 square meters of road surfaces were damaged ； This fire indeed affected other organisms as well: the high temperatures from the flames, water pollution, and the shock of the explosions caused the death of 33,000 valuable black fish, nearly 3,000 minks, as well as 5,200 acres of shrimp ponds and 1,160 acres of mussel farms. Clam farms were destroyed, and hundreds of millions of fish fry perished in 22,000 mu of tidal flats. During the fires and explosions, thousands of tons of crude oil spilled out, with an estimated 600 tons flowing into the waters of Jiaozhou Bay; the 102-kilometer coastline surrounding Huangdao was severely polluted ； The dark crude oil also spread along the coast of Qingdao city, and several of the city’s famous seaside beaches were polluted as well; shark nets and rocks were all covered with black oil stains. Warning signs from the health authorities have been erected along the shores of the beach resorts: \"For the sake of your health, please do not swim in the sea at present, especially those with skin diseases.\" "This announcement left many tourists who had traveled great distances just to experience it and who wanted to swim in the azure waters returning disappointed. After the fire, the oil tank area was filled with ruins; the ground was completely scorched, and even the concrete floors and marble inlaid in the halls were burned to pieces ； The trees were left with only their bare branches, and the electricity poles stood alone, with a few tangled wires hanging from their tops. This scene makes one think that a fierce battle took place here once. Fire, how merciless! IV. Cause of the fire: This large fire was caused by a lightning strike. Lightning rods are installed in the Huangdao oil depot area – why then is it still struck by lightning? Analysis suggests that the fire was caused by a rolling landmine. The commonly known “rolling landmine” is a spherical mine. A spherical lightning bolt is different from a linear one; it does not disappear in an instant, but can persist for some time. Its diameter is generally around 20 centimeters, and it can roll on the ground and pass through walls. If such a \"rolling landmine\" is deployed in an oil depot area, it can cause combustion or explosion upon encountering oil vapors. Furthermore, since it rolls on the ground, the lightning arrester cannot completely prevent its \"movement,\" just as planes flying at low altitudes can evade radar detection. The Tank No. 5, which was the first to explode and catch fire this time, is a reinforced concrete tank with many steel plates on its walls; several of these plates form closed circuits, but they are not connected to each other or grounded. Therefore, when a lightning strike occurs, strong induced electromotive forces and induced currents are generated in these closed circuits. At the steel bar connection points, high temperatures were generated due to excessive contact resistance, resulting in electric sparks that ignited the oil vapor. The Tank No. 4 located next to Tank No. 5 contained only a little over 4,000 tons of oil at that time; it had a volume of more than 16,000 cubic meters. Even under normal conditions, there would be a large amount of oil vapor above the liquid surface. After the explosion and fire in Tank 5, heat radiation caused more oil vapor to be generated inside the tank; at the same time, the ventilation openings and breather valves being blocked led to the accumulation of oil vapor within the tank. When the wind direction changed, Tank No. 4, which was only about 10 meters away from Tank No. 5, was hit first, with the flames posing a direct threat to Tank No. 4. Although reinforced concrete tanks have poor thermal conductivity, prolonged exposure to high temperatures causes the temperature inside the tank to rise and the pressure to increase, ultimately leading to an explosion. Due to the thick layer of soil surrounding the tank and the double layer of cement plates on top, the conditions for pressure release were poor; as a result, the explosion was extremely powerful and caused severe consequences. V. Lessons from the accident: In recent years, oil tank fires have occurred frequently in our country, but the large-scale fire at the Huangdao oil depot was rare in terms of its duration, the extent of the damage, and the number of casualties among firefighters. There are many lessons to be learned from fires. (1) The Huangdao oil depot covers an area of 572 mu and has a storage capacity of over 700,000 cubic meters; it is a super-large oil depot. Where to build such large oil depots requires careful consideration; the location selection must take into account not only convenient transportation but also fire safety. The 615,000 cubic meter oil depot in Huangdao is built more than 10 meters above sea level, with some oil tanks located just 90 meters from the coastline. A investigation team sent by the Fire Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security in 1987 pointed out that in the event of an earthquake. Disasters such as lightning strikes, or major fires and explosions, could cause crude oil to flow into Jiaozhou Bay and trigger huge fires on the water’s surface – the consequences would be unimaginable! This fire unfortunately came true. Fortunately, no large fire broke out on the water’s surface; otherwise, the consequences would have been much worse! (2) Oil tanks should be located at a slightly lower elevation than the surrounding area to prevent the leakage of oil in case of fire or explosion. Some of the oil tanks at the Huangdao oil depot are located on the slopes; in the event of an explosion or spill, thousands of tons of crude oil, along with flames, flow down the slope. Although there are firebreaks in the reservoir area, they still struggle to hold back the raging flames. The main reason why this fire spread over such a large area was the leakage of oil everywhere. (3) Maintaining the necessary distance between oil tanks is an important measure to prevent chain reactions in the event of a fire. For tanks 4 and 5 in this oil depot, the sum of their lengths on either side is 120 meters, and their D value is 60 meters; the distance between them should be no less than 0.5D. However, the distance between tanks 5 and 4 in this area is less than 10 meters, which is far too small. Judging from this fire incident, when the wind speed is above level 5, the angle between the flames and the ground is only 10–20 degrees; in such cases, the tanks located downwind are not only threatened by thermal radiation but also directly by the flames. (4) For storing oil, steel floating roof or internal floating roof tanks are recommended, as this not only helps to reduce fuel consumption but also enhances fire safety. Reinforced concrete tanks are prone to both static electricity accumulation and lightning strikes ； Moreover, in the event of a fire, it is difficult to cool reinforced concrete tanks, and it is also impossible to determine the level of the liquid inside the tank (with steel tanks, this can be determined by changes in the color of the tank wall) ； Furthermore, in the event of an explosion, the top of the cement tank will be shattered and scatter over a wide area, resulting in serious consequences. Currently, reinforced concrete tanks are rarely used abroad ； Our country should also try to avoid using such storage tanks. If such storage tanks still need to be used due to objective constraints, attention should be paid to lightning protection. For example, weld all rebar connection points firmly and ground them, and avoid exposing the rebar. (5) In the event of a fire involving heavy oil, care should be taken to prevent boiling over and splashing. Due to the \"thermal wave properties\" of heavy oil" ； It can transfer heat underwater, and oil often contains emulsified water or a water layer; therefore, after burning for some time, the water is heated to boiling point and vaporizes, causing boiling over or splashing. This phenomenon can be very severe and poses a serious threat to firefighters. Therefore, when fighting fires involving heavy oil, it is essential to constantly monitor the conditions of the burning tank; if any signs of boiling or splashing are detected, evacuation must be carried out immediately. (6) Wind direction often changes, which is very unfavorable for firefighting; therefore, this factor should be taken into account when deploying firefighting forces. According to statistics, there is an 85% chance that the wind direction will remain between 0 and 90 degrees within 1 hour, while there is a 9.2% chance that it will shift between 90 and 180 degrees within the same period. Generally speaking, it is easier to adjust the position when the wind direction deviation is less than 90 degrees; it becomes more difficult when the deviation is greater than 90 degrees. During this fire, the wind direction changed by nearly 180 degrees several times, having a significant impact on the firefighting efforts. (7) Areas with large oil storage tanks should be equipped with appropriate firefighting capabilities. Qingdao has super-large oil depots, but its firefighting capabilities are relatively weak; the resources they have available are not sufficient to deal with a fire in a large oil tank. When fighting oil tank fires, time is extremely precious, and waiting for external assistance often delays action. Especially when fighting fires in heavy oil tanks, it is necessary to extinguish the fire immediately before boiling and splashing occur. However, the fire-fighting forces in Qingdao were unable to do so at that time, which led to the aforementioned consequences. Comment: Oil depots pose a high risk of fire and explosion; the combustion occurs rapidly and over a large area, making it easy for multi-dimensional fires to develop. Heavy oil tanks can experience boiling and splashing, while crude oil can flow everywhere, resulting in widespread flash fires that make firefighting operations difficult and require significant efforts from fire fighters. Changes in wind direction directly affect the cooling and protection provided to adjacent tanks, thereby influencing the command center’s ability to make sound decisions. The following issues arose during the firefighting operation: First, there was insufficient initial response force at the fire scene. In the early stages of the fire, 10 Yellow River foam trucks and 5 tons of foam solution were needed, but the fire trucks and foam solution available at that time did not meet these requirements ； Second, there is a lack of backup forces, which delays taking action. In response to the requirement that areas with large oil storage tanks must have appropriate firefighting resources, Qingdao has very large oil depots, yet its firefighting capabilities are relatively weak; such resources are not sufficient to deal with a fire involving a large oil tank ； Thirdly, either the communication within the fire scene was poor or there were issues with the implementation of orders; as a result, 10 minutes after the order to evacuate was given, some people still failed to leave promptly, leading to severe casualties ； There was no pre-agreed signal for withdrawal, nor was any rapid and effective organization in place, which resulted in some people failing to evacuate in time after the danger was detected. Fourth, there are too many personnel at the front line, and the fire trucks are too close to the fire site. Each combatant failed to quickly pass on the retreat message. When dealing with such fires, the following points should be noted: (1) Strengthen the deployment of the first response force and promptly request reinforcements from higher-level authorities ； (2) Ensure an adequate supply of firefighting resources and extinguishing agents, and organize effective firefighting efforts ； (3) Suppressing the explosion must be the top priority; when there is insufficient fire-fighting capacity, every effort should be made to cool down the area, and if cooling capacity is also lacking, then sacrifice must be accepted ； (4) Carry out surveillance, evacuation, and detection tasks; set up observation posts in all directions to report any potential hazards to the command center as soon as possible ； (5) In regular training, commanders and fighters at all levels should put people first, have an awareness of evacuation, and practice evacuations in the event of large-scale fires or when there are numerous firefighting resources available* ； (6) Appropriate locations should be chosen for vehicle parking and attack positions ； (7) The running fire must be dealt with first.

As an additional note regarding the explosion at the Huangdao oil depot, at that time the fire access routes were not designed to be circular, and there was not enough space for vehicles to turn around. Most of the fire trucks from Shandong were sent to assist, but they were unable to enter or exit, which also contributed to the loss of life of our beloved soldiers. Our designers really need to pay attention

I’d like to recommend a book that I hope will satisfy storage and transportation engineers. Hehe. Title: Analysis and Prevention of Oil Tank Farm Accidents. Authors: Feng Kuanmin, Wang Feng, Tang Qing. ISBN: 9787801648136, 7801648137. Publisher: Sinopec Press. Publication date: June 1, 2005. Price: ¥36.00; ¥29.40 at 18% discount. Buy it on Dangdang.com – free shipping! ￥29.30, 18% discount. Buy from Amazon. Summary: This book selects over 100 typical accident cases from domestic and international oil depots, analyzing them from four aspects: the course of the accidents, cause analysis, lessons learned, and improvement measures, and it also proposes strategies for preventing such accidents. The content of this book mainly includes analysis and prevention of static electricity accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of lightning accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of oil and gas poisoning accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of equipment damage accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of oil leakage and mixing accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of electrical fire accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of accidents during maintenance operations in oil depots, analysis and prevention of other types of accidents in oil depots, as well as accident management in oil depots. Conducting targeted safety education for oil depots through the analysis of typical accident cases is an important method to improve the effectiveness of such education and to disseminate safety knowledge. At the same time, by analyzing typical accident cases and taking into account the actual conditions of the facility, it is also possible to identify potential hazards in oil depots, eliminate existing risks in a timely manner, and prevent accidents from occurring. This book can be used as a training material and reference for tank farm operations. It can also serve as a reference book for relevant majors in colleges and universities. Editor’s recommendation: This book carefully selects over 100 typical accident cases from domestic and international oil depots, analyzing them from four aspects: the course of the accidents, cause analysis, lessons learned, and improvement measures. It also proposes strategies for preventing such accidents. The content of this book mainly includes analysis and prevention of static electricity accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of lightning accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of oil and gas poisoning accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of equipment damage accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of oil leakage and mixing accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of electrical fire accidents in oil depots, analysis and prevention of accidents during maintenance operations in oil depots, analysis and prevention of other types of accidents in oil depots, as well as accident management in oil depots. Conducting targeted safety education for oil depots through the analysis of typical accident cases is an important method to improve the effectiveness of such education and to disseminate safety knowledge. At the same time, by analyzing typical accident cases and taking into account the actual conditions of the facility, it is also possible to identify potential hazards in oil depots, eliminate existing risks in a timely manner, and prevent accidents from occurring. This book can be used as a training material and reference for tank farm operations. It can also serve as a reference book for relevant majors in colleges and universities. Author’s profile: Feng Kuanmin, born in 1956, is from Danfeng, Shaanxi Province. He is a colonel in the Air Force. He graduated in 1986 from the Logistics Engineering Institute with a degree in fuel management. Currently, he serves as the head of the Military Supplies and Fuel Department in the Air Force Logistics Command of the Chengdu Military Region. He is also an adjunct professor at the Logistics Engineering Institute. Having long been involved in fuel management work, he has been recognized by the General Logistics Department as an “Advanced Individual in Fuel Depot Safety Management” and an “Advanced Individual in Fuel Supply Management across the military.” He has received three third-class awards for his contributions. He has led several research projects and won two third-prize awards for military scientific and technological progress, as well as one fourth-prize award for theoretical research in the field of the Air Force. He is the author of the book “Research on Air Force Operational Fuel Support under High-Tech Conditions,” and has published over 30 papers in both military and civilian journals. Table of Contents: Chapter 1 Analysis and Prevention of Static Electricity Accidents in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Static Electricity Accidents in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Static Electricity Accidents in Oil Stores Chapter 2 Analysis and Prevention of Lightning Strikes in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Lightning Strike Accidents in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Lightning Strike Accidents in Oil Stores Chapter 3 Analysis and Prevention of Poisoning Incidents Caused by Oil and Gas in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Poisoning Incidents Caused by Oil and Gas in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Poisoning Incidents Caused by Oil and Gas in Oil Stores Chapter 4 Analysis and Prevention of Equipment Damage Incidents in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Equipment Damage Incidents in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Equipment Damage Incidents in Oil Stores Chapter 5 Analysis and Prevention of Oil Leakage and Mixing Incidents in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Oil Leakage and Mixing Incidents in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Oil Leakage and Mixing Incidents in Oil Stores Chapter 6 Analysis and Prevention of Electrical Fires in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Electrical Fire Incidents in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Electrical Fire Incidents in Oil Stores Chapter 7 Analysis and Prevention of Accidents Related to Maintenance Work in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis of Accidents Related to Maintenance Work in Oil Stores Section 2 Prevention of Accidents Related to Maintenance Work in Oil Stores Chapter 8 Analysis and Prevention of Other Accidents in Oil Stores Section 1 Analysis and Prevention of Open-Flame Accidents in Oil Stores Section 2 Analysis and Prevention of Flood Disasters in Oil Stores Section 3 Analysis and Prevention of Forest Fires in Oil Stores Section 4 Analysis and Prevention of Earthquake-Related Accidents in Oil Stores Chapter 9 Management of Accidents in Oil Stores Section 1 Overview Section 2 Theories of Accident Causes Section 3 Accident Models in Oil Stores Section 4 Analysis of Accidents and Calculation of Losses Section 5 Investigation and Analysis of Accidents Section 6 Handling of Accidents Section 7 Statistical Analysis of Accidents in Oil Stores References

Haha, the author of that book above is actually one of my alumni – a colonel in the air force. Hehe, it’s said that 70% of the personnel in charge of fuel supply within the military are graduates from those schools!

Brother on the 9th floor, is there an electronic version?

To the brothers on the 6th floor: high-level interlocks are only installed on oil tanks with a capacity of over 10,000 liters.

At around 12:18 p.m. on August 7, 2006, the 150,000-cubic-meter crude oil storage tank No. 16 at the Yizheng oil transfer station of Sinopec was struck by lightning and caught fire; fires broke out in five locations at the secondary sealing areas. At the time of the incident, the tank contained approximately 110,000 tons of crude oil. A lightning strike caused damage to the television monitoring equipment in the tank area. The fire duty personnel noticed intermittent flames coming from one of the tanks through the surveillance cameras located in the living area; they immediately activated the fire response plan, turned on the fixed foam fire suppression system, and used water-based foam extinguishing agents to cover the circular sealing gaps around the tanks. They also notified the local fire department. Due to the strong wind and rain, the foam coverage was not effective, so the station’s firefighters climbed onto the tanks and used fire hoses to apply foam manually. Upon receiving the call, the Yizheng Fire Brigade sent 5 fire trucks and 22 firefighters, while the Yizheng Chemical Fiber Specialized Fire Team dispatched 4 fire trucks and 32 firefighters to the scene to quickly extinguish the fire. At 12:40, the fire was extinguished. Foam guns are installed around the tank, but they should not be used to extinguish fires in the annular gaps around the tank, as this is not only ineffective but also results in waste of foam. The lightning protection design of the automatic monitoring system is not reliable enough, resulting in damage during lightning strikes. Afterward, the mechanical seals of the large storage tanks were all replaced with soft seals ； The antistatic cable between the floating roof and the tank wall is made of stranded soft copper wire with a cross-sectional area of not less than 50 square millimeters (previously not less than 25), and additional wire bridging is provided for the drainage system.

Lighted by matches, the oil tank caught fire. On October 19, 1988, a serious attempted fire accident occurred involving an××× private gasoline tanker. At 22:30 that day, the salesperson received a notice from the boss to go to the top of the gasoline tank truck to check whether it had been emptied completely. When lifting the lid of the can, he found that the flashlight attached to it did not work, so he took out matches from his pocket to provide light. The moment he lit the match to take a look, there was a loud \"bang\" – the lid of the jar flew off, knocking one of his arms off and starting a fire. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of the villagers around, a major fire accident was averted. Severe violations of safety protocols and disregard for safety and fire prevention rules will inevitably lead to accidents.