Add an explosion-proof film to the conversion converter?

Thank you. The explosion in the Zhongyan Jilantai converter was a physical explosion; it occurred when the aqueous phase valve was opened immediately after high temperatures were detected in the converter. The explosion was caused in the shell side, but since it is a hot water system, how should an explosion-proof membrane be installed? If it is placed on the cover of the converter, will it be effective?

I really haven’t heard of any converters with explosion-proof plates!

Is there any extra? Have you really never heard of it? We didn’t add it here either!

This post was last edited by clq20040107 on 2011-7-13 at 13:32. This expert is really talented – an explosion-proof membrane needs to be installed on the converter: the operating pressure in the tube side of the L-type converter does not exceed 60 KPa, and the flow rate is even lower. By installing an explosion-proof membrane, what amount of pressure needs to be released? If it’s just twice the normal operating pressure, then such a thick explosion-proof membrane will either get damaged accidentally by inspection tools or get corroded and punctured. Moreover, there are many fixed-bed converters, which means that maintenance work is extensive. What was said on the second floor is that it’s due to human carelessness; if employees have such an attitude towards their work, then even the simplest devices, like those used for heating water, can explode

We haven’t installed an explosion-proof film here either

Reply 8# clq20040107: It is added to the upper part of the shell side.

Installing explosion vents on the shell side of the converter holds little practical value; it’s like wearing a safety helmet while shopping.

Reply to 11# xj-jinbao: If everyone who took those two buses on July 23rd had worn safety helmets, would the outcome have been as tragic as it is now? Think again about why wealthy people buy cars with high safety standards Comrades: 2012 is coming up soon. Be more open-minded; the starting point is different now, so don’t keep sticking to the old ways of thinking!

I’ve worked in the chemical industry for 4 years; although I’m not old, I’ve witnessed several tragic accidents, and I really can’t bear it all! I feel it’s my responsibility to help more people understand the true circumstances of this accident, so as to prevent such a tragedy from happening again! Below is what I experienced, which remains vivid in my memory to this day. I work at the second phase of the VCM dry conversion process at Sino Salt PVC Plant (it was the first phase where the incident occurred); I was on duty on the night of December 2nd. I take over at 12 at night. There are no issues on my unit in Phase 2; I just heard that there’s a leak in the converter of Phase 1, and it’s quite serious – a large amount of water has caused holes to form in the exhaust pipes of the converter, leading to a leakage of vinyl chloride gas. Adhering to the principle that \"those in charge of a task should handle it themselves,\" the colleagues from the previous shift stayed behind to take care of it. Since this hole is located behind the exhaust valve, it’s useless to shut down the converter even then. So, two workers from an external company were called in to seal the leak under pressure. I didn’t go to the scene either at that time; I just chatted with my colleagues in the lounge. 3 o’clock! I came back from my inspection, and my buddy who was responsible for the first phase of conversion also returned. I asked about the specific situation, and he told me what had happened. I then asked whether those who are still working on it are handling it now How many were missed? He said he went back half an hour ago; the converter was leaking a lot of water, but it has stopped now. One unit was missing and there was a hole in the exhaust pipe; his team handled it on site (he only said they handled it, but didn’t specify to what extent – was operation stopped or not?) ) On-site laborers are filling the holes. Then he started eating. Out of trust in my former colleague, I didn’t suggest that he go to the site to check the opening and closing status of the various valves (I really regret it now! ) At 3:30, the radio operator called my buddy and said that the gasket in the converter’s soda separator had failed, causing a lot of steam to be released; he asked me to go to the site right away. (Actually, it was already too late – anyone who went there would end up in trouble.) I said I was almost done eating and wouldn’t be able to leave for another half minute. My buddy didn’t listen to me and went out. Two minutes later, there was a loud explosion... I went to the scene; insulation material and thin metal sheets were flying everywhere, and the glass in the surrounding factories was all broken, with windows falling down as well. The sound of the steam was extremely loud; hot water sprayed out and flowed onto the road. There were no flames, and my friend didn’t know where he was either because it was impossible to get in… At 5 a.m., my friend was found more than 10 meters away from the exploded converter; fortunately, he was still alive. We infer that after hearing the dispatcher’s call over the radio, he was on his way to the scene; when he was not far from the converter, it exploded unexpectedly, and the shockwave threw him against another converter. He is still receiving treatment in Yinchuan to this day. As for scheduling and the employees from those two external factories, unfortunately... Recalling those events is truly painful. I hope that after seeing this, everyone will make sure to master the basic skills thoroughly, learn from these painful lessons, and avoid repeating the same mistakes. Wish my buddy a speedy recovery.