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Our company’s tank area is equipped with alarms for high liquid level, extremely high liquid level, low liquid level, and extremely low liquid level. However, the automatic protection system does not activate after these alarms are triggered; this is likely because closing the valves as part of the automatic protection mechanism could cause the equipment to stop functioning. May I ask how things are at your factory? How can it be set more reasonably? :):)
If you don’t use it, it’s as if it doesn’t exist at all; the relevant equipment fails to provide the necessary protection. Since the narration is not very complete, it’s impossible to give a specific answer. Appropriate parameters can be set in accordance with relevant specifications, regulations, and other requirements, taking into account the process flow.
SH3136-2003 Code for Safety Design of Spherical Storage Tanks for Liquefied Hydrocarbons, Section 5.3.3: “For spherical storage tanks containing single-component liquefied hydrocarbons or those used in continuously operating petrochemical production units, the interlock requirements shall be determined based on the needs of the upstream and downstream process flows.” ”It takes the upstream and downstream devices into consideration. I think you can refer to using interlocking.
Could the area inside the tank farm be put into use, while those parts outside the tank farm that are connected to the equipment need not be used?
Safety Supervision General Office Document No. 3 [2014] 68: II. Further Strengthening the Safety Management of Chemical Storage Areas (1) Further improve the monitoring and control facilities in chemical storage areas. In accordance with regulatory requirements, high and low liquid level alarms are installed in the storage tank; automatic interlocks are employed to shut down the tank’s feed valve when the liquid level is too high, and to stop material transfer when the liquid level is too low.
Personal advice must be put into practice. Moreover, not only should interlocks be installed in the DCS, but a separate SIS system for forced self-protection should also be put in place, independent of the DCS.
Hehe, has your company adopted it yet?
My previous employer was a newly established state-owned enterprise, and all the necessary safety measures were in place. If something goes wrong when it’s in use, it’s a problem with the instruments; if nothing goes wrong, then it’s an issue with the engineer’s design. It’s a way of shirking one’s own responsibilities, I guess.
Our company uses an independent SIS system to ensure safety