[Repost] Are your company facing any of the issues identified during the special supervision and inspection of enterprises with major hazardous chemical sources?

Furthermore, during the inspection of the fire pump room, the fire safety experts from the supervision and inspection team saw only one internal phone line. The experts pointed out that: \"Fire phones are specialized equipment for firefighting purposes, and they cannot be replaced by ordinary phones.\" ”Subsequently, the experts went to the power distribution room and found that there was no dedicated fire alarm phone either. Experts explain that, in accordance with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Automatic Fire Alarm Systems\" GB50116, a fire telephone switchboard should be installed in the fire control room, while dedicated fire telephones should be provided in areas such as the fire pump room and electrical distribution room. The dedicated telephone network for fire services should be an independent fire communication network, as the reliability of these dedicated lines is crucial for ensuring smooth operation of the fire communication command system during a fire; ordinary telephone lines cannot be used as a substitute.

During the inspection of another company, Wuhan xx Chemical Storage and Transportation Co., Ltd., Gou Zhenghua, an expert on hazardous chemicals from the supervision and inspection team, reviewed the company’s assessment reports on major hazard sources as well as the documents related to the design of safety facilities. It was found that the medium stored in tank T206 had been changed from methanol to liquid caustic, while the medium stored in tanks T207 and T212 had been changed from ethanol to fuel oil. However, the company’s employees only provided a standard change management form, without any documents related to the design changes. Expert Gou Zhenghua pointed out: “The storage medium has been changed from the flammable liquid methanol to the corrosive liquid lye. The enterprise has only addressed the risks associated with tank cleaning operations, without analyzing the safety conditions for storage. According to the ‘Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises’, when flammable liquids and corrosive liquids are stored in the same tank area, a dike should be installed.” ； The floor of the alkali storage tank should be treated to prevent corrosion. The inspection revealed significant gaps in the company’s change management processes, as well as inadequate security controls. ”

In Fuzhou: The general manager is often absent from the company, making it difficult to implement the responsibility system. Recently, the fifth team tasked with conducting special inspections of enterprises dealing with major hazardous sources under the Ministry of Emergency Management carried out a special inspection of xxxxxx New Materials Co., Ltd. in Fuzhou, Fujian Province. The company was established in May 2012 and is located in the Fuqing Jiangyin Chemical Industrial Park in Fuzhou. Upon reviewing the relevant documents, the supervision and inspection team found that the general manager of this company also serves as the legal representative of xxxx Chemical Company. The company’s office is located in the urban area of Fuzhou; aside from attending important meetings such as the annual party committee meetings, the general manager does not work at the company on a regular basis, which makes it difficult to implement the safety production responsibility system. The supervision and inspection team stated that the explosion incident on November 28 in Zhangjiakou revealed the problem of key responsible persons being absent from their posts for extended periods, which made it difficult to ensure compliance with safety requirements; it is necessary to learn deeply from this experience in order to prevent similar incidents from occurring. Experts responsible for on-site inspection found that there were no combustible or toxic gas detection and alarm devices at the fresh air inlets of the ventilation systems in the enterprise’s liquid ammonia tank area control rooms and central control rooms ； The deluge valve of the liquid ammonia spherical tank spraying system is leaking, resulting in insufficient system pressure ； The liquid ammonia spherical tank area lacks various safety measures such as fire water cannons. “The absence of flammable and toxic gas detection alarms at the fresh air inlet of the ventilation system means that leaks of toxic gases cannot be detected in a timely manner, delaying rescue efforts and leading to casualties. ”The experts from the supervision and inspection team said. During the inspection of the company’s primary major hazard area, namely the liquid ammonia spherical tank area, the supervision and inspection team posed questions on-site, requiring the company to activate the \"emergency alarm\" in accordance with the relevant procedures and to conduct drills. However, a few minutes after the \"incident alarm\" was triggered, only two members of the company’s process response team arrived, and they did not bring any combustible gas detectors or leak-sealing tools ； Although the company’s full-time fire brigade arrived quickly, the fire trucks were parked haphazardly. After the drill, experts from the supervision and inspection team pointed out on the spot the problems revealed by the drill, including the lack of on-site detection efforts, the failure to establish a safety zone, the fact that the company’s full-time firefighters were not wearing lightweight chemical protective suits or air respirators, as well as the insufficient emergency response capabilities of both the process handling team and the company’s full-time fire brigade. “Drills should not be conducted merely for the sake of it; rather, they should be treated as real accidents. ”Experts from the supervision and inspection team stated that since the company does not have its own full-time fire brigade, relying solely on partnerships to fund the hiring of full-time firefighters means that in the event of an emergency, it will inevitably affect rescue efforts. It is recommended to negotiate with the full-time fire stations of neighboring enterprises to form a joint defense force, further improve the coordination and assessment mechanisms as well as the communication systems with these full-time fire stations, and enhance the assessment and evaluation system. At the feedback meeting held with the company, Zheng Shuangzhong, head of the Fifth Supervision and Inspection Team, pointed out that enterprises dealing with major hazardous chemicals should take this as an opportunity to draw serious lessons from related accidents, earnestly fulfill their responsibilities for safe production, and promptly address any identified problems and risks. Local authorities should draw lessons from this situation, strengthen safety measures in other industries, and make every effort to promote the sustainable and healthy development of all sectors.

In Shanghai: Emergency equipment was expired or missing, yet the inspection forms showed checkboxes indicating that everything was in order. On June 21st, experts from Group 3 of the special supervision and inspection team for enterprises with major hazardous substances, under the Ministry of Emergency Management, began to conduct random inspections of the chemical warehouses that constitute major hazardous sources, located within the premises of Shanghai xxxx Logistics Co., Ltd. in Fengxian District, Shanghai. In Warehouse 7-1 of Category A, experts found that among the cleaning tools stored in a corner of the warehouse, the copper shovels were effective explosion-proof tools, with the company-made “explosion-proof tool” label attached to their wooden handles; however, the long-handled baskets were made of metal, which can generate sparks when rubbed against the floor. Experts point out: “The same type of tools should be used in the same hazardous materials storage area; since explosion-proof copper shovels are used, why wasn’t this consideration given when buckets were employed?” ” On the inspection records at the warehouse entrance, the experts found that the records for the period from June 13 to 18 were missing. The company employees argued that it was the Dragon Boat Festival holiday at the time. Experts pointed out seriously: “Safety inspections must be carried out daily; hazardous factors do not disappear just because it is a holiday.” To put it another way, the Dragon Boat Festival holiday lasts only 3 days, but there is a gap of 6 days in the records! ” In the emergency equipment cabinet outside the warehouse, the inspection team members found that two self-priming filter-type gas masks had expired, with their expiration dates being April 2019 and June 2020, respectively. “Expired gas masks may have issues such as failed filtration or deformation that leads to leaks, failing to provide effective protection for emergency responders using these devices. ”The members of the supervision and inspection team explained. In the emergency equipment cabinet of Warehouse 2-1, the gas masks are also expired. The members of the supervision and inspection team checked against the list of emergency equipment posted on the cabinet door and found that 4 pairs of chemical protective gloves were missing from the cabinet. The monthly inspection form for the emergency equipment cabinet showed checkmarks indicating confirmation, along with the signature of the inspector; no abnormalities were recorded. “It’s completely a formality check! ”Experts say. In chamber 5-1, the experts found that the newly installed air-conditioning units had not been grounded, and the explosion-proof connectors of the fire alarm buttons had not been properly handled, resulting in a loss of their explosion-proof functionality. Experts also found that none of the warehouses inspected complied with the regulations regarding locking, and in all of them, the infrared emitters for fire detection were blocked by stacked goods, preventing the receivers on the other side from receiving the infrared signals. “The fire and explosion prevention issues in hazardous materials warehouses must not be taken lightly; strict compliance with safety technical standards is essential, with no room for carelessness or negligence. ”Experts say. During the inspection that lasted over an hour, the supervisory team identified more than 10 potential hazards. However, during the preliminary special inspection for major hazard sources, no potential risks were identified by this company. Members of the supervision and inspection team stated that safety in production cannot be treated as a mere formality; management must be more meticulous, thorough, and stringent.

In Ji’an City: The trial production period has expired, and the company has been ordered to suspend operations for rectification. On June 19, the sixth supervision and inspection team visited xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd. in Ji’an City, Jiangxi Province, and found that the trial production period for the company’s project to expand its capacity for producing 4,000 tons of chlorpyrifos as well as its 4,200-ton salt by-product production line was from June 5, 2020, to June 4, 2021. This period has now passed by more than half a month, meaning that the trial production is ongoing beyond the allowed time frame, which poses a serious risk of accidents. “Do you know that your trial production has exceeded the deadline? ”“Why not postpone it? ”“You have serious flaws in your management! ”Faced with the continuous questions from the supervision and inspection team, the company’s executives looked at each other and nodded in acknowledgment. Jiangxi xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd. is an established factory that has been producing pesticides and insecticides since 1998. It currently engages in two key hazardous processes: amination and the use of chlorine. The company has three major hazard sources: a liquid chlorine warehouse of grade 3 (with a capacity of 20 tons), a tank area of category 3, and a highly toxic substance warehouse of grade 4. The chemicals that are under close supervision include methanol, dimethylamine, and phosphorus trichloride; among the highly toxic chemicals are sodium cyanide and liquid chlorine. When the supervision and inspection team went to the mini fire station for an inspection, they asked the company’s employees to demonstrate the use of positive-pressure fire breathing apparatus on site. When the company employees opened the packaging box to get ready to put it on, they found that the shoulder strap on the gas cylinder was broken. Fire expert Li Ningning immediately asked him to replace the air respirator and try the operation again. “It’s been ten minutes and you still haven’t finished getting dressed; you’re too slow! Once exposed to a chlorine leak, you would definitely be poisoned after such a long time! Don’t you have regular training? ”The company’s employees are slow and inefficient, and their movements throughout the entire process are irregular; they are not skilled at all. “I suggest you organize a competition and train regularly! ”The experts also found that the inspection and maintenance records for the air respirators inside the packaging box had not been filled out. Furthermore, opposite the shift change room in the company’s chilled water plant are Class A production facilities; there are a large number of employees in the shift change room, and no rectifications have been carried out in accordance with the \"Three-Year Action Plan for the Special Rectification of Hazardous Chemicals Safety.\" Song Dongri, an expert on hazardous chemicals, told reporters: “This is extremely dangerous. Control rooms and shift change rooms for production facilities that involve fire hazards of Category A or B should, in principle, not be located within the production facility area. In the event of an emergency, the personnel on duty at the site do not have any protective equipment, making it impossible for them to evacuate in a timely manner.” If it is necessary to set up a shift handover room, the blast-resistant design, construction, and reinforcement must be completed by the end of 2020 in accordance with the provisions of the \"Code for Blast-Resistant Design of Petrochemical Control Rooms\". ”The supervision and inspection team ordered Jiangxi xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd. to immediately cease its trial production activities ； The local emergency management department shall investigate and handle the situation of exceeding the trial production deadline, and provide timely feedback on the results of such investigation and handling ； Local authorities **must draw inferences from this case, conduct a thorough investigation and rectification of similar trial production activities, and impose severe penalties in accordance with the law on any related illegal or irregular behaviors.** It is reported that this inspection focuses on assessing the quality of self-inspections and self-corrections carried out by enterprises, as well as the fulfillment of their primary responsibilities. The aim is to achieve greater results in the special campaigns aimed at ensuring the safety of hazardous chemicals and improving fire safety over these three years, to strengthen the joint supervision mechanism between relevant authorities, to mitigate safety risks associated with major hazardous sources of hazardous chemicals, and to create a safe and stable environment to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party.

In Huludao City: The supervisor’s qualification certificate had expired; a copy of the commitment statement was pasted there. On June 18, the fourth team of the Special Inspection Group for enterprises with major hazardous sources of hazardous chemicals under the Ministry of Emergency Management went to XXXXX Casting Materials Co., Ltd. in the chemical industry park of the Huludao Economic Development Zone in Liaoning Province to conduct an inspection. Liu Guorui, an expert from the supervision and inspection team, found that none of the toxic gas alarms in the company were displaying any data. In response, the company’s safety officer said, “I am usually responsible for patrolling areas such as the tanks outside the facility and the utility systems, as well as collecting safety-related data; I am not familiar with the facility’s production processes or equipment.” ”“Do you have responsibilities related to identifying potential hazards? ”Liu Guorui pressed further. “I don’t know; I don’t have that ability. We have a Minister of Security. ”The company’s safety officer replied. However, the supervision and inspection team found that the company’s safety production responsibility system clearly stipulates that safety officers have the duty to \"inspect the safety production conditions of the unit, promptly identify potential hazards related to production safety incidents, and propose suggestions for improving safety production management.\" The supervision and inspection team believes that the company’s safety officer lacks basic knowledge of production processes and equipment, as well as an understanding of their job responsibilities, and is therefore not competent to carry out their duties. During the review of relevant documents, the supervision and inspection team found that the assessment certificate of the company’s main responsible person had expired. In response, Zhang Xinglin, head of the supervision and inspection team, said that the safe production of hazardous chemicals is a task that requires a high degree of scientific knowledge and professionalism. Only by mastering the basic principles of safe production for hazardous chemicals and possessing the essential skills in safety management can enterprise leaders and safety officers truly fulfill their responsibilities regarding safe production within their companies. During the inspection of the company’s warehouse, Yang Xinhong, an expert from the supervision and inspection team, asked the company’s staff, “Do you know that substances such as glycerin and silanes should be stored in warehouses designated for hazardous chemicals?” ”“Not very clear. ”“This is a finished goods warehouse; it does not meet the requirements for storing hazardous chemicals, do you know that? ”Yang Xinhong pointed out. “I know. ”The company’s staff stammered and said that they would immediately arrange for workers to remove glycerin, silanes, etc. from the finished products warehouse. Through careful inquiries and a review of the approval records, the supervision and inspection team found that the items stored in that warehouse did not match those specified in the company’s Safety Assessment Report from September 2019; glycerin, silanes, and other such substances were not listed in the Safety Assessment Report. Experts from the supervision and inspection team pointed out that this situation falls under the circumstances specified in Article 20 of the \"Criteria for Identifying Major Potential Hazards in Production Safety of Chemical and Hazardous Chemicals Production and Operation Units (Trial Version)\\": hazardous chemicals are not stored in accordance with **standard zoning and classification, excessive quantities or varieties of such chemicals are stored, and substances that are incompatible with each other are stored together. During the inspection, the supervision and verification team also found that the enterprise’s announcement regarding its assessment of safety risks was a complete copy-paste of a template, with no proper fulfillment of the relevant requirements ； The pressure monitoring of the furfuryl alcohol storage tank, which is classified as a major hazard source of level 4, cannot be performed remotely or with continuous recording ； The door from the fire control room to the evacuation passages is just an ordinary door; some fire safety signs are not clear, and there is no safety organization chart or list of fire-fighting equipment displayed in the fire control room. The supervision and inspection team stated that enterprises should strengthen safety control measures, thoroughly identify potential problems, ensure proper implementation of tasks, and avoid formalism. Local governments at all levels **and their relevant departments should accelerate the improvement of joint disposal mechanisms, ensure proper implementation of tasks, and create a coordinated effort in supervision.

In Dongying: Pipe rupture in the water pump room; fire suppression systems failed to function properly. On June 18, the second team of the special supervision and inspection group for enterprises with major hazardous sources under the Ministry of Emergency Management selected xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd., a company with major hazardous sources located in the Dongying Port Economic Development Zone, from 270 such enterprises in 7 counties (districts and development zones) in Dongying City, Shandong Province, to conduct a supervision and inspection. While reviewing the company’s maintenance records and inspection records for its fire sprinklers, the experts from the supervision and inspection team found that the water pressure in the company’s fire protection piping system had remained abnormal for half a year, with no records of any corrective actions taken. In response, the experts decided to go to the site to verify. During the testing of a fire nozzle, experts found that after it achieved its direct-current and spray patterns, the water output pressure gradually decreased, with no increase in pressure occurring within the specified time frame. Upon inspection, it was found that a water pipe on the left side of the company’s pump room had burst, and the water flowing out from the crack had spread across the factory floor. It turns out that the company is located by the sea, where the groundwater level is high; as a result, the fire protection pipes are prone to erosion by seawater. Additionally, the underground water supply networks are in poor condition due to lack of maintenance over the years, which reduces the pressure resistance of the pipes. Experts point out that in the event of a fire at this facility, the fire suppression system would be useless and unable to fulfill its role properly ； It is recommended that the company organize corrective actions as soon as possible, replace the existing pipeline network, carry out thorough repairs promptly, and strengthen regular maintenance. During the subsequent inspection, experts found that the company’s fire extinguishing and emergency response plans needed improvement, and there were few combined drills for process-related responses and firefighting measures. Experts urge the company’s process handling team and fire brigade to carry out more joint drills in order to effectively improve their emergency response capabilities. The supervision and inspection team required the enterprise to take immediate action to make corrections in accordance with the experts’ recommendations, learn from this experience, and conduct a thorough review to address any potential risks ； The local emergency management authorities and fire rescue agencies handled the matter strictly in accordance with laws and regulations. After the supervision and inspection were completed, the Emergency Management Bureau and the Fire and Rescue Brigade of the Dongying Port Economic Development Zone, along with safety and fire protection experts, went to the enterprise overnight to hold an on-site rectification meeting. In response to the issues of insufficient pressure in the fire protection piping system and pipe ruptures, the enterprise was ordered to suspend operations immediately for rectification. During the rectification period, the fire and rescue team will deploy fire trucks and firefighters to stand by at the enterprises to ensure safety. At 12:00 on June 19, the Emergency Management Bureau and the Fire and Rescue Brigade of the Dongying Port Economic Development Zone organized experts to conduct a follow-up inspection of the enterprise. It was found that the enterprise had ceased operations for rectification; the problems of insufficient water pressure in the fire protection piping system and pipe ruptures had been resolved, and the system was now operational. Of the problems and potential risks identified by the supervision and inspection team, 9 have been fully rectified ； Regarding other issues and potential risks, the company has formulated a rectification plan.

In Fushun: Insufficient spacing between storage tanks; the person in charge is working without a license. “Why are the tanks placed so close together?” Has the distance been measured? It seems that the spacing is not up to standard. ”Recently, when Group 4 of the special supervision and inspection team for enterprises with major hazardous sources of hazardous chemicals under the Ministry of Emergency Management was inspecting xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd. in Fushun City, Liaoning Province, Liu Guorui, an expert from the supervision team, identified problems as soon as he entered the storage tank area. xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd. is a company that constitutes a major hazard source for hazardous chemicals; its main product is trimethyl orthoformate. Due to the expiration of its safety production license, the company is currently shut down. After inspecting the entire tank area, the experts identified more problems: there were no walkways across the dikes surrounding the tank area ； The inlet and outlet of the methanol storage tank do not have flexible connections ； The combustible gas alarm at the methanol storage tank is not powered on ； No remote transmission of liquid level, pressure, and temperature for flammable and toxic liquid storage tanks ； The hydrocyanic acid salt formation reactor lacks pressure, level display, and alarms. Regarding the numerous issues existing in the tank farm, the company’s staff explained that it was designed according to old standards many years ago, and indeed there are many problems. The staff member said that during the shutdown period, the company would make prompt corrections by relocating several of the storage tanks, and after replanning the tank area in accordance with **the latest standards, they would be reinstallated. The machinery and equipment in enterprises that have ceased operations are no longer in use, but if safety management measures are not put in place, accidents can still easily occur. The supervision and inspection team is paying close attention to this. He Jin, an expert from the supervision and inspection team, and staff from the local fire and rescue brigade decided to conduct an inspection of the company’s fire safety conditions. After a thorough inspection, He Jin found that the door in the company’s fire control room that led to the evacuation passages was not a fireproof door, the width of certain parts of the fire access roads did not meet the regulatory requirements, and the employees were not proficient in using the fire-fighting equipment. During the review of relevant documents, the supervision and inspection team found that the company had failed to conduct risk assessments for reaction safety, the person in charge of production did not possess a certificate proving proficiency in safety production knowledge and management skills, and there were insufficient distances between the production facilities and the office buildings, control rooms, and laboratories. In response to the identified issues, the supervision and inspection team requested that xxxx Chemical Co., Ltd. take advantage of the downtime to carry out rectifications in accordance with the list of potential problems, thereby achieving a comprehensive upgrade in both hardware and management ； The Emergency Management Department of Liaoning Province is temporarily withholding approval for the company’s safety production license; until a renewal permit for this license is obtained, the company is prohibited from engaging in any production or business activities ； During the production suspension period, the company strictly controls materials such as trimethyl orthoformate, methanol, and ethanol to prevent safety accidents in production.

In Baotou: The same person worked shifts for 5 consecutive days – even an iron man couldn’t handle that. On June 18, the first inspection team from the Ministry of Emergency Management conducted a surprise check on the oil depot of Baotou xxxx Petroleum Co., Ltd., and discovered that the company had falsified its fire safety records, with the same person signing off on both day and night shifts for 5 consecutive days. Faced with questions from the experts on the inspection team, the company’s manager admitted to the falsification of the fire safety records. The supervision and inspection team also found serious flaws in the company’s special operation management system, including the absence of facilities for continuous liquid level monitoring in the gasoline storage tanks, as well as significant accident hazards such as the renovation of diesel pipelines within the tank area being carried out without proper design. On the evening of the 18th, the local emergency management authorities suspended the company’s license to handle hazardous chemicals and ordered it to suspend operations for rectification.

In Ordos: The fire suppression water system for the LNG storage tanks failed to deliver water after being activated for over 30 minutes. On June 15, the first supervision and inspection team conducted an on-site inspection at Inner Mongolia xxxx New Energy Co., Ltd., a company that handles hazardous chemicals in Ordos City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. During this inspection, they tested the fire cooling water systems of two 20,000-cubic-meter liquefied gas storage tanks, but no water was discharged from these systems after more than 30 minutes. xxxx New Energy Co., Ltd. is a new energy company focused on the comprehensive development and utilization of natural gas. Its main production facilities include a liquefaction plant capable of processing 300×10⁴ Nm3 of raw material (natural gas) per day, along with corresponding auxiliary production units and supporting utility systems. The key hazardous chemicals subject to strict regulation by this company are natural gas, ethylene, and propane. It has 1 major hazard source of level 4 (refrigerant storage area) and 1 major hazard source of level 1 (LNG storage tank area). On that day, experts from the supervision and inspection team went to the company’s LNG storage area and said, “Please activate the fire cooling water system and conduct a fire drill.” ”Upon hearing this, the staff at the company immediately started the fire pump. However, unexpectedly, the fire pump did not discharge water for spraying. “Please ask the expert to wait a moment. ”The staff rushed to the control room. The experts from the supervision and inspection team waited on site for 30 minutes, yet no water came out of the fire suppression cooling system… The company’s manager explained that air had accumulated inside the fire pipes, preventing timely spraying of water. An expert from the supervision and inspection team told reporters, “The fire cooling system is an important facility for fire safety. Its timely and effective activation plays a crucial role in extinguishing fires at their early stages and preventing them from spreading and causing accidents. Moreover, with the arrival of hot summer weather, the tank storage area may require cooling measures at any time.” Therefore, the fire protection facilities in the hazardous chemicals storage area must remain in good condition and functional, in an interconnected state, to truly fulfill their intended role. However, the company’s fire protection facilities were in poor condition, lacked proper interconnection, and the staff were not skilled enough in operating them; as a result, these fire protection facilities became nothing more than decorations. ”The supervision and inspection team ordered the enterprise to make immediate corrections, to learn from this incident and conduct a thorough investigation to address any potential risks, thereby ensuring safe production. It also requested that the local emergency management authorities impose penalties in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.