Thread Content
Report on the fire at Beihai LNG Company that resulted in 7 deaths: Instrument engineer’s improper operations 2021-03-27 14:42 · China Youth Network On March 26, the official website of the Emergency Management Department of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region published the “Investigation Report on the serious fire incident at Beihai LNG Co., Ltd. on November 2”. The report indicates that at around 11:45 on November 2, 2020, Sinopec Beihai LNG Co., Ltd., located in the Tieshangang (coastal) Industrial Zone in Beihai City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (hereinafter referred to as Beihai LNG Company), experienced this fire incident. ) An fire accident occurred during the construction of the project for simultaneous loading of rich and lean liquids in the second phase. The accident resulted in 7 deaths, 2 severe injuries, and direct economic losses of 20.293 million yuan. The investigation report states that the direct cause of the accident was that, during the implementation of the phase II project, the isolation valve was opened, causing LNG (liquefied natural gas) in the low-pressure export pipeline to spray out from the cut opening. The mixture of LNG vapor and air ignited upon encountering potential ignition energy. The indirect causes of the accident include improper valve isolation methods, instrument engineers failing to follow the prescribed procedures for approving instrument interlocks and operating procedures, insufficient verification of the conditions required for hot work, inadequate awareness of and control over safety risks, the labor organization model of \"small owners with large-scale contracting\" leading to ineffective implementation of safety management responsibilities, and poor management of contractors. The investigation report states that on the morning of November 2, 2020, instrument engineer Lai Xiaolin failed to carry out a series of procedures such as review and approval signing that are required after completing an instrument interlock work order; without the supervision of any other instrument engineers, he entered the engineer station and performed the operations alone. At 11:44:48, Lai Xiaolin used the SIS system to force the closure of valve 0301-XV-2001; immediately thereafter, the valve opened and LNG began to flow out. At 11:45:00, the valve was fully opened. About 10 seconds after the LNG was injected, a fire broke out on the front platform of the TK-02 storage tank. When the LNG started to spray and catch fire, there were 8 people including Liang on the platform in front of Tank TK-02, and 1 person named Tian on the tank top. The investigation report states that in this accident, the Natural Gas Technology Service Center of Sinopec Zhongyuan Petroleum Bureau, Beihai LNG Company, Sinopec 10th Construction Company, Henan Hongyu, Sichuan Yitong, Sinopec Guangzhou Engineering, and Qingdao Yueyang were involved in illegal and irregular activities. Among them, the Natural Gas Technology Service Center of Sinopec Zhongyuan Petroleum Bureau violated the regulations regarding instrument interlock protection systems; it failed to follow the prescribed procedures for approving such interlocks. Instrument engineer Lai Xiaolin carried out forced interlock operations without the approval process being completed and without any supervisor present. The report also mentioned issues with the reporting of accident information. After the accident, despite the fact that not all of the injured had been rescued and those missing had not yet been found, Beihai LNG Company reported to **Pipeline Network Group at 15:32 and 17:13 on November 2 that the accident had resulted in 3 serious injuries and 6 deaths. In the early stages of accident rescue, the command center failed to obtain timely information on the number of casualties at the accident site; the casualty figures provided in the update at 15:27 referred to the number of people taken to hospitals for treatment. The information submission process is not rigorous or standardized, resulting in information flowing in the wrong direction. The investigation report shows that Lai Xiaolin, an employee at the Natural Gas Technology Service Center of Sinopec Zhongyuan Petroleum Bureau and an instrument operator at the Inspection and Maintenance Center of Beihai LNG Company, is suspected of the crime of causing a major accident, and has been approved for arrest by the People’s Procuratorate of Beihai City. The clues and relevant materials regarding issues in the performance of duties by the relevant departments and their responsible personnel identified during the accident investigation have been collected by the accident liability investigation team of the Autonomous Region’s Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision. Proposals regarding the handling of the responsible units and individuals are put forward by the discipline inspection and supervision agencies. It is recommended that the Beihai Emergency Management Bureau impose administrative penalties on the 7 relevant enterprises.
Don’t act recklessly; always keep safety in mind.
Learn together*, improve together, and take it as a lesson
Why was the valve ultimately left open despite attempting a forced shutdown?
Safety is a matter of conscience; it requires dedication!
This post was last edited by jlshnlhj on 2021-11-20 at 23:31. Clearly, the control program in SIS wasn’t written by him; he didn’t participate in the configuration or debugging process, and he also didn’t fully understand how to operate the program, which led to errors. One of my colleagues encountered a similar problem in early 2000: the control program wasn’t configured by his team; he was responsible only for the operation station side and didn’t participate in the debugging of the control program. He was then asked to take care of maintenance tasks. More than a year after the system started operating (and of course, during that time he also didn’t fully understand the control program), one day an electromagnetic valve was not in its correct on/off position. Since the operator didn’t have the authority to make changes, he had to go to the engineer station. Due to his lack of understanding of the program, he attempted to make adjustments manually, which triggered the interlock system. It will be announced throughout the entire factory. Furthermore, in such cases, isolation valves alone are not sufficient; isolation blind plates should also be used.
It’s a valuable lesson; thankfully, no losses were incurred
The solenoid valve is originally unpowered; as a precaution, the supervisor ordered that it remain unpowered (to prevent the front-end logic from producing a value of 1 and thus powering the valve). However, due to his lack of familiarity with SIS and perhaps out of nervousness, he ended up forcing the valve to be powered (with a value of 1 or TRUE)! It ended in tragedy! !
This situation cannot be handled solely with isolation valves; isolation blind plates should also be used.