58 people held accountable! Report on the investigation into the serious high-pressure steam pipeline explosion incident on August 11 in Dangyang, Hubei released

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At 14:49 on August 11, 2016, during the trial production phase of the cogeneration project at Hubei Dangyang Madian Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd., the “integrally welded long-diameter nozzle” on the high-pressure main steam pipe of Boiler No. 2 (a product name designated by the company; it is a differential pressure flowmeter, hereinafter referred to as the “accident nozzle”) ruptured. This led to a major rupture accident involving a high-pressure steam pipe, resulting in 22 deaths, 4 severe injuries, and direct economic losses amounting to approximately 23.13 million yuan. After the accident, the leaders of the State Council attached great importance to it. The Premier issued important instructions: “Every effort must be made to rescue the injured, minimize casualties, properly handle post-accident matters, and promptly ascertain the cause of the accident and hold those responsible accountable.” The Hubei Provincial Party Committee and provincial authorities attached great importance to this matter. Li Hongzhong, then Party Secretary of the province, Wang Xiaodong, then Deputy Party Secretary and acting governor, along with other leaders of the provincial Party committee and authorities, issued relevant instructions and led relevant personnel from the province and city to the scene to organize and coordinate emergency rescue and handling efforts for the accident. In accordance with the Regulations on the Reporting, Investigation and Handling of Production Safety Accidents (Decree No. 493 of the State Council), the Measures for the Reporting, Investigation and Handling of Production Safety Accidents in Hubei Province (Decree No. 354 of the provincial government), and other relevant provisions, and with the approval of the provincial people’s government, an investigation team was established on August 12 to investigate the serious accident involving the rupture of a high-pressure steam pipeline at Dangyang Madian Gangshi Power Generation Co., Ltd. on August 11. The head of this team was Liu Xuhui, then director of the Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau; members of the team included representatives from departments such as the Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau, the Provincial Supervisory Commission, the Provincial Public Security Department, the Provincial Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau, the Provincial Energy Bureau, and the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, as well as relevant personnel from the Yichang City people’s government. (Hereinafter referred to as the accident investigation team.) The accident investigation team invited representatives from the Provincial People’s Procuratorate to participate, and assembled a panel of experts with expertise in thermal power plant design and operation management, inspection and testing of special equipment, metal welding, and other related fields to assist in the technical investigation of the accident. Relevant inspection, testing, and survey design agencies were also engaged to carry out inspections and evaluations. In accordance with the principles of \"not letting go until the issues are resolved\" and \"being scientific and rigorous, acting in accordance with laws and regulations, seeking truth from facts, and focusing on practical results\", the accident investigation team, through on-site inspections, evidence collection, testing, and expert analyses, determined the sequence of events leading to the accident, its causes, as well as the casualties and property losses incurred. It identified the nature of the accident, clarified the responsibilities of the relevant units and individuals, and put forward recommendations regarding the handling of those responsible. At the same time, suggestions for accident prevention measures were put forward in response to the causes of the accident and the prominent issues identified. The relevant information is reported as follows: I. Basic Information (1) Information on the unit where the accident occurred. 1. Dangyang Madian Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Gangue Power Generation Company) is the constructor of the cogeneration project where the accident occurred. The company was initially established on November 6, 2002, with its original registration address in Madian Village, Yuxi Town, Dangyang City. Its legal representative is Shuang Guoqing, and its business scope includes thermal power generation and the sale of ash and slag. In 2014, Huahua Chemical Group Co., Ltd. invested in and took control of the gangue power generation company, contributing 67 million yuan and holding a 67% stake ； Hubei Shenzhou New Energy Power Generation Co., Ltd. (legal representative: Shuang Guoqing) contributed 33 million yuan, holding a 33% stake. On November 18, 2014, the gangue power generation company underwent a change to its business license, with the license needing to be renewed upon expiration in 2016. The unified social credit code for the business license is 91420582741797379M; the legal representative is Yu Huaqiang. The registered address is Hefan Village, Baling Office, Dangyang City. The registered capital amounts to 100 million yuan. The business scope includes thermal power generation, heat production and sales, as well as the purchase and sale of coal. 2. Huahua Chemical Engineering Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Huahua Chemical Engineering Group). The company was established in 2002; its unified social credit code as per the business license is 91420500744607454B. Yu Huaqiang serves as the legal representative, and the company’s registered address is No. 1 Jinping Avenue, Dangyang City, Hubei Province. The registered capital amounts to 150 million yuan. The business scope includes the production and sale of chemical fertilizers and compound fertilizers, etc. The license number for the work safety permit is E WuH An Xu Zi (Yan 0311), and its validity period expires on May 8, 2018. Huahua Chemical Group is the controlling shareholder of the gangue power generation company; it oversees the construction of cogeneration projects and takes overall control of the production and operational activities of that company. A \"four-unified\" management system is implemented for the gangue power generation companies. That is: (1) Unified management of human resources (including the appointment of professional and technical staff as well as management personnel, employee recruitment, and training) ； (2) Unified management of finance (including the company’s cash inflows and outflows, bank financing, appointment of financial staff, accounting methods, etc.) ； (3) Unified management of material procurement (including the procurement of coal from Shanxi Coking Coal Group, etc.) ； (4) Unified management of production scheduling (including the production of steam, electricity, etc.). (II) Information on the units involved in the accident. 1. Chongqing Angoli Instrument Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Angoli Company) is the manufacturer and supplier of accident nozzles for the cogeneration projects of coal gangue power generation companies. The company was established on December 4, 2006. Its unified social credit code under the business license is 91500112795877497 T. Its registered address is No. 20, Cuiping Road, Yubei District, Chongqing. The legal representative is Yang Jiaxing, and the registered capital amounts to 2 million yuan. The business scope includes the production, processing, and sales of instruments and meters, etc ； Selling pressure vessels (it is prohibited to engage in production and business activities without the relevant administrative permits), etc. There is no license to produce nozzle accidents. The production site for the accident nozzles is a two-story shop located beneath Building 2 of the Xincheng Mingdu residential complex in Yubei District, Chongqing. The first floor serves as the manufacturing area, with a usable area of approximately 48 m²; the second floor functions as an office area, also with a usable area of about 48 m². The production site is small, the production equipment is outdated, and there is only 1 full-time employee; it operates on a workshop basis and lacks the technical capabilities to manufacture pressure vessels and pressure pipelines. 2. Shandong Huaneng Design Institute Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Huaneng Design Institute) is the design unit for the cogeneration project of the gangue power generation company. The unified social credit code of this unit’s business license is 913700007554381742. The license is valid until July 10, 2018. Its registered address is Shuntai Plaza, No. 2000 Shunhua Road, High-Tech Zone, Jinan City. The legal representative is Zhang Fuquan, and the registered capital amounts to 50 million yuan. It holds a project design qualification issued by the Shandong Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (certificate number: A237002018; validity period: February 4, 2016 – July 10, 2018; scope of authorization: Class B for the power industry, etc.) ； It holds a special equipment design license for pressure pipelines issued by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (license number: TS1810489-2016; validity period: August 13, 2012 – September 10, 2016; scope of approval: grades GB1, GB2, GC1(3), GC2, GC3, GD1 (only for sub-critical conditions), and GD2). (III) Status of cogeneration projects 1. Project approval and design status. The cogeneration project covers an area of 552 mu, with a total investment of 800 million yuan. In February 2009, the gangue power generation company began to apply for a cogeneration project. On October 20, 2009, the Provincial Development and Reform Commission approved the initiation of preliminary work for the project. In May 2012, the provincial power company approved the connection of the system through this project. In August 2012, Hubei Electric Power Survey and Design Institute was commissioned by the Gangue Power Generation Company to prepare the \"Feasibility Study Report on the Cogeneration Technology Upgrade Project for the 25MW backpressure unit of Dangyang Madian Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd.\" In September 2012, the Provincial Water Resources Department approved the soil and water conservation plan for this project. In November 2012, the Provincial Department of Environmental Protection approved the environmental impact assessment for the project. In December 2012, the Provincial Development and Reform Commission issued the \"Notice on the Approval of the Coal Gangue Cogeneration Project of Dangyang Madian Coal Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd.\" (E Fa Gai Shen Pi [2012] No. 572). The approved scope for this project included the construction of 4 high-temperature and high-pressure circulating fluidized bed boilers with a steam output of 220 t/H each, 1 high-temperature and high-pressure backpressure steam turbine with a capacity of 12.5 MW, and another 12.5 MW high-temperature and high-pressure extraction backpressure steam turbine; in addition, 2 air-cooled generators with a rated capacity of 12.5 MW were to be installed. The fuel for these boilers was coal gangue. In early 2014, without commissioning relevant agencies to carry out the preliminary design for the cogeneration project (including a dedicated section on safety facilities), Huahua Chemical Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company, under the leadership of Yu Huaqiang, held a meeting with relevant officials. It was decided to change the total installed capacity and equipment specifications of the cogeneration project as approved by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission; the project’s scope of construction was revised to include 1 medium-temperature and medium-pressure boiler with a capacity of 75 t/h, 2 high-temperature and high-pressure circulating fluidized bed boilers with a capacity of 300 t/h each, 1 extraction-backpressure steam turbine of 25 MW, another 25 MW back-pressure steam turbine, and 2 air-cooled generators, each with a rated capacity of 25 MW. The fuel for the boilers would be thermal coal. In April 2014, the Thermal Gangue Power Generation Company of Hubei Shenzhou New Energy Power Generation Co., Ltd. (the investor in the gangue power generation project) entered into a design contract with Huaneng Design Institute for the construction design of a cogeneration project, requiring Huaneng Design Institute to carry out the design work for the project’s construction drawings based on an installed capacity of 2×25MW. In July 2014, Huahua Chemical Group, the gangue power generation company, and the Environmental Energy Design Institute held a design coordination meeting to discuss matters related to the design. In accordance with the design contract and the outcomes of the design coordination meetings, Huan Neng Design Institute carried out the construction drawing design. The facilities to be constructed include 1 medium-temperature and medium-pressure boiler with a capacity of 75 t/h, 2 high-temperature and high-pressure boilers with a capacity of 300 t/h each, 1 backpressure steam turbine with a capacity of 25 MW, 1 extraction-type backpressure steam turbine with a capacity of 25 MW, and 2 air-cooled generators, each with a rated capacity of 25 MW. After the construction drawing design for the cogeneration project was completed and submitted, Huaneng Design Institute did not provide on-site services to the gangue power generation company. In April 2016, after the construction of the main project was completed, Huaneng Design Institute issued a special design document for the safety facilities of the cogeneration project in violation of regulations back in March 2016. 2. Project construction and equipment procurement status. In June 2015, the civil engineering works for the main structure and the building construction for the plant of the cogeneration project commenced. The construction contractor was ZhiGao Construction Group Co., Ltd., while the supervision company was Yichang Hongye Project Management Co., Ltd. During this period, work on the installation of the boiler and the main steam pipes was also carried out. The boiler was installed by Jiangsu Tianmu Construction Group Co., Ltd., whereas the main steam pipes were manufactured and installed by Yueyang Zhusheng Valve Pipe Co., Ltd. Huaqiang Chemical Group and Gangshi Power Generation Company independently tendered for and purchased the main equipment required for the cogeneration project: two high-temperature and high-pressure boilers with a steam output of 300 t/h each, manufactured by Wuhan Boiler Group Co., Ltd.; two turbo-generators produced by China Yangtze Power Group Co., Ltd. (one is a 25 MW medium-temperature and medium-pressure double-extraction condensing steam turbine, while the other is a 30 MW high-temperature and high-pressure back-pressure steam turbine); 13 sets of integrally welded long-radius nozzles manufactured by Chongqing Angoli Instrument Co., Ltd. (including two sets of long-radius nozzles of the same model and specifications, which were later installed on the pipelines of Boilers No. 2 and No. 3 respectively), as well as one set of standard nozzles. 3. Completion status of the project. In April 2016, Huahua Chemical Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company organized the construction units and supervision units to conduct completion inspections on the civil engineering works of the main body of the cogeneration project as well as the building construction work. In May 2016, the installation of the main equipment for the cogeneration project was completed. The actual facilities installed included 1 medium-temperature and medium-pressure boiler with a capacity of 75 t/h, and 2 high-temperature and high-pressure boilers with a capacity of 300 t/h each; 1 medium-temperature and medium-pressure double-condensing steam turbine with a capacity of 25 MW, and 1 high-temperature and high-pressure back-pressure steam turbine with a capacity of 30 MW; as well as 2 air-cooled generators, each with a rated capacity of 30 MW. The fuel used for the boilers was thermal coal. In January 2016, the Provincial Development and Reform Commission (Provincial Energy Bureau) issued the \"Notice on Confirming the Approval Matters Related to the Coal Gangue Cogeneration Project of Dangyang Madian Coal Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd.\" (E-Fagai Shenpi Faowu No. 515), confirming the cogeneration project and approving it for \"self-use of the generated power, with any excess sold to the grid.\" ”It indirectly determines that the installed capacity of the cogeneration project and the equipment selected are in line with the construction details approved initially. In August 2016, Huahua Chemical Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company applied to the Provincial Development and Reform Commission (Provincial Energy Bureau) for approval to change the construction details; however, the commission rejected the application due to incomplete documentation. 4. Project operation status. (1) Power and heating operation modes. Power operation mode: The Gangue Power Generation Company is connected to a 110 kV substation for the company’s own use, owned by Huqiang Chemical Group, via a 10 kV line. The electricity generated is utilized by Huqiang Chemical Group for its own needs, with any surplus being fed into the grid. On June 27, 2016, the Provincial Energy Bureau issued the \"Notice on the Grid Connection of the Generators at Dangyang Madian Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd.\", approving the grid connection of the cogeneration project. However, prior to the accident, the gangue power generation company had not signed a grid connection and dispatch agreement with Yichang Power Supply Company. Heating operation mode: Boiler No. 1 (a medium-temperature and medium-pressure boiler with a capacity of 75 t/h) serves as a standby boiler ； The main steam from Boilers No. 2 and No. 3 (300 t/h high-temperature, high-pressure boilers) is operated in a header system, with steam at 8.83 MPa and 530°C being supplied to Turbine No. 2 (a 30 MW high-temperature, high-pressure backpressure turbine) for power generation and heat supply. The exhaust pressure of Turbine No. 2 after power generation is 3.8 MPa, and it enters the No. 3 steam distribution cylinder. The 3.8 MPa steam coming from cylinder No. 3 has two destinations: the first is to serve as the steam source for power generation and heat supply by turbine No. 1 (a 25 MW medium-temperature and medium-pressure double-condensing turbine) ； Another destination is to serve as a steam source for power generation and production within the facilities of Sinochem Chemical Group (see Annex 2.1). (2) Inspection status of pressure pipelines. From January 17 to May 12, 2016, the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute conducted inspections and tests on the pipeline involved in the accident (the main steam pipeline of the 300t/h boiler). On May 27, 2016, the inspection report was issued, concluding that the pipeline was in good condition, with a safety rating of Grade 1. The supervising inspector is Hong Hai, deputy director of the Pipeline Inspection Laboratory at the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute, as well as a pressure pipeline inspector. (3) Debugging status. The cogeneration project violated the relevant provisions of the \"Measures for the Supervision and Management of Safety in Electric Power Construction Projects\" (Order No. 28 issued by the National Development and Reform Commission) and the \"Rules for the Commencement of Trial Operation and Acceptance of Thermal Power Generation Projects\" (DL/T 5437-2009), as it failed to entrust a qualified entity to carry out the commissioning work ； No supervision and approval from the power construction quality supervision agency was obtained prior to the unit’s entry into the full-scale start-up and trial operation ； The quality supervision evaluation from the power construction quality supervision agency was not obtained after the completion of the full-scale startup test run of the unit ； The startup acceptance committee and the trial operation command team were not established ； There is no formally compiled debugging outline ； The archiving and handover procedures were not carried out in accordance with the regulations regarding the archiving of documents related to power-related construction projects. Huahua Chemical Engineering Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company unauthorizedly organized personnel to carry out (72h+24h) commissioning operations on 3 boilers and 2 steam turbine generator sets successively from May 16 to July 1, 2016. From July 2 to July 11, 2016, Huahua Chemical Engineering Group organized a major equipment overhaul, during which the gangue power generation company also shut down for maintenance and defect correction. (4) Pilot production status. After the maintenance was completed, Huahua Chemical Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company proceeded with heating and power supply operations without conducting safety inspections of the boilers, signing grid connection agreements with the power supply company, carrying out quality inspections for the commissioning process, properly archiving all relevant documents, or completing the commissioning and defect-resolution tasks required during the unit’s evaluation period. From July 12 to August 5, 2016, the boilers and turbines were brought online one after another (the stator of Generator No. 1 was sent back to the manufacturer for repair due to a fault; it was returned to the Gangshi Power Generation Company on July 31 and installation was completed on August 5). From August 6, 2016, until 14:49 on August 11, when the accident occurred, the system was in operation with two boilers and two turbines running, while one boiler was not in use. Among them: Generator No. 1 has an active power of 25 MW, and Generator No. 2 has an active power of 25 MW ； Boiler No. 2: main steam pressure of 9.5 MPa, temperature of 530°C, flow rate of 250–260 t/h ； The main steam pressure of Boiler No. 3 is 9.5 MPa, with a temperature of 530°C and a flow rate of 280–290 t/h ； Boiler No. 1 is not in operation. When Huahua Chemical Group completed the overhauls of its fertilizer and chemical production facilities and restarted them on July 13, it did not restart the existing heating boiler systems that did not meet environmental standards. As required by the Heating Coordination Committee between Huahua Chemical Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company, the latter must ensure a continuous and stable supply of heat to Huahua Chemical Group. Starting from July 14, 2016, the cogeneration project of the gangue power generation company became the sole source of steam for heating Huaqiang Chemical Group. Starting from August 6, 2016, it also became the main source of electricity for this group; a disruption in the supply of steam and electricity would prevent Huaqiang Chemical Group from operating normally. (IV) Situation of the accident area 1. Basic information. The layout of the main building in the cogeneration project of the Gangshi Power Generation Company features a four-row arrangement consisting of the turbine hall, deaerator room, coal bunker room, and boiler room. The areas where the accident occurred include the central control room and the shift-change room on the 8.0m operating level of the main power house, the feedwater operation console in the deaerator hall, and the valve station for the high-pressure main steam pipes. Among these, the central control room, which has an area of approximately 240 m², was the area with the most severe casualties. Glass partitions are used between the central control room and the feedwater operation panels in the deaeration room, as well as between the high-pressure main steam pipeline valve stations. The emergency nozzle on the high-pressure main steam pipe of Boiler No. 2 is located at an elevation of 13.7 m in the pipe interlayer area between the roof of the centralized control room and the coal feeder level. (See Attachment 2.2) 2. Staffing situation. In accordance with the design layout and production arrangements of the cogeneration project at the waste rock power generation company, the centralized control room is responsible for the operation control and inspection of Boilers No. 1, 2, and 3, as well as Turbines No. 1 and 2. It also serves temporarily as the on-site coordination office for the operations of the waste rock power generation company; as a result, the centralized control room houses a large number of personnel involved in turbine operation, boiler operation, electrical control, thermal instrumentation, and inspections. At the time of the accident, there were 16 personnel on duty in the centralized control room, responsible for the operation control of the boilers and turbines, along with 10 production management staff from Huahua Chemical Group and the Gangue Power Generation Company; in total, 26 people were present (see Appendix 2.3). 3. Equipment status. An accident nozzle is a type of differential pressure flow meter installed on pressure pipelines; it operates by using the pressure difference between the sampling points before and after the nozzle to measure steam flow. It functions both as a measuring instrument and as part of the pipeline itself. (See Attachment 2.4) 4. Design layout. In the accident area, the high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipes are located in close proximity to the densely populated centralized control rooms and shift change rooms. The high-pressure main steam pipe of Boiler No. 2 passes through the pipe shaft and runs alongside the centralized control room before reaching the valve station for the high-pressure main steam pipe. There is only a regular glass partition that does not meet the design fire safety requirements separating the high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipes from those densely populated centralized control rooms (see Attachment 2.2). II. Course of the accident, emergency rescue efforts, and follow-up actions (I) Course of the accident Around 0:00 a.m. on August 10, 2016, employees on duty during their routine inspections noticed dripping water on the floor in front of the control room, as well as steam leakage from the insulation layer of the high-pressure main steam pipe of Boiler No. 2. Jiang Tao, the supervisor in charge of boiler operations, reported this leakage to the on-duty shift leader, but no instructions for taking action were given until 8:00 a.m. on August 10, at the end of the work shift. At around 11 a.m. on August 10, Wang Huaiguo, the director of the boiler workshop, led a team to remove part of the outer casing and insulation material near the accident nozzle of Boiler No. 2 in order to inspect it, but no signs of dripping or leakage were found. As a result, he ordered that the insulation material be reinstalled and asked the staff to increase their monitoring. At around 9 o’clock on August 11, boiler operator Xiao Xuehua noticed leaking noises near the emergency nozzle of Boiler No. 2, as well as a higher temperature than usual; however, since the insulation layer had not been removed, it was not possible to determine the exact location of the leak. At around 11 a.m. on August 11, Zhao Yufeng, the deputy general manager of the gangue power generation company, led a team to the site to check and measure the temperature; they found that the surface temperature of the insulation layer near the accident nozzle of Boiler No. 2 had reached 360°C, prompting the on-duty staff to continue to strengthen monitoring. At 12:32 on August 11, Xiao Xuehua posted a message in the WeChat group for the \"Boiler Workshop\", stating that \"the maximum temperature at the leakage point of the steam main pipe of Boiler No. 2 is rising; it was 360°C at 11:00 and 405°C at 12:00\" and that \"the noise from the leakage site has increased, and the insulation material has been blown away.\" At 12:51 on August 11, Zhong Xujin, the boiler operator in the boiler workshop, posted photos near the nozzle of Boiler No. 2 in the WeChat group for the \"Boiler Workshop\". At 12:57 on August 11, Xiao Xuehua forwarded information about the leak to another WeChat group, hoping that the leaders would see it. At around 1:00 p.m. on August 11, Wang Huaiguo received a report from Zhong Xujin stating that the steam leakage in the main steam pipeline of Boiler No. 2 had become more severe, accompanied by high-frequency whistling sounds. At around 1:30 p.m. on August 11, Zhao Yufeng was outside the factory when Wang Huaiguo and Zhang Huafeng, the deputy head of the production department, reported that there was steam leakage and the temperature was a bit high. Zhao Yufeng instructed them to report the situation to the production department of Huahua Chemical Group and to get ready to start Boiler No. 1 and shut down Boiler No. 2. However, Zhao Yufeng did not arrive at the scene in time to handle the situation. Between 1:50 p.m. and 2:20 p.m. on August 11, Ye Jinhua, the head of the Production Department at Huaxia Chemical Group, received telephone reports on three occasions from Zhang Huafeng, the deputy head of the Production Section at the Gangue Power Generation Company, and Zhuang Huacheng from the Production Scheduling Center of Huaxia Chemical Group, stating that there was a leak in the main steam pipeline of Boiler No. 2 and requesting that the boiler be shut down. Ye Jinhua failed to arrive at the scene to handle the situation, did not order the shutdown of the furnace to eliminate the risks, and did not report to the relevant supervisor. At around 2:20 p.m. on August 11, Luo Yang, an employee from the Equipment Department of the Gangue Power Generation Company, called Zhuang Xiaoyun, head of the Equipment and Power Department of Huaqiang Chemical Group, and reported that there was a leak in the steam main of Boiler No. 2, requesting assistance in dealing with the issue. Zhuang Xiaoyun arranged for two engineers from Huaqiang Chemical Group’s Equipment Department to go to the centralized control room of the Gangue Power Generation Company to provide guidance. At around 2:30 p.m. on August 11, Ye Jinhua went to the office to report to Zhao Pengcheng, the deputy general manager of Huaxia Chemical Group, about the steam pipe leak and the request from the gangue power generation company to shut down the furnace; thereafter, the two began discussing strategies for Huaxia Chemical Group to reduce electricity and steam consumption. By 14:49, the time of the accident, no supervisor at Huahua Chemical Group or the Gangue Power Generation Company issued an order to shut down the boiler, and Boiler No. 2 remained in operation. At 14:49 on August 11, the weld at the accident nozzle on the high-pressure main steam pipe of Boiler No. 2 cracked and burst, resulting in the rupture of that pipe. High-temperature, high-pressure steam from Boiler No. 2 sprayed out from the break on the side near the boiler, while high-temperature, high-pressure steam from Boiler No. 3 emerged through the steam header from the break on the side near the turbine. The break in the high-pressure main steam pipe caused a displacement of over 10 meters, leading to damage to the walls and floors in the area ranging from 8.0 m to 15.5 m above ground level in the deaeration room and coal storage room. The glass and frames of the partitions in the control room softened, melted, and collapsed. The high-temperature, high-pressure steam (at 530°C and 9.5 MPa) struck the control room instantly, causing severe casualties and extensive damage to the equipment. 4 to 5 minutes after the accident occurred, Yan Zongbin, an employee working near the accident site, began to manually shut down Boiler No. 2 and Boiler No. 3 one after another. This process took about 10 minutes; during this time, the steam in the high-pressure main steam pipes was cut off and any remaining steam was released, thereby preventing the accident from spreading. (II) Incident reporting status: At 14:51 on August 11, 2016, the 120 emergency service in Dangyang City received a call for help from the gangue power generation company, and promptly sent ambulances to the scene to provide emergency assistance. Immediately thereafter, the Dangyang Fire Brigade also received an alarm about the accident at the gangue power generation company and rushed to the scene. At 15:17 on August 11, Gong Xian from the Health and Family Planning Bureau of Dangyang City received a call from Dangyang People’s Hospital regarding the accident, and promptly reported it to Mayor Zhang Shimin of Dangyang City. Mayor Zhang immediately assigned Vice Mayor Wang Quansheng to go to the scene to investigate the situation, and ordered Liu Chao, the head of the city’s Work Safety Supervision Bureau, to verify the facts. At 15:42 on August 11, after the accident was confirmed through on-site verification, ** in Dangyang City and relevant departments immediately rushed to the accident site to carry out initial emergency rescue and handling efforts. At 16:06 on August 11, Wang Yong from Dangyang City reported to the relevant authorities in Yichang City. Yichang City **immediately reported to the provincial ** authority and kept track of the situation on site at all times. At 16:42 on August 11, the provincial authorities contacted Dangyang City to verify the details of the accident. At 17:00 on August 11, Dangyang City **reported the verified accident details to the provincial ** authorities. After the accident, Huahua Chemical Group and the gangue power generation company failed to report the relevant accident information to the local safety supervision authorities as required. (III) Accident rescue and post-incident handling: After the accident occurred, the main leaders of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee and government rushed to the accident site to handle the situation, and reported to the provincial Party committee and government, as well as the Yichang Municipal Party Committee and government and the relevant provincial and municipal departments. At the same time, the gangue power generation company was required to shut down all units of its cogeneration plants, and related enterprises in the surrounding area were also closed down to prevent secondary disasters from occurring. Staff from Yangdang City’s public security, fire department, health authorities, quality supervision agencies, and safety inspection departments rushed to the accident scene, established a perimeter around it, and made every effort to search for and rescue those injured or killed. In accordance with the **important instructions given by the Prime Minister regarding the rescue efforts in response to the accident, key provincial and municipal leaders as well as responsible officials from various departments rushed to the scene upon receiving the report. These included Li Hongzhong, who was then the Party secretary of the province; Wang Xiaodong, who was then the deputy Party secretary and acting governor; Fu Dehui, who served as a member of the Provincial Party Committee and its secretary-general; Huang Chuping, who was then the Party secretary of Yichang City; and Xu Kezhen, who was then the deputy governor. They provided guidance on the rescue and handling of the situation. Dangyang City promptly activated its emergency response plan and established a working group to handle the \"8.11\" incident, with the city party secretary serving as the team leader, and the city mayor and deputy party secretary serving as deputy leaders. It has established 8 working teams, including a comprehensive team, a medical team, an aftermath handling team, and a on-site team, to handle the follow-up measures for the accident. To date, the families of all 22 deceased have received comfort and compensation, the 4 injured have received thorough medical care, and stability has been maintained in Dangyang City. (IV) Casualties and economic losses caused by the accident: The accident resulted in 26 casualties, of whom 21 died on the spot and 1 died despite attempts to save them; the cause of death was high temperatures combined with shock wave injuries ； Four people are seriously injured and still receiving treatment in the hospital (see Attachment 3). The accident resulted in a total direct economic loss of 23.13 million yuan. III. Causes and Nature of the Accident (1) Direct Cause: The accident nozzle installed on the high-pressure main steam pipeline of Boiler No. 2 was a low-quality product with serious defects in terms of quality; the weld defects expanded under the effects of high temperature and pressure, leading to local cracking and steam leakage, which created a potential hazard. The relevant personnel failed to take measures to shut down the furnace in a timely manner to eliminate the potential hazards; as a result, the area of crack in the welds increased, and the remaining welds were unable to withstand the operating pressure, leading to the rupture of the pipes. A large amount of high-temperature, high-pressure steam rushed into the central control room and other areas, which were separated only by ordinary glass, causing severe casualties. (II) Management reasons 1. Analysis of the direct causes of the accident: Investigations have shown that there were four direct factors responsible for this serious accident: (1) The accident nozzles purchased and supplied were of poor quality, severely failing to meet standards; product quality was the main cause of the incident. The person in charge of equipment procurement at Huahua Chemical Engineering Group accepted bribes from the equipment supplier Angoli Company; he failed to verify its relevant qualifications, did not conduct on-site inspections of its production capacity, did not seek market quotes for the products to be purchased, and did not ensure proper quality control, as a result of which substandard products were installed and used in high-temperature and high-pressure pipelines. The supplier, Angoli Company, knowingly manufactured substandard accident nozzles of poor quality that failed to meet requirements due to high temperatures and pressures, without having the necessary qualifications and facilities for such production, and forged certificates stating that the products passed quality tests. The accident nozzles produced by them disconnect the pipe body; manually, connections are made at both ends of the nozzle to the pipe breaks, and two layers of welds made from different steel types are used for welding. The minimum effective thickness of these welds is only 1–2 mm, which is far below the required 21.2 mm as specified in the standards. Furthermore, the welded joints suffer from issues such as lack of penetration and lack of fusion, and the effective load-bearing capacity of the welds is far from meeting the strength requirements of high-pressure main steam pipes. (2) The most direct cause of the accident was the company’s failure to take timely and effective action when it was discovered that leaks from the nozzle posed a serious risk of an accident. The accident-prone unit did not give due importance to safe production, focusing instead on maximizing corporate profits. During the commissioning and trial production phase of the gangue power plant, there were continuous equipment failures and potential accident risks; yet, despite the lack of conditions necessary for normal operation, the plant was still used as the main source of power and heat supply for Huaqiang Chemical Group. The group forced the power plant to ensure continuous and stable heat supply, prohibiting it from shutting down the plants without authorization. In situations where there was a serious potential hazard of continuous leakage from the accident-related nozzle, neither the relevant responsible persons at Huaqiang Chemical Group nor those at Gangshi Power Generation Company dared to make the decision to shut down the furnace urgently. As a result, the measure of depressurizing and shutting down the furnace—which should have taken only about 5 minutes—was not carried out. Ultimately, the hazard continued to worsen, leading to a major accident. (3) The plant design does not meet the requirements of relevant standards and specifications, and the centralized control room where personnel gather lacks proper safety protection. The design of the combined heat and power project did not comply with the requirements set forth in the approved documents, nor did it meet the provisions of laws, regulations, and mandatory engineering construction standards. In the layout and design of the central control room (which also serves as a fire control room), shift change rooms, and high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipelines, no consideration was given to ensuring a reasonable separation and safe isolation between the high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipelines and areas where personnel are concentrated. The central control room was designed and equipped with ordinary glass partitions in violation of regulations; these partitions lack safety features such as insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance, and are unable to effectively block and withstand high-temperature, high-pressure steam in the event of an accident, thereby failing to provide the necessary time for people to escape. (4) Pipeline inspection and testing were not carried out in accordance with standard specifications; supervision was lacking, allowing weld defects to go unchecked. Although the accident nozzle is a type of flow meter, it is also part of the high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipeline, possessing all the functions of a pressure pipeline. The pipeline inspection and testing agency failed to comply with the relevant regulations regarding pipelines; it neither conducted pressure tests such as hydraulic and pneumatic tests on the faulty nozzle, nor carried out the \"three replacements with one\" approach, which involves using non-destructive testing, flexible analysis of the pipeline system, and leakage tests as alternatives to pressure tests. As a result, the two welds on the faulty nozzle were not inspected or tested, allowing a serious potential hazard to go unchecked. When overseeing special equipment, the quality supervision authorities turn a blind eye to the fact that accident nozzles possess all the functions of pressure pipelines. On the grounds that such nozzles are not listed in the catalog of special equipment, they mechanically apply relevant standards and fail to inspect or supervise them, resulting in a severe lack of oversight. 2. Analysis of the responsible parties for the accident (1) Gangue Power Generation Company. First, it failed to construct the project in accordance with the requirements stipulated in the approval notice issued by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission regarding the cogeneration project of the gangue power generation company; instead, it arbitrarily changed the approved project specifications, resulting in a project being built on a larger scale than permitted. Second, there is unauthorized self-tuning in violation of regulations. During the project construction, commissioning, and trial production phases, potential accident hazards arose on multiple occasions; these hazards were not rectified, and a proper system for identifying and addressing such hazards was not established or implemented. Third, there are serious flaws in production management, and the persons in charge of the enterprise have grossly neglected their duties. In an emergency situation where there was a serious potential hazard related to the accident nozzle, the relevant person in charge of Gangshi Power Generation Company failed to rush to the scene immediately to handle the situation; no urgent order was given to shut down the furnace, nor was the incident reported to Huaqiang Group Company in a timely manner. Fourth, safety management is inadequate, and the responsibility system for safe production is not implemented ； Safety training and education were not organized as required; personnel working in special positions were operating without the necessary certifications, and safety risks could not be properly identified ； The management and on-site operators of the gangue power generation company lack clear and implemented responsibilities regarding safe production, and they have no effective mechanisms or capabilities to address major accident hazards. (2) Huahua Chemical Group. First, it failed to construct the project in accordance with the requirements stipulated in the approval notice issued by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission regarding the cogeneration project of the gangue power generation company; instead, it arbitrarily changed the approved project specifications, resulting in a project being built on a larger scale than permitted. The design work was not commissioned to a design firm as required by the project approval documents, and the design firm was asked to prepare a separate section on the safety facilities for the cogeneration project in violation of the prescribed procedures. Second, the management of equipment procurement is severely out of control. Companies fail to exercise proper supervision and management over their employees; those responsible for equipment procurement take advantage of their positions to collude with equipment suppliers and accept bribes, resulting in the purchase of low-quality products that do not meet standard requirements. These products are then installed in pipes under high temperature and pressure, which directly leads to accidents. Third, the commissioning work was not carried out by a qualified entity in accordance with relevant regulations; instead, commissioning was organized without authorization. Trial production was commenced without conducting safety inspections and approvals for the boiler pipes, without signing a grid connection and dispatch agreement with the power supply company, without completing quality inspections for the commissioning process, and without properly archiving all relevant documents. Fourth, by implementing “four unifications” in the management of the Gangshi Power Generation Company, its autonomy in safety management—a right it should possess as an independent legal entity—was stripped away. As a result, in cases of serious steam pipeline leaks, the relevant responsible persons at the Gangshi Power Generation Company had to seek instructions from Huqiang Chemical Group and dared not readily order measures such as shutting down the boilers. Fifth, the relevant responsible persons failed seriously in their duties, failing to properly address the serious safety hazards associated with the accident nozzle. Upon receiving reports of a serious potential hazard related to a faulty nozzle, the relevant person in charge at Huaqiang Chemical Group failed to rush to the scene to handle the situation. No effective measures were taken in a timely manner to eliminate the hazard, ultimately leading to a major accident. Sixth is the lack of safety management. The safety production responsibility system was not properly implemented; supervision and inspection of the safety production activities at the gangue power generation company were inadequate. Safety training programs were not organized as required, and there was no action taken to address the issue of workers performing special tasks without the necessary certifications. As a result, relevant management personnel, technical staff, and field operators were unable to properly identify safety risks and lacked the capacity to effectively handle potential accident hazards. (3) Angoli Company. Bribery was used to collude with the persons in charge of equipment procurement at Huaqiang Group Company. Lacking the qualifications and production facilities necessary for manufacturing high-temperature and high-pressure equipment, it supplied Huqiang Group with substandard products of poor quality, falsely claiming that they had passed third-party testing and providing fake certificates of product compliance. The accident nozzles manufactured, supplied by Angoli Company and installed on the main steam pipeline of Boiler No. 2 suffered from expanding cracks due to weld defects during operation under high temperature and pressure, which led to the rupture of the pipeline and caused severe casualties; the company is responsible for this accident. (4) Huan Neng Design Institute. The design was not carried out in accordance with the requirements specified in the project approval documents issued by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission; it was not prepared in strict compliance with laws, regulations, and mandatory standards for engineering construction. When designing the centralized control room (also serving as a fire control room), the shift change room, and the high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipes, no proper consideration was given to ensuring adequate separation and safety distances between these pipes and areas where people are concentrated. The centralized control room is equipped only with ordinary glass partitions; the relevant regulations such as the \"Design Code for Small Thermal Power Plants\" (GB50049-2011) and the \"Requirements for the Depth of Content in Construction Drawing Designs for Thermal Power Plants – Part 10: Buildings\" (DL-T5461.10-2013) do not specify technical requirements regarding heat insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance for such partitions. As a result, these partitions lack the necessary safety features for heat insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance, posing a serious risk of accidents. In the event of leakage of high-temperature and high-pressure steam, they fail to provide any protection, which can lead to severe casualties; thus, they are responsible for such accidents. The unit also prepared a special section on the design of safety facilities for the cogeneration project in violation of the prescribed procedures. (5) Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute. It is responsible for conducting statutory inspections and tests on special equipment. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, ignoring the functional characteristics of the accident nozzle as part of the pipeline, failing to properly carry out the statutory responsibilities related to the inspection and testing of pressure pipelines, and not conducting tests on the pipelines in line with the requirements of the \"Code for Acceptance of Construction Quality of Industrial Metal Piping Projects\" (GB50184-2011); instead, they refused to inspect and test the accident nozzles on the high-temperature and high-pressure main steam pipelines on the grounds that such nozzles were not listed in the catalog of special equipment. (6) Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. It is responsible for the supervision and management of the safety of special equipment within the administrative area of Yichang City. Fulfillment of duties in accordance with the law was not ensured; supervision and management of the Yichang branch of the Hubei Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute in carrying out its responsibilities related to the inspection and testing of special equipment was inadequate. Key entities that use special equipment under high temperature and pressure, such as the companies involved in the accident, were not properly monitored, and illegal activities such as the employment of personnel without the necessary qualifications to work on pressure pipelines were not detected and corrected in a timely manner. (7) Hubei Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute. Responsible for the inspection, testing, and personnel training and assessment of special equipment within the province. As an institution directly under the Hubei Provincial Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau, it is a statutory inspection and testing agency for special equipment approved by the **General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and it serves as the superior authority to the Yichang branch. Failing to fulfill duties related to business guidance and supervision; showing a lack of oversight in terms of management and safety training at the Yichang branch; and failing to detect the issue of the Yichang branch’s failure to properly carry out its statutory responsibilities regarding the inspection and testing of pressure pipelines. (8) Hubei Provincial Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. It is responsible for the supervision and management of the safety of special equipment across the province. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law; failing to detect the problems of the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau and the Dangyang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau in properly carrying out their responsibilities for supervising the safety of special equipment; failing to detect the issues regarding the Hubei Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute and its Yichang branch in not fulfilling their statutory duties related to the inspection and testing of special equipment; lacking proper management of the performance of duties by subordinate units as well as adequate safety education; and providing insufficient organizational guidance for the supervision of the safety of high-temperature and high-pressure pipelines across the province. (9) Dangyang City Bureau of Economy, Commerce and Information Technology. It is responsible for the supervision and management of the electric power industry within the administrative area of Dangyang City. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, failing to provide adequate supervision and management over the safety production aspects of the cogeneration project at the accident-stricken unit, failing to urge that unit to identify and eliminate potential hazards promptly, and approving applications for grid connection for that unit despite the fact that its cogeneration project did not meet the conditions required for grid operation. (10) Yichang Economic and Information Technology Commission. It is responsible for the supervision and management of the electric power industry within the administrative jurisdiction of Yichang City. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, and showing inadequate guidance and supervision regarding the supervision and management of electricity-related activities by the Dangyang City Economic, Commercial and Information Technology Bureau; allowing the thermal power generation project in question to apply for grid connection despite it not meeting the required conditions for such operation. (11) Hubei Provincial Energy Bureau. Responsible for the approval, supervision, and management of electricity infrastructure projects within the province. Fulfilling duties in accordance with the law was not ensured; the regulations and policies regarding the supervision and management of power generation projects were not properly implemented, and the industry management functions were not adequately carried out. The issues related to the authority for managing small-scale thermal power generation projects after they were approved were not clarified, which resulted in gaps in supervision of such projects. Failure to promptly detect cases of construction that did not comply with the approved requirements and to order corrections. The grid connection was approved for the cogeneration project of the gangue power generation company without conducting on-site inspections as required. (12) Yichang Development and Reform Commission. Responsible for the preliminary review and management of energy project applications. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, and failing to provide adequate supervision and management over the implementation of the requirements set out in the project approval documents issued by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission; merely forwarding the approval documents to the Dangyang Development and Reform Bureau, without carrying out any follow-up oversight or inspection of the energy projects during their construction phase. Failure to detect and address the issue of the gangue power generation company’s cogeneration project not being constructed in accordance with what was approved by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission. (13) Dangyang Development and Reform Bureau. Responsible for the preliminary review and management of declared energy projects. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law; failing to provide adequate supervision and management with regard to the implementation of the requirements set out in the project approval documents forwarded by the Yichang Development and Reform Commission from the provincial development and reform commission; failing to monitor and supervise energy projects throughout their construction process. Failure to detect and address the issue of the gangue power generation company’s cogeneration project not being constructed in accordance with what was approved by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission. (14) Dangyang Land and Resources Bureau. It is responsible for the supervision of state-owned land resources within its administrative region. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, they illegally issued land use rights certificates for the gangue power generation company when its application did not meet the legal requirements. (15) Dangyang City Housing and Urban-Rural Development (Planning) Bureau. Responsible for overseeing urban construction planning within its administrative jurisdiction. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, they illegally issued construction land planning permits, construction project planning permits, and construction permits for the gangue power generation company, even though the conditions required by law were not met. (16) Dangyang People’s **. It bears the responsibility for local management of work safety within its administrative jurisdiction. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, failing to strictly implement the requirements for safe development, showing inadequate leadership in overseeing local work related to safety production, failing to arrange for relevant departments to exercise strict supervision over the safety practices of the accident-prone units, and failing to detect the problem of those departments not fulfilling their safety supervision responsibilities properly. (17) Yichang People’s **. It bears the responsibility for local management of work safety within its administrative jurisdiction. Failing to fulfill duties in accordance with the law, failing to detect the problem of subordinate ** and relevant departments at the same level not properly carrying out their safety supervision responsibilities, and providing inadequate organizational guidance for local work related to work safety. (III) Determination of the nature of the accident: The severe explosion of a high-pressure steam pipeline that occurred on August 11 at Hubei Dangyang Madian Gangshi Power Generation Co., Ltd. was an accident resulting from negligence in production safety. IV. Handling proposals for the entity where the accident occurred, the entities related to the accident, and the relevant responsible persons (1) Persons for whom judicial authorities have already taken action. 1. Yu Huaqiang, male, born on November 12, 1963, was then the chairman, general manager, and legal representative of Huahua Chemical Group, as well as the chairman and legal representative of the Gangshi Power Generation Company. On February 19, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of committing a serious liability accident. 2. Zhao Pengcheng, male, born on October 16, 1969, was then the deputy general manager and chief engineer of Huahua Chemical Engineering Group, responsible for production, safety, and technical matters; he supervised departments such as the Production Department, Equipment Department, Safety Department, Technical Reform Department, and Infrastructure Department. On February 22, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of a serious liability accident. 3. Ye Jinhua, male, born on April 16, 1978, was then the head of the Production Department at Huahua Chemical Group, responsible for production organization, scheduling, planning, and other related tasks. On February 22, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of a serious liability accident. 4. Shuang Guoqing, male, born on October 1, 1968, was the general manager of the Gangshi Power Generation Company at that time. On February 19, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of committing a serious liability accident. 5. Zhao Yufeng, male, born on March 25, 1969, was then the deputy general manager and chief engineer of the Gangshi Power Generation Company, responsible for production, safety, and technical matters. On January 20, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of a serious liability accident. 6. Wang Huaiguo, male, born on October 5, 1966, was the head of the boiler workshop at the gangue power generation company, responsible for tasks such as personnel management, safety, production, and equipment operation in that workshop. On January 20, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of a serious liability accident. 7. Li Yuchuan, male, born on April 12, 1978, was the deputy general manager of Angoli Company, responsible for product production, sales, and other related tasks. On February 21, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of producing and selling fake and substandard products. 8. Zhang Zejun, male, born on December 28, 1973. From August 2014 to November 2015, he served as the deputy head of the Materials Procurement Department at Huaqiang Chemical Group; at that time he was also the general manager of Huaqiang New Building Materials Company, which is part of Huaqiang Group. On February 22, 2017, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of a serious liability accident. 9. Sun Dayong, male, born on December 10, 1972, was then the head of the Security Department at Huahua Chemical Group. On December 9, 2016, he was referred for prosecution by the Dangyang Public Security Bureau on charges of assisting in the destruction of evidence. 10. Hong Hai, male, 43 years old, Han ethnicity, former inspector at the High-Pressure Pipeline Inspection Laboratory of the Yichang Branch of Hubei Provincial Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute. On September 3, 2016, the Yichang Procuratorate launched an investigation into him on suspicion of dereliction of duty. 11. Rao Youyi, male, 34 years old, Han ethnicity, former head of the Pressure Pipeline Inspection Laboratory at the Yichang Branch of Hubei Provincial Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute. On November 28, 2016, the Yichang Procuratorate launched an investigation into him on suspicion of dereliction of duty. 12. Han Zheng, male, 54 years old, of Han ethnicity, former chief engineer and technical director of the Yichang Branch of Hubei Provincial Special Equipment Inspection and Testing Institute. On March 21, 2017, the Yichang Procuratorate launched an investigation into him on suspicion of dereliction of duty. 13. Yang Yong, male, 55 years old, of Han ethnicity. From March 2008 to March 2016, he served as the deputy director of the Development and Reform Bureau of Dangyang City. Before the incident, he was a member of the Dangyang City Political Consultative Conference and held a position at the section-level within the Development and Reform Bureau of Dangyang City. On November 29, 2016, the Dangyang Procuratorate launched an investigation into him on suspicion of dereliction of duty. 14. Hu Hua, male, 56 years old, former director of the Development and Reform Bureau of Dangyang City, currently serving as head of the Economic Committee of the Dangyang City Political Consultative Conference. On February 15, 2017, the Dangyang Procuratorate launched an investigation into him on suspicion of dereliction of duty. 15. Zhao Hongjun, male, 45 years old, former head of the Special Supervision Section at the Dangyang City Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. On November 29, 2016, the Dangyang Procuratorate launched an investigation into him on suspicion of dereliction of duty. After the judicial authorities take compulsory measures against the aforementioned individuals, the local discipline inspection agencies shall, in accordance with relevant regulations such as the \"Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions in China\", hold them accountable under party and administrative discipline rules. Regarding the legal representatives of enterprises, after the completion of their criminal sentences, the work safety supervision authorities shall impose administrative penalties on them in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China; furthermore, they shall be prohibited from serving as the principal responsible persons of production and operation entities in their respective industries for life, starting from the date when their sentences are completed. (II) Persons recommended for administrative handling and disciplinary action. 1. Li Jianjun, male, was then the director of the Instrumentation Workshop at Huahua Chemical Engineering Group and served as the technical supervisor in charge of the procurement of the nozzles used in the accident. The procurement system at Huaqiang Group Company was not implemented strictly; no requirements regarding safety and technical parameters were set for those conducting on-site inspections, and insufficient oversight was exercised in the technical evaluation of the accident nozzles. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 2. Zhuang Xiaoyun, male, was then the head of the Power Equipment Department at Huaqiang Chemical Engineering Group, responsible for the operation, maintenance, and repair of equipment at Huaqiang Group and its subsidiaries; he was also the head of the commissioning team at the Gangue Power Generation Company. No qualified institution was assigned to carry out the commissioning of the new cogeneration project at the gangue power generation company; instead, the commissioning work was organized internally. Before the accidents on August 10 and August 11, reports were received regarding serious leaks in the high-pressure steam pipes of the gangue power generation company. The potential hazards posed by these serious issues were not properly identified; no action was taken promptly at the site, no decision was made to shut down the plant for maintenance, and no reports were made to higher-level management. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 3. Cao Dunquan, male, was the manager of the Materials Supply Company of Huaqiang Chemical Group (formerly the head of the Materials Procurement Department of Huaqiang Group), responsible for the procurement and supply of materials for the cogeneration projects of Huaqiang Group and the gangue power generation company. The procurement system at Huaqiang Group Company was not properly implemented; the equipment procurement rules were not strictly followed, and there was no system for equipment inspection. Poor control over equipment procurement led to the purchase and installation of faulty nozzles in the company. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 4. Wang Guangsu, male, then Assistant General Manager of Huaqiang Chemical Group and Director of the Infrastructure Department; he was responsible for the civil construction work related to the cogeneration project at both Huaqiang Group Company and the Gangshi Power Generation Company. When signing the contract with the construction and installation unit, no technical requirements regarding thermal insulation, fire resistance, or impact resistance were specified for the installation materials of the glass partitions in the accident area. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 5. Cheng Kexin, male, was the then deputy chief engineer at Huahua Chemical Engineering Group, responsible for the research and technical design aspects of the cogeneration project at the gangue power generation company. At relevant decision-making meetings of Huqiang Group Company, it was recommended to alter the project construction details as approved by the Provincial Development and Reform Commission in violation of regulations, and to participate in organizing the illegal construction, illegal commissioning, and illegal trial production of the new cogeneration project by the gangue power generation company. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 6. Du Guanhuai, male, then Deputy Section Chief of the Safety and Environmental Protection Section at the Gangue Power Generation Company, was responsible for the supervision and management of work safety at the company. Failure to organize specialized training for pipeline workers in a timely manner and ensure they obtain qualifications as special operation personnel; failure to promptly urge corrections and elimination of identified major potential safety hazards; failure to report the situation in a timely manner. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 7. Tan Ziyang, male, then head of the instrumentation workshop at the gangue power generation company, was one of the technical personnel responsible for purchasing the emergency nozzles, and was in charge of their inspection and acceptance. During the on-site inspection of the purchased accident nozzles, no requirements regarding safety technical parameters were specified; third-party inspection reports for those nozzles were not checked, and the authenticity of the acceptance reports for the accident nozzles as well as the product quality certification was not carefully verified. It was ordered that Huahua Chemical Group impose a dismissal penalty on them in accordance with the company’s relevant regulations, as well as impose financial sanctions. 8. Li Junying, female, then Deputy Director of the Environmental Energy Design Institute and Chief Project Design Engineer, was responsible for the overall design and layout of the gangue power generation company. Failing to fulfill his duties, he failed to take into account the need for proper spacing and safety isolation between the high-temperature and high-pressure steam pipes and the areas where many people are present when designing the layout of those pipes in the centralized control room of the cogeneration project ； The responsibility for reviewing the design of the glass partitions was not fulfilled, resulting in the centralized control room lacking safety features such as insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance ； Compiling a special section on the design of safety facilities for the cogeneration project of the Gangue Power Generation Company in violation of prescribed procedures ； The design plan is changed arbitrarily as required by the construction party. The Huanneng Design Institute was ordered to impose on him dismissal in accordance with relevant corporate regulations, as well as financial penalties. In accordance with provisions such as the Construction Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations on Registered Architects of the People’s Republic of China, and the Provisions on the Administration of Registered Engineers in Surveying and Design, it is requested that the local competent construction administrative authorities order them to cease engaging in any professional activities requiring relevant qualifications, and that the respective professional committees revoke their registration certificates. 9. Gao Wenlong, male, then Deputy Director of the Civil Engineering Department at the Environmental Energy Design Institute, senior engineer, and reviewer of project architectural designs. Failing to fulfill one’s duties, they failed to impose technical requirements such as heat insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance during the review of the glass partition design submitted by Tu Huihua for the centralized control room; this was a serious dereliction of duty, as they failed to carry out their responsibilities in overseeing the design review. The Huanneng Design Institute was ordered to impose on him dismissal in accordance with relevant corporate regulations, as well as financial penalties. In accordance with provisions such as the Construction Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations on Registered Architects of the People’s Republic of China, and the Provisions on the Administration of Registered Engineers in Surveying and Design, it is requested that the local competent construction administrative authorities order them to cease engaging in any professional activities requiring relevant qualifications, and that the respective professional committees revoke their registration certificates. 10. Ma Cuihua, female, then an engineer at the Environmental and Energy Design Institute; the main designer for the architectural portion. Failing to fulfill their duties, they arbitrarily reduced the quality standards for the project; for the centralized control room, only ordinary glass partitions were designed, without meeting the technical requirements regarding insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance specified in regulations such as the \"Design Code for Small Thermal Power Plants\" (GB50049-2011) and the \"Requirements for the Depth of Design Documents for Thermal Power Plant Construction – Part 10: Buildings\" (DL-T5461.10-2013). As a result, these glass partitions lacked the necessary safety properties in terms of insulation, fire resistance, and impact resistance, creating a serious risk of accidents. In the event of high-temperature, high-pressure steam escaping, these partitions would fail to provide any protection, leading to severe casualties. The Huanneng Design Institute was ordered to impose on him dismissal in accordance with relevant corporate regulations, as well as financial penalties. In accordance with provisions such as the Construction Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations on Registered Architects of the People’s Republic of China, and the Provisions on the Administration of Registered Engineers in Surveying and Design, it is requested that the local competent construction administrative authorities order them to cease engaging in any professional activities requiring relevant qualifications, and that the respective professional committees revoke their registration certificates. 11. Yang Jiaxing, female, then General Manager and legal representative of Angoli Company. Failed to fulfill duties regarding work safety management; bears primary responsibility for the accident. It is recommended that the Chongqing Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties on it in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China. 12. Zhang Fuquan, male, then chairman of Huaneng Design Institute. Failed to fulfill responsibilities regarding work safety; bears significant responsibility for the accident. It is recommended that the Shandong Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties on it in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China. 13. Zhang Guanzhou, male, then President of the Environmental and Energy Design Institute. Failed to fulfill responsibilities regarding work safety; bears significant responsibility for the accident. It is recommended that the Shandong Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties on it in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China. (III) Those who are subject to disciplinary action and administrative accountability. 1. Xu Luojun, male, Han ethnicity, born in August 1968, from Gong’an, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in July 1988; he joined the Chinese * in June 2000. In April 2014, he became the director of the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection Institute; in October 2014, he served as the Party branch secretary and director of the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection Institute. He bears primary leadership responsibility for the issue of the hospital’s pressure pipeline inspection laboratory failing to fully fulfill its duties regarding the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Article 29 of the *Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions in China, and Articles 17 and 5 of the Interim Provisions on Disciplinary Sanctions for Staff in Public Institutions, it is recommended that he be subjected to sanctions of removal from his party position and demotion in rank. 2. Song Yongjia, male, Han ethnicity, born in March 1966, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in 1988; he joined the Chinese * in July 2011. In August 2014, he became the deputy director of the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Inspection Institute, and in October 2014, he assumed the roles of publicity officer of the Party branch at that branch as well as deputy director. He bears primary leadership responsibility for the failure of the pressure pipeline inspection laboratory under his jurisdiction and its staff to fully fulfill their duties related to the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Article 29 of the *Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions in China, and Articles 17 and 5 of the Interim Provisions on Disciplinary Sanctions for Staff in Public Institutions, it is recommended that he be subjected to sanctions of removal from his party position and demotion in rank. 3. Wu Zunhong, male, Han ethnicity, born in October 1963, from Hanchuan, Hubei Province. He holds a postgraduate degree from the Provincial Party School. He joined the Communist Party of China in December 1985 and began working in July 1987. In January 2014, he became the Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and President of Hubei Special Inspection Institute. He bears significant leadership responsibility for the failure of the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Inspection Institute to fully fulfill its duties regarding the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Article 17 of the Interim Provisions on Sanctions for Staff in Public Institutions, it is recommended that a warning sanction be imposed on him. 4. Lin Hai, male, Han ethnicity, born in September 1971, from Macheng, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in July 1993; he joined the Chinese * in June 1999. In January 2014, he became a member of the Party Committee and vice president of Hubei Special Inspection Institute. As the vice president in charge of quality and technology at Hubei Special Inspection Institute, I bear primary leadership responsibility for the failure of its Yichang branch to fully fulfill its duties related to the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Article 17 of the Interim Provisions on Disciplinary Actions for Staff in Public Institutions, it is recommended that a demerit record be imposed on them. 5. Guo Yibin, male, Han ethnicity, born in February 1968, from Zigui, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in June 1990; he joined the Chinese * in April 2000. In March 2015, he became the Party secretary and director of the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. They bear significant leadership responsibility for the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau’s failure to exercise effective supervision over the installation of special equipment at the enterprise involved in the accident, as well as for the Yichang branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection Institute, which was responsible for assisting in this process, failing to fully carry out its duties related to the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that a severe administrative sanction be imposed on them ； In accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Hubei Province Administrative Accountability Measures, it is recommended that he be transferred from his current position. 6. Zhang Xiaolin, male, Han ethnicity, born in October 1961, from Yuanan, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in August 1982; he joined the Chinese * in March 1992. In October 2010, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and deputy director of the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. As the principal leader, I am responsible for the fact that the Special Equipment Safety Supervision Section under my jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Special Equipment Section) failed to exercise effective supervision over the installation of special equipment at the company involved in the accident, and that the Yichang Branch of Hubei Special Equipment Inspection Institute, which was tasked with assisting in this oversight, failed to fully carry out its duties related to the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that a severe administrative sanction be imposed on them ； In accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Hubei Province Administrative Accountability Measures, it is recommended that he be removed from his position. 7. Zeng Weiping, male, of the Tujia ethnicity, born in August 1966, from Changyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in July 1986; he joined the Chinese * in June 1994. In August 2011, he became the head of the Special Equipment Section at the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. They bear direct responsibility for the lack of effective supervision over the installation of special equipment at the accident-stricken enterprise. Since Zeng Weiping does not hold any party positions, in accordance with Article 29 and Article 10 of the \"Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions of the Communist Party of China\" and Article 20 of the \"Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies\", it is recommended that he be given a severe warning within the party and dismissed from his administrative position, with him being assigned to a non-leadership role at the deputy section level. 8. Chen Zhuan, male, Han ethnicity, born in January 1960, from Wuhan, Hubei Province, with a university education. He started working in August 1982 and joined the Chinese * in August 1988. In December 2010, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and deputy director of the Provincial Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau. He bears significant leadership responsibility for the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau’s failure to effectively carry out its duties in supervising the safety of special equipment, as well as for the Hubei Special Equipment Inspection Institute and its Yichang branch, which are under his jurisdiction, failing to fully fulfill their responsibilities regarding the supervision, inspection, and testing of pressure pipelines. In accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Hubei Province Administrative Accountability Measures, it is recommended to have a admonitory talk with him. 9. Wang Jing, female, Han ethnicity, born in September 1972, from Wuhan, Hubei Province. She holds an on-the-job postgraduate degree. She joined the Chinese * in July 1992 and started working in July 1994. In April 2010, he became the deputy director of the Special Equipment Safety Supervision Department of the Provincial Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau (hereinafter referred to as the Special Equipment Department), and in April 2016 he temporarily took charge of the work of that department. He bears primary leadership responsibility for the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau’s failure to effectively fulfill its duties in supervising the safety of special equipment. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 10. Gao Dechao, male, Han ethnicity, born in June 1960, from Tianmen, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in December 1978; he joined the Chinese * in November 1982. In January 2014, he was appointed as a researcher in the Special Affairs Division of the Provincial Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau, responsible for the classified supervision of special equipment as well as the supervision of pressure-bearing special equipment. He bore primary leadership responsibility for the failure of the Yichang Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau to fulfill its duties regarding the daily safety supervision of special equipment. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 11. Qin Bo, male, Han ethnicity, born in November 1963, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in October 1984; he joined the Chinese * in July 1986. In February 2012, he became the Party secretary and director of the Economic and Information Technology Bureau of Dangyang City (his rank was upgraded to the deputy department level in January 2015). By agreeing to forward the application for the grid connection of a cogeneration project on behalf of the accident-stricken enterprise, despite knowing that the bureau did not have the authority to conduct preliminary reviews for grid connection approvals for power generation projects, significant leadership responsibility was assumed. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 12. Huang Bo, male, Han ethnicity, born in June 1966, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in August 1985; he joined the Chinese * in December 1994. In March 2010, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and deputy director of the Economic and Information Technology Bureau of Dangyang City. In February 2015, she was given an administrative warning by the Discipline Inspection Commission of Dangyang City for engaging in gambling activities in public places; in August 2015, she was given another administrative warning by the Supervision Bureau of Dangyang City for illegally distributing allowances and subsidies. As the deputy director in charge of the Economic Operations Section at the Dangyang City Economy and Information Technology Bureau, Huang Bo, knowing full well that the bureau did not have the authority to conduct preliminary reviews for permits related to the operation of power generation projects, agreed to forward the applications for grid connection of cogeneration projects on behalf of the companies involved in the accident; he thus bears primary leadership responsibility. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that a severe administrative sanction be imposed on them ； In accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Hubei Administrative Accountability Measures, it is recommended that he be removed from his position. 13. Zhang Huafeng, male, Han ethnicity, born in October 1974, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in August 1997; he joined the Chinese * in June 2002. In September 2015, he became the head of the Economic Operations Section at the Dangyang City Economic and Information Bureau. They bear direct responsibility for forwarding the application for the cogeneration project to be connected to the grid on behalf of the accident-stricken enterprise, despite knowing that the agency does not have the authority to conduct preliminary reviews for such connections. Since Zhang Huafeng does not hold any party positions, in accordance with Article 29 and Article 10 of the \"Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions of the Communist Party of China\" and Article 20 of the \"Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies\", it is recommended that he be given a severe warning within the party as well as an administrative dismissal, with his rank reduced to that of a clerk. 14. Wang Dazhen, male, Han ethnicity, born in February 1966, from Zigui, Hubei Province. He holds an associate degree and started working in July 1987; he joined the Chinese * in November 2001. In June 2015, he became Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Yichang Economic and Information Commission. He bears significant leadership responsibility for the bureau’s failure to carefully review the application materials submitted by the accident-prone enterprise for grid connection, and for approving such applications for submission without detecting that the enterprise was not constructing in accordance with the approved project specifications. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Organs, it is recommended to impose a severe administrative disciplinary action. 15. Wang Jun, male, Han ethnicity, born in September 1961, from Yichang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in September 1981; he joined the Chinese * in December 1995. In August 2010, he became the head of the Power Department at the Yichang Economic and Information Technology Commission, and in January 2014, he was appointed deputy researcher at the same commission. As the deputy researcher in charge of power enterprise grid connection approvals at the Yichang Municipal Economic and Information Commission, Wang Jun bears primary leadership responsibility for the fact that the Office for Coordinating Economic Operations in that commission failed to thoroughly review the application materials submitted by the enterprises involved in the incident; it approved those applications for grid connection without detecting that the enterprises had not constructed in accordance with the approved project specifications. In accordance with Article 29 of the *Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions in China and Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions for Civil Servants in Administrative Organs, it is recommended that he be given a severe warning within the Party and a demotion at the administrative level. 16. Zhu Min, male, Han ethnicity, born in July 1981, from Yichang, Hubei Province. He holds an on-the-job postgraduate degree. He joined the Chinese * in December 2003 and started working in August 2005. In March 2015, he became a senior officer at the Yichang Economic and Information Technology Commission. As the staff member in the Economic Operations Coordination Office of the Yichang Municipal Economic and Information Commission responsible for handling matters related to power companies’ grid connection permits, Zhu Min failed to carefully review the application materials submitted by the company involved in the accident; she did not detect that the company had not constructed in accordance with the approved plans, and thus bears direct responsibility for this. Since Zhu Min does not hold any Party positions, in accordance with Article 29 and Article 10 of the *Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions within the Communist Party of China* and Article 20 of the *Regulations on Sanctions against Civil Servants in Administrative Organs*, it is recommended that she be given a serious warning within the Party and be removed from her administrative post; she should then be assigned to a non-leadership position at the deputy section level. 17. Yu Yousong, male, born in March 1963, from Yichang, Hubei Province, with a university education. He joined the Chinese * in June 1983 and started working in March 1984. In December 2013, he became the deputy director of the Provincial Energy Bureau. As the deputy director in charge of the Electricity Construction Department and the Electricity Dispatching Department at the Provincial Energy Bureau, Yu Yousong bears significant leadership responsibility for the fact that the Electricity Construction Department failed to detect cases where companies involved in accidents did not construct projects in accordance with the approved plans, as well as for the failure of the Electricity Dispatching Department to thoroughly review the applications submitted by such companies for grid connection. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 18. Xu Zelun, male, Han ethnicity, born in April 1964, from Ezhou, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in July 1984; he joined the Chinese * in May 1998. In 2014, he served as the head of the Electric Power Construction Department at the Provincial Energy Bureau. As the head of the Power Construction Department at the Provincial Energy Bureau, which is responsible for the approval and supervision of power projects, Xu Zelun bears primary leadership responsibility for the fact that no incidents were detected regarding companies that failed to construct projects in accordance with the approved plans. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 19. Liu Wenzhong, male, Han nationality, born in February 1963, from Jing Shan, Hubei Province. He has a university education. He started working in July 1984 and joined the Communist Party of China in December 1990. In January 2010, he became Director of the Electricity Division under the Provincial Economic and Information Commission. In March 2016, he and his staff were transferred to the Provincial Energy Bureau. As the head of the Power Dispatching Department at the Provincial Energy Bureau, which is responsible for daily power operation, Liu Wenzhong bears primary leadership responsibility for the failure of that department to thoroughly review the applications submitted by companies involved in the accident to connect to the power grid. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 20. Luo Qingzheng, male, Han ethnicity, born in March 1970, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in July 1989; he joined the Chinese * in June 1992. In May 2014, he became Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the Dangyang Development and Reform Bureau; in January 2015, he served as both Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Dangyang Development and Reform Bureau. The bureau bears significant leadership responsibility for failing to fulfill its supervision and management duties in accordance with the relevant requirements set out in the project approval documents forwarded by the Yichang Development and Reform Commission from the Provincial Development and Reform Commission, as well as for failing to detect or address the issue of the accident-prone enterprise not constructing the project in line with the approved specifications. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 21. Jiang Zhengxiong, male, Han nationality, born in October 1964, from Anlu, Hubei. He has a university education. He started working in February 1982 and joined the Communist Party of China in December 1990. In March 2012, he became the Party secretary and director of the Yichang Development and Reform Commission. He bears significant leadership responsibility for the failure of the commission to follow up on and supervise the matter after forwarding the project approval documents from the Provincial Development and Reform Commission to the Dangyang City Development and Reform Bureau, as well as for failing to detect and address the issue of the accident-prone enterprise not constructing in accordance with the requirements specified in the project approval. In accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Hubei Province Administrative Accountability Measures, it is recommended to have a admonitory talk with him. 22. Deng Mingliang, male, Han ethnicity, born in August 1972, from Jiangling, Hubei. He holds an on-the-job postgraduate degree. He joined the Chinese * in May 1994 and started working in July 1996. In February 2016, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and Chief Economist of the Yichang Development and Reform Commission. As the chief economist in charge of the Yichang Energy Office, Deng Mingliang bears primary leadership responsibility for the failure of that office to follow up on and supervise the transmission of project approval documents from the Provincial Development and Reform Commission to the Dangyang Development and Reform Bureau, as well as for its failure to monitor and manage the situation regarding the fact that the affected enterprises did not construct the projects in accordance with the approved plans. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 23. Zhao Ruilin, female, Han ethnicity, born in February 1965, from Yichang, Hubei Province. She holds a university degree and started working in 1984; she joined the Chinese * in June 1996. In December 2011, he became the director of the Yichang Energy Office. The principal leader is responsible for the failure of the Yichang Energy Office to follow up on and supervise the matter after forwarding the project approval documents from the Provincial Development and Reform Commission to the Dangyang Development and Reform Bureau, as well as for failing to oversee and manage the situation regarding the fact that the affected enterprises did not construct the projects in accordance with the approved plans. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 24. Chen Qianghua, male, Han nationality, born in December 1965, from Dangyang, Hubei. He has a university education. He joined the Communist Party of China in March 1986 and began working in July 1987. In June 2011, he became the Party secretary and director of the Dangyang Land and Resources Bureau. He is directly responsible for the bureau’s violation in issuing land-use certification documents for the accident-prone enterprise. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 25. Shi Mingzhou, male, Han ethnicity, born in July 1961, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He has an associate degree and started working in December 1978; he joined the Chinese * in June 1983. In February 2009, he served as Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Dangyang City Planning Bureau. In March 2016, he was appointed as an inspection commissioner of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee. As the then Party secretary and director of the Dangyang City Planning Bureau, Shi Mingzhou bore direct responsibility for the bureau’s violation of regulations by issuing construction land planning permits to the enterprise involved in the accident. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 26. Liu Wei, male, Han ethnicity, born in June 1970, from Dangyang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in July 1990; he joined the Chinese * in June 1997. In February 2014, he became the Party secretary and director of the Dangyang Urban and Rural Construction Bureau. He is directly responsible for the bureau’s violation of regulations by issuing construction permits to the accident-prone enterprise. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 27. Zheng Tinggui, male, Han ethnicity, born in July 1963, from Zhijiang, Hubei Province. He holds a university degree and started working in August 1985; he joined the Chinese * in October 1989. In April 2010, he became Deputy Secretary of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee and acting mayor of the city; in January 2011, he served as Deputy Secretary of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee and mayor of the city; and in October 2011, he became Secretary of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee. As the Secretary of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee, Zheng Tinggui failed to fulfill his responsibilities regarding local management of work safety; he failed to detect the problem of the municipal ** and relevant departments not properly carrying out their duties in overseeing work safety, and thus bears significant leadership responsibility for this. In accordance with Article 3 of the Interim Measures of Hubei Province on the Shared Responsibilities of Party and Government in Work Safety, and Article 29 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions of China*, it is recommended that a warning within the Party be imposed on him. 28. Zhang Shimin, male, Han ethnicity, born in May 1971, from Wuhan, Hubei. He holds an on-the-job postgraduate degree. He started working in July 1993 and joined the Chinese * in June 1999. In November 2013, he became Deputy Secretary of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee, Deputy Mayor of the city, and acting mayor ； In January 2014, he became the deputy secretary of the Dangyang Municipal Party Committee, the mayor of the city, and the head of the city’s Safety Committee. As the mayor of Dangyang City and head of the city’s Safety Committee, Zhang Shimin failed to fulfill his responsibilities regarding local management of work safety; he failed to detect the problem of relevant municipal departments not carrying out their duties in overseeing work safety properly, and thus bears significant leadership responsibility for this. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that an administrative reprimand be imposed on them. 29. Guo Junwei, male, Han ethnicity, born in December 1981, from Zhaoyuan, Shandong Province, holds a doctoral degree; he joined the Chinese * in January 2004. Began working in July 2012. In December 2015, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and vice mayor of Dangyang City. As the vice mayor of Dangyang City in charge of work safety and responsible for overseeing the Municipal Economic and Information Bureau, Guo Junwei failed to fulfill his duties related to work safety supervision. He failed to detect the issue of the bureau exceeding its authority by submitting applications on behalf of the accident-prone enterprises for the grid connection of cogeneration projects, and thus bears significant leadership responsibility for this. In accordance with Article 20 of the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Civil Servants in Administrative Agencies, it is recommended that a severe administrative disciplinary action be imposed on them. 30. Yuan Weidong, male, Han ethnicity, born in July 1962, from Zhijiang, Hubei Province. He has a university education degree. He started working in July 1978 and joined the Chinese * in May 1992. In January 2012, he served as Deputy Mayor of Yichang City and Deputy Secretary-General of the Municipal Party Committee. In February 2012, he became a member of the Party Leadership Group and Deputy Mayor of Yichang City. As the vice mayor of Yichang City in charge of work related to work safety and overseeing the Municipal Economic and Information Commission, Yuan Weidong failed to fulfill his duties regarding work safety supervision. He also neglected to notice that the Municipal Economic and Information Commission did not rigorously review the applications submitted by accident-prone enterprises for grid connection. Therefore, he bears significant leadership responsibility. In accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Hubei Province Administrative Accountability Measures, it is recommended to have a admonitory talk with him. (IV) Recommendations for penalties against the unit where the accident occurred and units related to the accident: 1. The gangue power generation company is the unit where the accident took place and bears primary responsibility for it. It is recommended that the Hubei Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China. 2. Huaqiang Chemical Group is the entity where the accident occurred and bears primary responsibility for it. It is recommended that the Hubei Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China. 3. Angoli Company is an entity related to the accident and bears primary responsibility for its occurrence. It is recommended that the Chongqing Municipal Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, and refer the case to local authorities for revoking the business license in accordance with the law. 4. The departments of the Circular Energy Design Institute, as the units involved in the accident, bear primary responsibility for its occurrence. It is recommended that the Shandong Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau impose administrative penalties in accordance with the Work Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, and refer the case to local authorities so that they may legally downgrade the design qualification level. (V) Recommendations for holding relevant regulatory authorities and ** accountable: 1. It is recommended that the People’s ** of Dangyang City be ordered to submit a written apology to the People’s ** of Yichang City. 2. It is recommended that the People’s Government of Yichang City be ordered to submit a written apology to the People’s Government of Hubei Province. 3. It is recommended that the Hubei Provincial Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision submit a written apology to the people’s government of Hubei Province. 4. It is recommended that the Hubei Provincial Energy Bureau be ordered to submit a written apology to the people of Hubei Province. V. Accident Prevention and Rectification Measures (1) Firmly establish the concept of safe development and strictly adhere to the red lines for work safety. Huahua Chemical Engineering Group, as well as the people’s governments of Yichang City and Dangyang City and their relevant departments, must earnestly draw lessons from the tragic accident that occurred on August 11 at Madian Gangshi Power Generation Co., Ltd. in Dangyang City, Hubei Province, where a high-pressure steam pipeline burst. They should fully implement the important directives regarding work safety issued by ****, firmly uphold the concept of safe development, assume responsibility for work safety, strengthen the construction of accident prevention and control systems, and intensify efforts to identify and address potential hazards, so as to ensure that all activities carried out by production and business units are conducted safely, in a standardized manner, and in an orderly fashion. Local authorities must give top priority to work safety, make coordinated plans and arrangements for it together with economic development, urban construction, and other related tasks, and resolutely rectify the erroneous notion of prioritizing development over safety. In processes such as attracting investment, project construction, and urban planning, it is essential to always uphold high standards and strict requirements for work safety. No organization or individual shall lower these standards for any reason; illegal and irregular acts in the field of work safety must be severely punished, and special handling without following the approved procedures is strictly prohibited. Local authorities and relevant departments must strictly fulfill their regulatory responsibilities, and exercise strict oversight in accordance with laws and regulations. (II) Effectively enhance awareness of work safety and strictly implement primary responsibilities. Production and operation units must thoroughly reflect on the lessons learned from accidents, earnestly fulfill their primary responsibilities for safe production, strengthen their awareness of safety, laws, and responsibilities, and establish a sound system for accountability in safe production. Whether they are senior management members or ordinary employees, everyone must carry out activities such as project construction, production operations, and safety management in strict compliance with laws, regulations, institutional standards, and operational procedures, ensuring that rules are followed and business is conducted legally ； It is necessary to advance the work of identifying and addressing potential hazards, ensuring that enterprise leaders assume primary responsibility for this task; the principle of \"whoever conducts the inspection, signs off on it, and is accountable for it\" should be followed, so as to guarantee comprehensive coverage in the identification and resolution of hazards without any superficial efforts ； It is necessary to strengthen the management of equipment and facility procurement, establish strict, standardized, and feasible procedures and methods for equipment procurement, and ensure strict control over the quality of such equipment and facilities ； It is necessary to strengthen the safety management of construction projects, strictly examine the qualifications of entities involved in design, construction, supervision, etc., and establish standardized and strict systems for project bidding and quality control, to ensure that construction projects comply with regulatory requirements and practical production needs. (III) Strengthen responsibility and accountability, and optimize the regulatory functions of departments. **Authorities at all levels and relevant departments must maintain a clear mind at all times, firmly grasp the essence and requirements of their regulatory responsibilities, strengthen their sense of responsibility, and ensure that they fulfill their duties without any gaps and with a focus on practical results. It is necessary to conduct in-depth research and clarify the boundaries of responsibilities among different departments, so as to ensure that production and business activities in various industries, fields, and stages are properly supervised. Relevant departments should strengthen their own development and enhance their initiative in fulfilling their duties. Quality supervision authorities should revise and improve the regulations and systems for the supervision of special equipment, add to the \"Catalogue of Special Equipment,\" and include those parts and components on pressure pipelines that are subject to the same pressure in the scope of supervision for special equipment. The energy sector should strengthen the revision of relevant design standards for slag power generation plants, clearly specifying safety requirements such as the design layout of densely populated areas like centralized control rooms and partitioning facilities. It is also necessary to establish specific regulations regarding the safe distance between high-temperature and high-pressure pipelines and densely populated areas, as well as the corresponding protective measures. In operational gangue power generation plants where high-temperature and high-pressure pipelines are located in densely populated areas, appropriate safety measures should be taken. It is necessary to strengthen the management of the administrative approval process, monitor the implementation of key projects, enhance supervision over project construction, and crack down severely on illegal and irregular construction activities. The land and planning departments must enhance their legal awareness, administer affairs strictly in accordance with the law, and strictly prevent inaction as well as arbitrary actions. Safety supervision departments should make good use of the platform provided by the Safety Committee to ensure that the principle of \"those in charge of an industry must also be responsible for its safety, those in charge of specific operations must also be responsible for safety, and those in charge of production and business activities must also be responsible for safety\" is properly implemented. (IV) It is recommended to revise and improve the relevant standard provisions. First, strict supervision is imposed on flow meters in high-pressure pipelines. It is necessary to clarify the regulatory requirements for flowmeters as measuring devices, and also to include them in the list of special equipment to strengthen oversight. The flow meter cannot be separated from the high-pressure pipeline as a whole. Second, revise certain provisions of the \"Design Code for Small Thermal Power Plants\" in light of the actual requirements of safety supervision. For small thermal power plants that are in operation but do not meet safety standards, the relevant regulatory requirements need to be further clarified ； Clear regulations are established for the safety distances between high-pressure pipelines and areas with a high concentration of workers, in order to increase the safety factor. Investigation Team on the “8•11” Severe Explosion of a High-Pressure Steam Pipeline at Hubei Dangyang Madian Gangue Power Generation Co., Ltd