I have some questions regarding the \"Safety Technical Specifications for Cryogenic Air Separation Units (Draft for Comment)\“.
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I’ve encountered some problems recently that I don’t understand, and I would appreciate it if everyone could help discuss them. Thank you. At the site of an air separation project, I noticed that the control room is located more than 25 meters away from the air separation tower, and the laboratory is even further away. . . . All six sides of the control room are constructed from reinforced concrete with a thickness of 300 mm. Basically blocks wireless signals. This introduces more uncertainties into the operation. Is it control similar to that used to control spacecraft? Are such supporting facilities provided? The response after consultation was that it is a requirement from the design institute, and in some areas there is an enforceable demand to make corrections wherever the existing installations do not meet the requirements of current regulations. Otherwise, production must be halted! After searching for the relevant latest \"standards,\" only this (draft for comments) was found to have such a requirement. It is said that there are also official \"standards\" issued by other petrochemical sectors,,,,. No results were found. I wonder what considerations led to such a requirement; could it be to scare off the “Yi Ma”? Has the cause of the Yima accident not been determined? Are there any regulations regarding the choice of standards to be followed as issued by the ministry? It feels vague in this regard. Similar problems may exist in other industries as well. . . . I also ask everyone to pay attention, provide relevant guidelines, and discuss their Reasonableness Thank you.
Regarding the issue you raised, I also believe that at the air separation plant site, the control rooms are located more than 25 meters away from the air separation towers, and the laboratories are even further away. The six sides of these control rooms are constructed from reinforced concrete with a thickness of 300 mm, which effectively blocks wireless signals and thus creates additional uncertainties in operations. Is this a requirement from the design institute? Are there any regulations to follow in this regard? From the perspective of the \"Safety Technical Specifications for Cryogenic Air Separation Units (Draft for Comment)\\", it is indeed specified that a protective area should be established between the operation area and the storage area. It is also required that the operation area be located in front of or to the side of the storage area, transfer area, and packaging area, so as to be protected from direct exposure to any leaks ； Soundproofing, heat insulation, wind protection, rain protection, explosion prevention, and other facilities should be installed, and hygiene and cleaning issues should also be taken into account. All six sides of the control room are constructed from reinforced concrete with a thickness of 300 mm; such measures can also help reduce the safety risks for the operators. However, in practical implementation, various factors must be taken into account, such as the site conditions, the production process, and the safety of the operators. If the settings are too strict and impractical to implement, it may instead pose certain security risks. Therefore, a comprehensive consideration based on the actual circumstances is necessary, and appropriate measures should be established in accordance with relevant regulations and standards to ensure the safety of operators. As for whether there are any regulations regarding the criteria to be followed when adopting departmental standards, one can refer to relevant documents such as the \"Guidelines for Standardization Work\" issued by the Standardization Management Committee; these documents stipulate clearly that standardization work should be based on standards, with an emphasis on formulating industry standards and corporate standards that are practical and actionable at the industry, local, and corporate levels. At the same time, standards need to be established based on actual circumstances to ensure their rationality and effectiveness. .
GB/T 50779-2022 \"Code for Blast Resistance Design of Petrochemical Buildings\"
After reviewing GB/T 50779-2022 \"Code for Blast Resistance Design of Petrochemical Buildings\", I’m wondering what the impact values resulting from an explosion in an air separation tower are. This standard seems to cannot be used as a basis for design. It seems that designers and regulatory authorities are overusing the relevant \"standards\". . . . . . Please go ahead, everyone. Thank you.
Such a setup will lead to more difficulties in on-site operations, thereby increasing the associated risks.