【Ministry of Emergency Management’s Special Inspection 2022】21 – Fire safety responsibilities need further refinement, and enterprises’ emergency response capabilities require further improvement

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From November 15th to 17th, Group 3 of the second ministerial inspection team for enterprises with major hazardous sources of hazardous chemicals in 2022, under the Ministry of Emergency Management, conducted inspections in Tianjin. They sampled companies in the Binhai New Area, inspected 4 enterprises that handle major hazardous sources and 2 oil and gas storage enterprises, and identified various issues such as insufficient and inadequate self-inspections by some companies, a need to improve their safety management standards, and lax compliance with fire safety regulations. On the 17th, the reporter followed the inspection team to Tianjin xxxxx New Materials Co., Ltd., a company that deals with hazardous chemicals such as styrene and ethylbenzene; it has two major hazard sources: a styrene storage area and a polymerization reaction unit. The responsibilities related to fire safety need to be further refined, and the emergency response capabilities of enterprises must be improved. Upon arriving at the enterprise, experts held discussions with the company’s fire safety officials and reviewed relevant documents; it was found that the enterprise failed to properly implement its fire safety responsibilities, as it did not appoint fire safety managers and responsible persons in accordance with the regulations governing fire safety in government agencies, organizations, enterprises, and institutions, nor did it define the fire safety duties of employees in key positions. Upon arriving at the tank farm, the experts requested that the company’s emergency response teams, such as the micro fire station and process control team, conduct fire drills. After the drill, experts pointed out that the fire-fighting and emergency evacuation plans were not properly formulated and did not take actual conditions into account. The responsibilities, methods, and measures for those tasked with handling emergencies were unclear. The micro fire stations in these enterprises had relatively few staff members, which reduced their effectiveness in carrying out their duties. Experts also requested that companies conduct specialized drills simulating valve leaks in raw material storage areas, in order to assess their emergency response capabilities. Upon completion of the drill, experts pointed out that the company’s response team was not skilled enough in closing valves to cut off the flow of material, isolating and cooling the system, or sealing leaks, and that the necessary equipment was not available in sufficient quantity. In addition, the inspection team identified several other issues at the enterprise. For example, the monitoring data related to major hazard sources in the plant area was not integrated into the monitoring and early warning system; the corridor (Category C) connecting the granulation workshop to the silo framework was built adjacent to a Class III major hazard source (the polymerization workshop, Category A) without proper design; polystyrene was stored illegally under the pipe racks, and transfer pumps were installed, which could pose a risk to the pipelines in the event of a fire.