[Special Rectification in Progress] Inadequate use of work permits, insufficient leak prevention measures, and irregular setting of alarm parameters

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From May 14 to 20, the 19th comprehensive inspection team of the State Council Safety Committee conducted a 7-day supervision and inspection, including both open and covert visits, in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The comprehensive inspection team conducted random inspections in key industries and sectors in Yinchuan and Wuzhong cities, including mines, hazardous chemicals, construction, industry and trade, transportation, commercial complexes, hospitals, schools, and nursing homes. It was found that some enterprises had weak basic management systems, and their measures for preventing risks on site were inadequate. In particular, certain hazardous chemicals companies had irregular management of permits for hot work; single valves were still used in some areas prone to leaks, alarm parameters were set improperly, and these enterprises did not even have employee operation procedures available in their control rooms. Problems related to low standards, persistent old issues, and bad habits were evident. The use of work permits is not rigorous. “Are you aware of the leak and explosion that occurred on January 15 this year at the alkylation unit of Liaoning Panjin Haoye Chemical Co., Ltd.? Your device is similar to that of this company; let’s start by looking at the device. ”On May 16, the comprehensive inspection team went straight to the site to conduct an unannounced inspection of Ningxia Pantai Energy Technology Co., Ltd. This enterprise is a private manufacturer of hazardous chemicals, located in the Suyin Industrial Park in Yinchuan. Its production process involves risks such as flammability and explosiveness, high temperatures and pressures, as well as the presence of toxic and harmful substances. Preventing leaks and fires/explosions is of top priority in its operations; however, the company is very lax in the use and management of work permits involving open flames, and the reports submitted differ greatly from the actual situation. The report shows that in 2022, the company revised its safety regulations for special operations in accordance with the **revised \"Safety Regulations for Special Operations in Hazardous Chemical Enterprises\" (GB30871—2022)\), and formulated safe and effective preventive measures to address issues such as incomplete identification of risk factors and inadequate safeguards. However, the Level 1 hot work permit issued by this company for welding cracks in the heat tracing system of the tank area was missing information such as risk assessment results, the person responsible for providing safety instructions, and the person who received those instructions, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Safety Specifications for Special Operations in Hazardous Chemical Enterprises\" (GB30871—2022). The person in charge of the company’s safety and environmental department was vague regarding the concepts of the time when an application for hot work must be submitted and the actual time when the work can be carried out. The standards set out in the \"Safety Regulations for Special Operations in Hazardous Chemical Enterprises\" (GB30871—2022) came into effect as early as last October, yet the company still uses the old-style forms for applying for hot work. The work order indicates the estimated time period during which the hot work is to be carried out, but no specific time is specified. Inadequate leak prevention measures: “The valve flanges on the waste discharge line of your alkali washing tank D210 do not have splash guards installed; in the event of a leak, this can lead to burns.” ”Experts from the comprehensive inspection team pointed out this during their inspection of the liquefied hydrocarbon spherical tank area at the enterprise. In hazardous chemical enterprises, safety accidents caused by leaks occur from time to time, which has long sounded an alarm in the field of hazardous chemicals; installing splash guards at flanges is the most basic measure to prevent leaks. “Perhaps it’s visual fatigue; we’ve checked regularly but found nothing, thanks to the experts’ guidance. ”An employee of the company said earnestly. “This drain valve is a single-valve unit – why isn’t a blind plate installed? ”An expert from the comprehensive inspection team pointed to the drain valve located at the bottom of the liquid separation tank D217 at the compressor inlet, explaining that the tank contained liquefied gas; standards require the use of two valves, and when only one valve is used, a blind flange must be installed. Immediately thereafter, the comprehensive inspection team found that the liquefied gas ball tank V3103 at the facility did not employ sealed sampling. A workshop supervisor accompanying them explained, “We regularly inspect the metal cover of the sampling cabinet to prevent gas leaks, and the sampling is carried out using a bladder sampler.” ”“Can bladder sampling ensure complete airtightness? The interface on the sampling cabinet is a balloon sampling interface, not a cylinder sampling interface. Balloon sampling is prone to leakage during the sampling process, and leaks of liquefied gas can lead to fires and explosions; therefore, cyclic closed-system sampling is required for liquefied hydrocarbon sampling. Cylinder sampling is currently the safest method for sampling. If your employees share the same sense of recklessness as you, it will pose risks. ”Faced with the serious attitude of the experts from the comprehensive inspection team, the company officials accompanying them and the officials from the local emergency management bureau took careful notes and accepted the feedback with an open mind. The comprehensive inspection team also found that on the risk identification board for liquefied gas sampling operations at this enterprise, the potential risks associated with liquefied gas sampling were only listed as skin frostbite and respiratory damage. “The risks associated with LPG sampling include leaks, frostbite, fires, and explosions. If the risks are not identified comprehensively, the corresponding preventive measures will have gaps. ”The experts from the inspection team suggested it. The alarm parameter settings were not standardized. According to the reporting materials, the company had strengthened daily inspections and alarm systems in order to implement the management measures related to the “two key areas and one major issue,” actively identifying potential hazards, and entering the results of these inspections into the digital system in a truthful manner. A dynamic update and closed-loop correction mechanism was in place; however, the inspection results showed that the alarm parameter settings were inaccurate. In the company’s alarm monitoring room, experts from the comprehensive inspection team found issues with the settings of the system’s alarm threshold values. “In your DCS system, the low and high level alarm settings are 0.5 meters and 12.5 meters respectively, while in your SIS system, the low-low and high-high interlock values are the same as those of the process alarms in the DCS system. This means that there is one less layer of protection; can your alarm system then serve to prevent risks? ”Faced with the questions from the experts of the comprehensive inspection team, the staff members humbly accepted their feedback, admitting that their professional skills were insufficient and that they had not considered parameter settings from a higher standard perspective. The comprehensive inspection team pointed out that what appears to be a flaw in the process settings actually reflects management deficiencies within the company. Enterprises are required to strictly implement various safety measures, draw lessons from incidents, actively carry out the identification and rectification of potential hazards, and effectively prevent the occurrence of various production safety accidents.