Why did the chemical storage fire occur after an \"safety inspection\"? (Source: Beijing News)
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Safety supervision relies on swift and rigorous oversight, unannounced inspections that catch companies off guard, as well as professional and thorough guidance for them. However, in many places, safety supervision has devolved into bureaucracy and formalism. On the morning of April 22, a fire broke out in a pump room at Jiangsu Deqiao Warehousing Co., Ltd. in the Xingang Industrial Park of Jingjiang City, Jiangsu Province, which caused several tanks to catch fire and led to flames rising into the air. According to the official website of Jingjiang City, following the August 12 accident in Tianjin, a collective meeting was held there; the person in charge of Deqiao Warehousing Company gave a report on his work at that meeting, and together with more than thirty other companies, they signed commitments regarding safe production on the spot. In addition, the local authorities requested that the leadership team of the city’s safety supervision bureau form partnerships with 12 key hazardous chemicals manufacturers in the city. On March 10 this year, Zhu Xiaobo, the head of the local safety supervision bureau, visited Deqiao Storage Company, one of the companies with which a partnership had been established, to conduct on-site inspections. He examined the monitoring systems, safety protection measures, and emergency rescue equipment in the company’s key storage areas, and offered suggestions regarding the company’s safety practices. Just over a month after the head of the Safety Supervision Bureau left, a major fire broke out. I really don’t know how the investigation was carried out back then, what problems he identified, what suggestions he made to the companies involved, and how valuable those suggestions were In the past, after safety accidents occurred, public opinion would often blame local safety supervision departments for their inaction. Regarding the Jingjiang fire, to say that the safety supervision authorities in Jingjiang did nothing is a true injustice to them. Look, it’s another group meeting – those who need to give reports do so, and those who need to sign documents do so as well; it’s quite lively. The leadership team of the Safety Supervision Bureau has formed partnerships with key hazardous chemicals enterprises, and this arrangement seems to be functioning fairly well. The head of the work safety supervision bureau also goes to enterprises for inspections in a hurry. But why didn’t all of this prevent the fire from breaking out? In my opinion, sometimes, what is the actual impact of the so-called \"actions\" taken by certain safety supervision agencies? Senior leaders are paired up with hazardous chemicals enterprises; with so many responsibilities, how many times can they visit these enterprises in a year? When the director goes to enterprises for inspections, if those enterprises prepare in advance and provide a proper reception, how many problems can actually be identified? In the eyes of some safety supervision agencies, their so-called \"actions\" are nothing more than a show meant to impress outsiders. This is precisely one of the major drawbacks of current grassroots safety supervision. Safety supervision relies on swift and rigorous oversight, unannounced inspections that catch companies off guard, as well as professional and thorough guidance for them. However, in many places, safety supervision has turned into bureaucracy and formalism; companies are constantly summoned to meetings, and asked to sign documents and affix stamps. The training sessions organized by some safety supervision agencies are not more than a formality, and they even serve as an excuse for arbitrary charging. The Jingjiang fire was followed by the Tianjin fire; the chemical storage fire occurred after an \"safety inspection\". Perhaps it’s time to reconsider the management approach of the safety supervision agencies. Reduce the gimmicks in safety oversight and take real action.
Formalism, going through the motions, lack of professional knowledge – it’s impossible to identify the real problems. In some cases, the authorities involved failed to take action against the problematic companies, thinking it was an attempt to create trouble and refusing to carry out any corrective actions.
**Its role is to guide; one should learn to let go rather than hold on tightly.
In fact, safety supervision is indeed not well implemented in many places at present: there are various main reasons for this: 1. The supervisors lack professionalism； It simply cannot fulfill its intended role when it gets to the scene ； 2. Reasons for being worldly in matters of human relations ； 3. Local governments’ emphasis on GDP prevents many regulations from being implemented ； 4. Of course, it does not rule out **the existence** ； I personally believe that third-party supervision should be introduced; having more professional organizations carry out oversight might yield better results
A lot of regulations are merely followed through for the sake of formality
I’m not too in favor of this wording. According to current safety laws, enterprises are the primary responsible parties for safe production. Only when enterprises place emphasis on safe production can there be fundamental improvements in safety.
Third-party supervision is theoretically good, but its actual implementation does not yield satisfactory results. With so many intermediary agencies around nowadays, they not only increase the burden on businesses but also fail to fulfill the roles that were originally expected of them.