Hazardous materials accidents that occurred in August throughout history

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1.jpg The \"8•1\" hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident at Haihua Chemical Factory in Liaoning Province On August 1, 1981, workers in the barium chloride production area of Haihua Chemical Factory in Liaoning Province suffered from hydrogen sulfide poisoning while cleaning calcium hydrosulfide storage tanks, resulting in 5 deaths. The direct cause of the accident was that three workers in the barium chloride workshop entered the calcium hydrosulfide storage tank without carrying out gas displacement or analysis, nor wearing protective masks. As a result, one person was poisoned and collapsed inside the tank; other people at the scene attempted to rescue them blindly, which ultimately led to the death of five people from poisoning. The “8•2” methanol storage tank explosion incident at Guizhou Xinghua Chemical Co., Ltd. On August 2, 2008, an explosion and fire broke out in a methanol storage tank at Guizhou Xinghua Chemical Co., Ltd., resulting in the death of 3 workers, 2 injuries (one of them with severe burns), and the destruction of 6 storage tanks. During the construction of the inert gas protection system for the methanol tank, the contractor violated regulations by opening the spare section at the top of the pure methanol storage tank and connecting it to a carbon dioxide pipeline; the other end of this pipeline extended to the lower part outside the tank, which allowed the tank to be connected to the atmosphere through this pipeline, resulting in air entering the tank. The methanol-air mixture inside the tank leaked through the piping; it came into contact with welding sparks generated from illegal welding work carried out near the pure methanol tank, which caused an explosive combustion in the area around the pipe outlet. This, in turn, triggered an explosion of the methanol-air mixture inside the tank via the connecting pipes. The bottom of the tank was damaged, resulting in a large amount of methanol leaking out and burning, which led to the successive explosions of 5 nearby storage tanks. The \"8•4\" poisoning accident at Ningxia Duowei Tairui Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. in Yongning County, Yinchuan City On August 4, 2011, a valve in the sewage pipeline of the pump room at Ningxia Duowei Tairui Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., located in Yongning County, Yinchuan City, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, broke open, resulting in the release of hydrogen sulfide gas from the pipeline; this incident caused 3 deaths and 2 injuries. The direct cause of the accident was the sudden rupture of a valve in the sewage pipeline of the pump room. The shift supervisor heard unusual noises and went down to check, only to faint; two workers on duty also fainted while attempting to carry out rescue efforts, and subsequently those who participated in the rescue experienced various health issues. Due to reckless attempts at rescue, 3 people ultimately died. The \"8•4\" poisoning and asphyxiation accident at Shandong Wucheng Kangda Chemical Co., Ltd. On August 4, 2006, a nitrogen dioxide poisoning incident occurred in the methoxyacetic acid production workshop of the first branch of Shandong Wucheng Kangda Chemical Co., Ltd., resulting in 4 deaths and 4 injuries. At the time of the incident, an operator entered the methoxyacetic acid reactor through a manhole to carry out work, and suffered asphyxiation due to nitrogen dioxide poisoning. During the company’s efforts to carry out rescue operations, without any protective measures in place, multiple people entered the reactor one after another to try to save those inside, which resulted in several people suffering from poisoning and suffocation. The “8•5” explosion at Harbin Kailue Chemical Products Factory On August 5, 2011, an explosion occurred at Harbin Kailue Chemical Products Factory, resulting in 3 deaths and 1 injury. At the time of the incident, 4 workers were carrying out the task of packaging sodium chlorite and citric acid. During the repackaging process, solid sodium chlorite comes into contact with an open flame or other ignition source, resulting in ignition and explosion, which ultimately leads to the detonation of the barrels of sodium chlorite stored in the warehouse. The “8•5” explosion at the Wuxi Coking Plant in Jiangsu On August 5, 1982, a violent explosion occurred suddenly in the anhydride production furnace in the Wuxi Coking Plant’s workshop. The furnace structure was thrown apart by the explosion, which triggered a large fire; the workshop building was destroyed. Four operators were killed on the spot, while two others suffered severe burns, one of whom died despite attempts to save him. The direct cause of the accident was that the company had been using and managing the furnace in the phthalic anhydride production workshop as a equipment operating at atmospheric pressure; it was equipped with only a pressure gauge rated at 0.6 MPa, had no safety valve, and no alarms for excessive temperature or pressure. A pressure overload occurred in 1981, but it was not given any attention. On the night of August 5, due to the hot weather and the fact that two operators did not get enough rest during the day – one of them was sleeping on a stool while the other left his post to chat – the furnace exceeded its temperature and pressure limits without being detected, resulting in an explosion. The Severe Explosion and Fire Accident at the Qingshuihe Chemical Hazardous Materials Warehouse in Shenzhen on August 5 The day of August 5, 1993, a severe explosion occurred at the Qingshuihe Chemical Hazardous Materials Warehouse operated by Shenzhen Anmao Hazardous Materials Storage and Transportation Company, resulting in 15 deaths and 200 injuries, including 25 severe cases. The direct economic loss amounted to 250 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was that the dry goods warehouse in Qingshui River was illegally converted into a warehouse for hazardous chemicals. A large amount of oxidizers such as potassium permanganate, peroxysulfuric acid, *AO acid, and potassium nitrate were stored there along with strong reducing agents like sodium sulfide, as well as flammable substances such as camphor oil. When these oxidizers came into contact with the reducing agents, a reaction occurred that released heat, leading to a fire. As a result, more than 3,000 boxes of matches and approximately 210 tons of *AO acid caught fire, which in turn triggered an explosion. An hour later, another powerful explosion occurred in the area affected by the fire, causing even greater destruction and further fires. The \"8•5\" leakage and explosion accident at Anhui Wuhu Shanjiang Chemical Group Company: On August 5, 1998, an explosion occurred in the polymerization section of the PVC plant belonging to Wuhu Shanjiang Chemical Group Company due to a leak of vinyl chloride, resulting in 5 deaths, 4 serious injuries, and 3 minor injuries. The direct cause of the accident was that, during maintenance of the sealing components of the two vinyl chloride monomer pumps used for feeding in the polymerization section, the feed inlet coupling flange of Pump No. 2 was not connected at the end of the shift, nor was any \"Do Not Operate\" safety warning sign installed ； During the shift handover, clear instructions were not given regarding pump #2, which had not been repaired yet. The operator on duty accidentally activated the system, resulting in a leak of vinyl chloride; failure to take immediate emergency measures led to a large-scale release of this substance, which in turn caused an explosion and fire. The \"8•7\" poisoning incident at Zhejiang Ningbo Jiangning Chemical Co., Ltd. On August 7, 2013, an accident involving poisoning of workers occurred at the maleic anhydride production facility under construction at Zhejiang Ningbo Jiangning Chemical Co., Ltd., resulting in 3 deaths. At the time of the incident, three unlicensed radiographic inspection workers from the subcontractor entered the maleic anhydride reactor in violation of regulations to carry out weld inspection work. Since the nitrogen pipeline connected to the reactor was not properly isolated, an operator on the gas side accidentally opened the valve of that pipeline, allowing nitrogen to flow into the reactor, which resulted in the death of all three workers due to asphyxiation. The “8•7” explosion at Tianjin Yikun Fine Chemicals Company: On August 7, 2006, an explosion occurred in a reactor in the nitration workshop of Tianjin Yikun Fine Chemicals Technology Development Co., Ltd.; the accident resulted in 9 deaths and 3 injuries. The direct cause of the accident was improper control of the rate at which concentrated sulfuric acid was added to Reactor No. 5, which led to rapid accumulation of heat from the chemical reactions within the reactor. Since cooling was not carried out in a timely manner, Reactor No. 5 exploded. The force of the explosion and the debris caused reactors No. 3, No. 4, and No. 6 to explode in succession. The \"8•10\" poisoning incident at Fengyuan (Suzhou) Biochemical Co., Ltd. On August 10, 2009, an ethanol poisoning accident occurred during the molecular sieve filling process at Fengyuan (Suzhou) Biochemical Co., Ltd.’s 50,000-ton anhydrous ethanol production facility, resulting in 3 deaths and 1 injury. The direct cause of the accident was that the construction workers from the contractor entered the molecular sieve tank to carry out work without obtaining a permit for working in confined spaces and without taking any protective measures, resulting in them inhaling ethanol vapor and falling unconscious due to poisoning. After discovering the situation, the 2 supervisors entered the tank without taking any protective measures to rescue the people, which ultimately resulted in 3 deaths. The “8•12” explosion at Ruihai Company in Tianjin: On August 12, 2015, a fire broke out at the hazardous materials warehouse of Ruihai Company located in the Binhai New Area of Tianjin, followed by two severe explosions. The accident resulted in 165 deaths, 8 people missing, and 798 people injured who required hospital treatment. 304 buildings, 12,428 commercial vehicles, and 7,533 containers were damaged, causing direct economic losses of 6.866 billion yuan. The direct cause of the accident was local drying of the nitrocellulose in the containers on the south side of Ruihai Company’s hazardous materials warehouse, due to the loss of moisture agents. Under the influence of factors such as high temperatures, this led to accelerated decomposition and heat generation, resulting in spontaneous combustion. This in turn caused widespread burning of the nitrocellulose and other hazardous chemicals in the adjacent containers, and led to explosions of hazardous chemicals such as *ao acid an that were stored improperly in the delivery area. The severe fire accident at the Huangdao Oil Depot in Shandong on August 12, 1989: On August 12, 1989, a serious fire and explosion occurred at the Huangdao Oil Depot, resulting in 19 deaths, over 100 injuries, and direct economic losses of 35.4 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was that Tank No. 5, a concrete tank holding 23,000 m3 of crude oil at the Huangdao oil depot, suffered damage due to inherent defects and was struck by a landmine, resulting in an ignition of the oil and gas and subsequent explosions in the nearby tanks. Subsequently, the flames* spread throughout the warehouse area and affected other nearby units as well. The spilled crude oil flowed into Jiaozhou Bay, causing marine pollution. The August 14 explosion at Zhaoyuan Chemical Plant in Shandong Province: On August 14, 1985, an explosion occurred in a sulfonation reactor in Workshop 13 for dyes at Zhaoyuan Chemical Plant in Shandong Province, resulting in 3 deaths. At the time of the incident, Shift B of the DSD acid processing unit in Workshop 13 was carrying out sulfuric acid addition operations. Due to a clogged level gauge that prevented accurate reading of the liquid level, a start-stop approach was used, which resulted in too rapid acid addition and insufficient mixing. This led to excessive local heating of p-nitrotoluene and nicotinic acid inside the tank, triggering an explosion. The oil tank explosion at the Shengxian Refinery in Shandong Province on August 23, 1993: On August 23, 1993, an oil tank explosion occurred at the Shengxian Refinery in Shandong Province, resulting in 10 deaths, 4 severe injuries, and 2 minor injuries. At the time of the incident, the contractor’s team was carrying out insulation work on the crude oil tank. When construction reached the upper part of the oil tank, the team leader violated regulations by smoking near the tank, which ignited the oil and gas escaping from the tank’s vents, resulting in a fire and explosion. The “8•24” explosion at Shenyang Chemical Plant in Liaoning Province: On August 24, 1981, an explosion occurred in the benzene heating jacket of the chlorophenol sodium production unit in the purification workshop of Shenyang Chemical Plant in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, resulting in 3 deaths and 2 people suffering minor injuries. The direct cause of the accident was that, during the hydrostatic test, water entered the jacket of Reactor No. 3, and there were inherent defects in the equipment itself (it was not manufactured in accordance with the drawings, with the return pipe fitting extending 15 millimeters into the jacket), which prevented the water accumulated below the pipe fitting from being drained ； Vessel No. 3 has been kept shut down for standby and no dewatering has been carried out. Therefore, when Unit 2 malfunctioned and Unit 3 was used as a substitute, the water accumulated in the jacket heated up and boiled; this caused it to vaporize rapidly in the biphenyl furnace, leading to an explosion in Unit 3 hydrolysis tank. The “8•25” explosion at Shandong Guojin Chemical Plant: On August 25, 2012, an explosion occurred in the hydrogen peroxide production workshop of Shandong Guojin Chemical Plant, resulting in 3 deaths and 7 injuries, with direct economic losses of around 7.5 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was the entry of palladium catalyst and aluminum oxide powder from the clay bed into the oxidation tower along with the hydrogenation liquid, which led to the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide and an increase in pressure and temperature inside the tower. After the emergency stop, no effective measures such as discharge or pressure relief were taken, and the high temperature and pressure led to an explosion in the oxidation tower. The “8•26” explosion at Guangwei Chemical Co., Ltd. in Hechi City, Guangxi Province On August 26, 2008, an explosion occurred at the organic chemicals plant of Guangwei Chemical Co., Ltd. in Hechi City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, resulting in 21 deaths and 59 injuries. More than 11,500 people living within a 3-kilometer radius of the plant were evacuated. The accident caused direct economic losses of 75.86 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was a general drop in the liquid level in the CC-601 series of storage tanks used to hold acetic acid and acetylene synthesis reaction fluids in the synthesis section. This led to a negative pressure inside the tanks, which caused air to be drawn in. This air mixed with the gaseous substances inside the tanks (90% of which was acetylene), forming an explosive mixture. This mixture escaped through the holes in the level gauge wires, and was ignited by static electricity generated by the movement of the wires and pulleys. Subsequently, the material inside the tanks flowed out and evaporated into large amounts of flammable and explosive vapor clouds that spread with the wind; upon encountering a source of fire, this resulted in a massive explosion and fire that affected the entire plant. The \"8•27\" Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning Incident at Lanzhou Petrochemical Company: On August 27, 2002, a hydrogen sulfide gas leak occurred on Xigu Ring East Road, outside the north wall of the refinery at Lanzhou Petrochemical Branch, resulting in poisoning incidents. The accident caused 5 deaths and 45 people to be poisoned to varying degrees, with economic losses amounting to over 2.5 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was the improper operation by the workers in the alkylation workshop, who discharged some acidic waste oil from the acid waste sedimentation tank into the sulfur-containing wastewater system. The highly concentrated waste acid emitted reacts with the sulfides in the sulfur-containing wastewater to produce hydrogen sulfide gas. As the reaction continued, large amounts of hydrogen sulfide gas accumulated and spread within the sewage pipes, escaping through the unsealed observation wells. The high-concentration hydrogen sulfide gas spread along the ground to the roads, causing poisoning and death among the people in passing vehicles as well as pedestrians on the road. The \"8•29\" explosion at the Caohekou Chemical Plant in Benxi, Liaoning On August 29, 1989, an explosion occurred in the polymerization section of the PVC workshop at the Caohekou Chemical Plant due to a leak of vinyl chloride, resulting in 12 deaths, 2 severe injuries, and 2 minor injuries. The direct cause of the accident was an operational error that resulted in the cooling water being shut off after only 8 hours (the usual duration for the polymerization reaction in this plant is around 11 hours), which led to a sudden increase in temperature and pressure inside Reactor No. 3, which was in the later stages of the polymerization process. Since the valve between the polymerization reactor and the burst disc was closed, the burst disc failed to perform its pressure-relief function; as a result, vinyl chloride escaped through the gasket on top of the reactor, leading to an explosion. The “8•31” explosion at Bin Yuan Chemical Co., Ltd. in Dongying, Shandong On August 31, 2015, an explosion occurred during the commissioning process of the diphenylamine unit in the plant dedicated to the production of 20,000 tons per year of modified adhesive materials at Bin Yuan Chemical Co., Ltd. in Dongying, Shandong; the accident resulted in 13 deaths. Before the explosion occurred, the company conducted two trial runs with material feeding, but both had to be stopped due to large temperature fluctuations and unstable operation of the nitration machine. On the day of the accident, despite the cause of those abnormalities still unknown, the company’s management forced another trial run. After the same problems arose and the trial run was halted, the workshop supervisor illegally ordered the workers to discharge the material containing mixed benzene from the nitration and separation unit onto the ground, which led to a fire and an explosion. Since the subsequent facilities had not yet been completed, several external construction teams were working and staying in the production area prior to the accident, which led to an increase in the number of casualties.