The Major Explosion and Fire Incident at the Triphenyl Tank Area of Dalian Petrochemical Branch on June 2 (Case Analysis)

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I. Accident Investigation and Analysis (I) Overview of the Accident 1. Introduction to the Accident At around 14:27 on June 2, 2013, an explosion occurred in tank No. 939, which was used for storing miscellaneous materials, within the small tank area of the triphenyl tank complex at the First Combined Workshop of Dalian Petrochemical Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Dalian Petrochemical Company”). During welding work, a leak occurred and the material caught fire; this led to explosions and fires in tanks Nos. 937, 936, and 935 as well. As a result, 4 people lost their lives, and the direct economic loss amounted to 6.97 million yuan. 2. Cause analysis: (1) Direct cause – The workers at Linyuan Company carried out gas cutting operations on the top of the tank in violation of safety regulations. The flame from the cutting ignited flammable and explosive gases such as toluene that had leaked, and the backfire spread inside the tank, resulting in its explosion. (2) Indirect cause ①: After undertaking the project to replace the instrumentation maintenance platform for tank No. 939, the Dalian project department of CNPC Seventh Construction Company illegally subcontracted the work to Lin Yuan Company, which did not possess the qualifications required for labor subcontracting; the company took on responsibility without actually exercising oversight, and failed to implement any safety controls over the work being carried out on site. ②Lin Yuan Company failed to fulfill its primary responsibilities regarding safe production as required by law; it undertook projects illegally without having the necessary qualifications as a labor subcontracting firm ； Enterprise rules and regulations are inadequate or not properly implemented; employees lack awareness of safety; illegal use of fire is practiced ； Effective safety controls were not implemented for on-site operations. ③Dalian Petrochemical Company fails to fulfill its safety management responsibilities; its management and operational staff lack a strong sense of safety, and regulations are not implemented diligently or strictly. There are serious deficiencies in maintenance management, hot work management, and contractor management. ④China National Petroleum Corporation failed to provide adequate supervision and management of the safety production efforts at Dalian Petrochemical Company; it did not pay sufficient attention to the repeated occurrence of production safety accidents there. The company also failed to address issues such as the non-implementation of safety production responsibilities and serious shortcomings in the management of welding operations and contractors. ⑤The Dalian Work Safety Supervision Bureau failed to enforce strict supervision and law enforcement in response to the repeated production safety accidents at Dalian Petrochemical Company; there were gaps in the supervision of hazardous chemicals, and the bureau failed to detect the problems existing in Dalian Petrochemical Company’s safety management practices. (II) Basic Information 1. Information on the units involved in the accident ① Dalian Petrochemical Company: Dalian Petrochemical Company is a large-scale refining enterprise under China National Petroleum Corporation. It has 37 main refining and chemical processing units, with a crude oil processing capacity of 20.5 million tons per year and a polypropylene production capacity of 270,000 tons per year. The company employs 6,659 people and is mainly engaged in crude oil processing, as well as the production of organic chemical raw materials and synthetic resins. The safety production license held by Dalian Petrochemical Company is valid until February 23, 2015. ②China National Petroleum Corporation Seventh Construction Company is affiliated with China National Petroleum Engineering Corporation. Its registered address is No. 36 Miaoling Road, Laoshan District, Qingdao City, Shandong Province, and its legal representative is Mr. Hao. Business scope: Construction of petrochemical plant projects ； Railway construction ； Construction of urban roads, bridges, liquefied gas storage tanks, and water and gas pipelines ； Manufacturing and installation of steel structures and grid structures ； Fire protection facility construction ； Non-destructive testing and pipeline engineering, etc. It holds a Class 1 general contracting qualification for chemical and petroleum engineering construction, as well as installation and maintenance licenses for pressure pipelines of grades GA1, GB1, GB2, and GC1. On May 30, 2011, it obtained the Safety Production License for construction enterprises, which is valid until May 29, 2014. CNPC Seventh Construction Company has a project department in Dalian; the manager of this department is Jia Lizhi, and it oversees 6 construction teams, namely Teams 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. ③Dalian Linyuan Construction Engineering Co., Ltd. Dalian Linyuan Construction Engineering Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Linyuan Company”) was established on February 19, 2003. Its registered address is No. 4, 2nd Floor, Songjiang Road, Ganjingzi District, Dalian. The legal representative is Yang, while the general manager is Yang Fumou (who, entrusted by the legal representative Yang, handles all daily affairs of the company with full authority). The business scope is: construction engineering ； Mechanical equipment leasing ； Manufacturing and installation of steel structures and grid structures ； Landscape gardening project ； Installation of pressure pipelines ； Corrosion protection for industrial equipment and pipelines ； Heat insulation, installation and repair of electrical instruments ； Road construction work ； Installation of storage tanks (operations requiring administrative permits must be carried out with the corresponding qualification certificates). It holds a Grade 2 qualification for general contracting of building construction projects, a Grade 3 qualification for specialized contracting in the installation of chemical and petroleum equipment and pipelines, as well as installation and maintenance licenses for pressure pipelines of Grades GB1, GB2, and GC2. In 2008, it obtained a work safety license issued by the Liaoning Provincial Department of Construction, valid until 2014. Lin Yuan Company carried out construction work at the site of this accident under the name of the Seventh Engineering Team of the Dalian Project Department of CNPC Seventh Construction Company. 2. Basic information on the accident tank area: The triphenyl tank area of the First Combined Workshop at Dalian Petrochemical Company (comprising a large tank area and a small tank area) was built in 2000 as a tank area supporting a styrene production plant with an annual capacity of 100,000 tons. Inside the fire dike of the small tank area in the triphenyl tank farm, there are Tank 940#, Tank 939#, Tank 938#, Tank 937#, Tank 936#, Tank 935#, Tank 934#, and Tank 510#. The specific details regarding the materials stored in each storage tank are shown in Table 1:
Table 1: Details of Storage Tanks and Stored Materials
Tank No. | Total Volume (m³) | Material Level (m) | Amount of Material Stored (t) | Condition of Material after Accident
V-5101 | 807.09 | 5 | Heat carrier | 142 | Unburned
V-934 | 67.20 | Tar | 0 | –
V-935 | 500 | 0.5 | Tar | 20 | Completely burned
V-936 | 500 | 4 | Hydrocarbon solution | 160 | Completely burned
V-937 | 500 | 2 | Dehydrogenation liquid | 80 | Completely burned
V-938 | 500 | 0 | Benzene | 0 | –
V-939 | 500 | 0.5 | Miscellaneous materials | 20 | Completely burned
V-940 | 500 | 0 | Styrene | 0 | –
Tank No. 939 is a domed roof tank with a total volume of 500 cubic meters; it is used for storing high-boiling substances, toluene, etc., generated by a styrene production plant with an annual capacity of 100,000 tons. Based on the sampling and analysis conducted on March 20, 2012, the components of the miscellaneous materials stored in Tank 939 are shown in Table 2: Table 2 Components of Materials in Tank 939 Material Name Benzene, Toluene, Ethylbenzene, Isopropylbenzene, n-Propylbenzene, Methylethylbenzene, Styrene, Divinylbenzene, High-boiling substances Mass percentage (%) 4.58, 15.93, 11.82, 5.62, 9.22, 5.86, 1.78, 38.30, 6.88 (III) Timeline of the accident Date, Time, Description March 15 The 100,000 tons/year styrene plant was shut down due to economic reasons. Starting in April, Dalian Petrochemical Company began technical upgrades to its 100,000 tons per year styrene production facility, At the same time carrying out maintenance work on the associated triphenyl tank area. On April 15, Dalian Petrochemical Company signed the \"Refining and Chemical Plant Maintenance Contract\" (Contract No.: 2013-502) and the \"Safety Production Contract for Maintenance Work on Refining and Chemical Plants\" with CNPC Seventh Construction Company. The duration of these contracts was from April 15, 2013, to December 30, 2013. On May 15, CNPC Seventh Construction Company and Linyuan Company signed the “Contract for Shutdown Maintenance, Technical Measures, and Renovation of the 100,000-ton/year Styrene Plant” and a “Safety Agreement”. Neither party stamped or signed the contracts. The contract period was from May 19, 2013, to December 31, 2013. The subcontracting method under the contract was labor service subcontracting. The project started on May 19, 2013. On June 1, Deng, the equipment supervisor of the First Combined Workshop at Dalian Petrochemical Company, instructed equipment operator Li to issue work orders for replacing the small platform plates used for instrument maintenance on Tank No. 939, as well as for installing drains along the fire water line. After Li and the construction workers from Lin Yuan Company went to the site to verify the situation, they issued a work order for the construction of tank No. 939. At 9:00 on June 1, Shao, an operator working outside the Sanben tank area and acting as a supervisor, arrived at the top of tank #939 and noticed a strong odor there. He called Han, the process engineer assigned to that tank area, to go up and check the situation. Han confirmed that the odor was indeed strong and observed that no blind plate had been installed on the tank’s vent valve; he then informed the on-site workers from Linyuan Company that no welding work could be carried out without installing such a blind plate. Since Lin Yuan Company failed to clean up the debris left at the work site in that workshop on May 31, safety officer Wang instructed the company’s workers to cease all welding operations in the small tank area; as a result, the welding permit (number 0010374) for the replacement and repair of the instrument panel on tank 939# issued on that day was not issued. On that day, the replacement work of the instrument small platform panel for tank 939# was not carried out. On June 2, following the morning scheduling meeting in the First Combined Workshop, Wang changed the validity date of the hot work permit for Tank No. 939 (permit number 0010374), which had not been issued on June 1, to June 2. He also assigned Ci, an outdoor operator from the triphenyl tank area, to supervise the hot work being carried out on Tank No. 939 on site. When Ci arrived at the small tank area, Zhang, the supervisor from Lin Yuan Company, as well as the welders Tao and Yao, and laborer Shi (responsible for cleaning the site and providing supervision) were already there. At 9:30 on June 2, Ci and Wang went up to the roof of tank #939 together. Wang detected a strong odor of oil gas, but was unable to identify the source of the leak. Ci used a portable combustible gas detector to measure the concentration of combustible gases at the observation hole, while Wang checked the gauge port, secured it with a clip, covered it with fireproof cloth, and confirmed that the breather valve cover had been put in place. Due to the strong smell of oil and gas near the foam generator, it was immediately requested that the construction team seal the foam generator with yellow mud and enclose the railing of the small instrument platform with fireproof cloth. Wang handed the hot work permit to Ci, then left the construction site of tank 939#. At 10:30 on June 2, Ci handed the hot work permit to the on-site workers at Lin Yuan Company, who then used tools such as gas welding to remove the corroded instrument platform panels. At 13:40 on June 2, 4 workers from Lin Yuan Company began working on tank No. 939: one person cleaned the floor beneath the tank, one person installed new flooring on the platform used for repairing instruments, and two people prepared to carry out welding work on the top of the tank. At 14:27:53939 on June 2, the tank suddenly exploded and caught fire; its container ruptured, and the burning material spread within the fire dike (there were no dikes separating the various tanks), resulting in a pool fire inside the fire dike of the small tank area. At 14:28:01, 14:28:29, and 14:30:43, Tank 937#, Tank 936#, and Tank 935# exploded and caught fire one after another. (IV) Accident losses: During welding work, the 939# miscellaneous materials tank in the small tank area of the triphenyl tank zone exploded, resulting in a leak and a fire; this led to successive explosions and fires in tanks 937#, 936#, and 935#. Four people lost their lives, and the direct economic loss amounted to 6.97 million yuan. http://www.chemicalsafety.org.cn/uploads/allimg/161107/7-16110G60042142.jpg Figure 1: Distribution of various tanks http://www.chemicalsafety.org.cn/uploads/allimg/161107/7-16110G60055556.jpg http://www.chemicalsafety.org.cn/uploads/allimg/161107/7-16110G6010X60.jpg Figure 2: Situation at the accident site http://www.chemicalsafety.org.cn/uploads/allimg/161107/7-16110G60122I5.jpg http://www.chemicalsafety.org.cn/uploads/allimg/161107/7-16110G6013A60.jpg Figure 3: The exploded tank (V) Analysis of the causes of the accident 1. Analysis of the direct cause: Workers from Linyuan Company carried out gas cutting operations on the top of the tank in violation of safety regulations. The flame from the cutting ignited flammable and explosive gases such as toluene, and the backfire spread inside the tank, resulting in its explosion. 2. Analysis of indirect causes: ① After undertaking the project to replace the instrumentation maintenance platform for tank No. 939, the Dalian project department of CNPC Seventh Construction Company illegally subcontracted the work to Lin Yuan Company, which did not possess the qualifications required for labor subcontracting; the company took on responsibility without actually carrying out proper management, and failed to implement any safety controls over the work being carried out on site. ②Lin Yuan Company failed to fulfill its primary responsibilities regarding safe production as required by law; it undertook projects illegally without having the necessary qualifications as a labor subcontracting firm ； Enterprise rules and regulations are inadequate or not properly implemented; employees lack awareness of safety; illegal use of fire is practiced ； Effective safety controls were not implemented for on-site operations. ③Dalian Petrochemical Company fails to fulfill its safety management responsibilities; its management and operational staff lack a strong sense of safety, and regulations are not implemented diligently or strictly. There are serious deficiencies in maintenance management, hot work management, and contractor management. ④China National Petroleum Corporation failed to provide adequate supervision and management of the safety production efforts at Dalian Petrochemical Company; it did not pay sufficient attention to the repeated occurrence of production safety accidents there. The company also failed to address issues such as the non-implementation of safety production responsibilities and serious shortcomings in the management of welding operations and contractors. ⑤The Dalian Work Safety Supervision Bureau failed to enforce strict supervision and law enforcement in response to the repeated production safety accidents at Dalian Petrochemical Company; there were gaps in the supervision of hazardous chemicals, and the bureau failed to detect the problems existing in Dalian Petrochemical Company’s safety management practices. II. Emergency rescue after the accident: Upon the occurrence of the accident, Dalian Petrochemical Company immediately organized self-rescue efforts, reported the incident to relevant authorities, and also alerted the 110 Command Center. Upon receiving the accident report, the top leaders of Dalian immediately went to the accident site, along with officials from relevant departments such as those in charge of work safety, environmental protection, and public security, to organize rescue efforts. Dalian City activated its emergency response plan for hazardous chemical accidents, established an emergency rescue command center, and mobilized public security personnel, firefighters, and medical staff to carry out emergency rescue efforts. The Dalian fire department dispatched 40 teams comprising 846 firefighters, along with 163 fire trucks, to participate in the firefighting efforts. Rescue personnel provided cooling protection for the pipes, drains, and framework in the accident area, and extinguished the ground fires as well as the fires in the dikes. The fire was extinguished at 16:00. At the same time, the two injured people found at the scene were rushed to the hospital for treatment, but they died despite efforts to save them. The two missing workers were later found dead after a search at the scene. After the accident, the company immediately activated its level-3 prevention and control system; the fire did not affect other facilities or tank areas, nor did it cause any environmental pollution. III. Reflections and Suggestions
(1) Further implement the primary responsibility of enterprises for work safety, and effectively carry out accident prevention measures. China National Petroleum Corporation and all types of production and operating entities must deeply learn from the painful lessons of the “6.2” explosion and fire at Dalian Petrochemical. They should further implement their primary responsibilities for work safety, and truly regard work safety as a top priority for their enterprises. First, it is necessary to legally establish and improve, and strictly enforce, the work safety responsibility systems for managers and employees at all levels, particularly the system of responsibility borne by the legal representative. Second, it is necessary to strictly enforce laws, regulations, and procedural standards related to work safety, further improve the enterprise’s safety management systems, and take measures to ensure their effective implementation. Third, it is necessary to strengthen safety production education and publicity, including among contractors, to enhance safety training and improve the safety knowledge and skills of managers at all levels as well as all employees. Fourth, it is necessary to increase investment in safety, promote technological progress, improve conditions for safe production, and continuously raise the level of intrinsic safety. On this basis, it is necessary to comprehensively strengthen a company’s production technologies, equipment and facilities, as well as on-site management, in order to firmly establish a solid foundation for safe production. Fifthly, it is necessary to further strengthen the safety management of special operations such as hot work and entry into confined spaces. By strictly adhering to relevant regulations, ensuring thorough condition assessments, issuing strict work permits, and implementing rigorous on-site monitoring, safety during such operations can be guaranteed. Sixth, it is necessary to comprehensively strengthen the management of contractors. Contractor management regulations should be revised and improved to clarify the responsibilities of leaders at all levels, various departments, and workshop managers regarding contractor management. It is essential to conduct qualification reviews of contractors, selecting only those enterprises with the requisite qualifications and a good safety record as contractors. Moreover, strict safety supervision must be exercised throughout the entire construction process involving contractors and subcontractors; safety briefings must be provided to them at the worksite, and their safety operating procedures, construction plans, and emergency response plans must be reviewed. Meanwhile, contracting companies must further strengthen safety management. All contracting enterprises must firmly establish a sense of the rule of law, undertake engineering projects strictly within the scope of their qualifications, and it is strictly prohibited to carry out illegal subcontracting or multiple layers of subcontracting ； The principal persons in charge of enterprises must diligently fulfill their safety management responsibilities. They should establish and improve safety management mechanisms and various rules and regulations regarding work safety in accordance with **laws and regulations, and ensure their strict implementation ； It is imperative that personnel engaged in special operations hold valid certificates to carry out their work, and unlicensed operation must be strictly prevented ； Managers at all levels, on-site supervisors, task supervisors, and individual workers must strictly fulfill their respective safety responsibilities, carry out effective supervision and inspection at the work sites, and eliminate all forms of violations of safety rules. (II) We must deeply learn from the lessons of the successive accidents and comprehensively strengthen work related to work safety. China National Petroleum Corporation must earnestly implement the spirit of a series of important directives from central leadership officials, firmly establish the concepts of scientific development and safe development, as well as the principle of putting people first and giving top priority to safety. It is necessary to properly handle the relationships between safety and production, safety and efficiency, and safety and development, by truly assigning top priority to safe production, strengthening leadership in this area, and comprehensively improving work related to safe production. It is necessary to draw serious lessons from the successive accidents that have occurred in enterprises in the Dalian area, conduct a thorough analysis of the underlying problems in these enterprises’ work safety practices, develop corresponding countermeasures, and comprehensively improve the level of work safety ； It is necessary to improve the safety production responsibility systems at all levels as well as various safety regulations and rules, and to take effective measures to ensure that responsibilities, systems, measures, work, and tasks are all properly implemented ； It is necessary to strengthen safety education and training for employees, fostering their awareness of safety and enhancing their operational skills. In particular, we must promote the spirit of Daqing’s “three old and four strict principles” and “doing everything the same way,” so as to cultivate a good work ethos among the workforce and encourage them to voluntarily abide by rules and regulations ； It is necessary to earnestly strengthen safety management in direct operational processes. Starting from enhancing risk identification, strictly managing work permits, and enforcing on-site supervision, efforts should be made to improve the level of safety control during on-site operations ； It is necessary to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the gaps and issues existing in the basic work related to work safety at the grassroots level, take targeted measures to strengthen this basic work, and effectively consolidate and reinforce its foundations ； It is necessary to strengthen project management effectively, establish a strict system for allowing contractors to subcontract project work, and implement effective supervision ； It is necessary to emphasize strengthening the supervision and management of refining and chemical enterprises, and earnestly address prominent issues such as lax management and failure to adhere to regulations. (III) It is necessary to attach great importance to this matter ideologically and further strengthen the management of inspection, maintenance, and repair operations in chemical enterprises. China National Petroleum Corporation and various chemical enterprises bear full responsibility for the safety of inspection, maintenance, and repair operations, and carry out comprehensive supervision throughout the entire process. First, it is necessary to establish and improve safety management systems and operating procedures for inspection, maintenance, and repair work, clarify the work processes and approval systems, and enforce them strictly. Second, it is necessary to strengthen the organizational leadership of inspection, maintenance, and repair work by establishing specialized teams, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, ensuring leadership provides direct oversight, and placing emphasis on effective control. Third, it is necessary to develop comprehensive, scientific, safe, and reliable inspection, maintenance, and repair plans; to ensure proper organization and management of such operations, as well as effective coordination and safety oversight; and to establish and implement emergency response plans throughout the inspection, maintenance, and repair process. Fourth, it is necessary to assign competent company personnel to conduct risk analyses prior to operations, and to implement appropriate preventive and control measures based on the results of those analyses. Fifth, it is necessary to ensure that all operators possess the appropriate qualifications, have received training, and are aware of the scope of the work, the associated risks, as well as the corresponding preventive and control measures. Before carrying out the work, prepare a safety inspection plan and provide safety technical instructions; the tasks to be performed and the safety measures must be further confirmed ； During the operation, it is necessary to strengthen on-site supervision and safety inspections. Sixth, it is necessary to continuously improve the basic first-aid skills of workers, especially those responsible for supervision and management, as well as their ability to handle emergencies at the work site; in the event of any abnormalities, decisive actions must be taken promptly. (IV) It is necessary to strengthen the safety supervision responsibilities of local governments at all levels and their relevant departments, and to enhance the supervision of safety in hazardous chemical enterprises. The safety supervision of hazardous chemical manufacturing enterprises involves **multiple departments**. Local authorities at all levels and their relevant departments shall, in accordance with the principle that \"those who are in charge of a sector must also be responsible for safety, those who are in charge of specific operations must also be responsible for safety, and those who are in charge of production, construction, and business activities must also be responsible for safety,\" as well as the principles of \"whoever is in charge is responsible,\" \"whoever issues permits is responsible,\" \"whoever issues certificates is responsible,\" and \"dual responsibilities for one position,\" effectively fulfill their safety supervision duties. They should step up law enforcement and inspection efforts, and further strengthen the safety supervision of hazardous chemicals enterprises, especially those owned by the central government. Strict controls must be imposed on market access and administrative approvals; the review process of the \"three simultaneities\" principle as well as the final inspection procedures need to be strengthened, in order to enhance oversight at the source ； It is necessary to innovate management models, assemble relevant experts, strengthen daily supervision and inspection of enterprises, urge them to promptly address the identified risks and problems, and impose severe penalties in such cases ； It is necessary to continuously improve the working mechanisms, make full use of the inter-departmental meeting system, strengthen joint law enforcement by various departments, and ensure that laws are strictly followed, law enforcement is thorough, and any violations are held accountable ； In accordance with the principles of “four things must not be overlooked” and “acting in accordance with laws and regulations, being scientific and rigorous, adhering to facts, and emphasizing practical results,” efforts must be stepped up in investigating and handling accidents. Greater accountability must be imposed on entities and individuals responsible for accidents. The pace of accident investigation and handling should be accelerated. It is necessary to resolutely rectify tendencies such as delaying accident investigations and imposing lenient or insufficient penalties on those responsible. Only through timely, serious, and thorough handling of accidents can we ensure the effective implementation of work safety responsibilities at all levels. Moreover, lessons learned from accidents should be utilized to drive improvements, thereby continuously enhancing both enterprises’ work safety standards and the effectiveness of safety supervision. (5) It is necessary to carry out in-depth work to crack down on illegal and irregular activities, firmly holding onto the key issue without relaxation. China National Petroleum Corporation, as well as various regions, relevant departments, and all types of production and operation entities, must continue to carry out efforts to eliminate illegal and irregular activities in the field of work safety in accordance with the requirements set out in the \"Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Carrying Out Special Campaigns to Eliminate Illegal and Irregular Activities in Work Safety\" (Guo Ban Fa [2012] No. 10), as well as the relevant directives issued by the State Council’s Work Safety Committee. It is necessary to fully recognize the importance of continuously strengthening efforts to combat illegal and irregular activities. Based on the specific conditions of one’s own region, department, or organization, mechanisms should be further improved, responsibilities clarified, and tasks assigned. Leadership over these efforts must be maintained, a strict stance must be upheld against any illegal or irregular behavior, and illegal subcontracting, contracting, as well as illegal production and business operations must be severely cracked down on. Tough actions, focused crackdowns, and intensive oversight will be carried out in areas, sectors, and organizations where illegal and unlawful activities are prevalent; in particular, those who violate the law will be held strictly accountable in accordance with the law. All types of production and business units must actively, proactively, and regularly carry out efforts to address and correct violations of regulations and rules. They should conduct thorough and ongoing self-inspections and self-corrections, and carefully identify and rectify issues within the enterprise such as a lack of emphasis on safety in production, inadequate or unimplemented safety responsibilities and regulations, insufficient or ineffective safety management measures, irregular or even chaotic on-site management, inadequate training and education, as well as careless, imperfect, insufficient, or incomplete identification and resolution of potential hazards. They must resolutely put an end to instances of unauthorized command, illegal operations, and violations of labor discipline, in order to completely eliminate these problems related to violations of regulations. We must focus on the present while looking to the future, address both the symptoms and root causes through comprehensive management, summarize experiences and draw lessons, and strive to establish a long-term mechanism for combating illegal and irregular activities. (6) Earnestly organize and carry out comprehensive safety inspections to thoroughly identify and rectify all kinds of potential accident hazards. China National Petroleum Corporation, as well as various regions, relevant departments, and all types of production and operation entities, must earnestly implement the important directives and instructions issued by central leaders such as **** and Premier **, as well as the various decisions and arrangements made by the State Council regarding the conduct of comprehensive inspections for work safety and the strengthening of work safety measures. They must organize these comprehensive inspections for work safety in a thorough manner. The comprehensive safety inspection should be regarded as the top priority in current safety work. In accordance with the overall requirements of \"full coverage, zero tolerance, strict law enforcement, and emphasis on practical results,\" effective measures must be taken to thoroughly investigate potential safety hazards, ensuring that no effort is spared, no corner is overlooked, and that issues are properly identified and addressed. For all identified potential hazards and problems, they must be rectified immediately or within a specified time frame, in accordance with the principle of the five aspects of implementation regarding responsibility, timeline, funding, measures, and contingency plans for addressing accident hazards ； Great efforts must be made to resolve the various issues that have been identified. Efforts should be made to institutionalize, normalize, and sustain the process of identifying and addressing safety hazards, so that enterprises can carry out self-inspections and self-corrections at all times and in all locations. Relevant departments should conduct regular inspections and random checks, as well as overt and covert audits. The role of the media should also be utilized, by drawing on both positive and negative examples, in order to strengthen exemplary leadership and public oversight.