AQ 3067-2026: Detailed Rules for Identifying Major Hidden Dangers Related to Equipment and Facilities – What specific requirements must be met by “equipment”?

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I recently came across a great WeChat public account that I’d like to share with everyone – it’s called “Chemical Equipment and Processes”. It’s suitable for everyone to use for learning together. By sharing this post, you’ll earn a vacuum insulated bottle worth 88 yuan! ! AQ 3067-2026 \"Criteria for Identifying Major Potential Hazards of Production Safety Accidents in Chemical and Hazardous Chemicals Production and Operation Enterprises\" will come into effect on September 30, 2026. These guidelines define 53 scenarios in which major safety hazards can occur, covering seven aspects: personnel, design, processes, equipment, operation, tasks, and management. Of these, 9 relate to equipment and facilities; each of these represents an absolute requirement that must be met. Failure to comply with any one of these requirements constitutes a potential major safety hazard in production. This means that companies must complete comprehensive compliance adjustments by September 30, 2026; otherwise, they risk having to suspend operations for rectification or even facing legal consequences. This article focuses on the key provisions in the section regarding equipment and facilities, breaking down in detail each of the mandatory requirements, to help everyone understand them quickly and make accurate corrections. I. 9 mandatory requirements for equipment and facilities 1. Mandatory requirement 1: Dual power supplies and UPS systems Key point (5.4.1): According to clause 5.4.1 of AQ 3067—2026, it is considered a serious hazard if chemical production facilities do not have dual power supply systems as required by standards and specifications, or if UPS systems are not installed in BPCS, GDS, and SIS systems. Analysis: This is a mandatory requirement regarding the power supply for critical control systems. Chemical production units with first-class load requirements must be powered by dual power sources – when one source fails, the other can be activated automatically or manually to ensure that the critical facilities of the production unit continue to operate without interruption. Furthermore, the three core control systems—BPCS (Basic Process Control System), GDS (Flammable and Toxic Gas Detection and Alarm System), and SIS (Safety Instrumented System)—must be equipped with UPS uninterruptible power supplies. Critical threshold: If the factory equipment has only one power supply line and no backup power source is provided ； Or any of the above three systems is not connected to a UPS ； Alternatively, insufficient UPS capacity or a prolonged operation in fault bypass mode both pose significant risks. Compliance advice: Enterprises should immediately check whether their power supply systems meet the requirements for dual power sources, ensure that all three systems are connected to UPS, and conduct regular load tests on the UPS as well as battery maintenance. 2. Hard constraint 2: Key points of the GDS gas detection and alarm system (5.4.2): In areas where there is a risk of leakage of flammable or toxic gases, failure to install gas detectors as required by design, malfunctioning of these gas detectors, or the failure to put the GDS system into use constitute serious safety hazards. Explanation: This requirement stipulates that a company’s combustible gas and toxic gas detection and alarm systems must be put into use in full compliance with regulations. Specifically, in areas such as plant zones, tank areas, and loading/unloading platforms where there is a risk of leaks, detectors must be installed in accordance with the design requirements ； The detectors must be in good working condition; each probe should be sensitive, accurate, and within its valid calibration period ； The entire GDS system must be in normal operation. Critical thresholds: The absence of gas detectors required by the design at the site, continued use of detectors that are faulty or not properly maintained, failure to address alarm signals, and the prolonged shutdown or bypassing of the GDS system all constitute serious safety hazards. Compliance recommendation: Enterprises should establish a regular inspection and calibration system for GDS to ensure that all detectors are functioning properly ； Alarm records should be archived, and a closed-loop mechanism for handling alarms should be established. 3. Hard Constraint 3: Explosion-proof electrical equipment in explosive hazard areas – Key points (5.4.3): The failure to install and use explosion-proof electrical equipment in explosive hazard areas in accordance with standard requirements constitutes a serious safety hazard. Explanation: In explosive environments, electrical equipment that does not have explosion-proof properties can serve as a source of ignition, leading to fire and explosion accidents. In the zones designated in the explosion hazard area classification map, such as Zones 0, 1, 2, as well as Zones 20, 21, and 22, enterprises must use explosion-proof electrical equipment that meets the corresponding requirements regarding explosion protection ratings and temperature groups; this includes motors, lighting fixtures, junction boxes, instruments, switches, and so on. Red line criterion: Ordinary non-explosion-proof electrical equipment present in explosion-hazardous areas ； Incorrect selection of explosion-proof equipment (e.g., the electrical explosion protection rating does not meet the requirements of the area) ； Even though the equipment is explosion-proof, issues such as damaged housings, failed seals, and missing bolts that result in the loss of its explosion-proof capabilities are considered serious hazards. Compliance recommendations: Enterprises should conduct a comprehensive review of the use of electrical equipment in areas at risk of explosion. They must verify whether the explosion-proof markings on the equipment’s nameplates correspond to the designated zones, maintain a register of explosion-proof electrical equipment, and regularly perform integrity checks on such equipment. Hard Requirement 4: Universal filling systems for hazardous chemicals such as liquefied hydrocarbons – Key points (5.4.4): The filling of liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, liquid chlorine, and anhydrous hydrogen fluoride does not utilize universal piping filling systems ； The liquefied hydrocarbon filling connector does not have locking, anti-detachment, and self-sealing upon detachment functions. Explanation: This clause outlines the key requirements for the handling of high-risk chemicals. These four hazardous substances – liquefied hydrocarbons, liquid ammonia, liquid chlorine, and anhydrous hydrogen fluoride – are all highly toxic, flammable, explosive, or highly corrosive; traditional filling hoses are prone to rupture, detachment, and leakage when used with them. Therefore, standards require that a universal piping filling system be used in place of filling hoses, and the filling connectors must have mechanical locking devices to prevent accidental detachment, while also being able to automatically close the pipeline pathway the moment the connector detaches. Red line criterion: Filling and unloading operations of the aforementioned medium are still being carried out using filling hoses on site ； The joint of the filling robotic arm lacks a locking function and an anti-drop function ； The failure of the self-sealing function due to detachment should be considered a serious hazard. Compliance advice: Enterprises involved in the loading and unloading of the aforementioned media should check whether their filling equipment is compliant, whether the universal filling arms are regularly inspected, and whether the locking and anti-loosening mechanisms of the connections are functioning properly. Hard Requirement 5: Oil and gas collection system on the roof of volatile material tanks – Key point (5.4.5): The oil and gas collection pipes on the roof of tanks storing highly volatile flammable liquids are not equipped with blast-proof flame arresters ； Gases that can undergo a chemical reaction when mixed together share a collection system. Analysis: This clause focuses on the safety of the oil and gas collection pipelines at the top of storage tanks. The so-called “volatile flammable liquid materials” generally refer to liquids with a true vapor pressure greater than 7.9 kPa(A). In the oil and gas collection pipes at the top of storage tanks containing such materials, if a backfire explosion occurs, the flame may spread along these pipes into the interior of the tank; therefore, blast-proof flame arresters must be installed. Blast-proof flame arresters are capable of preventing the rapid propagation of shock waves, which is what distinguishes them fundamentally from ordinary flame arresters. Furthermore, if two or more gases mixed in a pipeline may undergo a chemical reaction, it is strictly prohibited to use the same collection system. Red line criterion: The oil and gas collection pipeline is missing a flame arrester or still using a conventional flame arrester ； The introduction of gases with different chemical properties into the same collection pipeline (even if there are isolation measures in the pipeline) should be considered a serious hazard. Compliance recommendation: Enterprises should verify whether the models of flame arresters on the vapor collection pipelines of all storage tanks for volatile flammable liquids are correct, and check whether there is any risk of mixed reactions in the gas collection piping. Hard Requirement 6: Safety accessories (safety valves, rupture discs) Key points (5.4.6): If safety valves and rupture discs are not installed in accordance with design requirements or are not functioning properly, it constitutes a serious hazard. Analysis: Safety valves and rupture discs are the most important safety relief devices for pressure vessels and pipelines. Their function is to promptly release the medium when the equipment is subjected to excessive pressure, thereby preventing it from exploding due to overpressure. Standards require that enterprises install safety relief devices on corresponding equipment in accordance with design drawings and specification requirements, and ensure that these devices remain in a normally operational state—that is, the stop valves before and after the safety valve must be fully open, sealed with lead, and no blind flanges may be installed; additionally, the rupture discs must be intact. Red line criterion: A safety valve is not installed at the location where it is required ； The safety valve was not calibrated on time, and the valves before and after it were closed or blocked with blind flanges ； The burst disc is damaged but not replaced ； Incorrect selection or improper setting of the pressure can both pose serious risks. Compliance recommendation: Establish a management record for safety valves/blast discs, and ensure they are calibrated and replaced on schedule to guarantee that all safety relief devices are in good working condition. Hard Requirement 7: Water injection facilities for liquefied hydrocarbon spheres – Key points (5.4.7): Liquefied hydrocarbon spheres with full-pressure design that do not have water injection facilities as required by AQ 3059 represent a serious safety hazard. Explanation: Fully pressurized liquefied hydrocarbon spheres are used to store hydrocarbon substances that are in gaseous state at normal temperature and pressure, such as propylene, propane, butane, etc. When such storage tanks experience bottom leaks, the leaked material rapidly vaporizes and spreads, making it difficult to control. The principle of the water injection system is to inject water at the bottom of the storage tank in case of a leak, taking advantage of the fact that water has a higher density than hydrocarbons; this allows a water layer to form at the bottom of the tank, preventing further leakage of the hydrocarbon material. Clause 6.1.1 of AQ 3059-2023 explicitly requires that: \"In full-pressure storage tanks with a material storage temperature above 0°C, and where the inlets and outlets for materials are located at the bottom, facilities for adding water should be installed if the tank’s volume is greater than 100 m³.\" When the volume is 100 m³ or less, a risk assessment shall be conducted to determine whether injection facilities are required. Red line criterion: Meets the above conditions but no water injection facilities have been designed ； Water injection facilities that have been built but cannot be used properly (such as clogged water injection pipelines, rusted valves, or insufficient water supply) all represent serious safety hazards. Compliance recommendation: Enterprises should verify whether full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon spheres meet the requirements for water injection facilities as specified in AQ 3059-2023; if they do, they should promptly install or repair such facilities and establish a regular testing regime. Hard Constraint 8: Ammonium nitrate solution storage tank – Key points (5.4.8): The temperature of the heat source used for the ammonium nitrate solution storage tank, as well as the concentration and temperature of the solution in the tank, do not meet the requirements specified in GB 44022 ； Or the ammonium nitrate solution storage tank does not have an online monitoring function for the concentration of the ammonium nitrate solution. Explanation: Ammonium nitrate solutions have the property of decomposing and exploding at high temperatures, so their storage temperature and concentration must be strictly controlled. GB 44022-2024 specifies that: \"The storage temperature of ammonium nitrate solutions should not exceed 145°C, the temperature of steam from heat sources should not exceed 160°C, with an over-temperature interlock system in place to shut down the system; furthermore, the concentration of ammonium nitrate solutions should not be greater than 93% (by mass).\\" In addition, the storage tank must be equipped with online concentration monitoring instruments to enable real-time monitoring of the concentration of the ammonium nitrate solution. Red line criterion: The actual operating temperature or concentration of the storage tank exceeds the aforementioned limits ； No over-temperature interlock shutdown function is configured ； Online concentration monitoring instrument not available ； Even if the instruments are installed, inaccurate readings or malfunctioning conditions represent serious hazards. Compliance advice: Chemical enterprises dealing with ammonium nitrate solutions should strictly control process parameters in accordance with national standards to ensure the reliable operation of online monitoring instruments. Hard Constraint 9: Safety facilities for the storage and transportation of liquid chlorine – Key points (5.4.9): The liquid chlorine storage tanks, bottle warehouses, filling facilities, or vaporization rooms do not have a closed structure ； Liquid chlorine tank containers and dedicated tank vehicles are used as fixed storage tanks ； The accident chlorine absorption unit does not have the capability to operate continuously for 24 hours. The alkali liquid circulation absorption tank does not have the conditions for switching, standby, or solution preparation. Explanation: Liquid chlorine is a highly toxic gas, and its leakage can have extremely serious consequences; therefore, the standards impose three strict requirements on the equipment and facilities related to liquid chlorine. First, chlorine-related facilities must have a closed structure to contain any leaked chlorine within a sealed space, thereby facilitating its collection by the accident chlorine absorption system ； Second, it is strictly prohibited to convert mobile tank containers or tank trucks into fixed storage tanks—there are fundamental differences in the design, inspection standards, and storage requirements for such equipment ； Third, the accident chlorine absorption unit must have the capability to operate continuously 24 hours a day, being able to start up at any time in case of an emergency and continue to absorb chlorine gas. Red line criterion: The factory building has open openings and does not use a sealed structure ； On-site, there are cases where vehicle-mounted tanks are used as fixed storage tanks ； If the accident chlorine absorption tower cannot be started or cannot operate continuously for 24 hours, it should be considered a major safety hazard. Compliance recommendations: Chlorine-related enterprises should check the sealing condition of their facilities; it is strictly prohibited to use mobile tank containers as fixed storage tanks in violation of regulations. Special attention must be paid to ensuring that the chlorine absorption systems are capable of functioning in emergency situations around the clock. II. 9 Key Inspection Recommendations There are three main aspects that underlie the 9 requirements for identifying major hazards related to equipment and facilities, as outlined above: ensuring power supply for critical systems (such as dual power sources and UPS); ensuring safe handling, storage, and transfer of hazardous materials (such as universal filling systems, water injection facilities, and sealed systems for liquid chlorine); and ensuring that safety devices are properly in use (such as GDS systems, explosion-proof electrical equipment, safety accessories, and flame arrestors). Together, these three elements constitute the fundamental defense line for the intrinsic safety of chemical processing equipment and facilities; a failure in any one of them can directly lead to serious accidents such as uncontrolled leaks, fires, explosions, or poisoning of personnel. In view of the official implementation of AQ 3067—2026, it is recommended to carry out the following inspections immediately: 1. Check the power supply system: Does it meet the requirement for a dual-power supply configuration? Are all three systems—BPCS, GDS, and SIS—connected to UPS systems that are operating properly? 2. Check the GDS system: Are there any gas detectors that are not in use, not calibrated, or malfunctioning? Is the alarm system responding normally? 3. Inspect the explosion-proof area: Are there any areas where explosion-proof electrical equipment is not being used? Is the explosion-proof equipment damaged or incorrectly specified? 4. Check the universal filling system: Are filling hoses still being used for filling liquid chlorine, liquid ammonia, and liquefied hydrocarbons? Is the locking anti-drop function of the universal filling arm in good condition? 5. Check safety accessories: Are the valves before and after the safety valve closed? Is the burst disc damaged or missing? Is the verification period expired? 6. Inspect full-pressure liquefied hydrocarbon spheres: Do they meet the requirements for the installation of water injection facilities as specified in AQ 3059? Is the water injection facility available? 7. Inspect the ammonium nitrate solution storage tank: Are the operating temperature and concentration within the limits specified by national standards? Is online concentration monitoring in use? 8. Inspect chlorine-related facilities: Is the factory building sealed? Is there any unauthorized use of on-vehicle tanks as fixed storage tanks? Does the accident chlorine absorption unit have the capability to operate continuously for 24 hours? Chemical safety is no trivial matter; equipment and facilities constitute the material foundation for intrinsic safety. These nine “strict criteria” related to equipment and facilities outlined in AQ 3067—2026 each stem from hard-earned lessons; they represent red lines that enterprises must not cross. There is ample time before the official implementation of the standards on September 30, 2026; everyone should conduct self-inspections and make necessary adjustments as soon as possible to address these risks.