Thread Content
In the anthraquinone process for producing hydrogen peroxide, how should the interlocked emergency shutdown system for controlling the ratio of hydrogen to air be designed?
The interlock emergency shutdown system for controlling the hydrogen-air mixing ratio in the anthraquinone process for hydrogen peroxide production should be configured as follows: 1. The mixing ratio control system must have strict safety measures, including safety valves, flow meters, pressure sensors, etc., to ensure that the appropriate mixing ratio is maintained under all circumstances. 2. A preset threshold value should be established; when the actual ratio of ingredients reaches this value, the alarm system is automatically activated, and it is integrated into the interlock control system. 3. The interlock control system should be connected to other related systems, such as the temperature and pressure control systems of the reaction vessel, to ensure that the supply of ingredients is automatically cut off in case of abnormal conditions. 4. The emergency cut-off button should be installed in an easily accessible location and activated immediately when there is a significant deviation in the ingredient ratios. After cutting, inspection and recalibration are required. 5. Appropriate operating procedures and emergency response plans should be established to deal with potential accidents, and training and drills should be conducted to ensure that personnel can respond and handle such situations swiftly and effectively. .
To be honest, what is the purpose behind this design? I find it utterly pointless; what is the goal of having such a mechanism for active disconnection? A safety measure in dangerous situations. Regarding the hydrogen peroxide process, the hydrogenation-oxidation system itself is designed with numerous interlock points. For this process, temperature and pressure are the most sensitive design factors. A Let’s think about it the other way around: under what circumstances can we’t tolerate it? When is the hydrogenation tower extremely dangerous, causing our hydrogen feed SIS to activate? 1. Hydrogenation tower pressure HHHS; 2. Hydrogenation tower temperature HHHS; 3. The pressure reduction of hydrogen does not take effect, so the hydrogen pressure entering the hydrogenation tower is HHHS. B Well then, let’s consider under what circumstances the SIS does not activate, but the DSC logic loop still responds If there is a recycle compressor, then the shutdown of that compressor counts as one issue; the stoppage of the feed pump for the hydrogenation tower counts as another; a low liquid level in the working fluid tank counts as yet another issue; the closure of the hydrogen HV valve controller without it being reset counts as one more problem; high pressure at the PIC control valve of the hydrogen pipeline counts as one issue; high pressure within the hydrogenation tower counts as another; high temperature levels count as yet another issue; and high oxygen content levels detected online in the hydrogenation tower count as one more problem. These are the main issues. Of course, if there is an online anthraquinone detection system, it is also possible to establish a feedback loop related to degradation processes. The general idea presented above is the same for oxidation as well; I’m not sure if I’ve misunderstood what the original poster meant. If you’re interested, we can talk more.
If the original poster is only dealing with sequential design in the field of instrumentation, it’s not complicated; rather, the control loops are the more complex part. For proportional control, a ratio HU is specified, and the calculation result of f(x) for FU serves as a signal for the two variables to be controlled, which is then used as an input for the actuators. Compensation formulas for temperature and pressure are also taken into account. Since this process places significant emphasis on pressure and temperature, you should consider whether it’s necessary to incorporate TIC or PIC into FU to enable selective operation.