Is it necessary to install a separate SIS system for the refined oil tank farm and the crude oil tank farm?

It then depends on whether it constitutes a major hazard source, as well as the level determined by the HAZOP analysis.

Order No. 40 of the former State Administration of Work Safety: (1) Major hazard sources shall be equipped with continuous acquisition and monitoring systems for information such as temperature, pressure, liquid level, flow rate, and composition, as well as detection and alarm devices for leaks of flammable gases and toxic and harmful gases; these systems shall also have functions such as remote data transmission, continuous recording, accident early warning, and information storage； Primary or secondary major hazard sources are equipped with an emergency shutdown function. The electronic data recorded shall be retained for no less than 30 days ； 　　(II) Automated control systems for chemical production facilities and equipment involving major hazard sources that meet safety production requirements ； For Class 1 or Class 2 major hazard sources, an emergency shutdown system is required ； 　　(III) Install emergency shutoff devices for key facilities such as toxic gases, highly toxic liquids, and flammable gases among the major hazard sources ； For facilities handling toxic gases, emergency devices for dealing with leaks must be installed. For major hazard sources of grade 1 or 2 involving toxic gases, liquefied gases, or highly toxic liquids, an independent Safety Instrumented System (SIS) must be installed ； For those that don’t fall into the above categories, carry out the assessment based on your company’s own risk evaluation.

This post was last edited by bfdlwolf on 2019-4-25 09:14. **Guiding Opinions of the State Administration of Work Safety on Strengthening the Management of Process Safety Instrumented Systems, Document No. An Jian Zong Guan San [2014] No. 116. (1) Process safety instrumented systems (SIS) include safety interlock systems, emergency shutdown systems, as well as detection and protection systems for toxic and harmful gases, flammable gases, and fires.** The safety instrumented system is independent of the process control systems (such as distributed control systems, etc.). It remains in a dormant or inactive state during normal production, but can act instantly and accurately once a situation that could lead to a safety accident occurs in the production facility, thereby stopping the production process safely or bringing it into a predetermined safe state. It must possess high reliability (i.e., functional safety) as well as proper maintenance and management. If the safety instrumented system fails, it can often result in serious safety accidents; in recent years, most major chemical (hazardous chemicals) accidents that have occurred in developed countries have been related to failures in the safety instrumented systems or improper setup of these systems. Based on the consequences and risks resulting from the failure of safety instrument functions, these functions are classified into different safety integrity levels (SIL1-4, with level 4 being the highest). Safety instrumented systems of different levels have varying technical requirements in terms of design, manufacturing, installation and commissioning, as well as operation and maintenance. (12) Starting from January 1, 2016, qualified chemical enterprises such as large-scale enterprises and those wholly owned by foreign investors that construct new chemical plants or hazardous chemicals storage facilities related to the \"two key areas and one major project\" must design safety instrument systems that comply with relevant standard requirements, in accordance with the provisions of these guiding principles. (13) Starting from January 1, 2018, all newly constructed chemical processing units and hazardous chemical storage facilities related to the \"two key areas and one major project\" must be designed with safety instrument systems that meet the required standards. For the safety instrument systems of other newly built chemical processing units and hazardous chemical storage facilities, starting from January 1, 2020, it is necessary to comply with the requirements of functional safety standards and design safety instrument systems that meet those requirements.

Major hazard sources of level 1 and level 2 require such equipment

Our sphere tank area is independent; the storage tank area only has emergency shut-off valves added, and it is not integrated into the SIS system.

The newly built factory needs to be integrated into SIS; I think they will force a change to use SIS here.

It’s the same scripture, but different monks recite it in different ways. Safety supervision agency staff lack knowledge of relevant professional laws and regulations, so they have to rely on third-party safety assessment agencies. The so-called professional experts in these agencies vary in quality, with differing levels of knowledge, experience, and understanding, which leads to varying requirements. Some things are reasonable, but not legal. They require that corrections must be made ； Some things are compliant and legal, but unreasonable. They suggested making improvements. However, regular follow-ups on these recommended items are required. Anyway, anything that is proposed must be corrected. They are all ways of shirking responsibility. In the end, it is the companies that have to pay the price.

A separate SIS system is required to constitute a first-level major hazard source

How should this red text be understood? Does every tank farm that falls under the category of “two key points and one major issue” require a SIS? Regardless of the SIL classification and HAZOP analysis?