Checklist for Identifying Safety Hazards in Refining and Chemical Enterprises (to assist enterprises in making necessary corrections)

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13 major categories, 402 items! Checklist for Identifying Safety Hazards in Refining and Chemical Enterprises (to assist enterprises in making corrections) https://bbs.*anjichina.com/avatar/8217avatar.png Shared by Chemical Workers: WeChat, QQ Space, Weibo. Recently, efforts have been made to identify potential hazards by drawing parallels with similar cases; the issues have been categorized and shared with everyone! ! ! There are a total of 13 categories and 402 items, making it convenient for enterprises to compare and make corrections! I. Storage Tanks 1. The operating procedures and process cards for the oil and chemical storage workshop do not specify liquid level indicators for the storage tanks; only alarm values for the liquid level are provided. 2. The secondary sealing baffle at the top of tank YG30009 in the crude oil tank area is deformed, resulting in poor secondary sealing and leakage of oil and gas. 3. An static eliminator has been installed only at the external entrance to the eastern motor oil tank area, which does not comply with the requirements of the “Code for Design of Petroleum Depots”. 4. The emergency water injection line for the liquid hydrocarbon spheres lacks a remote control valve. 5. The methanol tank is not equipped with a nitrogen seal as required, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Occupational Safety and Health in Petrochemical Enterprises\". 6. There are a total of 12 atmospheric pressure vertical naphtha storage tanks, and the liquid level in 3 of them is below the lower limit of the process specifications (which are 2–10.1 meters). 7. The information on the safety notice board regarding hazardous substances at the major hazard installation in the MTBE tank farm is incorrect. The board lists three hazardous substances, but in reality, there are only two on site; TBA is not present. 8. The valves on the pipelines of the acid waste tank are open, with no blind shut-offs in place. 9. The tanks in the MTBE tank farm lack temperature display and remote transmission. 10. The lead seal on the safety valve at the top of Storage Tank Q-1 in the old spherical tank area was broken; the bolts connecting it to the safety valve flange do not match. 11. The methanol tank V180AB does not have a nitrogen seal installed as required, which fails to meet the specifications outlined in the \"Design Code for Occupational Safety and Health in Petrochemical Enterprises\". 12. The installation of alarms in the MTBE storage tank area is unreasonable; there are no leakage points near the locations where the alarms are installed, while alarms are not installed at the valve inlets and outlets where leaks are likely to occur, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Flammable and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industries\". 13. A spotlight for night lighting in the ball tank area is installed on top of the horizontal tank, but one bolt is missing, another bolt is not tightened properly, and the explosion-proof putty has fallen off, resulting in a loss of its explosion-proof function and posing a risk of fire and explosion. 14. The wires of the high liquid level alarm instrument for spherical tanks are not protected (no conduit is used), which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 15. The sampling port outside tank V1004 in the oil storage area with a capacity of 500–1000 m3 is equipped with a single valve without a pipe cap. 16. The magnetic float display panels in tanks Q1-Q6 of the 1,000 cubic meter C4 tank farm are not functioning properly. 17. Tank C604 in the gasoline tank farm lacks a disconnecting clip for lightning protection grounding, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings. 18. At the inlet and outlet valves of tanks C608 and C604 in the gasoline tank farm, there are no guardrails. When personnel operate these valves, there is a high risk of them falling. 19. The top of the wall of the floating-roof storage tanks in the naphtha solvent tank area is devoid of ventilation holes, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Vertical Cylindrical Welded Steel Oil Tanks\". 20. There are no process control parameters defined for tank temperature and liquid level. 21. The storage tank is equipped with a water cut-off valve, but it lacks a drainage system. 22. Neither of the two ammonia sphere tanks has high or low liquid level alarms. , 23. The hand valves of the top safety valves on the two ammonia spherical tanks have no lead seals. 24. The tar tank does not have a disconnecting clip for static grounding, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings. 25. An electrostatic eliminator manufactured in the workshop was installed at the entrance of the tar tank area; similar devices were placed in several locations within that area, and no specialized electrostatic eliminators were used. 26. The handrails of the ladder leading to the ammonia spherical tank are corroded and welded at multiple locations; those at higher elevations are particularly hazardous. 27. Multiple flanges on the top of the tar intermediate tank are missing bolts, and a similar situation exists with the flanges of other pipelines within the facility. 28. During normal operation, the floating roofs of the 7 naphtha storage tanks in the naphtha tank farm have sunk to the bottom (with a floating roof height of 1.5 meters). The breathing valves on these floating roofs are open, allowing air to enter beneath them; this creates an explosive atmosphere in that space. In the presence of ferrous sulfide, this can easily lead to fires and explosions. No risk assessment has been conducted, nor have any preventive and control measures been established. 29. The tanks in the tank farm have no vent holes or flame arresters, failing to meet the requirements of the “Design Code for Vertical Cylindrical Steel Welded Oil Tanks”. 30. For the 16 naphtha storage tanks, no operating indicators for level and temperature control have been established. 31. The static eliminator for humans outside the naphtha tank farm is not connected to the grounding network. 32. The tanks in the tank farm lack temperature display and remote transmission capabilities. 33. Liquid hydrocarbons are leaking from the drain valve at the lower end of the level gauge for G502 spherical tank, posing a significant risk of fire and explosion. 34. There are no vent holes on the upper part around the walls of the tanks in the light oil tank area under the Storage and Transportation Department. Currently, there is only one breather valve at the top. It is necessary to recalculate whether this arrangement meets the ventilation requirements; otherwise, it does not comply with the “Design Code for Vertical Cylindrical Steel Welded Oil Tanks”. 35. The methanol storage tank was not equipped with a nitrogen blanket as required, failing to comply with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Occupational Safety and Health in Petrochemical Enterprises\" ； The process control operations for atmospheric pressure tanks and pressure tanks do not have liquid level upper or lower limit specifications. 36. The temperature threshold for feeding atmospheric vacuum residue into the tank is 60–110°C. In the event of abnormal conditions in the plant, such as residue containing water, an inlet temperature above 100°C can lead to bumping in the storage tank; therefore, the threshold for feeding atmospheric vacuum residue should be set at <100°C. 37. The liquid levels in the 4 operating gasoline storage tanks were below the floating disks, and no risk assessment nor preventive and control measures were implemented. 38. The emergency water injection line for the liquefied gas tank is equipped with a remote shut-off valve, but the on-site manual valve is closed; in an emergency, it is not possible to inject water into the tank. 39. In the light oil tank farm, the flanges of the radar level gauges in G301 and G302 do not match those of the tank interfaces, and the bolt sizes are inconsistent. 40. The manual fire alarm test in the southeast corner of the light oil tank farm worked well, but the on-site sound and light alarm system did not function properly. 41. Fault in the low liquid level alarm switches for tanks G303 and G102 in the Storage and Transportation Department. 42. The opening of the light-transmitting hole on the upper part of Tank G301 in the light oil tank area is not sealed, and not all bolts are present on the cover of the light-transmitting hole. In the 43.20000 m³/h hydrogen production unit, there is no wire plug for venting at the upper part of the level gauge of the purge gas tank V5102; this does not comply with the requirements of the “Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises”. 44. The manhole on top of the hydrochloric acid tank was not secured with bolts to prevent internal leakage of the valve; hydrochloric acid vapor leaked from these two locations. Additionally, bolts were missing at the flanges of other pipelines. 45. No temperature indicators are set for gasoline and diesel storage tanks in the process cards; there are no level indicators for the two zero-level tanks used for heavy oil and crude oil. 46. Four level gauges in the spherical tank area were not repaired in a timely manner; the operation records were estimated based on the readings of the on-site level gauges. If those on-site level gauges failed, it became impossible to monitor the liquid level. 47. The rainwater discharge valve at the top of the external floating roof tank is in an open position; should the water transfer hose leak, it can easily lead to oil leakage accidents, and the drainage outlet is not connected to the rainwater drainage system. 48. An antistatic device for human bodies is not installed at the entrance to the tank ladder, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Oil Depots\". 49. Six additional pipelines are to be added at the bottom of tanks 102 and 202 in the asphalt tank area; the pipelines have already been installed and holes are ready to be made in the tanks, but the procedures for design changes have not been followed, and the risks associated with these changes have not been identified. 50. V-404 and V-405 were converted from diesel tanks to methanol tanks; no process changes were made as required, nor was a nitrogen sealing system installed as specified, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Occupational Safety and Health in Petrochemical Enterprises\". 51. For the two liquid ammonia spherical storage tanks, No. 1 and No. 2, the actual opening degree of the inlet valve for each safety valve is approximately 70%, which is not at full open position; this does not meet the requirements specified in the \"Safety Technical Inspection Regulations for Fixed Pressure Vessels\". 52. For liquefied gas spherical tanks, emergency shut-off valves shall be used instead of remotely controlled operating valves. 53. The high and low liquid level alarms for the spherical tanks in the liquefied gas tank area are installed on magnetic float level gauges; when these level gauges fail and need to be repaired, the high and low liquid level alarms for the spherical tanks can no longer function as alarms. 54. There are no audible and visual alarms at the naphtha tank area, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Automatic Fire Alarm Systems\". 55. The vent valve of tank V-404 in the methanol tank farm is lacking a wire plug, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 56. The manual valve in front of the emergency shut-off valve of the spherical tank Q1 is in the closed state. 57. The outlet lines of the two safety valves on the spherical tank Q5 do not have separate manual valves; a manual valve is installed at the bottom of the tank. This valve should remain open at all times, but it is currently closed, which means that the safety valves are not in use – a situation that does not comply with the requirements of the \"Safety Technical Inspection Regulations for Fixed Pressure Vessels\". 58. The spherical tanks Q5-Q8 in the liquefied gas tank area share one fire alarm button, which is installed at a position equidistant from the centers of the four tanks. In the event of an emergency, this button may not be usable, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Fire Alarm Systems\". 59. The isooctane tank farm only has level gauges; there are no on-site temperature sensors or devices for transmitting temperature data. 60. In the spherical tank area Q-5, there is no disconnecting clamp for the lightning protection grounding, which does not comply with the requirements of the “Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings”. 61. There is a leak at the connection of the threaded vent valve below the level gauge in the sphere tank area Q-6. 62. There is no human body static electricity eliminator at the ladder entrance of the isobutane tank farm V-601, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Oil Depots\". 63. The height of the footboard on the platform of sphere tank Q-1 is insufficient. 64. The spherical tanks Q1-Q4 in the liquefied gas tank area do not have independent level measurement instruments; the liquid level is determined by using pressure sensors located at the top and bottom of the tanks, and this resulting level data is inaccurate. 65. To ensure temperature control of the spherical tanks, water spraying is required in hot weather for cooling; in the spherical tank area under random inspection, tank No. 5 still did not produce water even after 20 minutes of operation. 66. There is a simple sampler on naphtha tank 1101, made up of PVC pipes and plastic bottles; a dedicated sampler is not used ； 61. The gauging ports of tanks 1102 were not closed; there was a strong odor of oil and gas at the tank tops, and equal potential bonding was not performed on the gauging ports of either tank. 67. In the spherical tank area, there is a water injection line for one of the spherical tanks that is connected to the dehydration line, which does not meet the requirement that the water injection line should be connected to the feed line ； The water filling line of the other spherical tank is connected to the feed line without a manual valve; only a check valve is used. Moreover, the manual valve on the water filling line is located within the tank area and is closed, with no remote control valve installed. 68. The operating procedures do not specify temperature parameters for atmospheric and pressurized tanks, and there are no pressure control parameters for pressurized tanks. 69. The nitrogen sealing systems for the naphtha and methanol storage tanks are not equipped with pressure monitoring devices or bypass lines. 70. The old tank area and the vertical tank area do not have independent high and low liquid level alarm systems, nor do they have manual fire alarm systems, which fails to meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 71. All the valves at the bottom of the magnetic float level gauges in the old tank area Q-103 should be closed, but only one valve was closed on site ； The magnetic float level gauge doesn’t work well. 72. There is no break-free clamp for the static grounding at the lower part of Q-103 in the old tank area, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings. 73. The water filling line of the n-butane sphere tank is connected to the dehydration line, rather than to the feeding line as required. 74. The rainwater and wastewater discharge outlets in the sulfuric acid tank area are located at a high elevation, preventing the water within the tank area from being completely drained; furthermore, the wastewater pipeline does not have a shut-off valve for control. 75. During maintenance work on the manhole of one tank in the raw material tank area, no signs prohibiting entry were placed, and no energy isolation was carried out. 76. The fire alarm system in the isooctane tank farm is equipped with silent alarms without lights, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Alarm Systems\". 77. The dehydration outlet for liquefied hydrocarbons in D210 is controlled by a single valve. 78. The two atmospheric pressure horizontal storage tanks are not equipped with breather valves; only an atmospheric vent valve is available for drainage. 79. In tank areas that constitute major hazard sources, there are generally no inspection ports or markings indicating where the lightning protection grounding connections are located; furthermore, there are no static electricity eliminators at the entrances to the ladders ； Safety warning labels on the tank lacking information such as the name of the material and its storage volume ； In the tank farm control room, the emergency shut-off valve buttons lack identification tags, which may lead to misoperations and similar issues during emergency responses. 80. The vertical ladders in the gasoline tank area that are over 2 meters high lack safety cages. 81. Cracking in the cement base of the gasoline tank. 82. The valve in front of the safety valve is not fully open; for example, the opening degree of the valve in front of the safety valve of Tank No. 5 is around 40%-50%, meaning it is not fully open, which hinders pressure release in abnormal situations. 83. The opening angles of the manual valves before and after the fast water filling valve for the 5# sphere tank are too small; they are not fully open, which affects the water filling speed in emergency situations. 84. The quick shut-off valve for the 5# sphere tank has not been tested regularly, so rapid response in emergency situations cannot be guaranteed. 85. The interlock measuring instruments for the high-level limits of liquids in Ball Tank No. 4 and Ball Tank No. 5, models LS3504 and LS3505, were damaged; the interlocks were removed without approval. 86. The Class A high-pressure gauge at the bottom of the 5# spherical tank (with serial number 1403101A34) is damaged and cannot be used properly; it has not been replaced. 87. There are issues with the safety management of tank farms that constitute major hazard sources; the pedestrian overpasses above the pipelines carrying different types of materials in these tank farms lack safety barriers, posing a risk of falls ； Two bolts on the flange of the feed pipe for the 406# gasoline tank were not tightened properly and were loose; one more bolt was also not tightened ； After being lost, the static eliminator for humans at the entrance to the ladders of gasoline tanks #405 and #406 was not restored in a timely manner ； There are few wind vanes in the gasoline tank area ； The lightning protection grounding points of spheres No. 13 and No. 14 lack disconnect clamps and are unnumbered. 88. The safety facilities in the tank area are inadequate; the storage tanks in the finished product tank area lack clear markings indicating the type of material stored, their capacity, and their hazardous properties ； The lightning protection and grounding systems for the spherical tank areas D3301, D3302, and D3303 in the product storage area lack clear markings as well as identification numbers for the lightning protection connection points ； The static eliminator at the entrance of the finished product tank farm is not connected to the grounding grid; it is grounded using a single expansion bolt, which fails to meet the requirements for effective grounding ； In the finished product tank farm, some of the detection and alarm facilities for flammable gases lack on-site display and alarm devices. 89. There are weak points in tank farm management; the control valve for an eyewash/shower station located outside the fire dike of the tank farm is positioned too high, affecting its normal use ； The sealing at the points where some pipes in the tank area pass through the fire dike is not tight enough ； There are no inspection points for checking the continuity of lightning protection grounding within the tank area, and they are not numbered ； There is a wind vane in the tank area that is damaged and has not been repaired ； The combustible gas detection and alarm devices in the tank area lack calibration labels, and some gauges are unclear ； A pressure gauge for a fire cannon located outside the fire dike of the tank area is damaged ； The drainage system in the tank area is not functioning properly; there is a significant amount of water accumulated in the pump area and at the control box for emergency shut-off valves, which hinders normal operations ； The upper-middle section of the tank wall in tank TK316B has localized inward deformation. 90. The phenomenon of the floating roofs of in-use internal floating roof tanks hitting the bottom is severe; the floating roofs of 6 internal floating roof tanks, namely TK304B, TK307A/B, TK312A, TK314A, and TK316B, have hit the bottom. 91. There are deficiencies in the safety management of the tank area; there are no devices for eliminating static electricity on the ladder access points to the tanks containing finished products ； The personnel inspection passage does not form a closed loop, and there are no safety evacuation signs ； The water depth in the tank area exceeds 40 centimeters, and there are no safety protection measures or warning signs near the water. 92. The exhaust outlets of the safety valves on equipment such as propylene horizontal tanks, propylene spherical tanks, propylene polymerization reactors, and flash tanks are directly discharged into the atmosphere, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises\" and the \"Regulations for the Inspection of Fixed Pressure Vessels\". 93. The combustible gas detectors in the operational propylene sphere tank area and horizontal tank area expired on June 26, 2017. The local testing authorities conducted inspections on June 21, 2017, but did not issue any certification reports, nor were there any documents indicating that the detectors were qualified for use. 94. The pressure gauge for mandatory inspection in the spherical tank area expired on June 4, 2017; it was not sent to Rizhao Metrology and Testing Institute for calibration until June 15, 2017, resulting in its use beyond the expiration date. 95. None of the spherical tanks in the spherical tank area are equipped with interlock detection instruments for high liquid level limits; currently, liquid level process control measuring instruments are used in place of interlock instruments, which does not meet the requirement that such interlock detection devices be installed separately. 96. All on-site level gauges of the propylene horizontal tanks and spherical tanks lack leak-proof threaded end caps at their low-level discharge ports. 97. The stair entrances for the 5# and 6# propylene spheres are located in the middle of the pipe rack, which affects normal use. 98. The lightning protection and grounding inspection points of the propylene horizontal tanks and spherical tanks lack disconnect clips and numbering, which affects the accuracy of lightning protection inspections. 99. The tank area is not equipped with emergency shut-off valves, which does not meet the requirements of the Interim Provisions on the Supervision and Management of Major Hazard Sources of Hazardous Chemicals. 100. The regular maintenance and inspection system for the breather valves of atmospheric pressure storage tanks is inadequate, and it fails to prevent the storage tank from collapsing or deforming due to the failure or blockage of the components inside the breather valves. 101. Some of the combustible gas detectors in the tank area lack on-site display and audible/visual alarm functions. 102. The tank area’s tanks lack labels indicating the name of the medium stored and the maximum capacity of the tanks. 103. The company’s regulations on safety management for warehouses and tank areas, which state that \"storage tanks should be inspected for corrosion once a year and their wall thickness measured; if they do not meet the requirements, they must be repaired or replaced promptly,\" were not effectively implemented. 104. A system for the regular maintenance, servicing, inspection, and testing of the breather valves in atmospheric pressure storage tanks has not been established, resulting in deficiencies in management. 105. A system for the regular maintenance, servicing, inspection, and testing of the breather valves in atmospheric pressure storage tanks has not been established, resulting in deficiencies in management. 106. The methanol, formaldehyde, and intermediate storage tanks are all lacking local and remote pressure and temperature monitoring instruments, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Tank Areas in Petrochemical Storage and Transportation Systems\". 107. None of the methanol, formaldehyde, and intermediate storage tanks are equipped with on-site level gauges, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Tank Areas in Petrochemical Storage and Transportation Systems\". 108. In the tank area and the formaldehyde production facility, no disconnecting clips were installed at multiple grounding points of the lightning protection system, making it impossible to conduct grounding tests. The lightning protection grounding system is in a disordered state, failing to meet the requirements of the \"Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings\". 109. The guard cage for the ladder of the storage tank in the raw material tank area was more than 2 meters above the ground; it was tied to the ladder with wire, but not properly fixed to it. 110. There is no regular maintenance, inspection, and repair system in place for the breather valves of atmospheric pressure storage tanks, which fails to prevent these valves from becoming ineffective due to poor management (such as blockages), thereby causing the tanks to collapse and deform. 111. There is no human body static eliminator at the entrance of the toluene tank area. 112. The installation location of the emergency shut-off valves at the inlets and outlets of the ammonia tank is too far away from the tank area (about 15 meters), and both shut-off valves for the liquid ammonia spherical tanks share the same setup, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Petrochemical Storage and Transportation Systems\". 113. The solenoid valve on the liquid ammonia spherical tank isolation valve is a non-explosion-proof solenoid valve, failing to meet the explosion-proof requirements. 114. The pressure transmitters and level transmitters in the ammonia station and spraying equipment are all intrinsically safe instruments; no intrinsically safe barrier has been installed indoors, so they cannot provide explosion protection for the circuits. 115. The combustible and toxic gas alarms in the ammonia station and spraying workshop are installed in the on-site rest room (which is often unoccupied), rather than in the control room where personnel are stationed on a continuous basis; this does not comply with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industries\". 116. The terminal posts at the ammonia station and the cable connections for instruments are severely damaged; wrapping them with plastic tape does not meet the explosion-proof requirements. 117. There is no regular maintenance and inspection system in place for the breather valves of atmospheric pressure storage tanks. 118. There are no disconnect clips at the lightning protection and grounding inspection points of the tank area and production units, which prevents ensuring the accuracy of the inspection data ； A lightning rod is installed on the top of the sulfuric acid tank, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Oil Depots\". 119. The U-tube manometer used in the hydrochloric acid storage tank lacks a protective cover. 120. There is no regular maintenance and inspection system in place for the breather valves of atmospheric pressure storage tanks, nor is there such a system for glass plate level gauges; the inadequate systems fail to ensure the proper functionality of these equipment components. 121. There are no disconnect clips at the lightning protection and grounding inspection points of the tank area and production units, which prevents ensuring the accuracy of the inspection data. 122. The water discharged from the liquefied hydrocarbon tank DR101 in the alkylation unit is directly poured into the surface rainwater drainage channels and enters the rainwater system, posing a risk of fire and explosion due to the volatilization of liquefied hydrocarbons within the unit area. 123. There is a leak at the bottom of the gas-liquid separation tank leading to the flare, and testing shows that it is a flammable gas (pressure inside the tank: 7 kilograms) ； After the level gauge of the tank was removed, no blind plate was installed at the flange. 124. The two acidic water tanks are under slight positive pressure; the gases emitted from the top of the tanks are guided through plastic hoses to two plastic barrels on the ground, where they are collected using water. There is a strong odor at the site, and no toxic gas detectors are available. Once saturated, gases such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide may be released, leading to poisoning or fire and explosion accidents, as there is no sealed system for collecting these gases. II. Problems with the loading quay 1. At the diesel truck loading quay in the western area, truck drivers operated the on-site loading system, violating the requirements set out in the company’s \"Management Procedures for the Loading Process of Hazardous Chemicals such as Liquefied Gas and Gasoline\", which state that \"unauthorized outsiders are strictly prohibited from using the facilities without permission.\" (Production Operations Department) 2. For the loading of isopentane, only the liquid phase line is connected; the gas phase line is not connected and remains in an open state. Moreover, the oil and chemical receiving and dispatching workshop does not have corresponding operating procedures or cards. (Production Operations Department) 3. At the liquefied gas unloading pier in the Oil and Chemical Reception and Dispatch Workshop, no remote emergency shut-off valves are installed at the gas-liquid interface; only manual valves are used for control. (Production Operations Department) 4. The vehicle loading trestle lacks an operational safety island, nor are double yellow lines marked there. (Production Operations Department) 5. There are no emergency shut-off valves or remote control systems at the liquefied hydrocarbon loading site. (Production Operations Department) 6. The equipotential bonding wire at the propylene loading quay TA-2007 is disconnected. 7. At the liquefied gas loading site, there is only a loading procedure display board; no loading operation sheet is provided on this board, and there are obvious errors in the procedure display board – the pump was started before the vapor valve was opened. 8. The pressure gauge used at the loading quay between positions 3# and 4# is incorrect (an ammonia-specific pressure gauge was used when the actual medium is gasoline). The pressure gauge has not been inspected within its required timeframe, and the pressure gauge at the outlet of pump P-105A in the MTBE unit has also not been checked. 9. When loading gasoline tankers, operators must climb up the ladder at the rear of the tanker to install and remove the flexible hose. In the absence of an operating platform and safety passages, it is easy for accidents to occur when operators are on board and emergencies arise, leading to collisions between the personnel and the pier. 10. The equipotential bonding wire for the unloading universal joint is disconnected. 11. There is no emergency shut-off valve for loading liquid ammonia. 12. The crude benzene trestle is not equipped with fixed toxic and flammable alarms. 13. The loading and unloading trestle lacks an emergency shut-off system. 14. The equipotential bonding wires for the loading trestles at positions 5# and 6# are disconnected. 15. The naphtha loading system lacks an electrostatic grounding interlock emergency shutdown system, and the oil and gas generated during loading is not recovered. 16. The equipotential bonding points such as the universal joint flanges at the loading quay are all secured with iron straps; moreover, the connection between the bonding wires and the universal joints has not had its paint removed, so it does not serve a bonding purpose. Additionally, the sealing rubber ring at one of the universal joint connections is too small. 17. There is no emergency shut-off valve for methanol unloading, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 18. The pressure gauge on the oil and gas recovery equipment at the loading quay was not checked. 19. There is no emergency shut-off valve at the site where methanol is unloaded, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 20. The naphtha loading quay lacks a safety island. It uses an upper-loading method, requiring operators to climb up via ladders at the back of the tank truck in order to install and remove the dip pipe; there is no operating platform or safety passage, which prevents operators on the truck from evacuating quickly in case of an emergency. 21. The LPG loading pier is lacking emergency shut-off valves, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 22. There are no combustible gas alarms on the loading quay platforms, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Enterprises\". 23. On an operation column on the loading quay platform, the stop and run indicator lights are on at the same time, making it impossible to determine the operating status. 24. There is a disconnection at the east side of the methanol pump area; the lightning protection grounding for the V-601 liquefied gas tank lacks a connection clamp, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Oil Depots\". 25. The isooctane loading pier lacks a safety island and emergency shut-off valves; the operating platform on the pier is at a low height, and it is covered with pipelines, making daily operations as well as evacuation in emergency situations difficult. This does not meet the requirements of the \"Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises\". 26. The isooctane unloading trestle has simple facilities and lacks emergency shut-off valves, failing to meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 27. The liquid hydrocarbon loading and unloading site lacks emergency shut-off valves and a safety island, failing to meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 28. The drain single valve in the unloading pump area lacks a pipe cap, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 29. The liquefied gas loading pier is not equipped with a safety island, nor does it have emergency shut-off valves or interlocks for static electricity grounding, which fails to meet the requirements of the \"Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises\". 30. The MTBE loading pier is lacking emergency shut-off valves; there are no operating platforms or safety passages for installing and removing the transfer pipes, which prevents personnel from evacuating quickly in case of an emergency while working on the pier. 31. The loading pump rooms for naphtha and MTBE have been shut down, but power has not been cut off. 32. The equipotential connection wires at the old loading pier were broken; some of the connection wires did not meet the specifications, and an anti-static device for humans was not installed in one location. 33. The butane unloading facilities are simple, lacking universal joint hoses and emergency shut-off valves, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 34. The isooctane loading quay is lacking emergency shut-off valves; the operation platform has two levels with no guardrails in between, posing a risk of falls and injuries, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises\". 35. Residual sampled oil products were stored for a long time on the operating platform of the isooctane loading quay, rather than in the designated area. 36. The personnel responsible for loading isooctane board the tank from the back, while the operators must climb up using the ladder at the rear of the tank to carry out the installation and removal of the dip pipe. There is no operating platform or safety passage, so in case of an emergency, the operators on board cannot evacuate quickly. 37. A warning sign indicating “Loading/Unloading in Progress” was not placed before the vehicle was loaded or unloaded. 38. Some gasoline loading/unloading stations have an insufficient number of combustible gas detection and alarm devices. 39. There are significant shortcomings in the management of the loading and unloading areas; the management of the areas where refined oil is loaded and unloaded is not standardized, vehicle parking is not properly organized, and the procedures for inspecting and registering loading and unloading vehicles are unclear. An LPG tank truck with the license plate number Lu NI226 was inspected on June 29th, but there was no record of any loading or unloading activities, and the operators were unaware of the specific details regarding those operations. 40. The loading platforms for liquefied gas, gasoline, and diesel lack collision prevention facilities, and large bird nests are located in the center of the two tall lighting towers in the finished product filling area, posing a fire hazard. 41. There are weak links in the management of the refined oil loading platform; there are no safety anti-collision facilities in the loading area ； No vehicle anti-slip shims or warning signs for loading operations ； The inspection and registration details for vehicles entering the site are incomplete; only checks for fire helmets and records of entry and exit times are available. 42. In the safety inspection confirmation form for tank truck loading and unloading, the operator failed to confirm the inspection items at various stages for 4 trucks – before loading/unloading, during loading/unloading, and after completion of loading/unloading; furthermore, the escorts for 10 trucks did not fill out the inspection confirmation form. 43. There is no warning sign indicating that loading is in progress at the loading station. 44. Damage to the pump housing of the pumps in the unloading pump area. 45. When loading n-butane, the vapor line is not connected as required by the operating procedures, which does not meet the requirements for loading liquefied hydrocarbons. III. Chain alarm system, static lightning protection grounding, and issues related to safety accessories: 1. The alarm signals generated in the analysis room of the gas separation unit were not transmitted to the control room, preventing the control room from monitoring the situation on site; this does not comply with the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm Systems of Flammable and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industries\". 2. The gas alarm sensor in the liquid chlorine room in the East Area is lacking a protective cover, and the hook of the electric hoist is homemade. 3. In the pump area of the alkylation unit, there is no grounded piping network; instead, all pumps are simply grounded and connected to each other. 4. The fire alarm in the combined MTBE and alkylation operation room is installed inside the instrument cabinet room, which makes it difficult for operators to inspect. This does not comply with the requirements of the “Code for Design of Automatic Fire Alarm Systems”. 5. The locations of grounding points stated in the lightning protection grounding inspection report do not match the actual site conditions; there is no ledger or diagram regarding lightning protection grounding. 6. There are no breakaway connectors for the lightning protection grounding of tanks V-501, V-503, and V-505, which does not comply with the requirements of the “Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings”. 7. In the analysis room of the 40,000 m3/h hydrogen production plant, the alarm signals are not transmitted to the control room; as a result, the control room is unable to monitor the situation on site, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Flammable and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industries\". 8. The static eliminator of the hydrogen production unit is directly connected to the ladder, rather than being connected to the nearby grounding network. 9. In the first half of 2017, the interlock automation rate was 81.08%; it was planned to address this issue during the maintenance period in March 2018, which does not meet the company’s requirement of an interlock automation rate of 100%. 10. The motor of pump P00AB in the 1.2 million-ton catalytic unit lacks an anti-static grounding system. 11. The fire alarm system in the control room indicated that at 9:43, a flammable gas detector malfunctioned. The site was contacted for handling; however, this was not recorded in the “Fire Control Room Duty Log”. The records were not filled out in a timely manner. 12. The manual valves of the three safety valves on the liquid ammonia inlet and outlet lines were not opened. 13. In the control room, the air conditioning system, the fire alarm system, and the gas detection instrument alarm system all share one switch, which is fixed directly to the wall; there is no switch box, posing a risk of electric shock injuries. 14. The combustible gas alarm does not have a certificate of conformity on site. 15. Some pressure gauges were not tested. 16. There is no certification for a fixed alarm outside the fan room. 17. The pressure gauge of the loading pump has not been inspected within the required time frame. 18. The lightning protection grounding in the loading pump area is disconnected. 19. Procedures were carried out to deactivate one combustible gas alarm. It has been out of service since March 24, 2017, and has not been put back into use since then; no control measures were implemented during this period. 20. The two four-in-one portable alarms have not been tested. 21. The cover of the explosion-proof wiring box for the interlock instruments of the gasoline hydrogenation cycle hydrogen compressor was not tightened properly. 22. Each device lacks records or diagrams related to lightning and static electricity protection grounding; only the original design drawings are available. In many of the lightning and static electricity protection grounding inspection reports, the names of the grounding points are identical, and upon inquiry with the management staff, it was not possible to determine how each test point corresponds to the actual points on site. 23. The interlocking equipment was subjected to interlocking verification, but the recorded information lacks authenticity, and the year of the commissioning date is missing. 24. There are no ledgers or layout plans for lightning protection grounding. Some grounding points in the lightning protection grounding test report lack identification numbers, making it impossible to correlate the test report with the actual site conditions. 25. In the lightning protection and grounding test report, the permissible resistance value is 30Ω; this does not meet the requirements stipulated in the “Code for Design of Petroleum Depots”. 26. In the Q-1 pump area, there are manual alarm buttons and audible/visual alarms, but they are not connected to a remote monitoring system; this fails to comply with the requirements outlined in the “Code for Design of Detection and Alarm Systems for Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Enterprises”. 27. There is no test report on lightning and static electricity protection grounding for the spring of 2017. Management reported that they did not engage a qualified organization to conduct the tests; instead, they carried out the tests themselves. There are no records or diagrams related to lightning and static electricity protection grounding for any of the installations. 28. There are no disconnect cards for static grounding in the pump area; furthermore, there are no records or diagrams related to lightning and static protection grounding, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings\". 29. Some interlocks are not in operation; for example, the interlocks related to the temperature and pressure of the lubricating oil in the new hydrogen compressor for diesel hydrogenation are on bypass, and the interlock for low liquid level at high pressure is also on bypass. 30. Random inspections revealed that 4 hydrogen detection alarms (with serial numbers 16521071, 16521072, 16521073, and 16521074) had not been inspected due to having expired (their validity period ended on May 3, 2017). 31. The change management system was not strictly implemented, and the procedures for disabling process interlocks due to changes were inadequate. For example, in the application form for disabling the low liquid level interlock in the cold high-pressure section of the diesel hydrogenation unit (1.8 million tons per year), the risk analysis stated that \"if the interlock is not disabled… the unit will stop operating\", which was an incorrect analysis ； The control measure is “using DCS control valves to regulate the liquid level”, which is not targeted ； The application for low-flow automatic protection for the riser feed in the two catalytic cracking units was withdrawn on May 26, 2016; the reason given was that the flow meters were prone to failure. Since these flow meter failures had not been resolved, the interlock shutdown was carried out without the approval of the design team ； On August 2, 2016, the interlocks for the thrust bearing temperatures TE-50101-50108 of the compressors in the diesel hydrogenation unit C101, as well as the thrust bearing pad temperatures TE50423A/B and TE50424A/B, were removed. The procedures for removing these interlocks were carried out, and the interlocks were restored; however, the necessary approval procedures for reactivating the interlocks were not followed, resulting in a lack of a closed-loop management system ； There was a fault with the instrument LT11002, which is related to the interlock for low liquid level in the cold high-pressure section of the diesel hydrogenation unit; temporary measures were taken to disable this interlock, and it has now been over 1 month since then ； The interlock circuit calibration for the two-stage catalytic unit was carried out on June 9, 2016, and all tests showed normal results. However, the calibration records do not include the specific interlock values used during calibration, making it impossible to determine the actual values at the time of interlock activation. For example, the high-limit interlock value for PT101-1 is 0.99 MPa; the calibration records only state that everything was normal, without indicating the actual interlock value. 32. Placing the combustible gas detection and alarm devices together with the DCS control system does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industries\". 33. There are many flange connections in the compressor room of the isomerization unit that could potentially be sources of leaks, but there are no combustible gas detectors in that room. 34. There are weaknesses in the safety instrumentation; all logic configurations for the interlock systems are carried out within the DCS, and no emergency shutdown system has been installed ； The DCS process alarm information system does not have sound alerts. 35. The H2S/SO2 online analyzer enclosure in the sulfur recovery unit’s proportional analysis system is a confined space. There are sampling pipes inside this enclosure, which poses a risk of leakage; however, there are no toxic gas detectors or alarm devices within the enclosure, and it does not have positive pressure ventilation. 36. The change management system is not implemented strictly; interlocks are removed and restored without authorization ； Eight interlock points were removed, including those for the flame detectors FI101A/B and FI201A/B in the acidic gas combustion units F101 and F201 of the sulfur recovery system, the high-high interlocks for the inlet air pressure of F101 and F201, the low-low liquid level interlock for E101, the flame detectors FI301A/B in the online heating furnace F301, the flame detection interlock for the flue gas incineration furnace F302, and the low-low liquid level interlock for E302; no approval procedures were followed, nor was any interlock registration carried out ； During the inspection, the process engineers were questioned; they arbitrarily restored the high-air-pressure interlock at the F101 inlet without conducting any risk assessment or verification, indicating significant deficiencies in interlock management. 37. The 3 combustible gas detectors in the propylene refining section lack on-site audible and visual alarm devices, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Enterprises\". 38. The safety instrument system for polymerization reactions is shared with the process control system; no separate safety instrument interlock system is provided, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Code for Design of Safety Instruments in Petrochemical Industries\". 39. The position switches for the spray valves in the spherical tank area are of explosion-proof design; however, the cable connectors in the field position switch junction boxes are not sealed, failing to meet the explosion-proof requirements. 40. The process control parameter for the crude oil storage tanks T-303 and T-304 is to keep the temperature at or below 40°C, but the DCS temperature alarm setting is set at 50°C. 41. On July 6, 2017, there was a malfunction with the float in tank T501, but no record was made of it ； The float alarm device of tank T503 is damaged and has been removed, but the high liquid level interlock shows to be in operational status. 42 and 134 units for detecting flammable and toxic gases had reached their expiration date on June 1, 2017; it was not until June 7 that they were sent to the local calibration agency for inspection, resulting in their use beyond the approved period. 43. The T503 high-limit float level interlock detection instrument was damaged and removed; the interlock system was also disabled. This matter was only reported at the safety production coordination meeting on June 29, 2017, without any approval procedures or risk assessments being carried out. 44. The combustible and toxic gas alarm system was designed in conjunction with the process control system, without separate alarm monitoring being provided. 45. The opening degree of the valve in front of the safety valve in the steam system is approximately 70%; it is not fully open, which fails to meet the requirements for pressure release in case of overpressure, and does not comply with the requirements of the \"Safety Technical Inspection Regulations for Fixed Pressure Vessels\". 46. None of the buildings or control rooms are equipped with lightning protection facilities or lightning conductors, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Design of Lightning Protection of Buildings. 47. According to company regulations, it is necessary to check the instrument parameters and interlock settings before driving, but this was not done in practice, and there are no records of such interlock checks. 48. At present, instrument control valves are used as substitutes for the isolation valves used in safety instrumented interlocks, and they are unable to achieve rapid closing or opening. 49. The system was not implemented properly: no tests were conducted on the instrument interlocks when the sulfonation reactor was started, nor were any calibration checks performed, and there are no records of such calibrations. 50. The alkylation process does not have interlocks related to the reaction temperature, cooling water, and isobutylene feed, which fails to meet the requirements specified in \"Safety Control Requirements, Key Monitoring Parameters, and Recommended Control Schemes for High-Risk Chemical Processes Under Strict Supervision.\" 51. The combustible and toxic gas analyzer is designed in integration with the DCS system, without separate input/output cards, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Design Code for Detection and Alarm of Combustible and Toxic Gases in Petrochemical Industries\". 52. The bottom vent single valve of the V-501 level gauge lacks a blind plate, and the oil line vent of P-606A is without a pipe cap, which does not meet the requirements of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Petrochemical Enterprises. 53. The requirements for putting safety valves into operation are not specifically defined in the company’s regulations; at the site, out of the 8 bolt holes on the outlet side of the safety valve, only 4 bolts were used for tightening, while the remaining 4 bolts were not installed. 54. The inaccurate placement of red labels indicating the upper and lower limits on pressure gauges is a common phenomenon. 55. Level gauges and pressure gauges on mechanically sealed oil tanks generally lack upper and lower limit markings. IV. Construction Operations 1. At the construction site of the facility under construction in the East Area, acetylene cylinders and oxygen cylinders were transported together and stored at excessive heights; furthermore, these cylinders lacked caps and shock-absorbing rings, failing to meet the requirements stipulated in the \"Regulations on Safety Supervision of Cylinders\". (Safety and Environmental Protection Department) 2. In the “Pre-Job Safety Analysis Form” regarding the welding work for adding a new pipeline to the gas manifold in Refining and Chemical Workshop B on April 30, 2017, only one person participated in the pre-job safety analysis. This does not comply with the company’s management regulations, which stipulate that “a JSA team should be formed by selecting personnel from management, technical, safety, and operational departments.” Furthermore, the pre-task safety analysis conducted before entering tank QG5001 in Refining Plant C for cleaning purposes did not identify the risk of \"poisoning and asphyxiation.\" The times of the two testing analyses were 9:50 and 12:57 respectively, which does not meet the company’s requirement to conduct testing analyses every 2 hours for work in confined spaces. (Ministry of Safety and Environmental Protection) 3. In the schematic diagrams of the “inspection range” for multiple inspection work orders in Workshop C of the Western Area’s refining and chemical processing facility, the boundaries of the work safety zone are not defined; there is a lack of criteria for establishing on-site safety zones as well as standards for inspection and assessment. Moreover, local employees are unaware of these boundary limits, which poses a risk of them entering dangerous areas and being exposed to radiation. (Ministry of Safety and Environmental Protection) 4. The manholes of the three gasoline storage tanks, V501, V503, and V505, were opened for maintenance work, but blind plates were not installed at the tank inlet and outlet valves as required. 5. On April 24, 2017, when hot work was carried out inside tank V2005, the permit for safe work in confined spaces indicated that the time of the analytical test was 5:50, while the permit became effective at 6:35; thus, the work was carried out 45 minutes after the analytical test, which violates the company’s policy stating that the interval between the analytical test and the start of hot work should not exceed 30 minutes. Additionally, the approval date on the work permit was altered twice ； The final approval date by the safety department on the hot work safety permit was April 25, but the actual start date of the work was April 24. 6. For the anti-corrosion work at the site of the installation, scaffolding was erected on a large scale; there were no sweepers on the scaffolding, no vertical supports on the working levels, and the working levels consisted of single planks only. No protective measures were in place above the walkways, and no warning signs were attached to the scaffolding, which does not meet the requirements of the \"Technical Specifications for Safety in the Construction of Petrochemical Projects\". 7. Contractor management needs further standardization. Inspections of the construction site in the intermediate tank area as well as relevant documents revealed that there was inadequate control over the entry of workers. During random checks, it was found that the worker engaged in hot work, “Ding Zhichao”, had not received the company’s entry training, while “Chen Mou” answered two questions incorrectly on his exam paper but was still marked correct ； The content of the Construction Organization Design is incomplete, lacking requirements for managing concurrent operations ； The on-site supervisors were insufficient in number and lacked the necessary skills. There were over 10 hazardous operations taking place at the site, yet only 2 supervisors were assigned by the local authorities; thus, the supervision capacity was severely inadequate. When asked one of those supervisors about the aspects of supervision required for welding work inside tanks, he failed to answer even one question ； The work order was not processed properly, with the expiration date being altered ； There are numerous violations at the site; these mainly manifest as cylinders used for welding being placed too close to flammable substances such as paint, as well as to ignition sources like welders and areas where welding is being carried out. In lifting operations, welding work is conducted beneath the crane arms. The scaffolding planks used are of a single type and not laid out in accordance with the specified requirements. When welding is performed inside tanks, no safety isolation transformers are used, which violates the requirements regarding the use of safe voltage in confined spaces within metal containers ； The site floor is in a mess, with cut metal scraps scattered throughout the maintenance area, posing a high risk of personal injuries such as falls and bruises. 8. The management of permits for hazardous operations is not proper; one of the permits inspected, with Number 2017051302, which is a permit for secondary level hot work, had an issue – the time interval between the hot work analysis and the start of the work was 1 hour, which does not comply with the company’s policy requiring that this interval be no more than 30 minutes ； The validity period of the hot work permit is two and a half days, which does not meet the company’s policy that stipulates the maximum duration for level 2 hot work to be 12 hours. These two issues have appeared multiple times on multiple work permits. 9. The management of work permits for hazardous operations is not proper; the approval sections for temporary power usage permits lack signed confirmations, which does not comply with the company’s policy requiring confirmation by the maintenance unit. Moreover, it is not clear at which level within the maintenance unit the signature should be provided ； There is no information regarding the contractor’s organization on the hot work permit, making it impossible to identify the contractor. This hinders inspections related to on-site supervision and the contractor’s training and education. For instance, in one of the permits, the hot worker “Gao” has no recorded training history. Additionally, there are instances where the time of hot work analysis and the date of the hot work have been altered ； The manhole of the on-site naphtha tank was opened, and there were clear signs of people having entered it; however, no permit for working in a confined space was provided. In the permit for working in the V401 confined space on July 4, the interval between testing and analysis was more than 1 hour, which does not comply with the company’s requirement to conduct monitoring at least once per hour. 10. During the maintenance of the V-109 straight-run diesel tank, the manholes were open, with no signs prohibiting entry, and the inlet and outlet valves lacked blind flanges for isolation. 11. The processing of permits for hazardous operations is not stringent; for the hot work safety permit (No. 2017-E-015), the time when the foreman inspected the permit predates the approval time, indicating that the foreman inspected it prematurely ； The old tank was rust-removed and coated with anti-corrosive material, yet a scaffold was set up without obtaining a permit for working at heights. 12. Employees on shift on Saturdays and Sundays work as usual, as these days are not considered holidays; therefore, no enhanced management measures are applied to hot work operations. The company’s management has a wrong understanding of what constitutes a holiday, and the regulations regarding hot work do not fully comply with the company’s rules on enhanced procedures for hot work during holidays. Additionally, the regulations for hot work specify conflicting frequencies for testing and analysis in case of Level 1 hot work – the regulations state 60 minutes at one point and 30 minutes at another – making it impossible to implement these rules effectively. The fire safety regulations also mention the use of 1211 fire extinguishers, **which have been phased out long ago; the company actually does not have any of such extinguishers either. The company has failed to review and revise its regulations in a timely manner. 13. The management of work permit for hazardous operations is not proper; in the section regarding firework operations that specifies \"the shift supervisor must verify the permit before starting the work\", it is always the construction unit that provides the confirmation signature. The closure procedures for firework operations and work at heights are also carried out by personnel from the construction unit, with no signature confirmation from the local unit ； The approval sequence for some hot work safety permits is incorrect; the shift supervisor checks the permits ahead of the scheduled approval time ； The operation time on individual permits was altered; the interval between the hot work analysis and the actual hot work exceeded 30 minutes. 14. The management of hot work operations is not standardized, and the rules are not enforced strictly. Company policies stipulate that hot work of category A and B should be approved by company leaders, but in practice, all such approvals are given by workshop leaders. 15. A fixed fire point is set outside the control room of the hydrogenation unit; the safety distance from surrounding units is insufficient. 16. The management of special operations such as hot work is not standardized; no detection of flammable or toxic gases is conducted, with only oxygen content being measured. 17. Special operations were not carried out in a proper manner: the fire analysis test forms and records for fire-related work did not indicate the sampling time, and the lifting safety operation permit did not include the license number of the person in charge of the lifting operation. 18. For hot work operations, no combustible gas analysis was conducted as required. Upon inspection of the unit’s Level 1 Hot Work Safety Permit numbered 2017-5-31, it was found that only H2S in the environment was tested; the concentration of combustible gases was not analyzed. The hot work commenced at 8:30 on May 24 and concluded at 17:30 on the same day, lasting for over 8 hours. 19. The management of special operations was not proper. Examining the fire safety permit with Number 2017041201 for level 1 operations, the task involved electrical welding work in a sedimentation tank, scheduled from 8:00 to 17:00 on April 12th – thus exceeding an 8-hour limit for using fire. No fire hazard analysis was conducted at the start of the work; analysis data was only available at 13:40. Additionally, since this was work carried out in a confined space, no permit for such operations was obtained ； For the No. 20170110601 First-Class Hot Work Safety Permit, the hot work was scheduled to commence at 8:00. The gas analysis for hot work was conducted at 8:30. The actual hot work period lasted from 8:00 to 17:00, exceeding the permitted duration of 8 hours. 20. The toxic substance analysis specified in the confined space safety operation permit does not indicate the specific names of the substances to be analyzed. 21. The safety management of hot work is highly irregular; for example, in the case of the company’s level-2 hot work operations that lasted 72 hours, only a single hot work analysis was conducted at the start of the work, with no such analysis carried out before each day’s work began ； The applying entity, safety management department, etc. have no approval comments or approval timeline ； There are no records of completion acceptance, which does not comply with the requirements of the “Safety Specifications for Special Operations in Chemical Production Units”. 22. The safety supervision for special operations is not proper. Upon inspection of the level-1 hot work safety permit with reference number Q/DCG1317-2017, it was found that the hot work lasted for more than 8 hours; the worker’s specialty and certificate number were not filled in, no hot work analysis was conducted, and the person responsible for safety training did not sign ； A random check of one permit for work in a confined space revealed that it had no serial number, no toxic gas analysis was conducted, and the completion acceptance section did not indicate any acceptance details. 23. The safety management of hot work is not standardized, and the safeguards for hot work are inadequate ； The control measures for hot work were not signed and confirmed item by item. 24. The contractor’s management records are incomplete, and the construction plan does not match the actual construction work. 25. The safety management of special operations is not standardized: the firework operation safety permit lacks the special project identification number of the person performing the work, and toxic gas analysis is not conducted for operations in confined spaces. 26. The safety management of special operations is not standardized; the approver for hot work only signs without providing any approval comments, and no subsequent hot work analysis is carried out after the operation is interrupted ； Toxic gas analysis was not conducted for work in confined spaces. V. Emergency Response 1. Issues were identified during the emergency drill for liquefied gas pump leaks conducted by Shift 3 of Process Unit C in the West Area’s refining and chemical processing facility on June 24, 2017: upon detecting a leak, power should be cut off immediately; instead, the pump should be stopped first ； After the emergency response is completed, on-site environmental testing and analysis should be carried out; production can only be resumed once the results are satisfactory. However, this step was missing in the drill. 2. In 2017, the comprehensive emergency drill procedures were incomplete and contained errors; procedures for reporting fires and providing first aid were missing. The scenario outlined was a leak from a naphtha tank, but it was later stated that gasoline was the substance leaking. Yet none of these issues were identified in the final evaluation of the emergency drill. 3. Fire emergency management is inadequate; the \"Emergency Drill Plan for Liquefied Gas Tanker Leaks\" specifies that the chief commander should issue the order to \"act in accordance with the plan\", yet upon investigation it was found that the company had not developed any emergency plan. 4. Two emergency drills were conducted in the first half of 2017, but there are no records of these drills. 5. The pressure of the air tanks in the two positive-pressure air respirators installed on site is too low; one has a pressure of 12 MPa and the other 18 MPa, which does not meet the regulatory requirements. 6. The enterprise has two major primary hazard sources. The emergency response plan revised in May 2017 did not include specific plans for dealing with these major hazard sources. The company’s management approved this plan on May 10, 2017, but its effective date was set as May 1, 2017. 7. There are weaknesses in emergency management: the company’s emergency plans are not issued after being signed by the person in charge, and there is no sign-in sheet for experts participating in the plan review ； There is no annual plan for emergency drills ； There is no sign-in sheet for conducting emergency drills; the records of these drills are not detailed, there is no signature of the person who made the records, and there is no summary of the drills. 8. Emergency management is not standardized; the validity period of the existing emergency plan expired on March 19, 2017. The company’s newly revised plan was reviewed by three external experts on April 24, 2017, but the company’s management has yet to sign it for issuance, nor has it submitted it to the local authorities for registration. 9. The lessons learned from the \"6.5\" accident at Jinyu Petrochemical were not properly implemented, and no on-site response plan for loading operations at the company’s hazardous chemicals loading station was developed ； There are no records or evaluations of the emergency drills, the summaries of these drills are inadequate, and there are no measures for improvement nor information on the emergency resources that were utilized. 10. The lessons learned from the serious explosion and fire incident that occurred on June 5 at Shandong Linyi Jinyu Petrochemical Co., Ltd. were not properly implemented; no on-site response plan for handling hazardous chemicals during loading operations was developed by the company ； There are no records or evaluations of the emergency drills, the summaries of these drills are inadequate, and there are no measures for improvement nor information on the emergency resources that were utilized. VI. Education and Training 1. The safety responsibility system outlined in the \"Safety Production Management System\" refers generally to the \"safety responsibilities of employees,\" while the \"Safety Production Responsibility List\" specifies the safety responsibilities for employees in specific positions; these two documents contain inconsistent information. In employee safety training, regarding the question of \"safety responsibilities for one’s own position,\" employees provide two different answers, yet both are considered correct. There are issues with the company’s management systems and the criteria used for grading training assessments. 2. The safety education management for contractors upon entry needs to be further standardized; the scoring of examination papers for training is inaccurate, with some incorrect or missed answers being marked as correct. 3. The alkylation plant has a total of 18 operators, working in three shifts; each shift consists of 1 shift leader, 2 operators for internal tasks, and 3 operators for external tasks. However, only 6 people hold certificates for operating special equipment, 2 of whom are assigned to each shift. 4. There were errors in scoring the contractor’s entry training test: the actual score was 56 points, which is below the passing mark, yet it was recorded as 60 points, indicating a pass. The overall scores for the contractor’s staff’s entry training were low, and there were also employees who failed their safety training; neither of these situations led to re-conducting the training or exams. 5. The company’s three-level safety education management is inadequate; only safety training upon arrival at the facility was provided to external contractors, with no workshop-level safety training given. 6. Personnel working with chemical automation control instruments do not hold the required certifications. 7. The third-level safety training is not conducted properly; no such training has been provided for the company’s management and office staff, and the safety training records are incomplete. Of the company’s 18 employees, only 3 have records of having received third-level training. 8. No separate safety production education and training plan was seen. 9. Certificates proving that the key persons in charge of the enterprise and safety management personnel have passed assessments on safety production knowledge and skills are not provided. 10. No special operation qualification certificate for forklift operators was seen. VII. Job Responsibilities and Rules and Regulations 1. The \"Work Safety Management System\" states that \"for confined spaces with a large volume, at least three sampling points – one at the top, one in the middle, and one at the bottom – should be designated in each working area.\" This description is vague; it does not clarify what constitutes a \"large\" confined space. In practice, when cleaning the confined space inside tank 5001, only two sampling points were checked. The system lacks practicality and is not properly implemented. 2. The job responsibilities and safety responsibilities are identical; the requirement of having dual responsibilities for each position has not been met. 3. There are contradictions among the various regulations: the \"Compilation of Safety Production Regulations\" stipulates that the person in charge of production or safety in an enterprise shall issue the safety permits for \"special\" and \"first-class\" hot work, whereas the \"Safety Production Responsibility System\" specifies that it is the person in charge of issuing permits for \"special-grade\" hot work. 4. There are 4 deputy general managers, each responsible for different tasks, but only one of them has safety responsibilities ； Different positions share the same safety responsibility. 5. The safety production responsibility system has not been revised; most of its contents relate to job responsibilities and are unrelated to safety work. 6. It failed to provide the labor contracts signed with employees Wang Zhiqiang and Wang Zhigang, and the information regarding occupational hazards in those contracts did not mention the risk of hydrogen sulfide present in the respective jobs. 7. There are deficiencies in system management; the coverage of relevant systems is incomplete. There are radioactive sources in the coking workshop, but no management system for these radioactive sources has been established ； Some of the system regulations are incomplete; the firework operation management system does not specify the requirements regarding the frequency of testing and analysis for such operations. 8. Safety responsibilities are not defined for each specific position; there are no safety responsibilities assigned to the deputy finance director, and various departments have also failed to establish specific safety responsibilities for their respective positions. 9. The safety responsibilities for each position are not clearly defined; for example, all operators use the same set of responsibilities, while the safety department only has the responsibilities specified for its manager. 10. Safety responsibilities are not assigned to specific positions; for example, the three vice presidents of the company share one safety responsibility, various departments only have safety responsibilities related to the department itself and its manager, and no safety responsibilities have been defined for different positions within a department. 11. The systems have not been further revised and improved; for example, the fire management system lacks requirements for the management of fire pump rooms and foam stations. 12. The enterprises fail to fulfill their primary responsibilities for safe production, and their managers and safety officers are not familiar with the safety management requirements for special operations such as hot work. 13. The “Compilation of Safety Production Management Systems” includes 2 systems related to occupational health; in addition, 13 additional occupational health systems required by standards and regulations have been established, resulting in overlaps and repetitions among these systems. 14. No records of the company’s safety production meetings were found. 15. Confusion between rules and regulations and the responsibility systems for various types of personnel ； The safety production responsibility system is exactly the same as that of other companies, word for word; it does not match the actual conditions of this company and is merely a formality. 16. The establishment of safety production management agencies and full-time safety management personnel is not clear. 17. There is a shortage of full-time safety management personnel. With over 1,300 employees, the requirement is to have 2% of them as full-time safety managers, which means at least 26 people should be assigned to this role; however, only 22 such personnel are actually in place. 18. The safety production responsibilities of the chairman and the general manager are exactly the same, while the responsibilities of the deputy general manager for safety are not clearly defined alongside those of the other deputy general managers. 19. The safety production responsibility system and responsibilities are not clearly defined; there is overlap ； The responsibilities of the safety director are also unclear ； There is a position for the chief engineer, but no one is actually assigned to it; there is a mismatch between the staff and the positions. 20. The management system is inadequate; for example, there are no regular inspections of on-site level gauges, nor are any corresponding management requirements in place ； There are no corresponding management requirements for equipment lubrication management (the five fixed principles and three-stage filtration) ； The information regarding equipment maintenance (such as the regular rotation of standby pumps) is not detailed enough ； No changes were seen in the management system or the management system for the use and maintenance of personal protective equipment. 21. The safety production responsibility system does not contain any provisions regarding the chairman’s responsibilities in terms of safety production. VIII. Hazard Rectification 1. In the rectification report for the issues identified during the inspection of Refining and Chemical Processing Workshop C on June 2, 2017, the corrective measure for the issue of \"an unusual odor around Pump P1388B\" was listed as \"already resolved.\" However, this measure was not specific; it did not indicate exactly how the problem was addressed, the cause of the odor, or whether tests showed satisfactory results. As a result, the issue was not truly resolved. 2. The hazard remediation project related to the \"absence of a combustible gas alarm on the second floor of the rich gas compressor in the coking workshop\" has been completed. During on-site verification, it was found that the newly installed alarm was powered off and not in operation. 3. Check the “Orders for Rectification of Hidden Dangers” that were completed by April 7, 2017; these orders lack identification numbers. There are 10 items that needed to be rectified, but there are no records of the completion of these rectifications nor any documentation related to the entire process of management. 4. Safety inspections and the handling of potential hazards are not conducted in a proper manner; for example, those who participated in the safety inspections did not sign their names, and there is no follow-up to address those identified hazards that have not been rectified. 5. The instrument management system requires regular identification of potential hazards and inspection of instruments, but there are no records of such inspections or checks. 6. The items identified as problems or potential risks that were not rectified within the specified time frame have not been followed up and verified. For example, on June 6, 2017, it was detected that the pipes in the pipe gallery on the east side of the horizontal tank were severely corroded and lacked labeling; corrective actions were required to be completed by June 13, 2017, yet there are no records of follow-up on these actions nor any preventive measures taken. 7. Safety inspections and the rectification of potential hazards are not carried out in a proper manner. For example, referring to the notice regarding the rectification of hazards for enterprise number (2016) 42, the two issues identified during the inspection on November 7, 2016, were not assigned to any department responsible for their rectification; the person in charge of the rectification did not sign off on it, the necessary corrective actions were not taken, and the results of follow-up checks were not recorded. 8. The closed-loop management process for addressing safety inspection findings is not implemented properly; grassroots units fail to provide written confirmation after rectifying the identified issues. IX. Inspection 1. The inspection certificate for crane H-001 in the alkylation unit is not available on site, and the equipment code in the inspection report does not match that in the certificate. 2. The control room of Production Department 2 is equipped with only one portable gas detector; the number of such detectors is insufficient and there are no backups. From April to June 2017, this detector was under repair, leaving no detectors available at the post, which poses a significant risk to employees carrying out inspections. 3. The inspection reports for the two safety valves on the same container contain inconsistent descriptions regarding the operating pressure, and the operating pressures of the safety valves on multiple containers of the same type also vary. 4. The safety valves inspected lacked quality certificates and approval documents; in particular, the safety valves on the ammonia storage tanks could not prove that they were designed specifically for ammonia use, and the labels on them were also unreadable. 5. The set pressure values of the two safety valves on the V-601 liquefied gas tank differed when inspected on-site, yet were the same as recorded in the ledger; meanwhile, the set pressure values indicated on the safety valve inspection reports were also different, creating confusion. In the calibration report for one of the safety valves, the set pressure value was listed as 0.78 MPa, while the set pressure itself was 1.84 MPa – these two values did not match. 6. The safety valve of the liquid nitrogen storage tank is not included in the company’s inventory of safety valves for unified management, nor is it subject to regular inspection, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Rules for Periodic Inspection of Pressure Vessels\". 7. The pressure vessel inspection report and the pressure vessel usage license number do not match. 8. The expiration dates for the two safety valves of the liquid nitrogen tank are February 2017; they have not been inspected since then. The two safety valves of the other tank lack labels, and it is unknown whether they have been inspected. Upon investigation, it was found that none of these four safety valves are recorded in the company’s safety valve register, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Rules for Periodic Inspection of Pressure Vessels\". 9. A total of 5 safety valves in the liquid nitrogen storage tank, nitrogen storage tank, and their associated pipelines are not included in the company’s safety valve registry for unified management, nor are they subject to regular inspections, which does not comply with the requirements of the \"Rules for Periodic Inspection of Pressure Vessels\". 10. The safety valves of the C801A and C4 compressors have exceeded their calibration deadline without being inspected; the safety valves of the C801B and C4 compressors have not been calibrated at all. Upon checking the records of safety valves, these two valves are not listed there. 11. The pressure gauge on the oil and gas recovery equipment is not being monitored. 12. The pressure vessel was inspected in April 2017, and to date no inspection report has been issued; only a notice regarding the inspection findings for special equipment exists, and this notice expires after July 10th. 13. The inspection reports of the safety valves checked randomly revealed that 4 of these safety valves had not been inspected within the required time frame. 14. Special equipment is being used beyond its inspection deadline in violation of regulations. For example, the registration form for the ammonia synthesis tower pressure vessel shows that the vessel belongs to Category III, with the next inspection date set for September 24, 2015. The entity using the pressure vessel applied to extend its usage period until September 23, 2016. As of September 24, 2016, no approval for continued use was obtained, yet the equipment continues to be used in production. 15. Safety inspections and the rectification of potential hazards were not carried out in a proper manner: there were no records of the inspections, the personnel involved did not sign their names, there was no specified deadline for addressing the issues, and no verification or signing was done on an item-by-item basis during the inspection of the rectifications. 16. There is no inspection certificate available for the crane at the coking workshop site. X. Energy isolation: 1. The vent valve at the outlet of the gasoline pump discharges directly into the environment, without being blocked, fitted with a blind flange, or captured in a sealed system. 2. Energy isolation was not implemented during the maintenance of the tar pump. 3. Certain management systems are lacking; blind plates are only used during inspection and maintenance, and no blind plates are installed on the operating equipment. However, two blind plates were found during inspections, and the company does not know how many blind plates are present on site in total, nor has it established any regulations for the daily management of these blind plates. 4. The decommissioned equipment for storing alkaline solutions was not isolated from energy sources. 5. No energy isolation was carried out when the two acid tanks used for sulfur recovery were taken out of service, and the two valves connecting the rich liquid to the regeneration line were left open without blind flanges for isolation. XI. Labor Protection 1. Anti-static work shoes were not provided for employees. 2. The gas protection equipment available in the control room is lacking in filters designed to protect against benzene and xylene. 3. Labor protection measures are inadequate; managers enter the production area without wearing protective shoes. 4. Insufficient provision of personal protective equipment; during the inspection, it was found that one operator at the loading station was not wearing a work uniform, goggles, or protective shoes ； There is 1 operator in the pressure room who is not wearing protective shoes ； The company’s management staff do not have protective shoes. XII. Process Parameters and Operating Procedures 1. The operating procedures do not specify the control steps and measures for the initial oil flow rate during loading/unloading, as well as the normal flow rate in the storage tanks. 2. The gas temperature entering the benzene washing tower exceeded the process specifications (the specified value was less than 30°C, while the actual value was 33.6°C). The air flow rate into the regeneration tower also exceeded the process specifications (the specified range was 500–2000 m3/h, while the actual value was 2098 m3/h). 3. The operating procedures specify that the initial flow rate of oil during loading/unloading and storage in the tanks should not exceed 1 m/s, while the normal flow rate is 4.5 m/s; however, no control measures or procedures are outlined in the operating procedures to address these requirements. 4. The assessment of safety operation procedures is conducted on a monthly basis; on-site inspections only cover data up to July 2016. 5. The operating procedures need further standardization; there are no process parameters specified in the safety technical regulations ； Lack of procedures for switching on cold exchange equipment ； The safety technical regulations for liquefied gas storage tanks in the storage and transportation workshop are rather general, lacking specific details and requirements regarding storage, transportation, and process control. 6. The process parameters need further improvement. The enterprise has established control parameters for the process, but there are shortcomings; for example, the catalytic cracking unit does not have a defined lower limit for the inventory level in the stripper section, and the lower limit control parameter for the liquid level in Storage and Transportation Workshop’s No. 2 floating-roof gasoline tank is lower than the height at which the floating disk touches the bottom. 7. Some process parameters exceed the specified limits; for example, the differential pressure between the two units in the catalytic cracking unit should not be greater than 38 kPa, but the DCS shows a value of 41 kPa ； The high-pressure inlet temperature parameter for the diesel hydrogenation unit is specified to be no more than 40°C, while the DCS shows 40.5°C. 8. There are issues with the process records; for example, there is no record of the shift handover for the gas separation unit between 9:00 and 15:00 on June 30 ； MTBE plant shift handover record; records for 16:00 to 21:00 have been completed ； Operation records for tanks 305-306 in the storage and transportation workshop: the records for 15:00-16:00 are not filled in. 9. The temperature control criteria for diesel sent out from the atmospheric and vacuum distillation unit are not specified in the Operating Procedures; different control criteria for downstream units and intermediate tank areas are not defined therein. 10. In the ignition procedure for the gas burners of the heating furnace as outlined in the \"Operating Procedures for the Heating Furnace in Atmospheric and Vacuum Distillation Units,\" the specific requirements regarding the analysis of explosive gases in the furnace before ignition and the operation of the pilot light are not clearly specified. 11. The operating procedures have deficiencies: they were not improved in accordance with the \"Chlorine Safety Regulations\" and the \"Technical Safety Regulations for the Use of Liquid Chlorine\", and there are no procedures for unloading chlorine cylinders or loading bromine. The procedures include a \"Boiler Operation Procedure\", yet no boilers are actually present on site. 12. The process parameters are incomplete; some key parameters are not included in the control framework for these process parameters, resulting in significant gaps. For example, the temperature on the water side of the chlorine vaporizer and the chlorine pressure in the vaporizer are not covered by the control measures for process parameters ； The \"Safety Operating Procedures for Distillation Process\" posted on the wall at the site specifies a finished product flow rate of \"0.2–0.5 m3/h\", which does not match this value specified in the controlled version of the operating procedures ； No upper limit control criteria for the furnace temperature and pressure criteria for sulfur combustion furnaces have been established ； The outlet temperature specification for the sulfur combustion furnace is greater than or equal to 150°C, but there are no temperature monitoring instruments. 13. Some process parameters are not established rigorously; for example, the liquid level specifications for the gasoline storage tanks T3101–T3106 in the operating procedures of the Storage and Transportation Department are set at 0.8–14.3 m, while those for tanks T3107–T3112 are 1.8–16.5 m. These lower limits vary, and the limit of 0.8 m does not meet the process control requirements that prohibit the floating roof from touching the bottom during operation of such tanks ； The operating liquid level limit for spherical tanks is set at 0.9 m or less, which does not correspond to the actual conditions of storage and transportation. 14. Some process monitoring instruments failed, resulting in the inability to monitor parameters in a timely manner. For example, instruments such as those for the temperature of the reboiler at the top of the distillation column in the second catalytic unit, the temperature of the second intermediate reboiler in the distillation column, and the level of the reflux tank in the stabilizer failed, and since they were not repaired promptly, it became impossible to monitor the process parameters. 15. The process operation parameters exceed the process control limits; for example, the lower limit for the liquid level in unit D405 of the reforming plant is 10%, while the actual value is 8.4%. The pressure control target for the condensate tank in the reformation unit is greater than 5 kPa, while the actual value is -1.6 kPa. 16. The process parameters are out of specification; the pressure parameter for the methanol extraction tower T1302 in the isomerization unit is