【Haichuan Chemical Accident Update】Fire breaks out at a coal chemical plant in Tangshan, Hebei

Can it be said that I have a bad mouth? Did what was agreed upon yesterday – one explosion per day – unfortunately come true? Heinrich’s Law states that behind every serious accident, there are 29 minor accidents, 300 near-misses, and 1,000 potential accident hazards. So, how much time remains before the next serious accident occurs?

This year has seen many accidents, numerous studies, extensive training, frequent inspections, and regular patrols; as a result, work safety has been overshadowed

It seems there are still some dead corners that haven’t been checked or noticed

It seems to have started burning from the coal conveyor belt pier

Another tragic accident! ! !

On April 28, 2018, a fire broke out on the coal conveyor belt in Section 11 of the fuel handling system at a thermal power plant in Heilongjiang. With the assistance of the fire brigade, the fire was brought under control and extinguished in a timely manner. No casualties were reported in this accident, but the 11 coal transfer trestles as well as belts A and B suffered varying degrees of damage. The power plant adopted temporary mechanical methods to transport coal at Transfer Station #6, preventing forced shutdowns of the units. (1) Incident details: On April 27, Units #8 and #9 of the company were in operation, using lignite as fuel. At 21:50, Belt A in Section 11 was started up to feed coal into the units; coal feeding ceased at 00:15 on April 28, after which Belt A stopped operating. At 4:15, the on-duty fuel operation staff noticed smoke coming from the coal crusher room beneath conveyor belt section 10 (connected to the rear end of section 11). The fuel control system checked the monitoring video for belt section 11, but no signal was displayed; immediate fire-fighting emergency measures were taken. Due to the rapid spread of the fire, the emergency response forces on site were unable to bring it under control; at 4:39, a call was made to the fire department at 119. At 4:57, the fire brigade arrived at the scene to carry out the firefighting. At 5:40, all open flames at the scene were extinguished. (II) Losses due to the accident: The accident caused 208 meters of Belt Type A to be damaged, and 133 meters of Belt Type B to be damaged as well. 252 sets of belt idlers were damaged, the upper beams of the coal transfer bridge’s steel structure collapsed and deformed in some areas, and 40 meters of the composite insulated metal panel enclosure structure was damaged and deformed. Some cables, lighting circuits, and lighting fixtures were also damaged, resulting in direct economic losses of approximately 830,000 yuan. III. Cause Analysis (1) Immediate Cause: Accumulated dust inside the dust collection trough at the tail end of the No. 11 coal conveying belt ignited spontaneously, which in turn caused the belt to catch fire. (II) Indirect causes 1. Fire alarm failure. The 11-section temperature-sensitive cables, control modules, etc. were removed during the coal transfer trestle renovation in 2016, and the restoration work has not yet been completed to this day. 2. The wet sprinkler fire suppression system did not function. Upon inspection, it was found that the inner and outer walls of some of the sprinkler fire suppression pipes had thick layers of black oxidation scale that fell off in flakes; the pipes were severely deformed, confirming that the water pressure in the fire sprinkler system at that time was insufficient. Within more than 20 meters of the location where the fire started, near the dust removal device without power, no sprinkler systems were installed. The fire spread upward along the pier, and by the time the sprinkler systems activated, it had reached a stage of explosive combustion; insufficient pressure and water flow from the sprinkler systems meant that they were unable to control the spread of the fire. 3. The duty officer in the fuel control room failed to provide adequate monitoring, and the duty officer responsible for the fuel handling belts did not conduct regular inspections of the equipment as required. The fire was not detected in time, resulting in the loss of the opportunity to extinguish it at its early stages and contributing to the escalation of the incident.