Thread Content
“To strictly implement the requirements for blind plate management and enforce the energy isolation system, we organized personnel to conduct a thorough inspection of 412 blind plates in the hydrogenation complex and replace their nameplates. This ensured that information regarding the dimensions of each blind plate, the medium flowing through the pipelines, their installation locations, and the responsible persons was recorded in a systematic manner, thereby providing the necessary hardware support for standardizing the management of blind plate installation and removal operations. ”On March 3, Yang Xin, an equipment technician at the hydrogenation unit of the Second Oil Plant of Fushun Petrochemical Company, said this while organizing the records related to blind plate management. Yang Xin explained that the workshop organized its staff to study the regulations regarding the blind plate management system, ensuring that everyone was aware of them, took the lead in complying with them, and enforced them strictly. By learning industry standard specifications, typical accident cases, and management system requirements, employees have improved their ability to identify and solve problems. On this basis, the workshop has intensified efforts to address potential hazards and promoted systematic and detailed management of blind plates through digitalization. The workshop technicians prepare a ledger of blind plates in advance, including the dimensions of each blind plate, the medium flowing through the pipeline, the location where it is installed, and the person responsible for it. This creates a management ledger for blind plates, which helps to ensure proper management of the process of installing and removing such blind plates. Through this initiative, the workshop effectively addressed issues such as irregular hanging of blind plate tags, incomplete record-keeping information, and unclear label content, thereby reducing the risks associated with inspection, maintenance, as well as startup and shutdown operations. To establish a long-term mechanism for blind plate management, this workshop has formed a leadership team responsible for such management and energy isolation, and has carried out specialized initiatives to improve the standards of blind plate management. These efforts are aimed at addressing the prominent issues that arise during the implementation of management systems, thereby preventing safety accidents caused by inadequate blind plate management. Depending on the properties, temperature, pressure of the medium inside the pipes, as well as the diameter of the flange sealing surfaces, appropriate materials, strength levels, diameters, and gaskets that meet design and manufacturing requirements are selected to ensure the safety of blind plate installation and removal operations.
I hope everyone will follow the rules; here we just use self-made iron plates to cover things instead
Case 1: Around 16:50 on July 12, 2017, an explosion occurred at the blind flange of the reserved pipe connection in the deaerator of Unit 5 at a power generation company in Shaanxi, resulting in 2 deaths and 1 injury, with direct economic losses amounting to 2.279 million yuan.
Case 2: On March 3, 2015, during maintenance work at a fertilizer company in Inner Mongolia, the blind flange at the bottom of the gas-liquid separator of the vaporization furnace was removed, causing high-pressure steam to erupt and resulting in the death by burns of 3 workers on site (2 maintenance workers and 1 supervisor). Cause of the accident: The relevant department of the company issued a maintenance work order before the production system was shut down ; The maintenance personnel removed the flange blind plate without confirming the situation, which caused high-pressure steam to spray out and led to the accident.
At around 17:15 on September 29, 2021, an explosion occurred while workers at Guangxi Chuyi Ceramic Co., Ltd. were removing the blind plate from the top cover of a air cooler; this incident resulted in 5 people being injured, one of them seriously. The direct economic loss is approximately 500,000 yuan.
The \"4•25\" hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident at China National Chemical Corporation Shenyang Paraffin Chemical Co., Ltd. On April 25, 2013, a poisoning incident occurred during maintenance work on the gas separation unit at China National Chemical Corporation Shenyang Paraffin Chemical Co., Ltd., resulting in 3 deaths. The direct cause of the accident was that three workers were carrying out blind plate removal and installation operations at the pump pressure relief blind plate; due to inadequate protective measures, all three died from hydrogen sulfide poisoning.