Some thoughts on the Jingjiang 4.22 fire accident – Level 1 perspectives on chemical safety

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As a chemical worker working in Jingjiang, although I did not experience this incident firsthand, I have still learned about it from various sources. As a chemical industry worker, I feel that one should always make some positive contributions to one’s field. Now, I would like to share my views on the factors that lead to chemical accidents, based on this incident. During the meeting, the leader mentioned the issue of trust. In my opinion, whenever it comes to matters related to safety, there should be no trust at all. Total trust can be said to be the beginning of accidents; safety cannot rely on experienced workers nor on experience alone. Blind trust is the first factor that leads to chemical accidents. The cause of this accident is very simple: four words, illegal welding. This is why most people hear about it, but if an open flame is generated as a result of illegal use of fire, the valve can be closed promptly and the appropriate emergency procedures can be followed to resolve the incident in a short time. This includes a second factor, namely the lack of psychological resilience among operators as well as their inability to properly assess risks. After the accident, the fire gradually spread. The operators on site reported that the pipeline valves had been closed, but it was determined on site that they were not actually closed; as flammable materials continued to flow out, the fire not only failed to be extinguished but also grew larger. This is the third factor: the professional competence of the staff. It can be said that these three factors are the main causes of most chemical accidents. Among them, the composition of chemical industry workers is complex, and their average professional competence is low, which is a serious issue. I used to work at a coking plant, where neither the workers on the factory floor nor the operators in the control room had any background in chemical engineering. At the time of the accident, the people involved lacked the necessary psychological resilience and were unable to accurately assess the level of danger, which inevitably led to them leaving their posts immediately instead of taking appropriate action. Furthermore, empiricism is not applicable when it comes to safety; this is a very bad practice. When safety is at stake, a 0% level of trust is necessary, as only in this way can the risk of accidents caused by operational errors be reduced. To minimize the likelihood of chemical accidents, one must focus on these factors. All that companies can do is to increase supervision. Regulation means supervision and management. Improving the basic competence of staff from a management perspective and standardizing operating procedures – at its core, it is still a matter of trust. But since trust cannot be relied on when safety is involved, solving such problems requires supervision. Improving the quality of personnel is not easy; in the event of an emergency, it is an inevitable tendency for operators to leave their posts and take cover. So we can establish a dedicated hot work supervision team; the number of members doesn’t need to be large – two people are sufficient. It includes one person on-site and one person at the control center. On-site personnel need to be familiar with the relevant emergency response plans as well as possess the ability to conduct risk assessments, so as to take the most appropriate actions in the event of an accident and minimize its impact. The control operator is responsible for opening and closing the valves in the event of an accident, as well as monitoring the system. Establishing such a team serves two purposes: supervision and emergency response in the event of an accident. The members of the team can be trained on-site, with specialized training provided in each workshop department; they act as ordinary employees on a regular basis, but take on roles as supervisors when carrying out dangerous operations.