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The Concept of Environmental Governance in Circular Economy Law and the Development of an Integrated Collaborative Governance Technology System (Part 2) II. The Development of an Integrated Collaborative Governance Technology System Collaborative governance involves identifying a set of effective techniques to enable various stakeholders to work together effectively, thereby addressing multiple environmental pollution issues simultaneously. This approach helps companies maximize the economic benefits of industrial production, as well as safeguard the health of people and improve the quality of the social environment. It is a response to the failures of traditional single-technology, single-model approaches and to the challenges posed by the worsening public environment. The approach of integrated collaborative governance is a way to address relatively complex negative externalities. In 1960, Coase’s article “The Problem of Social Cost” conducted a dedicated study on negative externalities, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. In economics, environmental pollution is a typical example of a negative externality. From the perspective of efficient resource allocation, Coase proposed four channels and an overall framework for addressing negative externalities. First: if the transaction costs between the perpetrator and the victim are zero, negative externalities can be effectively resolved through voluntary negotiation, achieving the optimal efficiency in resource allocation. Second, negative externalities are an important source of market failure, and the key to solving this problem lies in how to internalize these externalities. To internalize externalities, when it is cheaper for firms to do so rather than relying on voluntary negotiation, firms replace voluntary negotiation; in such cases, it is efficient for society as a whole that firms take on the task of internalizing externalities instead of relying on voluntary negotiation. Third, due to the special advantages of **direct regulation, it plays a positive and effective role in the internalization of externalities. When the disruptions caused by externalities far exceed the administrative costs of corporate organizations, **direct regulation is usually a common alternative to address externality problems. Issues such as dust, sewage, and noise pollution are obviously costly or inefficient to address by businesses. Fourth, when transaction costs are greater than zero, clear definition of property rights helps reduce the transaction costs incurred in transactions, thereby improving economic efficiency. This is what Coase proposed: environmental pollution problems can be resolved through voluntary negotiation, as well as four main approaches, namely corporate actions, regulation, clear legal definitions of property rights, and so on. It must be clear here that Coase viewed this issue from the perspective of optimal resource allocation efficiency. The overall idea is that actions that yield more than they cost are what people pursue. However, when choosing among various social configurations while improving decisions individually, changes in the existing systems that lead to improvements in certain decisions can also result in deterioration of other decisions. We must consider the operating costs (whether through market mechanisms or **management mechanisms), as well as the cost of transitioning to a new system. When designing and selecting social structures, the overall effect should be considered. The insight that Coase’s theory provides for the development of integrated collaborative governance technologies is this: regardless of the technology used to address environmental pollution issues, it is essential to consider the advantages of each technology and make full use of their strengths in solving problems. The overarching principle should be to develop technologies that offer the highest efficiency at the lowest cost, and orderly and thorough recycling of various resources forms the basis for this principle. Without such a foundation, even the most efficient and cost-effective solutions can cause new damage to the environment, that is, secondary pollution. Therefore, when **, society, enterprises, and individuals engage in addressing environmental pollution issues, they should take into account overall planning, operational costs, the overall effectiveness of the mitigation measures, as well as the issue of secondary pollution. This is also the logical starting point for the integrated collaborative governance of FOSS proposed in this article. Unlike the concept of collaborative governance from a social perspective, the FOSS integrated collaborative governance technology framework places greater emphasis on integrated, composite technologies – that is, a single technology with multiple functions – which enable the orderly integration of various resources within one system, thus facilitating the recycling of different materials. The development of the FOSS integrated collaborative governance technology system went through three stages: (1) the process of achieving four functions—desulfurization, denitrification, dust removal, and mercury removal—in a single tower; (2) the formation of sulfates, nitrates, and solid dust as by-products of desulfurization, denitrification, and dust removal; (3) the formation of crystalline powder through chemical reactions between sulfates, nitrates, dust, wastewater, and solid waste. Compared to desulfurization, the key aspect of this technology lies in overcoming the limitations of low-temperature denitrification techniques through forced oxidation and spray absorption reactions. The overall implementation process involves several steps: In the reaction tower, NO is oxidized to NO2, SO2 is oxidized to H2SO4, and Hg0 is oxidized to Hg2+. The added Mg(OH)2 slurry reacts with NO2, H2SO4, and HgCl2 to remove these substances; at the same time, dust particles in the flue gas are captured. The cleaned flue gas is then discharged directly. When the pH value and density of the slurry in the tower meet the required specifications, it is discharged directly into a slurry tank for later use. The slurry that meets the standards in this tank can be mixed with pre-treated industrial wastewater that also meets the required standards. Finally, industrial residues and ashes collected either on-site or from outside the plant, such as steel slag, water slag, fly ash, and furnace slag, are added to this mixture; after mixing, a qualified crystalline powder cementitious material is obtained. A single technology, a crystal powder product, enables the integrated treatment of six types of pollutants (sulfur, nitrogen oxides, dust, and mercury in flue gas, as well as industrial wastewater and solid waste). It is a system that consists of various different components, such as desulfurization agents and denitration agents, as well as different technologies like desulfurization techniques, denitration techniques, dust capture technologies, and crystal powder technologies, all combined together. It addresses the issues of flue gas treatment, industrial wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal; various components form a system, with each component being an integral part of it, and every component plays a role in this governance framework. This is the integrated collaborative pollution control technology system that we advocate for and study. The establishment of this system requires the joint participation of industrial enterprises, consumers, and social organizations. It is also necessary to foster a cultural atmosphere of integrated and collaborative governance, as well as rely on the continuous improvement of environmental protection awareness and cleaner production awareness among industrial enterprises. The FOSS integrated collaborative governance technology framework represents a new concept for environmental management as well as a new approach to it. It will bring new vitality to ecological environment management, thereby improving its efficiency. Since the transaction costs associated with this FOSS integrated collaborative governance technology are greater than zero, it can be fully marketized; transactions can be settled through voluntary negotiations between enterprises, and progress can be made rapidly in the market. This is also one of the advantages of this technology framework. But I have been worried about this for many years; after all, Coase’s theory is based on research on free-market economies, and a market economy with Chinese characteristics may not be suitable for it!   III. Main challenges in establishing the concept and technical framework for integrated collaborative governance In order for the concept of integrated collaborative governance and related technologies to be utilized in the collaborative management of public environmental affairs, it is essential to ensure the absolute advantage of these technologies; that is, the new value they create must be sustainable ; At the same time, a high level of rigor in fulfilling contracts and a proactive attitude in cooperation are required from industrial enterprises in order to achieve the true objectives of integrated collaborative governance ; Due to the difficulties in defining property rights and the inequality in the status of various parties, imbalances in interest distribution can easily lead to conflicts, thereby affecting the ultimate outcome of integrated collaborative governance. Therefore, it is necessary to consider corresponding countermeasures.   (I) Problems and Challenges 1. Unequal status of the parties involved; there is uncertainty regarding Party B’s actual control over the property rights. Industrial manufacturing enterprises are the sources of pollution as well as the owners of the properties, while environmental protection service companies, although they are the investors, have property rights that are highly dependent on the entities they are associated with. Even if they possess clear property rights, their actual control over them is weak, and those rights could be seized by the relevant entities at any time.   2. Responsibilities are difficult to define, and there is an imbalance in benefit distribution. Due to the externalities associated with the ecological environment, its effective management can bring benefits to various stakeholders; even those who make no effort can still obtain additional gains. However, due to the difficulty in defining property rights, a dilemma arises regarding responsibility when governance issues occur. In our country, since the economic and political status of all social entities other than ** is relatively low, this results in each entity being unwilling to take on responsibilities. At present, the economic benefits generated by integrated collaborative governance technologies are quite promising. Once these benefits become established, the issues arising from them will also become increasingly prominent; how can benefits be distributed evenly? Should it be Coase’s solution, or should the entities propose demands as they see fit depending on different circumstances? In a socio-cultural context where contracts do not play a dominant role, Party B generally ends up being the one who actually resolves the problems and assumes the responsibilities, which further intensifies the contradictions and conflicts regarding responsibility sharing and benefit distribution. “Phenomena such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the ‘logic of collective action’, and ‘bad money driving out good money’ all occur.   3. There are no unified national standards for the various building materials developed using crystal powder as a raw material. Crystal powder is a green, recyclable cementing material specifically designed for construction purposes; its properties enable it to replace any cement-based materials. However, traditional cement products have, over the course of a century, developed a comprehensive system for quality management and testing, whereas for crystal powder-based products, it is necessary to establish national and industry standards for each individual product developed. Under the current management system, the path ahead is incredibly long! Although the concept and technology of integrated collaborative governance for FOSS offer significant advantages, whether it can be successfully promoted and its application accelerated to benefit the Chinese people and industrial enterprises, and to help realize the nation’s aspiration and dream of blue skies, green lands, and clean waters, depends not only on factors such as efficiency and cost but, at this stage, to a greater extent on the degree of market acceptance of building materials made from crystal powder. To increase this level of recognition, in addition to normal market practices, it is likely essential to have **conceptual and policy-based responses and support**.
Reply #22016-12-16
Thank you to the original poster for sharing; I’ve learned something.

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