Report on the Serious Explosion and Fire Incident at Hebei Shenghua Chemical Co., Ltd. on “11·28”

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Report on the Serious Explosion and Fire Incident at Hebei Shenghua Chemical Co., Ltd. on November 28 A brief report is provided on the serious explosion and fire incident that occurred at Hebei Shenghua Chemical Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Sinochem Group (hereinafter referred to as Shenghua Company), on November 28. I. Basic information on the accident: At around 00:40 on November 28, 2018, a severe explosion occurred near Shenghua Company in the Wangshan Circular Economy Park in Zhangjiakou City, Hebei Province, resulting in 23 deaths and 22 injuries. It also caused 38 trucks and 12 cars on Provincial Road 310, located to the south of the company, to be set on fire. Preliminary investigations indicate that the direct cause of the accident was a leak in the vinyl chloride gas tank owned by Shenghua Company, which is part of Sinochem Group. The leaked vinyl chloride spread to the roads outside the factory area, where it came into contact with an open flame and exploded, resulting in the accident. This accident is the deadliest chemical disaster since the major explosion at Hebei Kerui Chemical Co., Ltd. on February 28, 2012, which resulted in 29 deaths ； It was also the second major chemical industry accident in the country this year, following the \"7·12\" explosion in Yibin, Sichuan, which resulted in 19 deaths. In this incident as well, the effects of the accident spread to society and another hazardous chemicals company, leading to severe casualties and heavy losses. The company involved, which is part of China National Chemical Corporation—a central state-owned enterprise—was suspected of concealing details about the accident and misleading the investigation process, resulting in serious negative social consequences. This once again highlighted the failure to fulfill corporate responsibilities regarding safe production, as well as weaknesses in local safety supervision. Once again, these tragic events show that the situation regarding safe production in the chemical and hazardous chemicals industries remains severe and complex. Leaders of the State Council have attached great importance to this accident and issued important directives, calling for every effort to handle the incident and provide treatment for the injured, to determine the causes of the accident as soon as possible, and to hold those responsible accountable. Further measures should be taken to identify and address potential risks, in order to resolutely prevent and curb serious accidents. Upon receiving reports of the accident, the Ministry of Emergency Management attached great importance to it. Secretary Huang Ming, who was on a business trip elsewhere, personally took charge of the situation via video conference and ordered that an emergency response to this major accident be initiated promptly. Vice Minister Fu Jianhua led a working group to the scene to guide and assist local authorities in carrying out tasks such as on-site handling, treatment of the injured, investigation of the accident, and subsequent remedial actions. Following the accident, the Hebei Provincial Party Committee and the provincial government attached great importance to it. Wang Dongfeng, the secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, immediately led four provincial officials and relevant departments to the scene to oversee matters such as handling the accident, treating the injured, releasing information, conducting investigations into the accident, and dealing with the aftermath ； Governor Xu Qin interrupted his overseas trip and rushed back to the scene upon returning to the country to oversee and guide the subsequent handling of the accident. The entire accident handling process was carried out swiftly, efficiently, and in a stable and orderly manner. The State Council Safety Committee has placed the investigation and handling of this accident under special supervision. II. Basic information on the enterprise involved in the accident: Hebei Shenghua Chemical Co., Ltd., which is part of Sinopec Group, is located in the Wangshan Industrial Park in Zhangjiakou City, Hebei Province. It has over 1,300 employees, and its main products include polyvinyl chloride resin, caustic soda, liquid chlorine, hydrochloric acid, etc. The company was established in 1970. In May 2000, it was transformed into a private enterprise through shareholding reform. In 2007, it joined the New Materials Corporation under Sinopec through capital increase and share expansion. In August 2012, it came under the jurisdiction of Haohua Chemical Group Company, which is also part of Sinopec. Hebei Shenghua began construction in the industrial park in July 2009, and the main construction was completed in October 2012. The facility’s production capacity is 200,000 tons per year of caustic soda and 200,000 tons per year of polyvinyl chloride. It obtained a safety production license in January 2014. The chloroethylene water-sealed gas storage tank that experienced a leak has a capacity of 5,000 cubic meters and is located within the factory premises near Provincial Road 310. The accident affected Haipuer New Energy Technology Company, which is located across a road from Hebei Shenghua – namely Highway 310. This is a private enterprise under construction; it utilizes waste wind and solar energy to produce hydrogen through the electrolysis of desalinated water. The company plans to build one hydrogen production plant and one hydrogen refueling station. The safety assessment report classifies this enterprise as a hazardous chemicals manufacturer. III. Prominent Issues Revealed by the Accident (1) Issues exposed by the accident-affected enterprise: The specific causes of the accident are under thorough investigation by the accident investigation team of Hebei Province’s People’s Government. Based on the information gathered so far, this accident has revealed at least the following prominent issues: 1. The enterprise failed to fulfill its primary responsibilities adequately. The company has suffered from losses for a long time; after turning profitable last year, its management became complacent. The company’s leaders focused more on production than on safety, and various fundamental tasks were not properly addressed. Process management, equipment management, instrument management, site management, and safety management within the company were all in a state of chaos. 2. The company lacks awareness of risks, and its ability to manage them is severely inadequate. Shenghua Company has a total of 3 vinyl chloride gas tanks and 2 vinyl chloride spherical tanks, which constitute major hazard sources and represent highly dangerous areas. They are located adjacent to Provincial Highway 310, at a height of about 2 meters above it. Vinyl chloride is explosive and toxic; if its concentration in the air reaches 3.6%, an explosion will occur upon contact with a spark source. Vinyl chloride is heavier than air (with a relative density to air of 2.15); once it leaks, it spreads along the ground toward lower areas and is very difficult to dissipate. Since the accident gas tank was located right next to Provincial Road 310, the leak spread quickly onto the road, resulting in numerous casualties among people outside the factory. Preliminary investigations suggest that the factory was built before the construction of Highway 310. However, after the highway was completed, Shenghua Company failed to realize that there had been significant changes in the layout of the factory. The presence of vinyl chloride gas tanks and spherical tanks adjacent to major traffic routes posed a serious risk. Moreover, the large number of vehicles parked on the highway near the vinyl chloride gas tanks and the large crowd that gathered there at night created significant hazards; no measures were taken to prevent the spread of vinyl chloride leaks onto Highway 310. Judging from the circumstances of the accident, the company did not have an appropriate emergency response plan. 3. The enterprise’s safety production management is chaotic. First, labor discipline management is out of control; it is very common for workers to use their phones or leave their posts after starting work, and issues related to violations of safety rules are not given proper attention or resolved over time. Secondly, process management is virtually non-existent; operation records are mere formality, and only a few data points are recorded for the equipment parameters during shift handovers. In DCS, the operation record retention is set to 0 days, making it impossible to query past operations and causing significant difficulties in accident analysis. Third, the management of control instruments and safety instruments is not standardized; all control circuits near the gas tanks have had their automatic control functions disabled ； The control room often turns off the alarms for flammable and toxic gases, takes various alarms for granted, and fails to respond in a timely manner ； The combustible and toxic gas alarm systems are not installed properly, and the operators are unaware of some functions of the DCS control system, preventing the full utilization of its various capabilities. Fourth, the training is inadequate; the operators lack professional skills and have only a superficial understanding of the risks associated with their roles, making it impossible for them to detect and address abnormalities in a timely manner. Fifth, the on-site management is in a chaotic state. The factory complex of Shenghua Company was built in 2012; in just 6 years, the equipment on site has suffered severe corrosion, there are abnormal noises from the equipment, and the office buildings and control rooms are in disarray. 4. Lack of safety management in the sewerage network. Shenghua Company’s vinyl chloride gas holders are of the wet-type design, sealed with water. The wastewater containing saturated vinyl chloride is discharged directly into the local municipal sewer system through unauthorized drainage pipes, without any treatment, posing a serious threat to the safety of that sewer system. This accident fully exposed this issue, with multiple manhole covers along the municipal pipeline networks on both sides of Provincial Road 310 being blown off. 5. The problem of random parking of vehicles outside the chemical plant area is extremely severe. There is no dedicated parking lot designed for vehicles transporting hazardous goods; the vehicles that deliver raw materials to the company park there overnight on Highway 310, outside the company and near the vinyl chloride gas tanks. On the night of the accident, 31 coal transport vehicles and 7 empty vehicles were parked there, waiting until daylight to enter the factory premises. This problem has persisted for a long time, yet the company involved in the accident, as well as the local authorities, turned a blind eye and failed to take any action to address it. At the same time, some transport workers lack a strong sense of safety; some vehicles use liquefied natural gas as fuel, and drivers and escorts rest in these vehicles while lighting fires by the roadside to keep warm, which poses a great risk. 6. The enterprise’s emergency response capacity is weak. The operators failed to respond promptly and scientifically to abnormal conditions of the equipment; they did not act in a timely manner after a leak occurred. By the time the operators on duty outside received notification from those inside and opened the doors to the outdoor control room, the accident had already taken place. After the accident, the operators on duty merely carried out simple fire-fighting measures near the spherical tank on the east side of the gas holder before going back to the control room, and the company also failed to organize an effective emergency response. (II) Prominent problems exposed by Sinochem Group. 1. The basic operations of the subsidiary companies are poor. This accident was an operational error. In recent years, most major accidents in central state-owned enterprises have been caused by hot work, entry into confined spaces, and maintenance operations. The occurrence of such serious operational accidents in enterprises under Sinopec Group indicates that the \"three basics\" approach is quite weak. 2. The group headquarters has poor control over its affiliated companies. On the morning of November 29, all clues related to the accident pointed to Shenghua Company. Staff from the Ministry of Emergency Management once again asked the person in charge at Sinochem Group to gather the relevant personnel from the company involved in the accident to inquire about the situation, but those employees still refused to admit that an leakage had occurred. 3. The personnel sent from the group headquarters to the site lack sufficient capabilities in production operations. The personnel sent from the group headquarters to the site merely passively listened to the reports from the company involved in the accident, lacking the capability to conduct in-depth analyses of the facilities, identify any abnormal operating conditions within the company, and detect potential accident risks. 4. The safety organization structure and the number of safety management personnel at the headquarters of Sinopec Group Corporation are not sufficient to meet the requirements for safe production in the enterprise. The group’s headquarters does not have a separate department dedicated to work safety; work safety management is handled by the production and operation office, and there are only 3 people assigned to this task. This makes it the only company among those in the central region that are involved in the production of chemical and hazardous materials. ****Central state-owned enterprises are expected to serve as pioneers in ensuring safety in production across the country. When an accident occurs at a company under Sinopec Group, it not only fails to set an example for chemical enterprises nationwide in terms of safe production, but also significantly hinders progress in this area for all chemical and hazardous materials industries in the country; this is a very serious lesson to be learned. (III) Issues related to the **safety** of the local population: 1. The planning and layout of the Wangshan Industrial Park are unreasonable. The establishment of a new hazardous chemicals manufacturing enterprise opposite the Shenghua major hazard source results in an unreasonable safety layout, creating significant risks. 2. There are obvious gaps in safety management. Zhangjiakou Haiper New Energy Technology Co., Ltd., which was affected by this accident, has been classified by the evaluation agency as a hazardous chemicals manufacturing enterprise. This company has completed construction and entered the production testing phase, but it is not being managed in accordance with the licensing requirements stipulated for such enterprises. 3. Insufficient capacity for safety production supervision and management. Shenghua Company has so many issues regarding safety management in its operations; local safety supervision authorities have conducted inspections on multiple occasions but failed to detect any problems, and no specific requirements for improvement were put forward. (IV) This accident once again exposed prominent issues in Hebei Province, such as a weak foundation for the safe production of chemical and hazardous materials, inadequate supervision, and a high frequency of accidents. Hebei Province is a major chemical industry province with a large number of chemical enterprises, many of which are small-scale. The foundation for safe chemical production in this region is weak. Although the situation regarding safety in production has improved to some extent since last year, it has suddenly become more serious recently. In particular, since November, following the \"11·7\" accident at Shijiazhuang Xinle Jinwantai Fertilizer Co., Ltd., which resulted in 6 deaths and 7 injuries, another major explosion occurred at Hebei Shenghua Chemical Co., Ltd. on \"11·28\“. Since the beginning of this year, chemical enterprises in Hebei Province have experienced 2 major accidents and 1 severe accident, resulting in 33 deaths. The number of such accidents and deaths ranks first in the country. This highlights serious problems such as lax enforcement, inadequate work ethics, insufficient capabilities on the part of some local safety supervision agencies, as well as gaps and loopholes in supervision. These agencies fail to properly implement the directives and requirements set by higher authorities regarding work safety; they do not conduct thorough inspections for potential risks, and they lack the necessary efforts and effective methods to ensure that enterprises assume their responsibilities for work safety. III. Recommendations for next steps: Later, Secretary Huang Ming of the Ministry of Emergency Management will deliver an important speech in which he will give comprehensive guidance on work related to work safety across the country, with a particular focus on work safety in the handling of hazardous chemicals. We must study and understand this speech carefully and ensure its full implementation. In light of the problems exposed by this accident, the Office of the State Council Safety Committee issued an accident report in the form of a special directive on November 30. To thoroughly learn from the lessons of these accidents and prevent and curb the recurrence of similar incidents, specific action plans have been put forward, which all localities must earnestly implement. On this basis, I would like to emphasize a few points: First, fully recognize the high danger of vinyl chloride. Vinyl chloride gas has a low explosive limit, is heavier than air, and in the event of a leak it will spread along the ground toward lower areas; such leaked gas does not dissipate easily, making it difficult to handle. All regions should treat vinyl chloride production and storage enterprises as key facilities that require strict oversight, and promptly deploy specialized teams to conduct thorough inspections. In particular, a comprehensive assessment of the safety risks associated with vinyl chloride gas tanks should be carried out, with any issues identified being addressed immediately. If there are serious safety hazards that cannot be eliminated immediately, production must be halted right away. Second, last night, the Hazardous Chemicals Supervision Department of the Emergency Management Ministry brought together relevant design firms, industry associations, and enterprises to address the issues identified in the \"11·28\" accident. It was determined that the safety measures for gas cabinets were insufficient; accordingly, the relevant design agencies were instructed to work together with the Chlor-alkali Association to come up with specific measures to enhance the safety of vinyl chloride gas cabinets, and these measures will be issued as soon as possible. Upon receiving the notification, relevant regions should promptly organize enterprises to carry out rectifications. Third, a comprehensive assessment must be conducted of the risks associated with gas holder systems used for other hazardous chemicals that are toxic and have a density greater than that of air. Fourth, given the current lack of capacity in local safety supervision agencies, various regions should draw on the experience of some areas where large state-owned enterprises and local safety supervision agencies exchange staff to enhance professional oversight capabilities. They should plan carefully and work together with relevant local departments to carry out this effort promptly, in order to quickly address the shortfall in professional oversight capabilities at the local level. Fifthly, it is necessary to make full use of social forces to support the safety supervision of chemical and hazardous materials. By organizing relevant associations, intermediary organizations, and corporate collaborations, efforts can be made to strengthen the identification of potential hazards in such enterprises, thereby quickly reversing the passive situation regarding their safety. Sixth, strengthen emergency management by strictly implementing the duty system, improving emergency plans, enhancing drills, and boosting the capacity for emergency response. Seventh, it is necessary to ensure safe production of hazardous chemicals during winter and at the end of the year. All regions and relevant enterprises must strictly implement winter prevention measures to firmly prevent and curb the occurrence of serious accidents, thereby maintaining stability in the field of safe production of hazardous chemicals.