【2026 Standard Specification】SH/T 3245—2025 \"Design Specifications for Petrochemical Alarm Management Systems\" will come into effect on July 1, 2026
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SH/T 3245—2025 \"Design Specifications for Petrochemical Alarm Management Systems\" proposes systematic solutions to the long-standing challenges in petrochemical alarm management. As the industry’s first technical specification specifically designed for alarm management systems (successor to the 2016 version), the new specification not only incorporates nearly a decade of industry experience but also integrates new intelligent and digital technologies. It serves as a \"guideline for alarm management\" in petrochemical safety management, and will come into effect on July 1, 2026.
Standard Core Framework (11 chapters + 3 informational appendices)
From \"passive response\" to \"proactive prevention\": A complete restructuring of the alarm classification logic. The core challenge in alarm management is \"how to accurately identify key risks among a large number of abnormal signals.\" Although the old version of the standards introduced the concept of \"alarm classification,\" the classification criteria were rather coarse (limited to \"urgent/important/general\"), and the relationship between this classification and process safety as well as personnel response was not clearly defined; as a result, in practice the classification was imprecise and responses lacked a proper basis.
The new version of the standards classifies alarms for the first time based on two dimensions: \"risk level\" and \"degree of impact\", and provides differentiated design and response requirements to truly achieve \"precise prevention and control\": 1. Risk classification: Moving from \"experience-based judgment\" to \"quantitative assessment\", the new standards require that alarm classification be based on a quantitative analysis of the potential consequences of process deviations (such as casualties, environmental impacts, economic losses) as well as their probability of occurrence (tools such as HAZOP and LOPA can be utilized for this purpose).
For example: Level 1 alarm (the highest level): Parameter abnormalities that directly lead to an emergency shutdown of the device, serious casualties, or environmental disasters (such as a reactor pressure exceeding 90% of the design value, or a toxic gas leakage concentration exceeding the IDLH value)； Level 2 alarm (critical level): Abnormalities that may lead to an unplanned shutdown of the equipment or pose a moderate risk (such as bearing temperatures of critical pumps being 20% above normal values, or fire water pressure remaining consistently below the design value) ； Level 3 alarm (warning level): Fluctuations that require attention but do not immediately affect safety (such as slight fluctuations in the liquid level of towers or a gradual drop in fuel gas pressure).
Alarm classification is no longer determined arbitrarily; it must be closely linked to process safety risks, ensuring that \"high-risk parameters receive heightened attention.\"
2. Response grading: From a one-size-fits-all approach to a differentiated approach. For alerts of different severity levels, the new guidelines specify the requirements regarding response times, handling procedures, and the qualifications of personnel.
Level 1 alarm: An audio-visual alarm must be triggered, along with a SMS/app notification sent to the person on duty; manual confirmation and activation of the emergency procedures are required within 5 minutes； Level 2 alarm: A pop-up alert appears on the on-site control station, requiring confirmation and recording by the on-duty operator within 15 minutes ； Level 3 alarm: Marked only in the operation log, and reviewed and analyzed by the day shift team.
This adjustment targets a key pain point in the industry: in the past, since all alarms were treated equally, important information often got lost among them； Today, thanks to hierarchical response mechanisms, operators can quickly identify high-risk incidents, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach.
From \"system isolation\" to \"global coordination\": Alarm system design places greater emphasis on \"integration.\" Petrochemical plants often involve multiple independent systems such as DCS (Distributed Control Systems), SIS (Safety Instrumented Systems), and GDS (Gas Detection Systems). In the past, alarm management was plagued by a situation where each system operated independently: process alarms from the DCS, interlock alarms from the SIS, and gas alarms from the GDS were displayed on separate interfaces, forcing operators to switch between multiple systems to check the information, which was inefficient； Worse still, the alarm logic of different systems may conflict (for example, the same parameter triggers a warning in the DCS but an interlock action in the SIS), leading to incorrect operations.
The new version of the standards mandates \"alarm system integration\" for the first time, with the core goal of achieving \"unified management of alarm information and coordinated handling processes across the board\": 1. Hardware and networks: Breaking down \"information silos\" – the new standards require that alarm management systems be based on a unified real-time database, integrating data from various sources such as DCS, SIS, GDS, fire protection systems, and weather systems； The network architecture must incorporate a \"redundant design\" (dual-network redundancy + resume transmission in case of network failure) to ensure that critical alarm signals are not lost.