Thread Content
“If there is no frustration, no guidance will be given; if there is no confusion, no clarification will be offered. If one cannot infer the other two corners from one corner, then no further instruction will be provided. ”From The Analects, Chapter 7: Shu Er. It means teaching students not to give them guidance until they have tried hard enough to figure it out on their own ； Do not prompt him until he wants to say something but is unable to. Point out one aspect to him; if he cannot deduce the other three aspects from it, I will not repeat it to him. In the operation of their QHSE management systems, companies often use the approach of \"drawing inferences from one instance\" to improve the rate of issue resolution, so as to address one type of problem by identifying it once. However, in practical application, some companies have not clearly defined the scope of application for \"drawing inferences from one instance.\" Various departments and units are not familiar with the technical approaches involved in this process, which results in the tools designed for such purposes failing to fulfill their intended functions. Currently, there are several phenomena regarding the application of \"drawing inferences from one instance\": first is the failure to understand what it means to draw inferences from one instance. The relevant professionals have not truly applied the principle of drawing inferences from one instance. During the verification of issue resolution, once the original issue is resolved, it is considered to be fixed; no attention is paid to whether similar issues still exist, and the principle of addressing one issue to prevent others from arising is not followed. The second is to cast a wide net. Some department heads do not understand the methods and practical significance of applying this approach by drawing parallels from similar situations. They simply forward the list of problems from other units to the grassroots level, asking them to apply this approach, but they do not plan how such an application should be carried out; as a result, the impact of their actions is minimal. Third is to draw inferences by sitting in the office. Some employees do not go to the production site to verify things against the list of issues; instead, they stay in the office and make subjective judgments about whether similar problems exist by drawing parallels. Fourth, responsibilities are not clear. Some units do not carry out thorough analysis based on professional specialization; instead, they assign this task to individual people. Due to those individuals’ work experience and capabilities, good results cannot be achieved. Fifth, there is no favorable atmosphere for addressing issues within the enterprise, with a tendency to avoid confronting problems. Even some leaders will punish those responsible and enforce assessments as soon as they detect any problems, which prevents teams in various fields from bringing up issues, creating an illusion of safety – let alone learning from such situations to prevent similar problems in the future. Regarding the use of tools for drawing inferences from one example, I have the following thoughts for your consideration. I. Problem Classification https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/d6vZSicMDg3tG8uRIkwlPshswaTEMHdXTO7Kc0ib31HI3nU2yBdaxHSCJ0r8NQGh8CN9yGCNgOfshnLnROTKriaZQ/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/d6vZSicMDg3tG8uRIkwlPshswaTEMHdXTO7Kc0ib31HI3nU2yBdaxHSCJ0r8NQGh8CN9yGCNgOfshnLnROTKriaZQ/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/d6vZSicMDg3tG8uRIkwlPshswaTEMHdXTO7Kc0ib31HI3nU2yBdaxHSCJ0r8NQGh8CN9yGCNgOfshnLnROTKriaZQ/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg After receiving the list of problems, the relevant personnel organize various specialists to carry out a preliminary classification of these problems based on criteria such as the severity of the problems, the risks they pose to people and property, and the extent of their impact. Severe issues: **When inspecting entities that produce hazardous chemicals, problems that meet the criteria set out in the \"Standards for Identifying Serious Potential Hazards in Chemical and Hazardous Chemical Production and Operation Entities (Trial Version)\") are generally classified as severe issues. Severe issues typically have the following characteristics: first, they increase the risk of casualties, as serious safety problems can place people in dangerous situations, thereby greatly increasing the likelihood of accidents and leading to injuries or deaths. For example, in chemical manufacturing plants, if the production facilities that handle toxic gases are not equipped with safety instrument systems as required, plant workers could face life-threatening risks such as poisoning and suffocation in the event of a gas leak. Secondly, property losses increase, and this can lead to serious accidents such as fires, explosions, and collapses, causing severe damage to a company’s production facilities, equipment, raw materials, and products, resulting in huge economic losses. For example, if hazardous chemical production and operation enterprises use equipment or processes that are explicitly prohibited, an accident could lead to the destruction of the production facilities, as well as the detonation of the stored materials, resulting in huge financial losses. Third is the disruption of production and operations; serious issues can prevent the production process from running smoothly, forcing companies to suspend production for rectifications, which leads to a decline in the quality of customer service and affects the company’s reputation. Fourth is environmental damage; accidents caused by serious safety issues can lead to pollution and destruction of the surrounding environment. For example, a hazardous chemical leakage incident at an oil pipeline company could contaminate the soil and water sources, posing threats to ecosystems and the living conditions of residents in the surrounding area. Fifth, it has severe social consequences; the occurrence of major safety accidents draws widespread attention from society, causing serious damage to a company’s reputation, and may also lead to public concern and distrust regarding related industries. If not handled properly, it could even lead to factors of social instability. Universal issue: If similar problems are found in large numbers during an inspection of a certain company, it indicates that there are weaknesses in its management of related areas, which leads to the widespread occurrence of such problems. Individual incident issues: They are sporadic and independent; such issues do not persist over a long period, and they have little impact on production safety or will not cause harm for the time being. Minor issue: There is room for improvement in management levels, but the current situation does not affect the safe production of the enterprise. II. Principles, methods, and evaluation of effectiveness for applying knowledge to similar problems https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/d6vZSicMDg3tG8uRIkwlPshswaTEMHdXTO7Kc0ib31HI3nU2yBdaxHSCJ0r8NQGh8CN9yGCNgOfshnLnROTKriaZQ/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/d6vZSicMDg3tG8uRIkwlPshswaTEMHdXTO7Kc0ib31HI3nU2yBdaxHSCJ0r8NQGh8CN9yGCNgOfshnLnROTKriaZQ/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg https://mmbiz.qpic.cn/sz_mmbiz_png/d6vZSicMDg3tG8uRIkwlPshswaTEMHdXTO7Kc0ib31HI3nU2yBdaxHSCJ0r8NQGh8CN9yGCNgOfshnLnROTKriaZQ/640?wx_fmt=png&from=appmsg Individual cases and minor problems. The risk is low, and it causes little damage to the safety of people and property; corrections can be made on a point-to-point basis, without it serving as a basis for broader analysis. When verifying the correction of issues, it is sufficient to address each problem separately; there is no need to draw broader conclusions. It’s a serious issue; we must draw lessons from it. Conduct root-cause analysis to identify the technical and managerial reasons behind the problems, resolve them at their source, and prevent their recurrence. When verifying the correction of issues, it is necessary to first check whether the corrections made for the previously identified issues were thorough and whether the methods used for those corrections were appropriate ； Second, it is necessary to check whether similar problems still exist; if such problems are found, it is determined that the issue resolution was ineffective. For universal issues, one must draw inferences from one instance to understand others. Such problems need to be addressed in a comprehensive and systematic manner, and root-cause analysis should also be conducted to tackle them at their source, with the aim of significantly reducing the incidence of such problems or resolving them completely. Based on summaries of audits conducted over the years, the common issues faced by enterprises can be categorized into problems related to equipment and facilities, as well as problems related to documents and records. The specific methods for addressing these issues and the recommendations for making judgments are as follows: (1) For problems related to equipment and facilities, it is necessary to carry out targeted corrective actions for each issue individually; at least 3 similar issues within the same organization must also be identified. The issues that are rechecked must either be resolved or included in a corrective action plan. If such a plan is feasible, then it can be considered that the corrective actions have been effective. (2) For document-related issues (such as work instructions, operating procedures, emergency response plans, etc.), corrective actions must be taken on a point-to-point basis; at least 3 similar issues must be identified in the organization’s documents. If the issues that were rechecked are also corrected, then it is considered that the corrective actions have been effective. (3) Documentation-related issues (such as JSA, safety briefings, maintenance work sheets, etc.). Past mistakes of this kind are not held against individuals; rather, it is necessary to ensure that no errors occur in the records after inspections. If similar issues occur repeatedly without any corrective actions being taken, it is considered that the corrective measures have been ineffective ； If corrective actions are taken for a problem but the results are not thorough, it is considered that the corrections were ineffective. For example, in the case of issues related to the segmentation of JSA steps, if these steps are not divided in accordance with the standard operating procedures, then the corrections are deemed ineffective; however, omissions in the identification of low-risk factors do not affect the effectiveness of the corrections. The above views are a summary of years of work experience and are well suited to the actual conditions of the companies I serve. The causes of these problems include factors related to the objects and people involved. Given the current level of technology and management, it is not possible to eliminate all problems completely; therefore, companies need to make rational and effective use of tools that allow for drawing inferences from one case to others, in order to effectively reduce the likelihood of accidents and improve the level of safety management. During use, it is essential to convey the correct concepts and provide specific, actionable methods and technical approaches