【Haichuan Chemical Salary News】Hengli Petrochemical’s continuous reforming unit has begun to introduce nitrogen for system purging.
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Ningbo Engineering Completes Nitrogen Introduction Work for Hengli’s Dalian Project 2019-01-10 Source: Sinopec News Network Print Article Petrochemical News Recently, the No. 2 continuous reforming unit at Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian), constructed by Ningbo Engineering’s Construction and Installation Branch, is undergoing tasks such as the removal of scaffolding, addressing oil leaks from compressors, and carrying out final adjustments; the owner plans to introduce nitrogen to purge the system. Nitrogen is a colorless and odorless gas; inhaling high concentrations of it can cause oxygen deprivation in the brain, leading to loss of consciousness and even death from asphyxiation. To further enhance the awareness of nitrogen asphyxiation among the workers at the Dalian project and prevent such accidents, safety measures are particularly important as the end of the year approaches. Ningbo Engineering Company has requested the Continuous Reforming Project Department of Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) to take concrete actions to reduce safety risks and ensure the absolute safety of the workers. The project team took proactive actions to prevent problems before they occurred. Management personnel fulfilled their safety responsibilities in accordance with their respective duties, carrying out thorough inspections. Safety signs reading “Confined space – entry prohibited” were placed on every tower, tank, and other enclosed space, and physical barriers were installed to strictly prevent anyone from entering and working there. Before starting work in the early morning, the project team conducts special training for all workers prior to the introduction of the medium, aiming to raise their awareness of the hazards associated with nitrogen. The workers sign the training forms to ensure that every one of them has received this training, and emergency plans are also put in place. (Wu Yong, Li Yifang)
The joint testing period is a high-risk time for safety; special attention must be paid to nitrogen sealing and confined spaces. Once, during the startup of a unit’s reforming unit, nitrogen leaked in, trapping 3 people inside instantly.
On July 9, 2016, a continuous reforming unit was shut down for maintenance; during the operations of isolation using blind flanges and evacuation for replacement, an accident involving hydrogen sulfide poisoning and asphyxiation occurred, resulting in 1 death. Course of the accident: At around 8:00 on July 9, 2016, the nitrogen purging was completed in a certain continuous reforming unit, and operations to isolate the system using blind flanges and to evacuate and purge it were to be carried out. At around 8:40, Luo, the workshop supervisor, arranged at the construction site for Han and Zhou, among others, to lead the contractors’ workers to identify the locations of the blind flanges, while Deng, the contractor’s project manager, was responsible for assigning the workers to various tasks. Around 9:00, Deng asked Yang, the process supervisor who was passing by the construction site, to issue a work order for blind flange opening and closing, but Yang did not do so. At around 9:15, Deng arranged for the workers Liu and Cheng to go to the vent line of tank D8201 to carry out the 8-shaped blind plate removal operation. At around 9:20, Liu and Cheng climbed onto the top platform of separator tank D8201 and began working. After the bolts on the upper part of the blind flange were removed, Cheng stood on the scaffolding and used a crowbar to pry the flange open, while Liu stood on the valve and lifted the 8-shaped blind plate. At 9:41, the 8-character blind flange was removed, and at that moment gas was escaping from the flange area. Liu and Cheng quickly unbuckled their safety belts and left the scaffolding; Cheng collapsed at the entrance to the vertical ladder on the platform, while Liu also fainted not long after reaching the ground. At around 9:45, Liu was taken to the hospital by the people on site for emergency treatment. At around 9:50, Han, wearing a breathing apparatus, climbed to the top platform of D8201 and found that Cheng had no visible pulse or heartbeat; he immediately began performing CPR on him. At around 9:54, Luo put on an air respirator and went onto the platform, where he discovered a leak at the 8-shaped blind flange. He then closed the valve located downstream of the blind flange, and once the leak was stopped, he assisted Han in continuing with cardiopulmonary resuscitation. At 10:10, the fire department and personnel on site rescued Cheng from the platform, after which he was taken to the hospital by an ambulance for emergency treatment. At 13:40, Cheng died despite efforts to save him at the hospital. Liu has been taken out of danger following emergency treatment and is gradually recovering.
This post was last edited by Desert Fish on 2019-1-14 at 17:51. On July 9, 2016, a continuous reforming unit was shut down for maintenance; during the operations of isolating it with blind flanges and evacuating and replacing the air inside, an accident involving hydrogen sulfide poisoning and asphyxiation occurred, resulting in 1 death. Course of the accident: At around 8:00 on July 9, 2016, the nitrogen purging was completed in a certain continuous reforming unit, and operations to isolate the system using blind flanges and to evacuate and purge it were to be carried out. At around 8:40, Luo, the workshop supervisor, arranged at the construction site for Han and Zhou, among others, to lead the contractors’ workers to identify the locations of the blind flanges, while Deng, the contractor’s project manager, was responsible for assigning the workers to various tasks. Around 9:00, Deng asked Yang, the process supervisor who was passing by the construction site, to issue a work order for blind flange opening and closing, but Yang did not do so. At around 9:15, Deng arranged for the workers Liu and Cheng to go to the vent line of tank D8201 to carry out the 8-shaped blind plate removal operation. At around 9:20, Liu and Cheng climbed onto the top platform of separator tank D8201 and began working. After the bolts on the upper part of the blind flange were removed, Cheng stood on the scaffolding and used a crowbar to pry the flange open, while Liu stood on the valve and lifted the 8-shaped blind plate. At 9:41, the 8-character blind flange was removed, and at that moment gas was escaping from the flange area. Liu and Cheng quickly unbuckled their safety belts and left the scaffolding; Cheng collapsed at the entrance to the vertical ladder on the platform, while Liu also fainted not long after reaching the ground. At around 9:45, Liu was taken to the hospital by the people on site for emergency treatment. At around 9:50, Han, wearing a breathing apparatus, climbed to the top platform of D8201 and found that Cheng had no visible pulse or heartbeat; he immediately began performing CPR on him. At around 9:54, Luo put on an air respirator and went onto the platform, where he discovered a leak at the 8-shaped blind flange. He then closed the valve located downstream of the blind flange, and once the leak was stopped, he assisted Han in continuing with cardiopulmonary resuscitation. At 10:10, the fire department and personnel on site rescued Cheng from the platform, after which he was taken to the hospital by an ambulance for emergency treatment. At 13:40, Cheng died despite efforts to save him at the hospital. Liu has been taken out of danger following emergency treatment and is gradually recovering.
During the construction of the environmental protection dust removal project for the mixer furnace at Wu’an Guangyao Foundry Co., Ltd., 5 workers suffered nitrogen poisoning and asphyxiation, and died despite attempts to save them. Preliminary investigations by the work safety authorities in Wu’an indicate that the accident was caused by improper operations by the construction workers. This project is an independent environmental protection dust removal system for the mixer furnace; it is still in the construction phase and has not yet been put into use. On the day of the incident, the contractor had two construction teams working simultaneously: one team was working inside the container, while the other was working on the top exterior of the container. Outside the box, an operator adjusted the nitrogen valve without confirming that there were people working inside the box, which allowed nitrogen to enter the box and resulted in asphyxiation of 5 people inside.