【Haichuan Chemical Salary Updates】Xinpu Chemical (Taixing) Co., Ltd. conducts in-depth inspections to identify potential hazards
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(1) Major safety hazards: 1. On the morning of January 8, 2019, a contractor employee carried out grinding work under the pipeline rack on the south side of the power plant without a proper fire safety permit, and there was no supervisor present; fire extinguishers were not available at the site where the welding work was being done, and the trenches were not sealed off；
(II) General safety hazards: 2. On November 30, 2018, the Taixing City Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau identified the hazard that the water spray system in the vinyl chloride storage area was not linked to gas alarm systems or temperature control systems. The enterprise committed to completing the necessary corrections by March 5, 2019. The preventive measures taken involved having personnel responsible for operating the vinyl chloride equipment conduct inspections of the storage area once per hour, carrying portable alarms for testing purposes. In reality, however, these inspections were carried out only once every two hours, and there were no records of any tests being conducted; thus, the preventive measures were not properly implemented； 3. On December 31, 2018, the analysis records of the vinyl chloride storage tanks showed that the acetylene levels in tanks T1301 and T2301 were above the allowed limits; there are no records indicating that pressure relief was carried out before further sampling and analysis, which yielded satisfactory results. Additionally, there are no records for the oxygen level analysis in the additional storage tanks from December 31, 2018 ；
4. The operating procedures for the vinyl chloride sphere tank lack process control parameters regarding the tank temperature, and the pressure in the DCS system of the dichloroethane storage tank does not correspond to the specified operating procedures； 5. There was a leak at the flange of the flow meter on the chlorine feed main pipe of the chlorination reactor in the vinyl chloride plant; the manual valve located before one of the pressure gauges on the main pipe was not open ； 6. One of the toxic gas detection alarms located next to the chlorine buffer tank in the vinyl chloride plant does not have an on-site audible and visual alarm function ； 7. Holes on the catalyst batching tank platform of the vinyl chloride plant are not sealed ； 8. The outlet stop valve of the safety valve on the dichloroethane inlet pipeline of the 22,000 cubic meter dichloroethane storage tank did not have a \"Do Not Operate\" sign installed nor was it locked ；
9. Inside the fire dike of the 22,000 cubic meter dichloroethane storage tank, one explosion-proof electrical box had its bolts not properly tightened, resulting in a loss of its explosion-proof functionality； 10. The outlets of the safety valves on vinyl chloride spheres and vinyl chloride reactors are directly connected to the atmosphere ； 11. The use of a fixed water injection method for vinyl chloride spheres does not comply with the specifications ； 12. The high liquid level interlock for the vinyl chloride sphere tank H1301 is disabled without any approval procedures ； 13. The rainwater and sewage separation facilities in the vinyl chloride sphere tank area lack emergency operation signs ； 14. The operating procedures for the cracking furnace in the vinyl chloride production plant lack procedures for secondary ignition.
9. Inside the fire dike of the 22,000 cubic meter dichloroethane storage tank, one explosion-proof electrical box had its bolts not properly tightened, resulting in a loss of its explosion-proof functionality； 10. The outlets of the safety valves on vinyl chloride spheres and vinyl chloride reactors are directly connected to the atmosphere ； 11. The use of a fixed water injection method for vinyl chloride spheres does not comply with the specifications ； 12. The high liquid level interlock for the vinyl chloride sphere tank H1301 is disabled without any approval procedures ； 13. The rainwater and sewage separation facilities in the vinyl chloride sphere tank area lack emergency operation signs ； 14. The operating procedures for the cracking furnace in the vinyl chloride production plant lack procedures for secondary ignition.
(Reporter: Wang Guozhu) At around 3 p.m. on July 11, a major fire broke out at Xinpǔ Chemical (Taixing) Co., Ltd., apparently due to improper operations by the staff. The fire occurred in a desulfurization tower located dozens of meters in the air; it burned fiercely and could be seen clearly from several kilometers away. The fire was eventually extinguished, and fortunately, no casualties were reported as a result of this incident. According to videos taken by citizens at the scene, the fire was located hundreds of meters in the air, bursting out of a tower, accompanied by thick plumes of smoke; the flames were intense and truly terrifying. At around 4 p.m. on the 11th, the reporter arrived at the chemical plant where the incident occurred and found that the area surrounding the plant was under police lockdown. Through the factory gates, the reporter saw that the fire had been extinguished. Below the desulfurization tower where the incident occurred, several fire trucks were spraying water on it. Factory workers prevented journalists from entering for an interview.
Thanks for sharing the info! Safety professionals can learn in depth through such posts and continuously improve themselves
May I ask, 11. The use of a fixed water injection method for vinyl chloride spheres does not comply with the specifications； I would like to ask what exactly is meant