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Hazardous materials accidents that occurred in September throughout history

2016-08-29View Original

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The September 2 explosion accident due to toluene vapor leakage in the phosgene chamber at Gansu Factory 805: On September 2, 1999, an explosion occurred in the phosgene chamber of the TDI (toluene diisocyanate) production line at China North Industries Group Corporation’s Factory 805, resulting in 3 deaths and 8 people suffering minor injuries. The direct economic loss amounted to 48.218 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was a leak of toluene vapor from the toluene desorption tower in the phosgene chamber, which filled the chamber with a mixture of toluene vapor and air at an explosive concentration. A short circuit in the electrical wiring inside the phosgene chamber, or static electricity generated by the toluene vapor, caused this explosive mixture to ignite, resulting in an explosion throughout the phosgene chamber. The \"9•7\" poisoning incident at Ningxia Jiemefengyou Chemical Co., Ltd. On September 7, 2014, an accident occurred at Ningxia Jiemefengyou Chemical Co., Ltd. in which a mixture of ammonia gas and liquid sprayed out from the top of the main flare tower, resulting in 41 people within a radius of 200 meters suffering from acute ammonia poisoning. The direct cause of the accident was that the safety valves installed on the outlet pipelines on the shell side of the two ammonia evaporators were both gas-liquid two-phase valves. After the safety valve of one of the ammonia evaporators activated, liquid ammonia flowed directly into the ammonia emergency flare pipeline. Since no gas-liquid separation tank was installed in this flare system, the liquid ammonia sprayed out from the flare outlet, vaporized, and spread, leading to the accident. The \"9•10\" tank explosion at the Petroleum Company in Zhangwu County, Liaoning Province On September 10, 1981, an explosion occurred in Tank No. 1 at the oil depot of the Petroleum Company in Zhangwu County, Liaoning Province, resulting in 6 deaths immediately. The direct cause of the accident was that when water was poured into Tank No. 1, gasoline accumulated in the original oil transfer pipeline was also introduced into the tank along with the water, resulting in the formation of flammable gases inside the tank. When holes were made to install the \"U-shaped pressure gauge,\" these flammable gases came into contact with the open flame from welding, leading to an explosion. The explosion caused by welding work during maintenance at the Chlor-Alkali Plant in Yangquan City, Shanxi Province, on September 12, 1997: On September 12, 1997, an explosion occurred at the Chlor-Alkali Plant in Yangquan City, Shanxi Province, during maintenance work, resulting in 3 deaths. The direct cause of the accident was a leak in the No. 2 air cooling system and the acid inlet of the No. 3 hydrochloric acid storage tank in the plant’s hydrochloric acid synthesis section. Without cleaning, purging, or analyzing the hydrochloric acid storage tank, and without complying with the regulations regarding hot work, 4 maintenance workers were sent to repair the leak using plastic welding guns; an explosion occurred during the welding process. The “9•13” explosion at Jiangxi Jiangwei High-Tech Co., Ltd. On September 13, 2011, an explosion occurred on the fourth floor of the alcoholysis section in the organic products factory of Jiangxi Jiangwei High-Tech Co., Ltd., resulting in 3 deaths, 3 injuries, and economic losses of over 2.3 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was that raw materials such as methanol and polyvinyl acetate were not adequately mixed or reacted; methanol vaporized inside the alcoholysis machine and mixed with the air that entered through the open manhole, forming an explosive mixture. To remove the waste material that had not reacted properly inside the hydrolysis machine, the operator opened the manhole, used an iron hook to pull out the material and then cut it with an iron saw. The impact of the iron hook and iron saw against the walls of the manhole generated sparks, which ignited the explosive mixture and caused an explosion. The “9•14” explosion at Jinhang Petrochemical Co., Ltd. in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province On September 14, 2008, an explosion occurred at Jinhang Petrochemical Co., Ltd. in Dengta City, Liaoyang Province, Liaoning Province, resulting in 2 deaths, 1 person missing, and 2 people suffering minor injuries. This accident occurred because, during the nitration reaction carried out by adding isooctanol, the operator on duty left his post in violation of regulations; when the reaction got out of control, it was not detected or addressed in time. As a result, the temperature and pressure inside the reactor rose sharply, and the material inside the reactor was ejected through the discharge port at the top of the reactor. This material came into contact with combustible materials in the finished products storage area, causing a fire. This fire led to the explosion of the barrels of isooctyl nitrate stored there, as well as explosions and fires of other materials within the factory. The “9•14” explosion and fire accident at Liaoning Fushun Shunte Chemical Co., Ltd. On September 14, 2013, an explosion and fire accident occurred at Fushun Shunte Chemical Co., Ltd.; the accident resulted in 5 deaths, two storage tanks being destroyed, and 50 m3 of trimethyl formate product being burned up, causing direct economic losses of 1.2 million yuan. The direct cause of the accident was sparks generated by the welding work carried out illegally by Suntex Company’s workers on the top of the tank, which ignited the methyl formate vapor leaking from the sampling ports on the tank’s roof. These sparks then traveled back into the tank, causing an explosion of the explosive gases inside it. The “9•17” explosion accident caused by illegal operation of the distillation system at Huangyan Jiaokeng Chemical Factory: On September 17, 1997, an explosion occurred in the distillation system of the methyl ethyl peroxide production workshop at Huangyan Jiaokeng Chemical Factory, resulting in 3 deaths, 8 injuries, and direct economic losses of 501,000 yuan. The direct cause of the accident was that the distillation operator violated the operating procedures by failing to add a stabilizer to the feed liquid before starting the second distillation, which led to the overheated decomposition of methyl ethyl peroxide and caused an explosion in the distillation system. The \"9•17\" chlorine poisoning accident at Yunnan Nanphosphorus Group Electrochemical Co., Ltd. On September 17, 2008, a chlorine leak occurred at Yunnan Nanphosphorus Group Electrochemical Co., Ltd. The accident caused 71 people to be poisoned. The direct cause of the accident was that after the operator at the liquid chlorine filling station filled the liquid chlorine cylinders and closed the filling valve, he failed to adjust the return valve on the main liquid chlorine filling pipeline in a timely manner. As a result, the pressure in the filling pipeline increased rapidly, causing leakage at the gasket located above the flange at the base of the pressure gauge in the filling system. The leaked liquid chlorine vaporized and spread, causing the operator in question, 6 other operators in positions downwind, as well as 64 construction workers working on the company’s second-phase construction project, to be poisoned to varying degrees. The “9•20” hydrochloric acid storage tank explosion at Henan Kaifeng Chemical Plant: On September 20, 1988, an explosion occurred in a hydrochloric acid storage tank at Henan Kaifeng Chemical Plant, resulting in 3 deaths and 1 serious injury. The direct cause of the accident was that the workers carried out welding work on the top of the hydrochloric acid tank without going through the necessary procedures for working with open flames. There were no exhaust vents on the top of the tank, which caused hydrogen to accumulate there; the welding work subsequently led to an explosion. The explosion incident during the maintenance of a Raymond mill at Hunan Luxiang Barium Industry on September 23, 2014: On September 23, 2014, an explosion occurred in the barium nitrate packaging workshop of Luxiang Barium Industry Co., Ltd. in Xinhuang County, Hunan Province, while work was being done to maintain a Raymond mill; this incident resulted in 6 deaths. The direct cause of the accident was that, during the maintenance of the Raymond mill, the top cover of the bottom gearbox broke off, creating a semi-circular opening. Barium nitrate remaining on and around the top cover fell into the gearbox oil, causing the highly oxidizing barium nitrate to mix with organic combustibles (the oil) and form an explosive mixture. The maintenance workers illegally used iron tools to strike the bolts, generating sparks that triggered the explosion. The explosion incident during the commissioning of the new dichlorobenzene plant at Jinxi Chemical Plant in Liaoning on September 25, 1995: On September 25, 1995, an explosion occurred at Jinxi Chemical Plant in Liaoning Province while the new dichlorobenzene plant was being commissioned; as a result, one person died and 12 people were admitted to hospital for treatment due to varying degrees of exposure to chlorine and benzene. The direct cause of the accident was a violent reaction between the catalyst exposed in the gas phase within the chlorination reactor and excess chlorine, which generated high temperatures and flames, leading to an explosion in the gas phase.
Reply #22016-08-29
Several cases of violations in maintenance and repair work
Reply #32016-12-20
Regarding accidents involving phosgene, a safer approach can be adopted by using ready-to-use phosgene generators that produce the required amount of phosgene as needed, allowing for immediate shutdown and startup. This ensures flexibility in operation while guaranteeing absolute safety. As far as I know, if many phosgene generators in China are shut down, restarting them results in poor quality of phosgene for a long time after operation resumes. The phosgene generator produced by the Swiss company BUSS is ready for use immediately, and it allows for flexible adjustment of production capacity between 10% and 110%
Reply #42016-12-21
Inspection and maintenance Inspection and maintenance Inspection and maintenance Important things are said three times

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