Reasons for the explosion of the dryer in Department 1 for raw materials at Baogang Group’s warehousing center on October 27

Thread Content

Reasons for the explosion of the dryer in Section 1 of the Raw Materials and Fuels Department at Baogang Group’s Warehousing Center on October 27 I. Basic information about the unit where the accident occurred The unit where the accident took place was the dryer facility in Section 1 of the Raw Materials and Fuels Department (workshop) at Baogang Group’s Warehousing Center. Baogang Group Company is currently undergoing organizational restructuring. Its warehousing center was established in August of this year by merging three previous secondary units: the Raw Materials Logistics Center, the Spare Parts and Materials Warehousing Center, and the Scrap Steel Branch; it employs 1,400 staff members in total. The Raw Materials and Fuels Department 1 (workshop) of the warehousing center was previously under the management of the Raw Materials and Fuels Logistics Center; it had a total of 493 employees, including 3 safety officers (with a shortage of safety management personnel). The drying furnace facility in the Raw Materials Department (workshop) consists of 4 drying furnaces, which are in operation from the end of October each year to March of the following year, and are shut down during the summer ； The purpose of operating this device is to use air heated by a drying furnace to warm and thaw the coal and iron ore delivered by trains from Baogang Company in winter, thereby facilitating their unloading. II. Brief account of the accident: On the morning of October 27, the drying furnace units in Department 1 for raw materials underwent startup procedures, in the order of Furnace No. 4, No. 3, No. 2, and No. 1. At that time, Furnaces No. 4 and No. 3 had already been successfully started. At 10:32, an explosion occurred while the operators were attempting to start Furnace No. 2. As a result of the explosion, Chen Tie, the technical supervisor, was hit in the abdomen by metal fragments thrown by the explosion; he was taken to the hospital but died despite efforts to save him ； Operator Du Zhaoping suffered severe burns to his face. III. Main causes of the accident: 1. The two electric valves located before the No. 2 drying furnace in the gas pipeline were not closed properly. The operators failed to carefully inspect and verify these valve settings before starting up the furnace, which allowed gas to leak into the drying furnace; when this gas came into contact with an open flame, an explosion occurred. 2. Incorrect selection of combustible gas detection instruments ； The gas used in the 2# drying furnace is mainly coke oven gas, whose main components are hydrogen (55%~60%) and methane (23%~27%); carbon monoxide accounts for only 5%~8%. However, the instrument used for testing before starting up the furnace is a carbon monoxide detector, which is why leaks of gas into the drying furnace go unnoticed. IV. Indirect causes of the accident: 1. The operating procedures and ignition plans did not match the actual practices. The drying furnace was originally designed to be ignited using an ignition gun, and its operating procedures and ignition plans were formulated accordingly. However, during the first ignition attempt organized by the Raw Materials Department in 2014, workshop managers and operators found that the ignition gun was not very effective. As a result, they decided to open the manhole near the furnace mouth; an igniter similar to a rake was used to start the fire outside the furnace, and then it was inserted through the manhole into the furnace mouth to heat it up before attempting to ignite it. Its ignition operation method has been changed, but the operating procedures for the drying furnace and the ignition plan have not been modified accordingly in the past 3 years. Let alone providing the corresponding technical training for its employees. 2. Safety measures were not properly implemented prior to the ignition process. At the morning production meeting at the warehouse center, it was announced that on the 27th, efforts would be made to have gas supplied to the drying furnace from the gas plant. Chen Tie, who is the technical supervisor of the Raw Materials Department, failed to organize training for the employees regarding the ignition procedure, did not conduct any risk assessment, nor did he ensure that appropriate safety measures were in place. He proceeded with the ignition of the drying furnace along with three employees, which led to the accident. 3. Lack of effective production and safety management at all levels: The Baogang Warehousing Center was formed in August of this year through the merger of three secondary units under Baogang. The production and safety managers at all levels after the merger were not familiar with or aware of the drying furnaces, and they failed to stop Chen Ti from carrying out operations on the furnaces in a hasty manner; thus, they bear responsibility for the inadequate safety management. 4. Insufficient safety management personnel: The Raw Materials Department 1 (workshop) of the storage center has a total of 493 employees, but there are only 3 safety officers, one of whom is dedicated to 5S management; thus, the number of safety management personnel is severely inadequate.