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Sharing others' accidents (fires) 3

2016-11-10View Original

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  Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd., Changchun City, Jilin Province – Investigation Report on the Extraordinarily Serious Fire and Explosion Incident on June 3 At around 6:10 a.m. on June 3, 2013, an extraordinarily serious fire and explosion occurred in the main factory building of Jilin Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Baoyuanfeng Company), located in Dehui City, Changchun City, Jilin Province. This incident resulted in 121 deaths and 76 injuries; 17,234 square meters of the main factory building along with the production equipment inside it were damaged, causing direct economic losses of 182 million yuan.   After the accident, **** and the State Council attached great importance to it. Central leaders including **** and Premier ** immediately issued important instructions, calling for all-out efforts in organizing rescue operations, doing everything possible to treat the injured, and properly handling the aftermath for the victims and providing comfort to their families ; Identify the causes of the accident, hold those responsible accountable in accordance with the law, draw thorough lessons from it, and take practical, effective measures to resolutely prevent the occurrence of serious and major accidents. On the afternoon of June 3, entrusted by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, State Councilor Guo Shengkun led responsible officials from relevant State Council departments to the scene. There, he conveyed the important instructions and directives of central leaders including ** and **, guided efforts in personnel search and rescue, post-incident handling, and accident investigation, and expressed condolences to the injured. On June 4, the **Prime Minister, via video conference, issued clear instructions on carrying out rescue operations, investigating the accidents, and handling the subsequent matters. During that time, leaders such as Zhang Gaoli, Ma Kai, Meng Jianzhu, Yang Jing, and Wang Yong also used various means to understand the situation on site, and provided guidance on emergency rescue efforts, treatment of the injured, follow-up actions, and accident investigations.   In accordance with the important instructions of central leadership, as well as relevant laws and regulations such as the \"Regulations on the Reporting, Investigation, and Handling of Production Safety Accidents\" (State Council Order No. 493), and with the approval of the State Council, on June 5 a investigation team was established to investigate the particularly serious fire and explosion accident that occurred at Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd. in Changchun City, Jilin Province, on June 3. Yang Dongliang, Director of the State Administration for Work Safety, served as the head of this team, which included responsible officials from the State Administration for Work Safety, the Ministry of Supervision, the Ministry of Public Security, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the local authorities in Jilin Province. The accident investigation team invited representatives from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate to participate, and appointed experts in fields such as fire protection, refrigeration, explosions, special equipment, chemistry, materials, construction, and electrical engineering to form an expert group that was involved in the accident investigation throughout its course.   In accordance with the principles of “four things must not be let go” and “scientific rigor, compliance with laws and regulations, seeking truth from facts, and emphasizing practical results”, the accident investigation team, through on-site inspections, evidence collection, testing and identification, simulation experiments, and expert deliberations, determined the sequence of events, the direct and indirect causes of the accident, as well as the extent of casualties and property damage. It also identified the nature of the accident and assigned responsibilities, while putting forward recommendations regarding the handling of relevant responsible persons and entities. At the same time, suggestions for accident prevention measures were put forward in response to the causes of the accident and the prominent issues that came to light. The relevant information is reported as follows: I. Basic Information (1) Information on the unit involved in the accident.   1. Company overview.   Baoyuanfeng Company is a sole proprietorship enterprise located in Mishazi Town, Dehui City. It was established on May 9, 2008, with Jia Yushan as its legal representative. The company’s total assets amount to 62.27 million yuan. Its business scope includes the slaughtering, cutting, quick-freezing, processing, and sale of broiler chickens. It currently has 430 employees, produces 36,000 tons of broiler chickens per year, and generates annual sales revenue of around 300 million yuan. The company obtained the \"Livestock and Poultry Slaughtering and Processing License\" issued by the Dehui City Meat Management Committee Office on October 1, 2009. On September 18, 2012, the \"Animal Disease Prevention Compliance Certificate\" issued by the Dehui City Animal Husbandry Administration was obtained.   2. Construction status of the main plant building.   (1) Functional zoning of the main plant. Inside the main plant, there are three main east-west passages: one in the south, one in the middle, and one in the north. These passages divide the main plant into four areas. From north to south, they are the cold storage, the quick-freezing workshop, the main workshop (with Workshop 1 on the east side, Workshop 2 on the west side, and a pre-cooling tank in the center), and the auxiliary area (which includes changing rooms, restrooms, offices, electrical rooms, mechanical repair workshops, and laboratories, etc.).   (2) Structure of the main plant. The structure of the main plant is a single-story portal light steel frame; the roof structure consists of I-beam frames with profiled sheets laid on top, and polyurethane foam is sprayed on the inner surface as an insulating material (based on on-site sampling, the combustion performance of this material was tested, with an oxygen index of 22.9%-23.4%). There is a ceiling under the roof, made of metal-faced polystyrene core panels (as determined through on-site sampling, the combustion performance of this material was evaluated, with an oxygen index of 33%). The height from the ceiling to the roof ranges from 2 to 3 meters.   Below 1 meter, the exterior walls of the main building are brick walls; above that level, the south side features metal-faced polystyrene sandwich panels, while the other sides have metal-faced rock wool sandwich panels. The cold storage and quick-freezing workshop are partially separated by solid walls; the interior surfaces of the cold storage walls and their roofs are coated with polyurethane foam as an insulating material (based on on-site samples, the combustion properties of this material were tested, with an oxygen index of 23.8%). The auxiliary areas use metal-faced polystyrene sandwich panels, while in the remaining areas, brick walls are used below a height of 2 meters, and metal-faced rock wool sandwich panels are used above that height. The portion of the steel column below 4 meters is protected with a cement layer applied over a wire mesh.   The roof of the main factory building was designed to use rock wool (a non-combustible material, Class A) as insulation material; however, in practice polyurethane foam (with a combustion performance rating of Class B3) was used, which does not meet the requirement specified in the \"Code for Fire Protection Design of Buildings\" (GB50016-2006) that the insulation material should have a minimum combustion performance rating of Class B2 ; Polyurethane foam is used as the insulation material for the roofs and walls of cold storage facilities (with a combustion performance rating of B3), which does not meet the requirement specified in the \"Code for Design of Cold Storage Facilities\" (GB50072-2001) that the combustion performance rating should be at least B1.   (3) Fire compartments, safety exits, and fire protection facilities in the main plant. The fire hazard category of the main plant is Class D-E, and its fire resistance rating is Grade 2. The main plant constitutes one fire compartment, in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Buildings.   There is one safety exit on each side of the main passage in the main plant building, leading east and west. There are 5 safety exits on the north side of the cold storage that lead directly outside. 4 safety exits are located on the south exterior wall of the auxiliary area, also leading outside. One safety exit is situated on the west exterior wall of Workshop 2, leading outside as well. The installation of safety exits complies with the relevant provisions of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Buildings. At the time of the accident, the safety exit on the west side of the southern main passage and the safety exit leading directly outside on the west side of Workshop 2 were locked, while the remaining safety exits were in normal condition.   The main plant is equipped with indoor and outdoor fire protection water supply networks and fire hydrants. It also has emergency lighting for accidents, exit signs, and fire extinguishers. The enterprise is equipped with a fire pump room and a 1,500-cubic-meter fire water tank, as well as a backup power supply for firefighting purposes, complying with the relevant provisions of the Code for Fire Protection Design of Buildings.   (4) Information on the production process flow. The main stages of this processing flow include hanging the chickens (on hanging racks), slaughtering, plucking, evisceration (in Workshop 1, also known as the dirty area), pre-cooling (in pre-cooling tanks), cutting up (in Workshop 2, also known as the clean area), quick freezing (in the quick-freezing workshop), packaging (in the carton packaging area), and storage (in the cold storage).   (5) Power distribution within the factory building. The electrical wiring in the cold storage and freezing workshop is introduced from above the east side of the main passage in the northern part of the main building, laid overhead, and fed separately to the power distribution cabinets of the cold storage and the freezing workshop.   The electrical wiring in Workshop 1 is introduced from above the east side of the main corridor in the southern part of the main building; the cables are placed in cable trays, pass through the ceiling, and lead to the power distribution room in Workshop 1.   The electrical wiring in Workshop 2 is introduced from above the east side of the main passage in the southern part of the main building; it is installed exposed on the roof I-beam beams (without being protected by conduits), running from east to west, and passes through the ceiling to reach the power distribution room in Workshop 2.   The electrical wiring in the main plant is not installed properly; cables are laid exposed. In Workshop 2, there are issues with the use of cable trays, raceways, and conduit for wiring.   3. Status of ammonia refrigeration systems.   (1) Basic information on the refrigeration system. The accident-stricken enterprise used an ammonia refrigeration system, which mainly consisted of the refrigeration equipment located in the refrigeration plant in the northeast outside the main building, the cooling equipment installed within the main building, as well as the pipelines for transporting liquid ammonia and recovering ammonia.   The refrigeration equipment includes 10 screw-type refrigeration compressors, 3 high-pressure ammonia storage tanks with a capacity of 15.4 cubic meters each, 10 horizontal low-pressure circulation tanks with a capacity of 7 cubic meters each (designated as 1-10 from north to south), etc.   Cooling equipment includes the evaporator coils of cold storage facilities, quick-freezing chambers, and pre-cooling tanks, spiral quick-freezers, air handlers in fan rooms, and cooling fans in fresh product storage areas. Both spiral freezers and air coolers have numerous aluminum components.   10 horizontal low-pressure circulation tanks, through liquid ammonia delivery and ammonia recovery pipelines, supply cooling to the cold storage, quick-freezing chamber, pre-cooling tank, spiral freezer, fan room, and fresh product storage, thereby forming 6 relatively independent cooling systems.   (2) Condition of the refrigeration system damage. Among the 6 cooling systems, the pipes in those serving the spiral freezer, the fan room, and the fresh product storage area had no open cracks; however, various aluminum components within the equipment were damaged in multiple places and some were burned ; There are 23 damage points in the pipes of the cooling system located in the cold storage and freezer facilities ; There are no open breaks in the pipes of the cooling system where the pre-cooling tank is located.   In the refrigeration plant, the insulation layer surrounding the No. 1 horizontal low-pressure circulation tank cracked, the liquid ammonia circulation pump below it also cracked, resulting in a leak of liquid ammonia from the tank. There were no signs of ammonia combustion or chemical explosions in the machine room, and the other equipment was intact.   In total, the accident-prone enterprise purchased 45 tons of liquid ammonia over time. After the accident, a total of 30 tons of liquid ammonia were removed from the ammonia refrigeration system; based on this, the maximum possible amount of liquid ammonia that leaked during the accident is estimated to be 15 tons.   (3) Design and construction details of the refrigeration system. The equipment and pipelines for the refrigeration system were purchased by the accident-stricken enterprise itself; without any systematic engineering design, Dalian Xueshan Refrigeration Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd. provided its qualifications to Lu Wencheng so that he could carry out the installation work. After the installation was completed, Guo Changyong, the original designer from Dalian Xueshan Refrigeration Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd., and Zhang Xingxiang, a retired employee from Dalian Chemical Engineering Design Institute, added supplementary design drawings and documents. Yang Xianwei, the office director of Dalian Chemical Engineering Design Institute, unauthorizedly stamped the institute’s official seal without approval from his organization.   4. Labor employment situation.   Baoyuanfeng Company entered into labor contracts with 120 workers, which were registered with the local labor authorities; the remaining workers did not have labor contracts. Insufficient contributions to workers’ pension insurance (social pooling), with some workers refusing to pay their share of the costs.   5. Qualifications of personnel engaged in the management and operation of special equipment.   Baoyuanfeng Company obtained the \"Special Equipment Use Registration Certificate\" illegally; it failed to establish safety technical records for the special equipment as required, did not conduct regular self-inspections and keep records on a monthly basis, failed to submit requests for regular inspections to the special equipment inspection and testing agencies one month before the expiration of the valid period for safety inspections, and did not carry out any safety education or training related to the special equipment. The company has 8 special operation workers (including 4 refrigeration workers, 2 electricians, and 2 boiler operators). Based on the transcripts of Zhao Changjiang’s interviews and the application materials for his qualification certificates obtained from the Quality and Technical Supervision Department in Changchun, it can be seen that Zhao Changjiang’s application forms lacked his signature, the information provided was false, the exam papers were not answered by him, and the qualification certificates he held were obtained through fraud.   (II) Situations regarding project approval, construction, and completion acceptance, etc.   The basic procedures for the project initiation, approval, construction, and completion acceptance of Baoyuanfeng Company are as follows: In November 2007, the Development and Reform Bureau of Dehui City approved the project initiation for Baoyuanfeng Company. In December, the Dehui Environmental Protection Bureau issued an environmental impact assessment approval. In March 2008, the people’s government of Mishazi Town **approved Bao Yuan Feng Company’s application for the site selection for its construction project. Thereafter, Baoyuanfeng Company acquired five plots of land through listing processes. In March 2008, Dehui City Construction Engineering Survey and Design Co., Ltd. (with Class C qualifications) submitted the \"Geotechnical Engineering Survey (Detailed Survey) Report\" for Baoyuanfeng Company’s workshop. In April, the Changchun Construction Project Drawing Review Center issued a \"Design Document Review Opinion\" for Baoyuanfeng Company’s factory building. In May, Baoyuanfeng Company successively signed a “Construction Project Contract” with Changchun Construction Engineering Group Co., Ltd. (the contract stipulated that the work would include civil construction and steel structure work; the start date was May 3, 2008, and the completion date was October 30, 2008; the contract price amounted to 8.37 million yuan). It also signed a “Contract for Entrusted Supervision of Construction Projects” with Tieling Ruicheng Construction Project Supervision Co., Ltd. (this contract was to take effect on May 16, 2008, and be completed on July 16, 2009). In May, the Dehui City Construction Project Quality Supervision Station issued a “Construction Project Quality Supervision Certificate”. In the section titled “Organizational Structure for the Office Building and Dormitory Building Projects of Jilin Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd.”, Jia Tiejin was listed as the project manager; the certificate was signed by Changchun Construction Engineering Group Co., Ltd. In November 2009, the construction, supervision, surveying, design, and construction units issued the “Project Completion Acceptance Report” for the Baoyuanfeng Company project. In December, the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade issued a \"Fire Safety Inspection Report for Construction Projects,\" stating that \"after comprehensive evaluation, the fire safety requirements of this project have been met.\"” ; The Dehui Environmental Protection Bureau issued an environmental compliance report ; The Dehui City Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau issued the \"Construction Project Completion Filing Certificate\" to finalize the filing for Baoyuanfeng Company’s project ; The people’s government of Mishazi Town in Dehui City issued the \"House Ownership Certificates\" for the factory buildings and cold storage facilities.   (III) Information on relevant entities.   The architectural design unit for Baoyuanfeng Company was the Liaoning Textile Industry Nonwoven Technology Development Center (holding Class-A qualifications for architectural engineering design; later restructured into Liaoning Tianwei Textile Research and Architectural Design Group Co., Ltd.).   The construction contractor is Changchun Construction Engineering Group Co., Ltd. (which holds a special-grade qualification for general contracting of building construction projects; hereinafter referred to as Changchun Construction Engineering Group), while the supervision company is Tieling Ruicheng Construction Project Supervision Co., Ltd. (which has a grade C qualification for building construction project supervision; hereinafter referred to as Ruicheng Supervision Company). Upon investigation, the aforementioned design, construction, and supervision units were all entities that obtained project construction permits illegally by borrowing or misusing qualifications. The actual situation is: 1. Situation of the design party.   For the Baoyuanfeng Company project, Jia Tiejin, the general manager of Liaoning Dahe Heavy Steel Engineering Co., Ltd., arranged for personnel within his company who did not possess design qualifications to carry out the design work, and then had the Shenyang Textile Industry Non-woven Fabric Technology Development Center handle the relevant construction procedures. The nominal design firm sent no one to participate in tasks such as design acceptance, nor did it charge any design fees.   2. Information on the contractor.   The contractor for Baoyuanfeng Company’s project met Liu Shengtong and Jia Yushan, employees of Changchun Construction Group, through Jia Tiejin. Subsequently, Baoyuanfeng Company entered into a contract with Changchun Construction Group and used that company’s qualifications to handle the relevant procedures. The civil engineering part of the project was carried out by Jia Yushan, who organized the workers for the work, while the steel structure part was constructed under Jia Tiejin’s supervision. Changchun Construction Group and Liu Sheng received management fees.   3. Situation of the supervision party.   The supervisor for Baoyuanfeng Company’s project was Zhang Xinming, an unemployed man from Tieling. He obtained the contract to supervise Baoyuanfeng Company’s project from Jia Yushan; it was Ruicheng Supervision Company that signed the contract with Baoyuanfeng Company, with Zhang Xinming acting as the representative of Ruicheng Supervision Company to carry out the supervision work. Zhang Xinming has no supervision qualifications and knows nothing about supervision work. Yet he simultaneously represents Jia Yushan in the technical management of the project, receiving remuneration from both companies.   II. Course of the accident, emergency rescue efforts, and follow-up actions (I) Course of the accident.   Between 5:20 and around 5:50 on June 3, employees of Baoyuanfeng Company gradually arrived at the factory to start work (due to transportation and weather conditions, the company usually begins work at 6 a.m.). On that day, it was planned to slaughter and process 37,900 broilers. A total of 395 people were present at the production sites: 113 in Workshop 1, 192 in Workshop 2, 20 at the poultry hanging stations, and 70 in the cold storage facility.   At around 6:10, some employees noticed smoke and flames coming from above the women’s locker room in Workshop 1 and the surrounding area. Outside the main building, others observed that thick black smoke was first emanating from the upper windows located in the middle section on the south side of the main building. Some personnel who noticed the fire early on attempted initial firefighting efforts, but the fire was not brought under control. The fire gradually spread from south to north within the ceiling, while also spreading downward to the entire auxiliary area, and from there toward the main workshop, freezing room, and cold storage to the north. The high temperatures generated by the combustion caused physical explosions in the liquid ammonia delivery and ammonia recovery pipelines of Cold Storage No. 1 and Spiral Freezer No. 1 in the northwest part of the main plant, resulting in the roof above that area being torn away and a large amount of ammonia leaking out. This ammonia then contributed to the combustion, allowing the fire to spread to other areas of the main plant.   (II) Fire fighting, rescue, and on-site handling.   At 6:30:57, upon receiving a call from the 110 command center, the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade promptly deployed forces to the scene to handle the situation. Upon receiving the report, the people’s authorities in Jilin Province and Changchun City promptly activated their emergency response plans. The main party and government officials at the provincial and municipal levels, along with other responsible officials, rushed to the scene immediately. They organized and mobilized relevant departments and agencies such as those in charge of public security, firefighting, medical services, water supply, and electricity supply to participate in the rescue efforts and emergency response. In total, over 800 firefighters, more than 300 police officers, over 800 military personnel, and more than 150 medical staff were deployed. Additionally, 113 fire trucks and 54 ambulances were sent to assist in the rescue operations and emergency handling. During the rescue operation, 10 search and rescue missions were carried out on site; 25 people trapped were rescued, and nearly 3,000 people from the scene and its surrounding areas were evacuated. The fire was extinguished at 11 a.m. on the same day.   Due to the large amounts of liquid ammonia stored in the high-pressure ammonia storage tanks and horizontal low-pressure circulation tanks in the refrigeration facility, the fire department followed the principle of \"ensuring that the ammonia storage tanks do not explode and preventing the occurrence of secondary disasters.\" It employed various technical and tactical measures such as spraying water to dilute the leaked ammonia, using water guns to cool the ammonia storage tanks, and breaking down structures to allow exhaust of smoke and ammonia. With the assistance of the technical staff from Baoyuanfeng Company, a special task force was able to successfully shut down the relevant valves.   In the accident, liquid ammonia leaked from Tank No. 1, the horizontal low-pressure circulation tank located in the refrigeration plant; 30 tons of liquid ammonia remained stored in the other 3 high-pressure ammonia storage tanks, 9 horizontal low-pressure circulation tanks, as well as the pipelines for transporting liquid ammonia and recovering it. Under the guidance of the relevant responsible officials and experts from the **Work Safety Emergency Rescue Command Center, and after 8 days of round-the-clock efforts, all 30 tons of liquid ammonia were removed and transported to a safe location.   The local authorities have carried out harmless treatment of the more than 2,600 tons of poultry products that had thawed and rotted at the accident site, and have repeatedly disinfected the area to prevent the spread of disease as well as secondary pollution of the soil and water sources.   (III) Follow-up handling.   The local Party committee **worked diligently to assist and comfort the families of those who died in the accident, as well as to identify the victims and arrange compensation. A total of 121 support teams were established to provide assistance to the families of the 121 victims, thereby maintaining social stability. The identities of all 121 victims have been confirmed through DNA testing; their bodies have been cremated, and the compensation for the victims has been fully processed.   At the time of the accident, 77 injured people were admitted to hospitals for treatment (15 of them in critical condition). The health authorities established one-on-one medical treatment teams. The Health and Family Planning Commission sent a team of medical experts to Changchun; a total of 18 senior experts, 52 experts from provincial and municipal levels, and 370 medical staff participated in the treatment, with 392 consultations carried out in total. At the same time, psychological counseling was provided in stages to the families of the deceased, as well as to the injured and their families; psychological crisis intervention treatment was also carried out. Of the 77 injured people, except for one who died despite efforts to save them due to severe injuries, all the others were able to regain their ability to live and work.   III. Causes and nature of the accident (1) Immediate cause.   A short circuit in the electrical wiring above the women’s dressing room to the west of Workshop 1 in Baoyuanfeng Company’s main factory building, as well as in the power distribution room adjacent to Workshop 2, caused flammable materials in the vicinity to catch fire. When the fire spread to the ammonia equipment and ammonia pipeline areas, the high temperatures generated by the combustion caused physical explosions in those equipment and pipelines, resulting in a large release of ammonia gas that contributed to the fire.   The main reasons for the rapid spread of the fire are as follows: first, a large amount of polyurethane foam insulation materials and polystyrene core boards were used in the main factory building (polyurethane foam has a low ignition point and burns very quickly, while the droplets produced during the combustion of polystyrene core boards are flammable). Secondly, there are many flammable items such as wardrobes, clothing, and office supplies in the rooms of the auxiliary areas like the women’s dressing room in Workshop 2, and these areas are separated from the main workshop, which is crowded with people, by polystyrene core panels. Third, most of the space inside the ceiling is interconnected; after a fire breaks out, the flames spread rapidly from south to north. Fourth, when the fire spreads to the ammonia equipment and ammonia pipelines, the high temperatures generated by the combustion cause physical explosions in these devices and pipelines, resulting in a large release of ammonia gas that contributes to the combustion process.   The main reasons for the heavy casualties are as follows: First, after the fire broke out, the flames spread rapidly from the point of origin; materials such as polyurethane foam and polystyrene foam burned on a large scale, generating high-temperature, toxic smoke, along with harmful substances like ammonia that leaked out. Secondly, the escape routes within the main plant are complex, and the safety exits on the west side of the main passage in the south, as well as the safety exit on the west side of Workshop 2 that leads directly outside, were locked, preventing people from escaping in time in the event of a fire. Thirdly, there were no alarm systems in the main factory building; some people became aware of the fire only late. Additionally, those who first noticed the fire did not have time to alert the people in areas such as Workshop 2 to evacuate, which caused some people to miss the best opportunity to escape. Fourth, Baoyuanfeng Company failed to provide safety training for its employees, nor did it organize emergency evacuation drills; as a result, the employees lack the knowledge and skills necessary for escaping and helping one another in emergencies.   (II) Indirect causes.   1. Baoyuanfeng Company fails to fulfill its primary responsibilities regarding safety production at all.   (1) The enterprise’s investors, who are also the legal representatives, have no awareness of putting people first and prioritizing safety; they seriously violate the Party’s guidelines on work safety as well as relevant laws and regulations. They focus on production, output, and profits, preferring money over safety, and ignore the lives of employees for the sake of the enterprise and their own interests.   (2) During the construction of the enterprise’s factory building, in an effort to save costs, the construction was not carried out in accordance with the original design. Insulation material was illegally replaced from non-flammable rock wool with flammable polyurethane foam, which caused the fire to spread rapidly once it broke out, generating large amounts of toxic gases and resulting in numerous casualties.   (3) The company has never carried out any safety awareness campaigns or training for its employees; its management and staff lack basic knowledge of fire safety as well as the ability to extinguish fires in their early stages ; Although an emergency response plan was established, no emergency drills have ever been carried out ; In violation of regulations, the safety exit on the west side of the southern main passage and the safety exit leading directly outside that was located on the west exterior wall of Workshop 2 were locked, preventing a large number of people from escaping after a fire broke out.   (4) The enterprise has not established a sound safety production responsibility system, let alone implemented it; although it has formulated some internal management systems and safety operating procedures, mainly to meet the requirements of inspections and record-keeping, these have not been made public, enforced, or put into practice ; The general manager, plant manager, and team leaders in the workshops are unaware of the existing rules and regulations, let alone implement them ; After the recruitment of managers, it is only announced at meetings; there is no written appointment, and daily management is arranged on a ad-hoc basis ; No plant-wide safety inspections have been conducted since the plant began operations.   (5) The safety management responsibilities were not clearly defined at each level, and no safety responsibility agreements covering fire safety were signed at those levels; as a result, the legal representative of the enterprise, the general manager, the director of the general office, as well as the supervisors of workshops and teams were unaware of their own safety duties and responsibilities.   (6) The enterprise illegally installed and laid electrical equipment and wiring; cables were left exposed in the main workshop. In Workshop 2, wires were not placed in cable trays or conduits, nor were they protected by safety protective pipes, thus creating significant potential hazards.   (7) Failure to monitor major hazard sources in accordance with relevant regulations, and failure to identify, rectify, and eliminate existing major safety hazards. Especially after several fire accidents occurred in 2010, no proper lessons were learned, and efforts to improve fire safety as well as to thoroughly address the existing safety hazards were not intensified.   2. Public security fire control departments fail to adequately perform their duties in fire supervision and management.   (1) The Mishazi Town Police Station failed to fulfill its responsibilities regarding the supervision of fire safety across the town. After determining that Baoyuanfeng Company met the criteria set out in the \"Jilin Province Standards for Identifying Key Fire Safety Units,\" it failed to report this company as a key fire safety unit of level two to the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade, nor did it carry out any monitoring or oversight of it ; Insufficient supervision and inspection were carried out in places with a high concentration of people, such as labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises; routine fire safety oversight was inadequate. No on-site inspections were conducted at this company, and the serious accident hazards present there were not identified in time, nor were any \"Rectification Notices\" issued to urge corrective actions. In particular, the repeated fire accidents that occurred at Baoyuanfeng Company in 2010 were not investigated thoroughly and seriously in conjunction with the Dehui City Fire Brigade, as a result of which the company failed to learn from those incidents and strengthen its fire safety management. After the accident, together with relevant personnel from the enterprise, they falsified the fire inspection records.   (2) The Dehui City Public Security and Fire Brigade illegally treated Baoyuanfeng Company’s application for fire design review as a matter subject to random inspection for record-keeping, and issued a \"Certificate of Compliance with Fire Safety Requirements for Construction Projects\" in violation of the law, without conducting any fire design review or fire safety inspection ; No issues were found regarding the construction unit’s unauthorized replacement of building materials that do not meet fire safety standards, and no actions were taken to address this problem ; Baoyuanfeng Company was not classified as a level-2 key fire safety unit in accordance with the \"Jilin Province Standards for Identifying Key Fire Safety Units,\" and therefore is not subject to enhanced monitoring ; No instructions were given to the Mishazi Town Police Station to conduct regular fire safety training and education for Baoyuanfeng Company ; The multiple fire accidents that occurred at Baoyuanfeng Company in 2010 were not investigated and dealt with seriously, which prevented the company from properly learning from those incidents and strengthening its fire safety measures as well as addressing and eliminating potential major safety hazards.   (3) The Dehui Public Security Bureau failed to adequately supervise and guide the identification and rectification of fire hazards in labor-intensive production and processing enterprises within its jurisdiction ; Inadequate definition of key units for fire safety considerations ; There was a lack of supervision over the fire safety management and oversight work at the Mishazi Town police station.   (4) The Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade failed to identify and rectify issues such as the Dehui Public Security Fire Brigade’s illegal treatment of Baoyuanfeng Company’s construction project as a subject for random inspection, as well as its unlawful handling of fire safety approval procedures ; Inadequate supervision and guidance of the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade in carrying out comprehensive safety inspections of crowded places ; Failure to detect the negligence of the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade.   (5) The Changchun Public Security Bureau failed to effectively supervise and guide Dehui City in carrying out inspections and rectifications of fire hazards in labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises ; The identification of key units for fire safety is inadequate ; There was a lack of supervision and inspection over the fire safety management work carried out by the Dehui City Public Security Bureau and its fire brigade.   (6) The Jilin Provincial Public Security Fire Brigade fails to properly promote and implement laws and regulations such as the Fire Protection Law, the Provisions on Fire Supervision and Management of Construction Projects (Order No. 106 of the Ministry of Public Security), and the Provisions on Fire Inspection and Supervision (Order No. 107 of the Ministry of Public Security) ; Failure to detect the problems existing in the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade and its Dehui Public Security Fire Team ; There are weaknesses in business training, team building, and ensuring that officials carry out their duties in accordance with the law.   (7) The Jilin Provincial Public Security Department failed to provide adequate supervision and oversight of fire safety measures across the province, and failed to pay attention to the fire safety supervision work carried out by the Changchun Public Security authorities and their fire departments.   3. The construction department suffers from a severe lack of oversight in the development of engineering projects.   (1) The supervisors at the Mishazishi Town Construction Branch lack the necessary certification for law enforcement, exhibit a lack of responsibility, and have a low level of supervision skills. Severe dereliction of duty in work, lax oversight of safety and quality, or even no oversight at all ; The qualification review of the various parties responsible for the project construction at Baoyuanfeng Company was not thorough enough; issues such as the use of unauthorized or borrowed qualifications in the design, construction, and supervision phases of the company’s projects were not identified or resolved ; During the project construction, issues such as Baoyuanfeng Company’s unauthorized modification of the architectural design and replacement of flame-retardant materials were not detected or addressed.   (2) The Dehui City Construction Project Quality Supervision Station failed seriously in its duty to supervise the construction projects carried out by Baoyuanfeng Company. The station failed to conduct the required review of the qualifications of all parties involved in the construction of Baoyuanfeng Company’s project, and failed to identify and rectify issues such as the use of unauthorized or borrowed qualifications by the design, construction, and supervision units involved in that project ; During the inspection of Baoyuanfeng Company’s projects, no issues were found or identified, such as engineering supervisors lacking the necessary qualifications, incomplete engineering documents including supervision logs and monthly reports, or the construction party altering the architectural design or replacing building materials without authorization ; Lax oversight was exercised during the completion inspection process; despite incomplete construction documents for the Baoyuanfeng Company project and unclear quality practices on the part of all parties involved in the construction, the completion inspection procedures were carried out in violation of regulations, resulting in the putting into use of buildings that posed serious safety hazards ; The daily supervision of construction projects within the jurisdiction is inadequate and not properly implemented; on-site quality inspections are not thorough, in-depth, or comprehensive. The person in charge of the station fails to fulfill their responsibilities adequately, conducts few on-site inspections, is unaware of the details regarding the supervision of the projects under their responsibility as well as their progress, and lacks a plan for their work, resulting in a high degree of randomness.   (3) The Dehui City Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau failed to exercise proper supervision over key aspects of Baoyuanfeng Company’s project, such as the bidding process and project acceptance, which led to issues where design, construction, and supervision units and personnel were using unauthorized or borrowed qualifications ; Inadequate guidance, supervision, encouragement, and inspection of the work carried out by the Dehui City Construction Project Quality Supervision Station by its superiors ; Severe negligence was shown regarding the safety and quality issues in the project construction of Baoyuanfeng Company.   4. The safety supervision authorities fail to fulfill their responsibilities for comprehensive supervision of work safety.   (1) The staff at the Work Safety Supervision Station in Mishatzi Town have unclear responsibilities regarding work safety; their daily supervision is arbitrary, and inspection records are incomplete ; The supervision and inspection of work safety at Baoyuanfeng Company were merely perfunctory; no checks were conducted on the qualifications and performance of operators in special positions at the company. There was also a failure to earnestly urge the company and the town’s fire department to conduct thorough inspections and rectifications regarding fire safety hazards ; It failed to urge relevant town authorities to implement the special fire prevention initiatives launched by Jilin Province and Changchun City. Moreover, upon discovering that Baoyuanfeng Company had not conducted any safety production training, it did not earnestly urge corrective measures to be taken.   (2) The Dehui City Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau fails to adequately supervise the requirement that special operation personnel must hold certificates to perform their duties ; It was found that after Baoyuanfeng Company began using liquid ammonia for storage, no inspections or actions were taken to verify whether its personnel performing special tasks held the required certificates ; Inadequate supervision of the monitoring of major hazard sources ; Urge and supervise enterprises and fire departments in the jurisdiction to carry out the special fire prevention campaigns as well as the work of identifying and addressing potential hazards in accordance with the requirements set by Jilin Province and Changchun City, as they are not doing so thoroughly or diligently enough ; Supervision and guidance of relevant municipal departments in fulfilling their responsibilities for industry safety oversight are inadequate.   5. The local authorities fail to properly fulfill their responsibilities for safety supervision in production.   (1) The people of Mishazhi Town place great emphasis on economic growth, fiscal revenue, and attracting investment; they give excessive priority to special treatment and preferential measures for Baoyuanfeng Company, seeking political achievements at the expense of workplace safety. The town’s economic and trade office is also responsible for overseeing the functions of the town’s food safety office and the safety supervision station; the head and staff of the safety supervision station appointed to this role lack basic knowledge in safety production supervision and are unaware of their job responsibilities ; There is inadequate guidance, supervision, and inspection regarding the fulfillment of duties related to work safety and local supervision by relevant departments in the town ; The required thorough, in-depth, and solid efforts to “crack down on illegal activities and rectify violations” were not carried out; in some cases, administrative actions even violated laws and regulations. As a result, Baoyuanfeng Company engaged in numerous acts of illegal construction ; The arrangements and requirements put forward by Jilin Province and Changchun City regarding special fire safety inspections in crowded areas were not properly implemented; the plans formulated lacked specificity, and the supervision and inspection measures were insufficient, resulting in the failure to identify and monitor the numerous major hazards present in that town ; The work of identifying and addressing potential hazards is not carried out seriously, thoroughly, or with due attention; inspections are arranged arbitrarily, without any plan or records. Once hazards are identified, there is no follow-up to implement corrective actions or conduct follow-up checks, resulting in major accident risks and serious problems not being eliminated or resolved in a timely and effective manner.   (2) The people of Dehui City have failed to firmly establish and implement the scientific development concept and the philosophy of safe development; they pursue GDP growth in a one-sided manner, emphasize granting preferential treatment to investment attraction projects by issuing more approvals on a case-by-case basis, and neglect safety in production. There is inadequate implementation of laws, regulations, and policy provisions related to work safety, as well as the requirements set by higher authorities regarding work safety; furthermore, insufficient efforts are made to urge enterprises, grassroots units, and relevant departments to fulfill their responsibilities in terms of work safety and quality management, and to strengthen supervision over safety and quality. Since 2012, in the context of special campaigns to improve fire safety in crowded areas, the 100-day fire prevention campaign during winter and spring, as well as the efforts to identify and address safety hazards following the extremely serious gas explosions at Babao Coal Mine of Jilin Jiemei Group Tonghua Mining Company on March 29 and the serious gas explosion on April 1, the municipal authorities merely made arrangements and directives, but failed to supervise and inspect the actual implementation of safety measures and the handling of identified hazards at various levels ; The comprehensive inspections and rectifications related to safe production were not thorough, complete, or exhaustive, resulting in blind spots and areas that went unaddressed; as a result, the serious safety hazards existing at Baoyuanfeng Company were not identified or resolved ; Inadequate efforts in carrying out operations to crack down on illegal activities led to serious illegal and irregular construction practices by Baoyuanfeng Company, as well as illegal and irregular administrative actions by local authorities and relevant departments ; After delegating the authority for project construction approval to the people’s government of Mishazi Town and the Mishazi Industrial Zone, there was a failure to supervise and guide them in carrying out the necessary inspections regarding safety and construction quality, as a result of which effective supervision of safety and quality at the local level was not ensured. Major accident hazards in these enterprises were not identified or addressed in a timely manner.   (3) The people’s government of Changchun City has failed to properly handle the relationship between safety and development; it has not implemented relevant laws, regulations, policy requirements, and work directives regarding work safety in Jilin Province in a thorough, diligent, or effective manner ; Insufficient supervision and inspection of the safety and quality oversight efforts by relevant departments and local authorities; lax requirements and inadequate implementation of measures to eliminate illegal activities and address potential hazards ; Supervision and guidance were insufficient to ensure that the relevant departments under Changchun City’s jurisdiction and the people’s government of Dehui City fulfilled their responsibilities for safety supervision in accordance with the law.   (4) The people of Jilin Province have not firmly established the scientific development concept and the philosophy of safe development ; Failing to implement **laws, regulations, policy provisions, and work requirements related to work safety, as well as failing to urge relevant regions and departments to fulfill their responsibilities properly and carry out work safety tasks effectively ; Weak leadership, guidance, and supervision over fire safety efforts across the province.   (III) Nature of the accident.   Upon investigation, it was determined that the particularly serious fire and explosion accident that occurred on June 3 at Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd. in Changchun City, Jilin Province, was an accident resulting from negligence in production safety.   IV. Recommendations regarding the handling of persons responsible and entities liable for the accident (1) Persons who died in the accident shall be exempt from liability investigation.   1. Jiang Tieyu, plant manager at Baoyuanfeng Company, and person in charge of factory production management. The fire safety responsibilities stipulated in laws such as the Fire Protection Law and the Work Safety Law were not properly fulfilled. No safety production responsibility system has been established, there are no effective safety protection measures, and no safety inspections have been carried out ; No basic education on emergency avoidance procedures was provided to the employees, and no emergency evacuation drills were conducted; thus, responsibility for the occurrence of the accident lies with them.   2. Zhou Shaoyan, Director of the Plant Power Department at Baoyuanfeng Company, and responsible for electrical management in the plant’s production workshops. Failing to properly fulfill the fire safety responsibilities stipulated by laws such as the Fire Protection Law and the Work Safety Law, and failing to conduct inspections, maintenance, and tests on electrical circuits and equipment as required, they are responsible for the occurrence of the accident.   (II) Persons for whom judicial authorities have taken measures.   1. Jia Yushan, **Party member, chairman of Baoyuanfeng Company, and the sole investor of the enterprise. Seriously violating the fire safety regulations stipulated in laws and regulations such as the Fire Protection Law, the Work Safety Law, and the Construction Law, prioritizing the economic interests of the enterprise and oneself while neglecting the safety of employees’ lives. Violating the statutory capital construction procedures during the project construction period ; Cutting corners to save on investment by replacing the factory’s insulation materials without authorization ; The company’s daily safety management is chaotic; it has failed to establish and implement a safety production responsibility system in accordance with the law, nor has it conducted any safety inspections ; Failing to carry out the identification, assessment, registration, filing, and record-keeping of major hazard sources involving hazardous chemicals as required ; No measures were taken to keep the workshop’s evacuation routes and safety exits unobstructed ; No basic education on emergency avoidance procedures was provided to employees, nor were any emergency evacuation drills organized for them. Arrest was approved on June 14.   2. Zhang Yushen, General Manager of Baoyuanfeng Company; also served as factory director from April 2011 to March 2013. As general manager, this constitutes serious dereliction of duty. Failing to fulfill the obligations stipulated by laws and regulations such as the Fire Protection Law and the Work Safety Law ; The safety production responsibility system has not been established or implemented at all levels ; No safety inspections or efforts to identify and address potential hazards were carried out ; Failing to carry out the identification, assessment, registration, filing, and record-keeping of major hazard sources involving hazardous chemicals as required ; No basic education on emergency avoidance procedures was provided to employees, nor were any emergency evacuation drills organized. Arrest was approved on June 14.   3. Jia Tiejin, director of Liaoning Dahe Heavy Steel Engineering Co., Ltd. From 2005 to 2011, he served as General Manager of Liaoning Dahe Heavy Steel Engineering Co., Ltd. It introduces how Baoyuanfeng Company illegally used the construction qualifications of Changchun Construction Group to go through the construction procedures ; It organized personnel to carry out the construction of the steel structure portion of the Baoyuanfeng Company project, and assigned unqualified employees from its own company to handle the project design for that project; it also violated regulations by affiliating itself with the Liaoning Textile Industry Non-woven Fabric Technology Development Center and going through the necessary procedures ; Participated in illegal changes to flame-retardant materials in Baoyuanfeng Company’s project. Arrest was approved on June 20.   4. Liu Sheng, an employee of Changchun Construction Group. Contact the relevant personnel to sign a construction contract with Baoyuanfeng Company, and engage in the illegal practice of using the qualifications of Changchun Construction Group to handle the construction procedures for Baoyuanfeng Company’s projects, in order to extract management fees from such activities. Arrest was approved on June 20.   5. Liu Zhenjiang, a Party member, became manager of Jixing Management Company of Changchun Construction Group in July 2005, and took sick leave in March 2012. With Liu Zhenjiang’s approval, Baoyuanfeng Company’s project utilized the qualifications of Changchun Construction Group to sign the construction contract and go through the relevant construction procedures. Arrest was approved on June 20.   6. Zhang Xinming, unemployed. Contact Baoyuanfeng Company, the responsible party, regarding the illegal affiliation with Ruicheng Supervision Company, the signing of supervision contracts, and the handling of related procedures. Representing Ruicheng Supervision Company to supervise the project construction of Baoyuanfeng Company, and at the same time representing Baoyuanfeng Company in technical management, receiving remuneration from both parties. Arrest was approved on June 20.   7. Yao Gaizheng, **Party member, Director of the General Office at Baoyuanfeng Company; responsible for fire safety and security matters other than those related to the production facilities. Failing to fulfill responsibilities related to safety production properly, and failing to assist the company’s management in establishing and implementing a safety production responsibility system at all levels, which led to chaos in the company’s safety management. Arrest was approved on June 20.   8. Leng Xuefei, the head of security at Baoyuanfeng Company, was approved for arrest on June 20 on suspicion of fabricating evidence.   9. Lv Yandong, **Party member, head of the Jingyue Fire Brigade of the Changchun Fire Department; former head of the Dehui Public Security Fire Brigade. On June 24, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate on charges of abuse of power, and criminal detention measures were imposed against him. He was reported to the police on June 27.   10. Liu Guicai, **Party member, staff officer at the Yushu Brigade of the Changchun Fire Brigade; former deputy head of the Dehui Public Security Fire Brigade. On June 24, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate on suspicion of dereliction of duty, and criminal detention measures were imposed on him. He was reported to the police on June 27.   11. Gao Wei, **Party member, fire prevention officer at the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade. On June 24, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate on charges of abuse of power, and criminal detention measures were imposed against him. He was reported to the police on June 27.   12. Lan Tian, **Party member, staff officer at the Nong’an Fire Brigade of the Changchun Fire Department; former fire prevention officer at the Dehui Public Security Fire Brigade. On June 24, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate on suspicion of dereliction of duty, and criminal detention measures were imposed on him. He was reported to the police on June 27.   13. Zhao Zhen, **Party member, head of the Mishazi Town Police Station of the Dehui City Public Security Bureau. On June 18, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate and the Changchun High-Tech Zone Procuratorate on charges of dereliction of duty, and criminal detention measures were imposed on him. Arrest was approved on June 27.   14. Sun Zhongguang, **Party member, officer at the Mishaizi Town Police Station of the Dehui Public Security Bureau. On June 18, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate and the Changchun High-Tech Zone Procuratorate on charges of dereliction of duty, and criminal detention measures were imposed on him. Arrest was approved on June 27.   15. Feng Tianming, **Party member, officer at the Mishazi Town Police Station of the Dehui City Public Security Bureau. On June 18, 2013, he was placed under investigation by the Dehui City Procuratorate and the Changchun High-Tech Zone Procuratorate on charges of dereliction of duty, and criminal detention measures were imposed on him. Arrest was approved on June 27.   16. Song Limin, **Party member, Director of the Construction Branch in Mishazi Town, Dehui City. There was inadequate supervision over the construction of the Baoyuanfeng project; the qualifications of all parties responsible for the project’s construction were not rigorously reviewed. As a result, problems such as design, construction, and supervision units using or lending their qualifications for the project went undetected and uncorrected ; The supervision and inspection during the construction process were merely perfunctory, failing to detect and rectify issues such as Baoyuanfeng Company’s unauthorized modification of the building design and replacement of construction materials. On June 30, a prosecution case was filed against him on suspicion of dereliction of duty.   17. Liu Shuwei, **Party member, Deputy Director of the Dehui Construction Project Quality Supervision Station. He is in charge of the Civil Engineering Section, Heating and Sanitation Section, and Electrical Section, and assists the Director in overseeing the quality supervision of newly constructed projects. It failed to examine the qualifications of all responsible parties involved in the Baoyuanfeng Company’s project as required; consequently, it failed to detect and rectify issues such as the use of false or borrowed qualifications by the design, construction, and supervision units during the project’s implementation. During the construction of Baoyuanfeng Company’s project, random inspections were not conducted thoroughly, and issues such as unqualified project supervision personnel, incomplete project documentation, and the construction party’s unauthorized modifications to the architectural design and substitution of building materials were not identified or addressed. Lax oversight was exercised in the final inspection of the projects carried out by Baoyuanfeng Company, resulting in serious negligence in supervision and creating significant safety hazards. On June 30, a prosecution case was filed against him on suspicion of dereliction of duty.   18. Li Yunlong, **Party member, Director of the Economic and Trade Office and Head of the Work Safety Supervision Station in Mishazi Town, Dehui City. The safety supervision work in Mishazi Town was not carried out in a comprehensive and proper manner in accordance with the requirements of laws and regulations on work safety ; The major hazard sources of Baoyuanfeng Company were not monitored ; No supervision or inspection was conducted regarding whether operators of special refrigeration-related jobs at Baoyuanfeng Company held the required certificates and how they performed their duties ; There was no proper follow-up and corrective action taken regarding the issues identified during inspections, such as Baoyuanfeng Company’s failure to conduct safety production training. On June 30, a prosecution case was filed against him on suspicion of dereliction of duty.   19. Liu Zhenxiang, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Town Mayor of Mishazi Town, Dehui City. Failing to implement laws and regulations on work safety and to carry out efforts to crack down on illegal activities; in some cases, engaging in administrative actions that violate these laws and regulations ; Inadequate leadership and supervision over work related to safety production in Mishazi Town ; Serious negligence was shown regarding the problems existing in the law enforcement inspections for work safety and the identification and resolution of potential hazards across the entire town, as well as the issues in the safety and quality supervision efforts carried out by the Mishazi Town Police Station, the Construction Branch, and the Safety Supervision Office. On June 30, a prosecution case was filed against him on suspicion of dereliction of duty.   For those who are **Party members or subjects of administrative supervision, once the judicial authorities have taken action, the local disciplinary inspection and supervision agencies or the authorities with jurisdiction shall promptly impose the appropriate Party discipline or administrative sanctions. In addition to the aforementioned individuals, the judicial authorities are conducting independent investigations in accordance with the law to determine whether other persons involved in the accident are suspected of committing crimes. It is recommended that the relevant authorities expedite the investigation and release the results as soon as possible.   (III) Persons recommended for disciplinary actions under Party discipline and administrative discipline.   1. Teng Jipeng, **Party member, deputy chief of the Mishazi Town Police Station in Dehui City. The laws and regulations regarding work safety, as well as the requirements set out in higher-level documents and work directives, have not been properly implemented ; Fire safety inspections and supervision of crowded places within the jurisdiction were not carried out properly. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and dismiss them from their position.   2. Wang Zhuo, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Head of the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade. The relevant provisions of the Fire Protection Law and the Standards for Identifying Key Fire Safety Units in Jilin Province were not properly implemented; Baoyuanfeng Company was not classified as a key fire safety unit for supervision ; Failing to provide proper guidance to the Mishazi Town Police Station in carrying out fire safety supervision and management tasks ; Failure to detect and address the serious fire hazards at Baoyuanfeng Company. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   3. Song Zhenyu, **Party member, Head of the Fire Prevention Department at the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade. There has been inadequate promotion and implementation of laws, regulations, and rules such as the Fire Protection Law, the Provisions on Fire Supervision and Management in Construction Projects, and the Standards for Identifying Key Fire Safety Units in Jilin Province; moreover, insufficient supervision and guidance have been provided regarding the daily fire safety inspections carried out by the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade, as well as the process of identifying key fire safety units. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and a demotion as punishment.   4. Zhao Lizhi, **Party member, Deputy Head of the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade, in charge of fire prevention and supervision work. Inadequate implementation of laws, regulations, and rules such as the Fire Protection Law, the Provisions on Fire Supervision and Management of Construction Projects, and the Standards for Identifying Key Fire Protection Units in Jilin Province ; During his tenure as the head of the Fire Prevention Department and deputy director of the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade, he failed to provide adequate guidance on fire safety supervision and management in Dehui City ; Lax management of the work carried out by the Dehui City Public Security and Fire Brigade ; Failure to detect issues of dereliction of duty and misconduct by relevant personnel at the Dehui City Public Security Fire Brigade. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and dismiss them from their position.   5. Wang Xichun, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Head of the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade. Inadequate implementation of relevant fire safety laws, regulations, and rules and regulations ; Inadequate guidance on fire supervision and management tasks in Dehui City ; Lax management of the work carried out by the Dehui City Public Security and Fire Brigade ; Failure to detect the issue of relevant personnel at the Dehui City Public Security and Fire Brigade failing to fulfill their duties properly. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   6. Zhao Zikui, Party Secretary and Political Commissar of the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade. Inadequate education, supervision, and management of the relevant functional departments and responsible leaders at the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade ; Failure to detect the issue of relevant personnel at the Dehui City Public Security and Fire Brigade failing to fulfill their duties properly. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and a demotion as punishment.   7. Liu Jun, member of the Party Committee and deputy chief of the Jilin Provincial Public Security Fire Brigade, in charge of fire prevention work. Failing to implement relevant fire protection laws and regulations, as well as failing to provide adequate leadership and supervision over subordinates in carrying out fire safety oversight duties; also failing to offer effective guidance on fire supervision and management tasks to the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and a demotion as punishment.   8. Li Shutian, Party Secretary and Chief of the Jilin Provincial Public Security Fire Brigade. Failure to detect issues such as the Changchun Public Security Fire Brigade’s improper implementation of policies and regulations, lax oversight of administrative licensing processes, and inadequate fire safety supervision ; There are shortcomings in areas such as business training, team building, and ensuring that officials act in accordance with the law. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe reprimand.   9. Zou Haichun, Party branch secretary and director of the Dehui City Construction Project Quality Supervision Station. Insufficient supervision and inspection regarding the performance of duties by relevant personnel at the Municipal Construction Project Quality Supervision Station ; There was severe negligence in overseeing issues such as the use of affiliated or borrowed qualifications by design, construction, and supervision firms in Baoyuanfeng Company’s project construction, unauthorized design changes, and lax quality control during inspections, which resulted in significant safety hazards. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   10. Liu Guangchun, **Party member. From August 2005 to December 2011, he served as Deputy Director of the Dehui Municipal Bureau of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, overseeing tasks such as construction market management, municipal engineering projects, and rural and town construction management. Since December 2011, he has been serving as Deputy Director of the Dehui Economic Bureau in Jilin Province. During her tenure as Deputy Director of the Dehui City Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau, she failed to adequately supervise and inspect the performance of regulatory duties by the Municipal Construction Engineering Quality Supervision Station and relevant personnel under her responsibility ; Negligent supervision regarding issues existing in the project construction of Baoyuanfeng Company, such as the use of affiliated entities and borrowed qualifications by the construction party, unauthorized design changes, and lax quality control during acceptance. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and dismiss them from their position.   11. Song Yanchang, **Party member, Head of the Hazardous Chemicals Supervision and Management Section at the Dehui City Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau. During the special rectification campaign requiring certified personnel for specific types of work, I was in charge of the Mishazi Town area. After discovering that Baoyuanfeng Company was storing liquid ammonia, no inspection was carried out on whether the company’s personnel performing special tasks held the required certificates ; No training is required for liquid ammonia refrigeration workers ; Failure to urge enterprises to monitor major hazard sources. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and dismiss them from their position.   12. Li Zhenwu, **Party member. From December 2003 to May 2013, he served as the head of the Inspection Section at the Dehui City Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau; since May 2013, he has been the head of the Inspection Team at the same bureau. Lack of clarity regarding the status of projects within one’s area of responsibility ; Failing to ensure that the special operation personnel at Baoyuanfeng Company receive training ; Failing to urge enterprises and relevant departments to carry out emergency drills for work safety ; Relevant work on law enforcement and supervision regarding work safety has not been carried out properly. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and dismiss them from their position.   13. Chen Fuqiang, member of the Party Leadership Group and deputy director of the Dehui City Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau. The supervisor in charge of the relevant department failed to report promptly upon discovering the major hazard of hazardous chemicals at Baoyuanfeng Company; he also failed to check whether the personnel working with liquid ammonia refrigeration systems held the necessary certificates and did not arrange any training for them ; The guidance and supervision over the work of safety production supervision and management at the Anshijie Station in Mishazi Town are inadequate ; Insufficient supervision and inspection of the performance of work safety responsibilities by the relevant departments in Dehui City ; Failure to detect problems existing in the process of work safety supervision. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and a demotion as punishment.   14. Fan Bu, Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau of Dehui City. Comprehensive supervision of work safety was inadequate; no inspections were carried out to assess how the relevant departments in Dehui City fulfilled their responsibilities for safety supervision ; The supervision and inspection of the implementation of specific tasks by the Municipal Work Safety Supervision and Administration Bureau, such as safety inspections, hazard identification, and staff training, are inadequate ; Supervision and inspection of the monitoring work for major hazard sources, as well as supervision and management of work safety at the Mishazi Town Safety Supervision Station, were inadequate. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe reprimand.   15. Wang Zhongfeng, member of the Party Committee and deputy town head of Mishazi Town in Dehui City; in charge of the fire safety leadership team and responsible for coordinating with the police station and other related tasks. The organizational leadership failed to effectively carry out fire safety efforts throughout the town ; Inadequate supervision and inspection of the town police station’s performance of its duties ; Inadequate efforts have been made to carry out operations to crack down on illegal activities and rectify violations, as well as to identify and address potential hazards. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   16. Pei Tianji, Secretary of the Party Committee of Mishazi Town in Dehui City, Secretary of the Party Working Committee of the Mishazi Industrial Zone, and Director of the Management Committee of the Mishazi Industrial Zone; he is in charge of all aspects of work related to the Party Committee of Mishazi Town and the Mishazi Industrial Zone. Failing to effectively organize and lead safety production efforts across the town ; Insufficient supervision and inspection of the performance of regulatory duties by departments such as public security, construction, and safety supervision ; Poor performance in carrying out efforts to crack down on illegal activities and violations, or even unlawful administrative actions ; Insufficient supervision and inspection were provided regarding the hazard identification and mitigation efforts carried out by departments such as public security and safety supervision agencies. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   17. Wang Tao, Member of the Dehui City Party Committee ** and Deputy Mayor. The supervision and inspection of the actual implementation of work safety measures in Dehui City’s urban construction efforts are inadequate ; He failed to notice the serious problems in the law enforcement and supervision efforts carried out by the Dehui Municipal Housing and Construction Bureau, the department under his responsibility, during the subsequent construction phase of Baoyuanfeng Company. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and a demotion as punishment.   18. Wang Huaan, member of the Party Leadership Group and vice mayor of Dehui City, as well as Secretary of the Party Committee and director of the Municipal Public Security Bureau. Inadequate organization, supervision, and guidance in carrying out the identification and rectification of fire hazards in labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises within the jurisdiction, as well as in determining which units are considered key fire safety targets ; There was inadequate supervision over the fire safety oversight work at the Mishazi Town Police Station. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   19. Liu Changchun, Deputy Secretary of the Dehui City Party Committee and Mayor. Inadequate implementation of laws and regulations regarding work safety, as well as the requirements set by higher authorities regarding work safety measures ; Inadequate leadership and organization of work related to work safety in Dehui City, as well as ineffective efforts to crack down on illegal activities and violations ; Insufficient supervision and inspection of the actual implementation of work related to work safety in Dehui City ; Failure to detect the problems existing in the work carried out by the fire protection, housing and construction, and safety supervision departments in Dehui City, such as law enforcement inspections for work safety and the identification and resolution of potential hazards. As the person who bears primary leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions and dismissed from office.   20. Zhang Dexiang, Secretary of the Dehui City Party Committee. Inadequate leadership and organization of work related to safe production, as well as ineffective efforts to crack down on illegal and irregular activities ; The supervision and inspection of work safety oversight in Dehui City are inadequate ; Failure to detect the problems existing in the work of safety production law enforcement inspections and hazard identification and rectification carried out by the relevant departments in Dehui City. As the main person responsible for the accident, it is recommended that they be removed from their party positions.   21. Li Xiang, member of the Party Leadership Group and vice mayor of Changchun City, as well as Secretary of the Party Committee and director of the Changchun Public Security Bureau. Insufficient supervision and guidance were provided to Dehui City in carrying out inspections to identify fire hazards in labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises, as well as in determining which entities are considered key fire safety targets ; Lax supervision was exercised over the Changchun Public Security Bureau and its fire brigade in fulfilling their responsibilities for fire safety supervision and management. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe warning within the party and a demotion as punishment.   22. Jiang Zhiying, Deputy Secretary of the Changchun Municipal Party Committee and Mayor. Failing to properly implement **laws, regulations, policy requirements related to work safety, as well as the directives set by higher authorities** ; Failing to provide proper guidance and supervision to the public security fire protection agencies in Changchun City and the People’s ** in Dehui City to carry out safety supervision and management work in accordance with the law ; Failure to detect the situation in which the public security fire departments in Changchun City and the People’s ** in Dehui City failed to fulfill their duties properly in accordance with the law. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe reprimand.   23. Huang Guanchun, Vice Governor of Jilin Province and Head of the Provincial Public Security Department. Failing to properly implement **fire safety laws, regulations, policy requirements, and work directives** ; Failing to provide proper guidance and supervision to the public security fire protection agencies in Jilin Province in carrying out fire safety supervision and management tasks ; Failure to detect situations such as public security and fire protection agencies failing to fulfill their duties in accordance with the law, and negligence or dereliction of duty by frontline officers. Given the significant leadership responsibility for the accident, it is recommended to impose a severe reprimand.   (IV) Relevant penalties and accountability recommendations.   1. In accordance with relevant laws and administrative regulations such as the Work Safety Law and the Regulations on the Reporting, Investigation, and Handling of Work Safety Accidents, it is recommended that the people’s government of Jilin Province instruct the Jilin Provincial Work Safety Supervision Bureau to impose an economic penalty on Baoyuanfeng Company up to the prescribed limit.   2. It is recommended that the people’s government of Jilin Province **order the relevant departments to shut down Baoyuanfeng Company in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.   3. It is recommended that the people’s government of Jilin Province **order the relevant departments to impose administrative penalties on the illegal and irregular activities of the design, construction, and supervision units involved in these projects.   4. It is recommended that, in connection with the particularly serious gas explosion incident that occurred on March 29 at Babao Coal Industry Company, part of Tonghua Mining Group Company under Jilin Province’s Jimei Group, a public reprimand be issued to the people of Jilin Province, and that they be ordered to submit a thorough self-examination to the State Council.   V. Recommendations for Accident Prevention Measures (1) It is necessary to firmly establish and implement the scientific outlook on development.   The people’s governments at all levels in Jilin Province, Changchun City, and Dehui City, along with the relevant departments and various production and business entities, must draw serious lessons from the extremely serious fire and explosion accident that occurred at Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd. on June 3. They should reflect deeply on this incident, make firm decisions, learn from it, and make significant efforts to strengthen work related to safety in production, particularly fire safety. In accordance with the major decisions and arrangements of **** and the State Council, as well as a series of important instructions from central leaders such as **** and Prime Minister **, it is necessary to firmly establish and effectively implement the scientific outlook on development, as well as correct concepts regarding political achievements and performance. We must resolutely prevent and correct the tendency in some localities, departments, and units to prioritize speed, growth, and efficiency while neglecting quality and safety, or even to sacrifice safety in order to achieve short-term economic growth. We should earnestly implement the safety development strategy, adhere to a people-oriented approach, scientific development, and safe development, and ensure that development is predicated on and secured by safety – development must be safe; without safety, there can be no development. We must always place the safety of people’s lives first, adhering to the non-negotiable principle that development must not come at the cost of human life. Safety production should truly be integrated into the overall plan for regional economic and social development, with more determined, effective, and forceful measures taken. This involves improving systems, establishing sound regulations, innovating mechanisms, strengthening responsibilities, enhancing management, and improving supervision. Strict law enforcement, rigorous evaluation, and serious accountability are also essential. The responsibilities and measures related to safety production must be effectively implemented, especially at the grassroots level and in enterprises, so as to solidify the foundation for enterprise safety production and **safety supervision. At the same time, it is necessary to handle well the relationships between safety and development, safety and efficiency, speed and quality, as well as growth and quality. Macro-control should be strengthened, policy guidance enhanced, and supervision and inspection improved. Development concepts must be corrected, development strategies clarified, and development patterns transformed. The industrial structure should be adjusted, scientific and technological progress promoted, and the level of development raised to ensure safe production.   (II) It is necessary to effectively strengthen the implementation of enterprises’ primary responsibilities regarding work safety.   All types of production and business entities must fundamentally strengthen their safety awareness, truly implement the system of accountability held by the legal representative for workplace safety as well as the primary responsibility for safety within the enterprise. They must strictly abide by laws and regulations related to workplace safety, construction, quality management, etc., establish and strictly enforce various rules and regulations as well as safety procedures. It is necessary to overcome the mindset that prioritizes production, expansion, speed, and profits at the expense of quality and safety; instead, the proper balance between safety and production, safety and profitability, and safety and development must be established. It is essential to firmly uphold and apply the scientific outlook on development, adhere to the principle of safe development and the policy of \"safety first, prevention first, comprehensive management,\" and refuse to pursue increased production and economic benefits at the cost of human lives. It is necessary to establish sound safety management organizations and a clear safety responsibility system, enforce strict performance evaluations and accountability measures for safe production, and implement a \"one-vote veto\" system” ; Ensure investment in safety production in accordance with the law, put an end to practices such as cutting corners and lowering standards, adhere to the use of technology to enhance safety, and improve the level of intrinsic safety ; Strengthen safety education and training, enhance the standardization of safe production, improve on-site safety management, and enforce strict controls over personnel engaged in special types of work ; Persistently and vigorously combat illegal and rule-breaking activities related to construction, production, and business operations; rectify and correct instances of unauthorized commands, violations of operating procedures, and breaches of labor discipline ; Thoroughly, persistently, and meticulously identify and rectify safety hazards; strengthen the monitoring of major hazard sources and the management of hazardous materials ; Strengthening emergency management requires particular focus on the development of emergency plans and emergency drills, in order to improve the ability to respond to and handle accidents and disasters. Through unremitting efforts, it is necessary to continuously improve and enhance the enterprise’s safety production standards, boost its overall safety capabilities, and resolutely prevent all types of accidents from occurring.   (III) It is necessary to effectively strengthen fire safety efforts, with a focus on the standardization of fire safety practices.   The people’s governments at all levels in Jilin Province, Changchun City, and Dehui City, along with the relevant departments and various production and business entities, must strengthen efforts related to safe production, with a particular focus on the principle of \"simultaneous implementation\" for fire safety measures. They should further work to improve the fire safety conditions in labor-intensive enterprises; fire safety requirements must be fully taken into account during the design and construction of buildings, and efforts should be made to raise the standards for fire protection. Additionally, stricter oversight, verification, and inspection processes are necessary to ensure that safety facilities, including those related to fire protection, are implemented simultaneously. The use of flammable and combustible insulation materials in the production and processing workshops of labor-intensive enterprises must be strictly restricted to ensure the fire-resistant properties of building materials ; Evacuation routes and safety exits should be properly designated, and emergency signs and alarm systems should be improved to provide adequate safety safeguards for workers ; A comprehensive inspection must be carried out across the province of similar enterprises, particularly those that use such insulation materials; thorough rectifications must be implemented, and prevention and control measures must be improved and strengthened. At the same time, it is necessary to implement fire safety responsibility systems at all levels, especially at the grassroots level. Efforts should be made to comprehensively improve the fire safety skills of the public, particularly workers. Special campaigns for improving fire safety must be carried out in a thorough manner. Safety management and supervision in various areas such as crowded places and the production, sales, transportation, and storage of flammable and explosive materials need to be strengthened. Factories and workshops that pose a high risk of fires, such as those that combine multiple functions in one building, should be shut down in accordance with the law. The construction of \"firewall projects\" should be enhanced, and a \"grid-based\" management system for fire safety should be put in place to prevent fires and other types of industrial accidents from the source.   (4) It is necessary to effectively strengthen the safety supervision and management of enterprises using ammonia refrigeration systems.   The people’s governments at all levels in Jilin Province, Changchun City, and Dehui City, along with the relevant departments, should strengthen the safety supervision and management of enterprises that use ammonia-based refrigeration systems as well as those that utilize ammonia. By identifying the competent authorities, a leading department should be designated, coordination mechanisms among relevant departments should be established, industry safety management systems should be improved, relevant standards and regulations should be unified, regular inspections and monitoring of major hazard sources should be intensified, and efforts to prevent and control accidents should be enhanced. At the same time, effective measures must be taken to strengthen publicity, education, and professional training, so as to help all employees in enterprises that use ammonia refrigeration systems and those units that employ ammonia understand its physical and chemical properties. Appropriate safety procedures should be established in light of its hazards, and these procedures must be implemented conscientiously and thoroughly ; It is necessary to strengthen monitoring and surveillance at industrial sites, and earnestly carry out measures such as leak prevention ; Ammonia concentration alarm devices and emergency ventilation systems should be installed in areas with a high density of workers. Water spray systems, collection tanks, and emergency drainage systems should be added to ammonia storage tanks, while sealed emergency drainage tanks or basins should be provided for emergency ammonia release devices. On this basis, it is necessary to vigorously promote the transformation and upgrading of enterprises, with a particular focus on promoting safe and environmentally friendly refrigeration units.   (5) It is necessary to effectively strengthen the supervision of safety and quality in engineering project construction.   The people’s governments at all levels in Jilin Province, Changchun City, and Dehui City, along with the relevant departments, must supervise the owners, designers, contractors, and supervisors of all construction projects to strictly abide by the relevant laws, regulations, and procedures governing infrastructure construction. They must ensure that all parties fulfill their responsibilities regarding safety and quality, comply with the construction management processes, and go through the necessary procedures such as project approval, design approval, construction permits, organization of construction work, and completion inspections. It is strictly prohibited to rush the construction timeline, pressure for faster progress, or relax oversight of quality and safety. It is essential to ensure proper investment in the projects, especially in terms of safety measures, as well as a reasonable construction timeline. Careful planning and standardized construction practices are necessary to guarantee the quality and safety of construction projects. The relevant management and supervision departments in the field of engineering construction must fulfill their duties properly, carry out administrative tasks in accordance with laws and regulations, strengthen daily oversight and administrative law enforcement, adhere to principles, enforce the law impartially and strictly, strictly control all key points, and absolutely prohibit granting approvals in violation of laws, regulations or procedural requirements. At the same time, efforts to crack down on illegal and irregular activities must be intensified. Outstanding problems in the field of engineering construction need to be thoroughly identified and resolved. Illegal acts such as approval beyond authorized limits, commencement of construction without prior approval, engagement of unqualified parties for design, construction, and supervision, as well as illegal subcontracting and the lending of qualifications, must be strictly punished. Effective measures should be taken to ensure fair competition in the market, maintain project quality, and guarantee safe production.   (VI) It is necessary to effectively strengthen the safety supervision responsibilities of ** and its relevant departments.   The people’s governments at all levels in Jilin Province, Changchun City, and Dehui City, along with the relevant departments, must strictly implement the system of administrative responsibility held by the top officials for work safety, as well as the principle of \"dual responsibilities\" for other leaders. Additionally, the industry authorities are responsible for direct supervision, the safety supervision agencies bear comprehensive supervision duties, and the local governments are responsible for supervision within their respective jurisdictions. The administrative licensing system and the approval responsibility system must be strictly enforced. Especially in terms of administrative approval, it is necessary to adhere to the principles of \"whoever is in charge is responsible,\" \"whoever grants the permission is responsible,\" and \"whoever issues the certificate is responsible.\" Strict scrutiny should be carried out before approval, strict control should be exercised during the approval process, and enhanced supervision should be implemented after approval. Industry authorities at all levels must adhere to the principle that safety must be taken into account in all aspects of industry management, business operations, and production and construction activities. They should earnestly fulfill their responsibilities for overseeing industry safety, strengthen such oversight, increase administrative enforcement efforts, and crack down on illegal and unlawful production, operation, and construction activities. It is necessary to completely address and resolve any issues related to violations of regulations, and to shut down, in accordance with the law, all types of small factories, mines, and business units that do not meet safety standards. In particular, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the risk factors in labor-intensive enterprises, and to strengthen fire safety supervision over such enterprises in a targeted manner. At the same time, safety supervision departments at all levels must further strengthen comprehensive supervision of work safety. Under the leadership of the Party committees and **, they should enhance supervision, inspection, guidance, and coordination over lower-level local people’s **s as well as relevant departments at the same level, in order to effectively mobilize and urge all parties to work together to ensure proper work safety practices. On the basis of comprehensively strengthening safety supervision and accident prevention, it is necessary to improve the response and handling of accident disasters. A work mechanism featuring unified leadership, coordinated operations, and efficient functioning should be established. Relevant departments as well as various production and business entities, especially labor-intensive enterprises, should be urged and guided to develop effective emergency plans for accident disasters. Emergency drills of different levels and in various forms should be carried out on a wide scale, an emergency rescue team system should be established and improved, and the provision of rescue equipment and the storage of supplies should be enhanced. In the event of an accident, it is necessary to provide effective organization and leadership, respond in a scientific and safe manner, carry out rescue efforts in an orderly, efficient, and effective way, and protect the scene during the rescue process.   (7) It is necessary to effectively strengthen leadership over work related to safety production.   The people’s governments at all levels in Jilin Province, Changchun City, and Dehui City must attach great importance to work related to safety production, strengthen organizational leadership, and ensure that there is proper awareness, effective leadership, adequate organizational structures, suitable working measures, and proper implementation of relevant policies. It is necessary to improve the work system and establish an effective framework, ensuring that both the Party and government take action and that all parties share responsibility ; It is necessary to regularly listen to reports on work related to safety production, periodically study and analyze the safety production situation, and promptly identify and resolve existing problems ; It is necessary to adhere to governance in accordance with the law and maintain order through legal means. Efforts to combat illegal and irregular activities should be carried out in a thorough and sustained manner; illegal construction and production activities by enterprises must be firmly suppressed, and illegal and irregular administrative practices by local authorities, especially at the grassroots level, as well as related departments, must be resolutely addressed and corrected ; Regular safety inspections and audits must be carried out, with particular emphasis on organizing the comprehensive safety inspections mandated by the State Council at present, to ensure that these efforts are not merely formalities but yield actual results ; Safety in production must truly be regarded as an important indicator for assessing the effectiveness of local economic development, social management, and cultural progress. On the basis of a proper understanding of the situation, it is necessary to integrate safety in production with scientific development, the promotion of economic transformation and upgrading, the fulfillment of requirements aimed at serving the people and practicing pragmatism, as well as the improvement of governance capabilities, ensuring comprehensive consideration and coordinated development ; It is necessary to further strengthen the development of safety-related laws and regulations, long-term mechanisms, responsibility systems, regulatory teams, and investment mechanisms, in order to continuously improve enterprises’ capabilities and standards in safe production and **safety supervision ; It is necessary to focus on prevention, address both symptoms and root causes, prioritize addressing the root issues, and tackle problems at their source. We must strengthen implementation, enforcement, and the foundational aspects, so as to fundamentally improve the situation regarding work safety. Through strong leadership and effective efforts, we will resolutely prevent all types of accidents, especially serious and major production safety incidents, and promote the synchronized and coordinated development of safe production alongside the economy and society.   State Council, Baoyuanfeng Poultry Industry Co., Ltd., Changchun City, Jilin Province – Investigation Team for the particularly serious fire and explosion accident on June 3: It’s most cost-effective to learn from others’ accidents as if they were one’s own.
Reply #22016-11-10
Everyone must have a strong memory of this accident; it is mentioned in the safety month promotional videos over the past few years. The accident was tragic; 121 lives were lost in this way. The emergency exit is locked. Would your company do such a thing?
Reply #32016-11-10
The sanctions imposed in the wake of each major accident involve many people and various departments. If someone had followed the laws and regulations at that stage, the accident might have been prevented. This is another issue that deserves our consideration: managing safety does not depend on the number of people or departments involved; what’s important is the ability to take effective action. This is the real truth.

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