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Course of the accident: At around 18:40 on August 3, 2001, an operator from one of the workshops at Harbin Petrochemical Branch went to the fresh water pump room to conduct inspections and attach signs, after which he stayed in the adjacent fire pump room (an underground pump room separated by a wall). At 18:45, a flash explosion occurred in the fire pump room; the operator was severely burned on the spot. Discovered around 19:00, he was immediately taken to Harbin’s Fifth Hospital for treatment. Due to 95% of his body being covered in third-degree burns along with severe inhalation injuries, he died despite efforts to save him. Cause of the accident: Upon investigation, the direct cause of the accident was that the operator violated the rules and regulations by entering the underground fire pump room to smoke. When using a lighter to light a cigarette, the flammable gases present in the room reached their flash point, resulting in a flash explosion. The indirect cause is the inadequate implementation of rules and regulations, as well as the weak safety awareness among employees ; Flammable gases are present in the fire pump room ; Inspections were insufficient, and violations related to smoking were not detected or stopped in a timely manner. Responsibility assignment: 1. The shift supervisor in that workshop failed to adequately supervise and inspect the violations of rules and regulations by the workers on duty; he bears direct managerial responsibility for this accident and is given an administrative warning. 2. The deputy director of this workshop failed to provide adequate supervision and inspection of the implementation of safety regulations; safety inspections were not carried out properly, and he bears direct leadership responsibility for this accident. He has been given an administrative warning as punishment. 3. The workshop supervisor failed to implement the rules and regulations established by the factory in a proper and effective manner; he failed to detect the potential fire hazards associated with the combustible gases in the fire pump room, and did not provide adequate safety training for the employees. He is held accountable for this accident and has been given an administrative reprimand. Preventive measures: 1. Strengthen safety education and publicity, increase penalties for violations of rules, and strictly abide by all regulations and procedures. 2. Emphasize that leaders should take the lead in abiding by rules and regulations, starting with themselves, and guide employees to adhere to the principle of \"safety first, prevention first\" in order to ensure smooth production. 3. Redesign the smoking ban regulations, sign smoking bans agreements, and increase penalties. It is stipulated that employees who smoke within the company will have their employment contracts terminated. 4. The sewer well at the fire pump room was remolded with cement, and the implementation of the dewatering system was strengthened. 5. Develop new approaches to safety management, focusing more on prevention. Go beyond traditional management models, promote modern concepts of safety management, and implement proactive management focused on intrinsic safety.
Where could this flammable gas come from? It’s strange indeed
It seems that there are safety hazards in the drainage and waste disposal system. Among the preventive measures mentioned is the repaving of the sewers at the fire pump room with cement (an interesting term), as well as stricter enforcement of the dehydration procedures. Similar to the case with liquefied petroleum gas, when small amounts of this gas are released into the drainage system over time, it can accumulate in low-lying areas, increasing the risk of accidents.
The heart is too big; they should be fired.
Keep the safety alarm ringing; there are no minor or major safety issues