Discuss “I””

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This post was last edited by cflt111 on 2015-9-30 at 20:19. It is reproduced from an article by Xie Panda on Zhihu; here is the link to the original article. http://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/*epanda Everyone is familiar with the three ultimate philosophical questions posed by the doorman: Who are you? Where are you from? Where are you going? Yes, in life, these three questions are truly ultimate—Who am I? Where do I come from? Where should I go? The question asked by the original poster is actually a sub-question of the first of these three questions, “Who am I?” – What is “I”? ========================= ========================= When you use the word “I,” you should feel that your meaning is very clear. “\"I\" is probably the thing you know best in this world, and the one you’re least likely to get wrong; you’ve known it since you were very young. So when discussing the question of “Who am I?”, the focus is placed on “who”, because “I” is self-evident. But if you think about it according to the description below, the concept of “I” becomes less clear; let’s discuss this next. Body theory: Let’s start with the most fundamental aspects. When we talk about a person, we are first referring to that person’s physical body. The body theory holds that your physical body is you. Actually, this theory makes sense. After all, if your body stops functioning, you’re dead. If Mr. Wang next door goes through a major life change, his family might say, “He has changed; he isn’t the same person anymore.” ” Of course, this isn’t meant literally; Old Wang is still Old Wang after all. Even though he has changed, he remains Old Wang. Because Old Wang’s body is still Old Wang, no matter how his behavior changes. Humans always feel that they are more than just physical bodies. But in the end, an ant’s body is simply an ant’s body; a squirrel’s body is a squirrel’s body; and a human body is a human body. That is the theory of the body; now let’s consider this theory. If you cut your fingernails, you change the composition of your body; you remove some of the atoms that were once part of your body. So are you still you? The answer to this question is obvious; of course it is. If you are to undergo a kidney transplant, and you exchange your kidney with Mr. Wang next door, taking his kidney and implanting it in yourself, are you still the same person? This change is much bigger than just trimming your nails, but the answer remains obvious: you’re still you. If you suffer from a serious illness and need to have your heart, liver, spleen, lungs, kidneys, blood, and skin replaced, and if you recover successfully after undergoing all these surgeries and return to a normal life. At this point, will your family think you are dead because most of your body is no longer what it used to be? Obviously not; without so many body organs, you’re still you. Could it be your genes? Perhaps that is the core of who you are; all organ transplants don’t matter – as long as your remaining cells still contain your genes, you remain you. But there is one problem: twins have the same genes, yet they are not the same person. You are you, and your twin brother is not you. Genes are not the answer either. It seems that this theory of the body isn’t very reliable after all – we’ve replaced all those important organs in you, yet you remain the same person. What about your brain? Brain theory: We assume that a mad scientist (MadSci) captured you and Old Wang from next door. The madman first knocks you and Old Wang out, then cuts open your heads and Old Wang’s, swaps your brains, and sews your heads back together. After everything was done, you woke up. You realized that you were now inside Old Wang’s body, while your original body had taken on Old Wang’s personality. Are you still you now? Intuitively, you are still you; you still possess all your original personality and memories – you just happen to be living inside Old Wang’s body. Then you go home and explain to your family what happened: Other organ transplants do not change your identity, because technically, swapping brains is not a \"brain transplant\" but rather a \"body transplant\". You feel like yourself, just in a different body. At the same time, your original body is no longer you—it has become Old Wang. In that case, you are your own brain. The brain theory suggests that you go wherever your brain goes, even if that means entering someone else’s body. Data theory: But what if, instead of swapping your brains with those of the neighbor next door, those mad scientists captured you and him, connected your two brains to a computer, copied all the information in each brain to the other—one bit at a time—before erasing all the original information from those brains. Then you and Old Wang wake up; their brains have not been exchanged, but \"you\" are now inside Old Wang’s body, while \"Old Wang\" is inside yours. In Old Wang’s brain are already your thoughts, memories, fears, hopes, dreams, emotions, and personality. Old Wang’s brain and body, carrying the data of “you,” will still scare your family. However, after some effort, your family will accept the fact that \"you\" are still alive, only you live in Old Wang’s mind and body. Philosopher Locke’s theory of memory regarding personal identity holds that the \"you\" is determined by memories of your experiences. According to Locke’s definition of \"you,\" the body and brain of the aforementioned Old Wang are \"you,\" although this \"you\" does not include any part of your body, including your brain. This is data theory. Data theory suggests that you are not determined by your physical body at all; rather, you are determined by the data in your brain. Our reasoning is becoming more reliable, but to obtain the correct answer, we still need to test it using hypothetical scenarios. Here is a test by the British philosopher Bernard Williams: the Torture Test. Scenario 1: A mad scientist captures you and your neighbor, Mr. Wang, and swaps the data in your brains using the method mentioned earlier. When you wake up, he turns to Old Wang’s body (that is, “you”) and says, “Next, I’m going to torture one of you. Who should I torture?” ” What is your instinctive reaction at that moment? I think it should be your original body, because “you” is no longer in that body. If data theory is reliable, then this conclusion is also reliable; after all, “you” are now inside Old Wang’s body, so that original body is no longer something you need to worry about. Scenario 2: The mad scientist has captured you and Mr. Wang next door, but before he starts manipulating your brains, he asks you a few questions. At this point, \"you\" are still in your original body and brain. This conversation is likely to go like this: Psychiatry department: I’m going to torture one of you. Do you think I should torture you or Old Wang? You: Of course it’s Old Wang. Feng Ke: Okay. But no matter who I torture, I will wipe the minds of you two, so that when I torment this person, you two won’t remember who you used to be. In that case, are you going to change your mind? You: No, you’d better torture Old Wang instead. Feng Ke: Oh, right. Before torturing this person, I will not only empty your brains but also alter yours, turning you into a madman. After that, you will believe that you are Old Wang, and you will possess all of Old Wang’s memories, personality, perceptions, and knowledge. I would do the same thing to Old Wang, making him believe that he is actually you. If that’s the case, will you change your mind? You: Um, still not. No matter how my brain is altered, no matter who I think I am, I don’t want to be tortured—even madmen feel pain; go torture Old Wang instead. In Scenario 1, “you” will choose to let Feng Ke torture your original body ； In Scenario 2, you might choose to have Maniac Science torture Old Wang’s body. If you think about it carefully, you’ll realize that Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are actually the same—in both scenarios, before Feng Ke starts to torture them, Old Wang’s brain will have all of your data, and your brain will have all of his data. The difference is simply that “you” need to make a decision at that stage of the process. In both scenarios, your goal is to prevent \"you\" from being tortured. However, in Scenario 1, you believe that after the exchange of brain data, you end up in Old Wang’s body, with all of your personality and memories also residing in Old Wang’s body. In Scenario 2, you don’t care at all what happens to the data in your brain; you think that you will still be with your body and brain anyway. Choosing who to torment actually reflects which theory you support. Choosing to torment your original body is essentially data theory – where your data is, there you are. Choosing to torment Old Wang’s body is supporting the brain theory, because you believe that no matter what happens to the data in the brain, \"you\" will still be inside your own body, as your brain is there. . In fact, even if a mad scientist tells you that he intends to transplant the brains of the two of you, some people would still choose to let the scientist torture Old Wang’s body – and that is evidence in support of the body theory. I don’t know what you think, but after considering this scenario, I feel that the problems aren’t over yet. Let’s try another scenario, which is a modern version of the teleporter thought experiment described by philosopher Derek Parfit in his book Reasons and Persons: The teleporter thought experiment: In the distant 28th century, humanity has invented many advanced technologies that are beyond our current imagination, one of which is the teleporter – a device capable of transporting people at the speed of light. Here’s how it works: you enter the departure room, which is a very small space. Then you specify the destination you want to go to; for example, if you are starting from Shanghai and want to go to Beijing. After you choose your destination, you press the button. The equipment in the departure room begins to scan your entire body, collecting detailed information about its molecular composition – down to each atom and its precise location. As the device scans you, it also destroys you, destroying each of your cells while it scans. After the scan is complete, you are also completely destroyed, and the departure room is empty. The device then sends the collected information to the arrival room in Beijing. The arrival chamber uses these data to reconstruct your body. When all this is done, you walk out of the arrival hall and feel no different from when you were in the departure hall in Shanghai – your mood remains the same, you’re still a bit hungry, and even the scratches on your fingers are still there. From the moment you press the button in the departure hall in Shanghai to the moment you step out of the departure hall in Beijing, the entire process takes about five minutes, but for you it happens instantly—you press the button, everything goes dark, and then you’re in Beijing. Barricaded. In the 28th century, this is a very common technology; everyone travels this way. It’s not only convenient but also safe—no one has ever been injured as a result of using this technology. But one day, you have to go from Shanghai to Beijing again; you press the button in the departure room, you hear the sound of the instruments scanning, but you are not transported. The sudden darkness that had originally occurred did not happen; you stepped out of the departure room, and you were still in Shanghai. So you go to the customer service staff, tell her that the equipment in the departure room is broken, and ask if you can use another departure room, otherwise you’ll be late for work. The customer service representative took a look at the usage records and told you, “The scanning device is working properly; it has collected all of your data. However, the cell destruction device that was supposed to work in conjunction with the scanning device seems to be malfunctioning.” ” “That’s impossible; I’m still right here. I’m going to be late for work. Please use another departure room for me. ”You argued your case firmly. The customer service representative viewed the surveillance footage, which showed you in Beijing. “No, the scanning device was indeed working properly.” Look, this is the surveillance footage from the arrival hall in Beijing; it seems you won’t be late, hehe. ” You got angry: “But it can’t be me, because I’m still here!” ” At that moment, the noisy customer service manager came over and explained to you that the scanning device was indeed working properly, and that you had indeed arrived in Beijing; it was just the cell destruction device in the departure area in Shanghai that was broken. \"But don’t worry, we’ll just take you to another departure area and activate the cell destruction device there separately to destroy you.\" ”Although you go to Beijing for work every day and your devices are destroyed by cells once each on the way to and from work, at that moment you suddenly panic: \"Wait, I can’t do this; if I’m destroyed, won’t I die?\" ” The customer service manager explained, “That’s not the case, sir. Look at the surveillance footage – you were moving around freely in Beijing.” ” You became even more panicked: “But that’s not me; it’s just a copy of me. I am the real me!” You can’t destroy me.” The customer service representative and the manager exchanged a helpless look: “I’m sorry, sir, but the law requires us to destroy your cells. We cannot create a new body in the arrival room without destroying the body in the departure room first.” ” You look at the other person in shock, then start to run for your life. At that moment, two guards grabbed you and dragged you to another departure room... If you, like me, watched the first half of this story and thought the idea of instant teleportation was cool. But as the story progressed to its latter half, I began to wonder – is instant teleportation a process of movement, or a process of death? If you were asked this question at the beginning of the story, you might find it confusing—instant teleportation seems like a very safe way of moving, but as the story progresses, it increasingly turns into a process that leads to death. In other words, every time you travel back and forth between Beijing and Shanghai, you are killed by the cell destroyers, and then the device creates a copy of you. To those who know you, you come out of the instant teleportation unharmed, just as your wife would appear unharmed after teleporting home instantly. She will complain about her work experience today just like you do, and discuss where they want to go for fun over the weekend. But is it possible that your wife was killed on that day, and what you were holding in your arms was just a replica created just a few minutes earlier? And all of this still depends on what “you” are. Those who agree with the theory of data would argue that you, having arrived in Beijing, are the same as you when you set out from Shanghai; instant teleportation does not kill you. But we can all understand the fear of that \"you\" who is still in Shanghai at the end of the story – whether people can peacefully accept the reality of being destroyed in Shanghai after confirming that their data has survived in Beijing. Furthermore, if the transmitter can send your data to Beijing to be reconstructed, then can it send the data to Tokyo, Nanjing, and Xijing to recreate three identical \"you\"s? It must be difficult at this point to admit that all four “you’s” are you, right? The conveyor belt thought experiment is, in fact, a powerful rebuttal to data theory. Similarly, if there is an ego theory that holds that “you” are your ego, the teleporter thought experiment can also refute it in the same way. The thought that that \"I\" in Beijing will become friends with my friends, will continue to post online, and will carry on with my life, with no one missing me or thinking I’m dead (just as you don’t think your wife who was transported back is dead), makes no sense. I don’t care about the fate of that \"I\" in Beijing; what matters to me is my own fate. If that’s the case, then data theory isn’t reliable either; should we go back to body theory and brain theory instead? Don’t rush. Brain split test: One of the amazing features of the human brain is that its left and right hemispheres can function independently. If one of these hemispheres is removed, the person may still be able to survive; in fact, the remaining half of the brain can learn to take over the functions of the missing half, allowing the person to continue living as usual. Suppose you have a twin brother named Shin. Xiao Xin’s brain is sick, and you decide to donate half of your brain to save his life. So the doctor cut open the heads of you two, removed Shin-chan’s brain, and then gave half of your brain to Shin-chan. When you wake up, you feel just the same as before. And Shin-chan (since they are twins, their genes are identical to begin with) woke up with exactly the same personality and memories as you. When you realized what had happened, you panicked. \"Xiao Xin\" knew everything about you, and at that moment you needed him to swear not to tell anyone, but then you realized there was no need to do that—he wasn’t your twin brother Xiao Xin; he was \"you\". He cares just as much about your privacy, because it is also his privacy. And when you look at the person who used to be Shinichi, seeing him panicked because he’s in Shinichi’s body, you also wonder – why did I stay in my own body instead of going into Shinichi’s? Both the left brain and the right brain are part of me, so why am I only inside my own body now, rather than seeing the world through the perspectives of two people at the same time? Regardless of which half of the brain is in Shin-chan’s body, why does that half seem to turn into another person? Who is that \"I\" inside Shin-chan? Why is “he” inside Shin-chan while I’m still inside me? The brain theory can no longer explain it. If the brain goes where the person goes, then what if a brain is in two places at the same time? The data theory and brain theory, defeated by the conveyor belt thought experiment, are completely equivalent after all. The theory of the body that turns out to be unreliable right from the beginning of this article is where things get interesting – of course you stay inside your own body, because your body is you; your brain is merely a tool used by the body for thinking. Xiao Xin is not “you”; Xiao Xin is Xiao Xin himself – he’s just Xiao Xin who possesses your thoughts and personality. Anyway, Shin-chan’s body is still Shin-chan. But let’s not rush to embrace the physical theory; let’s consider this further: What we learn from the teleporter thought experiment is that if your brain’s data is transferred to another brain, even if that brain has the same molecular structure as yours, it only creates a copy of you—a stranger who happens to be exactly like you. You are special in Shanghai; when you are reconstructed with other atoms, some very important things are lost, and it is these lost things that determine what you are. The body theory and the brain theory would suggest that the only difference between you in Beijing and you in Shanghai is the different atoms that make up your body; your body in Beijing is similar to your body here, but it is still composed of different materials. Is then the material that makes up the body the answer? Let’s test this with two experiments: The cell replacement test assumes that if we replace one of the cells in your body with an exact copy of it, are you still the same person? Of course, still. So, if we replaced 1% of the cells in your body one by one with identical copies, would you still be you? What if this ratio becomes 10%? 30%? 60%? That “you” in Beijing is a version that has been 100% replaced, but we have already determined that this version is not you. So, where exactly is the dividing line? What percentage of you does it take to turn the rest of you into something that is no longer you, but just a copy? Is it difficult to answer this question? Given that the alternative cells we used have exactly the same molecular structure, anyone observing from the side would not notice any change in you; it seems then that you never died throughout the process, even if we ended up replacing 100% of your cells. But if 100% of your cells are replaced by replicas, what essential difference is there between you and the \"you\" created by a transporter in Beijing? The body pulverization test assumes that you use an atom-dispersing device to break your body down into atoms – once the device is activated, you disappear and are replaced by a cloud of floating atoms – and then, after a few minutes, these atoms reassemble themselves into your original form. Are you still you after being reassembled? Or were you already dead when you were shattered, and the one that was reassembled is actually a copy of you? If this reassembled version of you is not a copy, then the version in Beijing cannot be considered a copy either—the only difference is that the atom dispersion device retains your original atoms, while the conveyor in Beijing uses different atoms; yet at the atomic level, the atoms are identical. A hydrogen atom in your body is exactly the same as the hydrogen atom used by the conveyor in Beijing. So if the “you” in Beijing is not you, then the “you” that is reassembled after being crushed cannot be considered you either. What these two tests are intended to show is that the difference between you in Shanghai and you in Beijing lies not in whether your original cells are still there. The cell replacement test shows that by using replicated cells, it is possible to gradually replace most or even all of your body’s cells, without changing the fact that you are still you; whereas the body disintegration test indicates that the components of your body can be broken down and reassembled, but the person resulting from this reassembly is not any more \"original\" than the person created by the Beijing Transmitter. So, the theory of the body isn’t reliable after all, is it? These two tests also show that the difference between you in Shanghai and you in Beijing may not lie in whether atoms and cells are \"original\", but rather in continuity. Cell replacement testing allows you to remain who you are, because the replacement process occurs gradually, cell by cell. And if the body crushing test is your \"end,\" it might be because the crushing occurs in an instant, and such crushing destroys continuity. This also explains why instant teleporters could be killing machines—because you in Beijing and you in Shanghai are not continuous. So, have we been off track the whole time we’ve been discussing the brain, the body, data, personality, and memory? Is it possible that when you move your brain, either by destroying and reassembling it or by transferring its data to a new brain, \"you\" lose yourself? Is it possible that these elements do not exist independently, but rather together form a continuous whole? Continuity: A few years ago, my grandfather was still alive; he was 90 at that time and had a poor memory. Once, he pointed to a photo of himself at the age of 6 on the wall and said, “That’s me.” ” He certainly wasn’t wrong. But isn’t it ridiculous to say that the six-year-old boy in the photo and the elderly person in their nineties in front of me are the same person? These two people have nothing in common. Physically, they are completely different; every cell in that 6-year-old boy has been dead for decades. As for their personalities, I can only say that this little boy probably won’t like this old man. Moreover, the data in their brains hardly overlap; any 90-year-old person you find on the street has data that is more similar to my grandfather’s than that of that 6-year-old boy. But remember, what matters is not similarity, but continuity. If similarity can define a person, then you in Shanghai and you in Beijing are the same person. What my 90-year-old grandfather and that 6-year-old boy have in common is something that no one else on Earth possesses: the 90-year-old man may not be able to understand what he looked like at the age of 6, but he remembers what he looked like at 89 years old; while the 89-year-old person remembers what he looked like at 85 years old. That 50-year-old self remembers what they looked like at 43. And that 7-year-old self remembers what it was like when they were 6. It is a long, overlapping chain composed of memories, personality traits, and physical characteristics. It’s like an old wooden boat – you may have repaired it hundreds of times, replacing its planks over and over again, until one day you realize that every single plank in that boat has been replaced. Is it still your little wooden boat? If you once named your little wooden boat “Sister Wang from Next Door,” does it need to be given a new name now? But you know, it’s still “Sister Wang next door,” right? In other words, you are not actually a thing, but rather a story, a theme that is constantly evolving. You are like a room filled with things; some of them are new, some are old, some you know where they are, and some you don’t. The things in the room keep changing, being different every day. Similarly, you are not a set of brain data; you are a database whose content is constantly changing, growing, and being updated. You are not a set of atoms; you are a set of instructions that tell these atoms how to organize themselves. Soul: People always talk about the soul, but I never understand what they mean. To me, the soul seems like a poetic euphemism used to describe a very inner part of the brain ； Or rather, it is an elegant attempt to distinguish humans from animals driven by biological instincts ； Or rather, it’s a way of declaring forever. Perhaps when people talk about the soul, they are referring to that thing which connects my 90-year-old grandfather with the 6-year-old boy in that photo. His cells and memories come and go; perhaps the only constant connection is his soul. After discussing what the “self” is from both material and spiritual perspectives, perhaps the answer to it all is actually a theory that doesn’t seem all that reliable—the soul. Conclusion: The article could have ended here, but after thinking about it, I realized that’s not right; I still don’t believe in souls that much. I feel completely out of balance right now. To write this article, I spent a week thinking about my clones, about sharing my brain with others, and wondering whether every time I fall asleep I die and wake up as an exact copy. If you want a very satisfactory answer, please read the relevant source section below by yourself. I told someone before that I was going to write on this topic, and they asked me why. While writing this, I came across Paffett’s words: “Early Buddhists believed that much, if not most, of the suffering in life stems from a mistaken understanding of the self.” ”I think what was said might be very true, and that is also the purpose of reflecting on oneself. .