Share: Revisiting Order No. 69 and Order No. 84 issued by the Work Safety Administration – each one is a lesson learned through bloodshed

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Today, let’s revisit Order No. 69 of the State Administration of Work Safety, which outlines the Five Provisions for Safe Operations in Confined Spaces, and Order No. 84, which sets out the Ten Provisions for Fire and Explosion Prevention in Oil and Gas Storage Areas. Each of these provisions stems from painful lessons learned through tragedy; they represent lifelines, critical boundaries, and red lines that must not be crossed. To thoroughly comprehend and accurately understand the content and requirements of each provision, an interpretation of these provisions is provided one by one: Order No. 69 issued by the State Administration of Work Safety, \"Five Provisions for Safe Operations in Confined Spaces\" – It is imperative to strictly implement an operation approval system, and entry into confined spaces for work without authorization is strictly prohibited. The major poisoning incident on January 14 in Yunnan: A typical case – At 21:20 on January 14, the deputy director of the processing workshop at Yunnan Honghe Jinkē Sugar Industry Co., Ltd. ordered 5 workers to go to the fifth floor to clean syrup tanks No. 7 and No. 8. At 21:46, a worker entered Tank No. 7 containing syrup; he fainted while bending down to carry out his tasks. The people on site noticed this and called for help using walkie-talkies, and 11 workers in the vicinity rushed to assist him. As a result, 4 people died, 2 suffered moderate poisoning, and 6 suffered mild poisoning. Lesson analysis: The company failed to implement an operation approval system when carrying out work in confined spaces, did not conduct risk assessments for such spaces in advance, and did not take targeted preventive measures against those risks, which led to the accident. Attempting rescue efforts in a hasty manner resulted in an increase in casualties. Common knowledge on work safety: Enterprises must implement a work approval system for confined space operations, and conduct a step-by-step safety verification of the conditions under which such operations are carried out. Before carrying out work in confined spaces, enterprises shall conduct risk identification, analyze the existing hazardous factors, propose measures to eliminate or control these hazards, develop a plan for working in confined spaces, and have it approved by the enterprise’s management. Operations in confined spaces must strictly adhere to the principle of “ventilate first, then test, and finally carry out the work”. Working in confined spaces is a high-risk activity; companies must, in accordance with relevant regulatory requirements, equip themselves with the necessary testing, ventilation, and protective equipment, and install safety warning signs in such areas to ensure operational safety. 2 It is necessary to follow the order of \"ventilation first, then testing, and finally operation\"; work must not proceed if ventilation or testing are not satisfactory. Typical incident of the October 19 poisoning accident in Jiangsu: At around 2:40 p.m. on October 19, employees at the methanol plant of Supor Group in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province, suffered carbon monoxide poisoning while carrying out dust removal work inside a vacuum black water cooling and separation tank in the gas processing section, resulting in the death of 3 workers. Lesson analysis: The faulty equipment was not properly isolated, allowing toxic gases such as carbon monoxide to enter, resulting in 3 deaths from poisoning. Basic knowledge of safe production: Carbon monoxide is a toxic gas; exposure to high concentrations of it for a short period of time can be fatal. It can also explode when mixed with air, with an explosive range of 12.5%–74.2%. Before entering confined spaces in chemical processing equipment for work, the confined space must be completely and effectively isolated and thoroughly cleaned and purged. It is necessary to conduct quantitative tests of the oxygen level within the confined space, as well as quantitative analyses of the levels of toxic and harmful gases and flammable gases; work can only proceed once these conditions are met. 3. Personal protective equipment against poisoning and asphyxiation must be provided; safety warning signs shall be posted. Operations without any protective or monitoring measures are strictly prohibited. Typical accident of the Hubei 10•14 asphyxiation incident: At around 16:50 on October 14, an nitrogen asphyxiation accident occurred at Lantian United Gas Co., Ltd. in Xishui County, Huanggang City, Hubei Province, resulting in 3 deaths. Lesson analysis: The device design is unreasonable; the excess nitrogen exhaust pipe is connected to a pit, posing a high safety risk. Due to inadequate management of confined spaces, a maintenance worker suffocated while opening the cover of a pit to fetch water. Improper on-site emergency handling and reckless attempts to rescue led to the expansion of the accident. Basic knowledge of safe production: Inhaling high concentrations of nitrogen can cause oxygen deprivation and asphyxiation, leading to rapid loss of consciousness and death due to the cessation of breathing and heartbeat. Chemical industry enterprises (enterprises dealing with hazardous chemicals) are strictly prohibited from carrying out operations such as hot work, entry into confined spaces, working at heights, lifting operations, temporary electrical use, excavation, inspection and maintenance, and blind flange removal/installation without prior approval. 4 Safety training must be provided to workers; it is strictly prohibited to allow those who have not passed the training to work. The major poisoning incident on March 18 in Hainan: A typical case – On March 18, Weilin Rubber Company in Danzhou City, Hainan Province, organized operations to clean the rubber wastewater tank. One employee fainted suddenly while working in the tank; two other employees and the factory manager, who arrived upon hearing the news, went into the tank to try to rescue him, which resulted in the death of all three from poisoning. Lesson analysis: The company had a mistaken understanding of confined spaces; it believed that open ponds did not constitute confined spaces and could not cause poisoning. The company failed to provide its employees with safety training regarding work in confined spaces; as a result, the employees lacked awareness of the safety risks associated with such work, were unaware of the dangers of poisoning and suffocation in confined spaces, and entered these spaces without taking any measures such as ventilation, testing, or protection. Basic knowledge of safe production: A confined space refers to a space that is enclosed or partially enclosed and has poor natural ventilation; such spaces are prone to the accumulation of toxic, harmful, flammable, and explosive gases, which can lead to poisoning, fire, and explosion accidents, or suffocation due to insufficient oxygen levels. When working in confined spaces such as wastewater tanks, septic tanks, fermentation tanks, pickling tanks, manholes, and ditches, the toxic hydrogen sulfide gas that accumulates within these tanks/holes/ditches or is released as a result of the activities carried out there can cause poisoning, even leading to death within seconds. Before carrying out work in confined spaces, company employees must receive specialized training to understand the safety requirements for working in such environments. Without training and effective protective measures, employees have the right to refuse to perform work in confined spaces. 5 Emergency measures must be established, and emergency equipment must be available on site; blind attempts at rescue are strictly prohibited. The August 28 poisoning incident in Hunan: A typical case – Around 11 a.m. on August 28, during the process of resuming production after shutting down due to the hot weather, a worker at Anxiang Zhongxin Paper Industry Co., Ltd. in Changde City, Hunan Province, fainted in a pulp tank after being poisoned while cleaning waste from it. The company’s owner and seven other workers went into the tank to try to rescue him, and they too were poisoned as a result. In total, 7 people died and 2 were seriously injured. Lesson analysis: The company failed to provide its employees with safety training regarding the requirements for working safely in confined spaces and emergency rescue procedures. No emergency equipment was available at the work site, and when an accident occurred, the people on site entered the confined space without taking any protective measures in an attempt to carry out rescue efforts, which resulted in injuries or deaths among the rescuers. In the vast majority of confined space accidents, reckless attempts to rescue victims lead to an increase in casualties. Basic safety knowledge: In the event of an accident during work in confined spaces, the people present at the scene should immediately call the police; attempting rescue actions blindly is prohibited. Emergency responders should take proper protective measures, wearing necessary breathing equipment and rescue gear. http://img.proxx.xmtbang.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fmmbiz.qpic.cn%2Fmmbiz%2FNYDicc9VyncsiapAxZGCjjvoCeKbTicNXTyrdN7ShgjtuybmwwxvdqtznZyB2icqJTQNoAkbDmmkUACIRwF4jHicBAA%2F640%3FEnterprises should develop emergency response plans for incidents in confined spaces and conduct regular drills to improve their ability to handle such situations, thereby preventing accidents from worsening due to improper rescue attempts. Order No. 84 of the State Administration of Work Safety: “Ten Provisions on Fire and Explosion Prevention in Oil and Gas Storage Areas” – It is strictly prohibited to operate oil and gas storage tanks beyond their temperature, pressure, or liquid level limits, as well as to change the storage medium arbitrarily. This article mainly specifies the requirements for the use and management of oil and gas storage tanks. The storage medium, storage temperature, pressure, and liquid level in oil and gas storage tanks must comply with the designed process conditions and process control parameters. Deviations from these parameters can lead to safety risks such as leaks, fires, and explosions. During the design phase, storage tanks are designed for a specific type of storage medium, with the design considerations limited to the physical and chemical properties of that medium as well as the requirements of its storage and transportation processes. If the storage medium is to be changed, it is necessary to determine whether the existing design parameters of the tank meet the requirements for storing that new medium, in order to ensure the safe operation of the tank. Arbitrarily changing the storage medium or the purpose of a storage tank may pose safety hazards and lead to accidents. Typical accident case: On March 31, 1984, an explosion occurred in a tank at a petrochemical plant in Baoding City, Hebei Province, resulting in 16 deaths and 6 serious injuries. The main cause of the accident was the illegal introduction of residue oil (which was originally intended for use as boiler fuel) into the tank; the high oil temperature caused a large amount of gas to mix with the air inside the tank, forming explosive gases that ignited upon contact with sparks. 2 It is strictly prohibited for operators to leave the site when manually removing water, switching tanks, or loading/unloading vehicles in the oil and gas tank farm. This article mainly specifies the management requirements for manual water separation, tank switching, and loading/unloading operations in the storage tank area. Manual water cutting refers to the process of intermittently opening the water cut valve by hand to release water accumulated at the bottom of the oil and gas storage tank; tank transfer involves switching the flow of materials between one storage tank and another; loading and unloading refers to putting materials into a storage tank or transferring materials from a transport vehicle into a storage tank. Operations such as water cutting, canning, loading and unloading must be carried out in strict compliance with safety standards, procedures, and regulations, under the on-site supervision and guidance of supervisors throughout the process. If supervision is inadequate, it is very likely to cause oil and gas leaks, leading to accidents. Typical accident case: On October 22, 1988, a liquefied gas explosion and fire occurred in the Xiao Liangshan spherical tank area of the refinery at Shanghai Gaoqiao Petrochemical Company. The incident resulted in 26 deaths and 15 people suffering burns. The main cause of the accident was that the operators, while opening valves to drain water from the liquefied gas spheres, failed to follow operating procedures and did not supervise the process on site. As a result, liquefied gas was discharged together with water. Due to untimely response measures, the liquefied gas ignited upon contact with an open flame, leading to the explosion and fire. On July 16, 2015, an explosion occurred in a liquefied gas spherical tank at Shandong Shida Technology Petrochemical Co., Ltd., also as a result of water cutting operations being carried out in the tank area; the workers left the site, leading to a leakage of liquefied gas and inadequate response to address the situation. 3. It is strictly prohibited to close the safety valve cut-off valves of operating oil and gas storage tanks, as well as to install blind flanges in the pressure relief and discharge systems. This article mainly specifies the safety operation requirements for safety valves and pressure relief systems. A safety valve isolation valve refers to an isolation valve installed in front of and behind a safety valve to facilitate its testing or replacement. A pressure relief and discharge system is a system that can quickly release the pressure from a storage tank, typically referring to a flare system or a dedicated discharge system. If the safety valve or cut-off valve is closed, or if a blind flange is installed on the pressure relief system, it will prevent the tank from releasing pressure in cases of overpressure or emergencies, leading to serious accidents such as explosions and fires due to excessive pressure. Typical accident case: On July 16, 2015, a fire and explosion occurred in a liquefied gas sphere tank at Shandong Shida Technology Petrochemical Co., Ltd., resulting in minor injuries to 2 firefighters, the destruction of 7 fire trucks, and varying degrees of damage to some of the sphere tanks as well as surrounding facilities and buildings. The direct cause of the accident was that, during the tank transfer operation, once all the water in Tank No. 6 was removed, liquefied petroleum gas leaked out through the connection pipes and spread; it then caught fire upon encountering an ignition source, resulting in a fire in the liquefied hydrocarbon tank area ； The spherical tank exploded because the safety valve was closed and a blind flange was installed on the pressure relief system, thereby exacerbating the consequences of the accident. 4 It is strictly prohibited to disable the temperature, pressure, level, as well as combustible and toxic gas alarm and interlock systems in the oil and gas tank farm. This provision specifies the management requirements for alarm and interlock systems related to key parameters such as temperature, pressure, liquid level, as well as flammable and toxic gases in oil and gas tank farms. Oil and gas storage tanks should be equipped with level gauges, thermometers, pressure gauges, and detectors for flammable (toxic) gases, in accordance with standard and regulatory requirements. They should also have mechanisms for detecting high liquid levels and for automatically shutting off feed when extremely high levels are reached. The alarm signals must be sent to the control room or operation room where operators are stationed, and audible and visual alarms should be provided to enable prompt detection of any abnormalities and timely action to address them. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that the alarm and interlock systems are in good condition and functional. Typical accident case: On December 11, 2005, a fire and explosion occurred at the Buncefield oil depot in the UK. More than 20 large storage tanks were destroyed in the incident. Forty-three people were injured, and the direct economic loss amounted to £250 million. The main causes of the accident included a malfunction in the automated measurement system of the storage tanks; furthermore, the electronic monitors and related alarm devices for certain tanks and pipeline systems were not functioning properly. 5. It is strictly prohibited to perform hot work in oil and gas tank areas or carry out work in confined spaces without conducting gas testing and obtaining a work permit. This article mainly stipulates the management requirements for hot work and work in confined spaces in oil and gas tank farms. Before carrying out hot work, it is necessary to analyze and test the concentration of combustible gases in the area around the point where hot work will be performed in the oil and gas tank area. Before entering confined spaces, it is essential to analyze the levels of combustible and toxic gases as well as oxygen content within the tanks. Hot work and operations in confined spaces have always been areas prone to accidents. Oil and gas storage areas contain large quantities of materials, and accidents in such areas can lead to severe consequences; therefore, strict approval procedures are necessary. It is essential to identify the potential dangers and hazards at the work site and during the operation, to establish corresponding safety measures and ensure their implementation. Relevant personnel must sign off in accordance with their authority, and supervisors should be present to oversee the operations. The specific management procedures should comply with the requirements of the \"Safety Regulations for Special Operations in Chemical Production Units\" (GB30871). Typical accident case: On June 2, 2010, an explosion and fire occurred at the tribenzene storage area of PetroChina Dalian Petrochemical. The incident resulted in 4 deaths. The direct cause of the accident was that workers from a contractor hired through illegal subcontracting performed hot work involving gas cutting on top of one of the storage tanks in the tribenzene area. The cutting flame ignited leaking flammable and explosive gases such as toluene; this led to a flashback into the tank, causing it to explode. On October 27, 2004, an explosion occurred in an acidic water tank at CNPC Daqing Petrochemical, resulting in 7 deaths. The main cause of the accident was the leakage of explosive gas mixtures from cracks in the tank walls, which then ignited due to open flames from gas cutting operations or flying slag. 6 It is strictly prohibited for the floating disk of an internal floating roof tank to touch the bottom during operation. This article mainly specifies the requirements for the liquid level in internal floating roof storage tanks. The float falling to the bottom refers to the situation where, due to an excessively low liquid level in the tank, the float settles on the support legs. During normal operation, once the floating disk settles to the bottom, a gas space is formed between the disk and the oil surface. When the flow rate of the material is too high, static electricity tends to accumulate at the outlet of the material pipeline, which can easily lead to fires and explosions. Typical accident case: On August 29, 2011, an explosion and fire occurred in a diesel tank at CNPC Dalian Petrochemical. The main cause of the accident was the low liquid level resulting from oil being pumped into the storage tank; this created a gas space between the floating disk and the surface of the diesel, allowing air to enter ； Meanwhile, fluctuations in the operation of upstream equipment led to an increase in the content of light components in the diesel entering the emergency storage tank, resulting in the formation of an explosive mixture of gases beneath the floating roof ； Additionally, the excessively fast oil inflow rate generates a large amount of static electricity, which cannot be dissipated in time, leading to discharges that can cause explosions and fires. 7 It is strictly prohibited to directly add substances of unknown properties or those that may undergo violent reactions into oil and gas storage tanks or the pipelines connected to them. This provision sets out the safety management requirements for the use of various additives and auxiliaries in oil and gas processing and blending. Before adding additives, it is necessary to understand their physical and chemical properties, conduct a risk assessment, and formulate corresponding control measures and emergency plans. During the operation, a dedicated additive dosing system should be used, and operating procedures must be strictly followed. Typical accident case: On July 16, 2010, an explosion and fire occurred in the oil transfer pipeline of the tank farm operated by Dalian CNPC International Storage and Transportation Co., Ltd. The main cause of the accident was the continued injection of crude oil desulfurization agents containing strong oxidants into the pipeline, even after the crude oil tanker had stopped unloading oil; this led to a violent reaction within the pipeline, resulting in an explosion and a fire. 8. It is strictly prohibited to use non-explosion-proof lighting, electrical equipment, tools, and electronic devices in oil and gas tank areas. This article mainly specifies the requirements for the use of explosion-proof equipment in oil and gas tank farms. The media stored in oil and gas tank farms are generally flammable and explosive. Using non-explosion-proof tools, electrical equipment, communication devices, etc. in such areas poses significant safety risks and can easily lead to accidents. Typical accident case: On June 29, 2010, a deflagration occurred at a crude oil storage tank at PetroChina Liaoyang Petrochemical. The incident resulted in 5 deaths and 5 injuries. The main cause of the accident was that during tank cleaning operations, hydrocarbon combustibles in the tank reached their explosive limits; upon encountering an electric spark generated by a non-explosion-proof ordinary lighting fixture connected to the tank, a deflagration took place. 9. It is strictly prohibited to allow unqualified personnel and contractors without relevant qualifications to work in the oil and gas tank farm. Without permission, motor vehicles and external personnel are not allowed to enter the tank farm. This article mainly stipulates the training requirements for personnel operating the equipment, as well as the management requirements for contractors, external personnel, and motor vehicles. Operators of oil and gas tank farms must be trained to a satisfactory standard and possess the necessary skills to perform their duties. It is a prerequisite for ensuring operational safety that contractors working in the tank farm possess the necessary qualifications. Unrestricted access to the tank farm by outsiders and motor vehicles poses numerous uncontrollable safety risks. Typical accident case: On October 21, 1993, an oil tank explosion occurred at the Sinopec Jinling Petrochemical Refinery, resulting in 2 deaths. The main cause of the accident was that the operators violated the operating procedures, which led to gasoline leakage and the formation of an explosive mixture in the air; this mixture ignited when exposed to sparks from the exhaust pipe of a tractor driven by a contractor, causing a fire and explosion. 10 It is strictly prohibited to operate equipment and facilities in oil and gas tank farms when they are in poor condition or malfunctioning. This article mainly stipulates the management requirements for equipment and facilities in oil and gas tank farms. The storage tanks, pipeline fittings, safety accessories, lightning and static electricity protection systems, fire emergency equipment, as well as other facilities in the oil and gas tank farm must all be regularly maintained to ensure their proper operation. Typical accident case: On January 7, 2010, an explosion and fire broke out in a butane tank at CNPC Lanzhou Petrochemical, resulting in 6 deaths and 6 injuries. The main cause of the accident was the failure and rupture of the elbow in the outlet pipeline of the butane tank, which led to a material leak. The leaked butane reached its explosive limit; upon encountering an ignition source, an explosion occurred, which in turn caused leaks, fires, and explosions in the surrounding tanks.