How to handle and assess safety hazards

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1.jpg There is a Chinese proverb that goes, \"A dike thousands of miles long can be ruined by an ant hole.\" And indeed, such a situation has occurred in China. As is well known, the “ant nests” here refer to “hidden dangers”. Compared to a dam that stretches for thousands of miles, an ant’s nest is incredibly small, yet its potential for destruction is great enough to ruin even such a sturdy dam. This idiom profoundly, meticulously, and in depth outlines the form, characteristics, and consequences of \"hidden dangers\". We can easily imagine what a “hidden danger” is like: it is small and unnoticeable, highly concealed and deceptive, which makes it difficult to detect and easy to overlook. It possesses potential destructive power and can lead to serious consequences. This is the “hidden danger”. These minor issues can also cause losses to businesses that have invested thousands of dollars and put in a lot of effort to build them up, and those losses can be substantial. Therefore, knowing how to address and assess \"potential hazards\" is an essential part of safety work. In daily work, it is common to observe that some employees, and even managers with certain responsibilities, exhibit, in various ways, problems such as vague judgment, unclear consequences, and sluggish actions regarding “safety hazards.” This directly affects the rectification of such hazards and compromises workplace safety. The reason for this may be that these comrades have a vague understanding of the specific working methods related to safety work, and they fail to grasp the ultimate purpose of safe production. As a result, they are slow to respond mentally and act tardily when it comes to rectifying potential hazards. This undermines the effectiveness of safety efforts and could ultimately lead to the occurrence of production accidents. Therefore, sufficient attention must be paid to the issue of how to address safety hazards. First, let’s clarify a few points: 1. What is the ultimate goal of safety production efforts? It is to eliminate or control hazardous factors in the production process, prevent various types of accidents, and ensure the smooth progress of production. (Keywords: elimination, control, prevention, assurance). 2. What are safety hazards? —— The “hazardous factors” present in the production process are collectively referred to as safety hazards (keyword: factors). 3. What is an “accident”? —— An “accident” refers to the general term for sudden, unexpected events that occur during occupational activities. (Keywords: unexpected, sudden) (If it is intentional and man-made, then it’s “destruction”.) 4. What are the specific methods of safety work? ———— There are two specific methods: A. Passive safety methods ———— also known as “external safety methods”; this is a traditional approach to safety work. It involves the use of external devices (in simple terms, some remedial safety measures) and the establishment of corresponding safety regulations to control and mitigate the occurrence of hazards. (Keywords: control, mitigation) B. Proactive safety approach — that is, the “inherent safety approach”. It is a safe working method that has been promoted in recent years. It involves using scientific methods during the design process to eliminate or reduce hazards at their source. (Keywords: From the source) Although the \"passive safety laws\" are not as effective as the \"active safety laws\", due to various constraints and conditions, our current safety management personnel still rely primarily on \"passive safety methods\" in their daily safety management tasks. According to the above definition, we can briefly describe the procedures of safety work as follows: using either “passive safety” or “active safety” methods to control or mitigate (or eliminate at the source) the “hazardous factors” (potential risks) present in the production process, thereby preventing “accidents” from occurring during occupational activities under “unexpected” or “sudden” circumstances and ensuring the smooth progress of production. The key here is: control, and gradually eliminate “risk factors,” that is, “hidden dangers”. Therefore, fundamentally, safety work revolves around \"hidden dangers\" – whether by using proactive safety methods to eliminate these dangers at their source, or by employing passive safety methods to control or mitigate risk factors during the process. Why do we keep focusing on those minor safety hazards in our work? Some comrades do not quite understand this issue. To solve this problem, it is necessary to understand how the accident occurred. Like other things, the occurrence of an accident requires two conditions: internal and external factors. Here, internal factors refer to the potential hazards (risks) that exist within the production system, such as equipment, management practices, and the quality of personnel ； Commissioner: External factors refer to those so-called \"coincidences\" and \"accidents\" that occur in accidents, as we often say. Under appropriate conditions, and triggered by these \"coincidences\" and \"accidents,\" these internal factors give rise to accidents. If you don’t believe it, you can check to see if the accidents that have occurred were indeed like this. Under the current conditions, it is rather difficult for us to control or eliminate those unpredictable and highly random \"coincidences\" and \"accidents.\" In contrast, it is possible to identify, control, or eliminate those \"hidden dangers\" that exist within things themselves. This is why we need to keep focusing on the \"hidden dangers\". However, in reality, the attitude of some comrades toward “potential hazards” is worthy of discussion: instead of working around these hazards, they try to circumvent them altogether. To give a few examples: One day, a company needed to carry out work at height for operational reasons; the workers asked for a permit for working at height, but the person in charge of issuing such permits said, \"If you don’t have a permit, just say I didn’t know.\" The implicit message is: I won’t issue the certificate; I don’t know, and if something goes wrong I won’t be held responsible. This is a fairly typical phenomenon of going around it. The reason is that it was not clear what the purpose of issuing a certificate for “hazardous operations” is Issuing a certificate is merely a formality, a process of identifying potential risks that may exist during this procedure. Since those responsible must sign to approve it and assume corresponding responsibilities, even from a personal interest perspective, they need to check whether there are any issues within their area of responsibility and what safety measures need to be taken. The result is that, through multiple channels and involving various personnel related to this hazardous operation, problems can be identified and resolved from different perspectives. Ultimately, this aims to eliminate potential hazards during the operation and ensure safe working conditions. There are also some comrades who don’t even show up at the site and don’t follow all the procedures, yet they still manage to issue \"work permits\" carelessly. Once again, let me reiterate: the “work permit” itself is merely a piece of paper—a “checklist” meant to remind relevant personnel to inspect for any potential safety hazards during the course of work. It is not a “amulet” or talisman. Risks exist objectively, and the idea of trying to avoid them is unrealistic. To put it bluntly, the notion of trying to circumvent risks is nothing more than an expression of the Ah Q mentality in safety work – a way of comforting oneself. Apart from issues of awareness, the existence of this situation may also be related to the problem of how to identify potential hazards and assess their consequences. This is an issue that could directly affect the level of attention paid to potential hazards. Next, I will explain the methods for identifying potential hazards. It is quite difficult to correctly identify safety hazards, as the great principle that \"practice is the sole criterion for testing truth\" is not very applicable in this case. Because it is impossible for us to carry out an experiment just to prove whether a potential hazard will actually turn into an accident. In Yabang’s history, there was an incident in which the existence of hidden dangers was tested through practical action: two workers were not convinced that open flames represented a serious safety hazard in chemical plants, nor did they believe that anthraquinone could catch fire. To test this, they used lighters to ignite the anthraquinone deposits on the walls of the drying room. As soon as the lighters were used, the drying room caught fire, resulting in the first accident in Yabang’s history. It’s a heavy joke, and it also reflects the naive ideas of some comrades regarding potential risks. So, how can we scientifically assess and identify safety hazards? According to the above definition, any “hazard factor” present in the production process that has the potential to cause accidents is considered a hidden danger. The three words that deserve special attention here are “it is possible,” not that it will definitely happen. **When formulating safety regulations and standards, the approach is also to start from the premise of \"possibility\" in order to establish corresponding measures. For example, the definition of work at height in the \"Safety Procedures for Work at Height\" is as follows: \"Any work carried out at a height of 2 meters or more above the reference level from which a fall could occur is considered work at height.\" Therefore, the key question is how to determine this “possibility,” that is, what is the basis for determining “possibility”? ““It’s possible” is not invented out of thin air, nor is it determined by someone’s subjective will. The basis for determining whether something is “possible” generally consists of two aspects: first, the theoretical basis, which involves conducting computational analyses of physical and chemical properties of materials as well as various parameters of equipment, in order to assess whether there are any hazardous factors that could lead to accidents; it even requires considering certain environmental influences. For example, in the case of a metal pressure reactor that has been in use for a long time, by measuring its wall thickness, checking its safety accessories, calculating the remaining corrosion resistance, determining data related to the material used, and estimating the pressure that could be generated by the reaction medium, a comprehensive analysis can be conducted to determine whether there is a possibility of the reactor rupturing. If so, it can be concluded that the equipment has potential hazards that “might” lead to accidents. Conversely, it can be theoretically assumed that the device is safe to operate under normal process conditions (excluding abnormal conditions) ； The other method is the “case comparison approach”: that is, comparing with similar accidents that have occurred to see whether the system under consideration also has factors that could lead to accidents. If such factors exist, then there is a ‘potential’ risk; the more similar factors there are, the greater the likelihood of such a risk occurring. These two methods complement each other. In practice, the second method is sometimes more intuitive and reliable than the first. Because an accident itself results from hazardous factors (potential risks) breaking out under the influence of some accidental factor, or even multiple accidental factors—which leads to the occurrence of the accident. And theoretical calculations find it very difficult to take all such “unexpected factors” into account comprehensively. To give a real-life example: The serious accident on July 10, 2001, at Yabang, in which two people died from hydrogen sulfide poisoning, serves as a good illustration. In theory, after using five valves to isolate a system that produces hydrogen sulfide from one that produces hydrogen chloride, there is no way for the two gases to mix into each other’s systems under any circumstances. However, the fact that two systems that can produce different toxic gases share the same absorption system creates a safety hazard. But under normal circumstances, it might not lead to an accident. In fact, due to several unforeseen accidents occurring simultaneously and combining to create this internal factor, the accident does indeed happen: the first accident was related to the valve on the buffer tank. Due to the unit’s excessive focus on cost savings, coupled with the careless work of the installation personnel who simply picked a valve stem from a pile of waste and installed it on a valve whose valve core was actually already disconnected, this resulted in a valve that appeared to be in the closed position when it was actually fully open ； The second accident: due to human error, three plastic valves that should have been closed were not turned off. The third surprise: The only valve that was in the closed state developed an internal leak due to quality issues. (As a result, the five valves couldn’t shut off a gaseous pipeline with almost no pressure at all.) The fourth surprise: Due to the process conditions and the properties of hydrogen sulfide gas itself, the hydrogen sulfide produced is in high concentration; once it leaks into the accident vessel, it settles at the bottom of the vessel. The fifth surprise: Due to installation issues, the manhole of this furnace is located about 30 centimeters below the floor level. As a result, even when someone kneels on the ground, it is not possible to detect whether there are gases inside the furnace. Moreover, high-concentration hydrogen sulfide gas has the property of numbing the sense of smell, making it even harder to detect its odor. The sixth surprise: This is a piece of equipment that has been out of service for over half a month. It had already been thoroughly cleaned; it was inspected just a couple of days ago. From a technical standpoint, it’s impossible for this equipment to produce hydrogen sulfide at all. Under normal circumstances, people wouldn’t associate this equipment with hydrogen sulfide at all. The seventh surprise: The safety awareness in this unit is simply abysmal: there are no seat belts, no gas masks, and even the type of respirators used is incorrect. There was no ladder to enter the reactor tank, which was over 5 meters deep. The first person climbed down using the rope; when he realized something was wrong, he let go of the rope and fell to the bottom of the pot. It was impossible to pull him back up, and in those last moments, he lost any chance of being rescued. The eighth surprise: The second victim was also a relative of the first victim. Due to familial ties, he was eager to save him. Even though others had warned him not to go down there under any circumstances, he still grabbed a gas mask from the ground—a model that wasn’t even suitable for use—and went down without finding a proper one. The ninth accident: It happened that an irresponsible factory manager who didn’t understand the technical aspects was in charge on site, and he personally sent another person who shouldn’t have died down there, which led to further expansion of the accident. In this accident, if even one of the seven incidents numbered 1 through 7 had not occurred, the accident would not have happened. Similarly, if either of the last two incidents had not occurred, the accident would not have escalated. In reality, however, all nine incidents (i.e., external factors) acted simultaneously on the underlying safety hazard—namely, the fact that two different systems share a single absorption system (an internal factor)—thereby triggering this serious accident in which two people lost their lives. These factors that lead to accidents – if one were to consider and analyze them purely theoretically – would never allow one to anticipate these nine types of incidents, which include human error, carelessness, family relationships, equipment, gear, installation issues, and management problems. Nor could one expect such factors to combine together and cause accidents all at once. ——These are the three words that are always involved in the occurrence of the vast majority of accidents: \"skill\" and \"accident\". Therefore, determining \"hidden dangers\" solely from a theoretical perspective is incomplete and unreliable. But in actual work, the main reason why some comrades fail to accurately assess \"hidden dangers,\" lack a clear understanding of them, and do not pay enough attention is precisely this——an excessive reliance on \"theory.\" Another factor that affects people’s level of attention to \"hidden dangers\" is certain habitual ways of thinking: as a people who value etiquette, we tend to look at things from a positive perspective. In the same way, when it comes to \"safety hazards,\" we instinctively or unconsciously proceed from a hopeful mindset, believing that such things can’t happen all at once, that accidents won’t occur. Coupled with people’s tendency to rely on luck and a gambling mentality, this leads to a situation where safety hazards are delayed as long as possible, and repairs are avoided whenever possible. However, accidents occur when these very small, unnoticeable risk factors combine \"coincidentally,\" leading to an accident under unexpected circumstances. If it isn’t an accident that occurs due to “coincidence” and “accident,” then it is “sabotage.” Safety is a comprehensive discipline that encompasses many aspects. However, its ultimate goal remains the same—to identify “potential hazards”. With a scientific and fact-based approach, we determine whether these “risk factors” could potentially lead to accidents under abnormal conditions. If so, we take appropriate safety measures to “prevent” such accidents and ensure the smooth progress of production. It’s not a matter of belief, nor is it something that needs to be proven by facts. The last issue is that some comrades fail to properly balance the relationship between safety and production, as well as the relationship between preventing potential hazards and the needs of production. They’re always set in opposition to each other. One comrade said to me, “President Shi, if you keep pressing like this, it will be difficult for us to do our work.” ”In other words: safety is hindering production. In fact, safety work not only does not hinder production; on the contrary, it helps to make production smoother and more efficient. Although it may be a bit troublesome, with no immediate benefits visible and may even require some investment, its potential benefits are immeasurable. Recently, Plant 2 carried out technical upgrades on the equipment by safely initiating a fire at distances of approximately 1 meter and 4 meters from the distillation vessels and toluene storage tanks that hold toluene, respectively; certain measures were taken to ensure safety during this process ； The subsequent expansion work, which involved adding another hydrogenation reactor and connecting it to the system without shutting down the hydrogenation plant, is a good example of how safety is prioritized for production purposes. “The explosion at Shenlian on the first day of the Lunar New Year, which caused huge economic losses and negative social impacts, is an example of unsafe production. Finally, I hope everyone will remember: 1. \"Hidden dangers\" exist objectively; they are not determined by your will. 2. An “accident” is itself an “accident”; without an “accident,” there can be no accident. Without considering the possibility of \"accidents,\" there is no need to carry out safety measures. Good intentions cannot replace the fact of the existence of \"accidents\". 3. “Hidden dangers” are the internal factors that cause accidents; without addressing these hidden dangers, safe production cannot be ensured. 4. We must confront \"hidden dangers\" and address them; we cannot avoid or sidestep them, nor can we deceive ourselves by turning a blind eye.