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A chemical company in Chongqing had control rooms installed illegally within its liquid chlorine storage facility and filling plant; alarms kept sounding but the cause was not identified. Recently, the Ministry of Emergency Management dispatched 8 working groups to various locations to carry out special inspections and oversight of enterprises that handle major hazardous chemicals. Among them, the second supervision and inspection team carried out its work in Fuling District, Chongqing. During an inspection of Chongqing Tianyuan Chemical Co., Ltd., it was found that the company had illegally set up control rooms in its liquid chlorine storage facilities and liquid chlorine filling plants, and the reason for the continuous alarms from the toxic gas detectors could not be determined. Chongqing Tianyuan Chemical Co., Ltd. moved from Jiangbei District in Chongqing to Baitao Industrial Park in Fuling District in 2005. It currently has 5 major hazard sources: a first-class major hazard source represented by the storage unit for chlorine liquefaction and packaging processes; a second-class major hazard source corresponding to the first-phase production unit for methyl chlorides; a third-class major hazard source related to the second-phase production unit for methyl chlorides and the storage area for hydrogen peroxide solutions; and a fourth-class major hazard source represented by the methanol storage tanks.
When reviewing the company’s \"Major Hazard Source Assessment Report,\" the supervision and inspection team found that the evaluation agency, when conducting quantitative calculations for external safety protection distances, did not carry out a quantitative risk assessment of all the hazardous chemical production units and storage facilities within the enterprise as a whole; instead, it only performed quantitative risk calculations on one liquid chlorine storage tank. This approach does not comply with the relevant requirements outlined in the \"Method for Determining External Safety Protection Distances for Hazardous Chemical Production Units and Storage Facilities\" (GB/T37243—2019). Experts from the supervision and inspection team noted that due to changes in the storage media and the number of storage tanks in the hydrogen peroxide solution tank area and the methanol tank area of this company, it is necessary to use the individual risk criteria for new construction, renovation, or expansion of production facilities and storage installations involving hazardous chemicals in order to reevaluate these major hazard sources. Experts from the supervision and inspection team emphasized that inaccurate selection of scenarios for identifying major hazard sources and conducting quantitative risk assessments can significantly affect the calculation of external safety protection distances. It is reported that the company’s predecessor, Chongqing Tianyuan Chemical Plant, experienced an explosion of nitric trichloride in 2004 that led to a chlorine leak, resulting in 9 deaths, 3 injuries, and the evacuation of 150,000 people. An important reason for the company’s relocation was that its original location was in an urban area with a dense population, resulting in insufficient external safety distances. Subsequently, the supervision and inspection team conducted on-site inspections of the company’s control room and some production areas, and found that the tetrachloroethylene toxic gas alarm AT—01122 was continuously sounding alarms in both the control room and the production sites. By reviewing the records of these alarms and the actions taken in response to them, it was discovered that the alarm had triggered multiple times, yet the records indicated no abnormalities; the operators were unable to identify the cause of the alarms.
During their inspection of the storage units in the chlorine liquefaction and packaging process, which are classified as major hazard sources of level 1, the experts from the supervision and inspection team found that the facilities for filling liquid chlorine cylinders and the storage areas for such cylinders did not have a sealed structure. Moreover, control rooms for filling chlorine cylinders and loading them onto tank trucks were installed there in violation of regulations. Experts say that liquid chlorine is a highly toxic chemical with strong irritant and corrosive properties; it can vaporize into a gas at normal pressure, and inhalation by humans can lead to severe poisoning. Therefore, the liquid chlorine cylinder filling plants and liquid chlorine bulk storage areas should have a sealed structure, and the design or renovation of buildings and structures should take corrosion prevention into account. The supervision and inspection team immediately ordered the enterprise to make corrections, and urged the local emergency management department to ensure that the enterprise carried out thorough corrective actions and completed the process accordingly. By comparing the plant design drawings with on-site inspections, the experts from the supervision and inspection team found that the company is located adjacent to Chongqing Yongyuan Sheng Technology Co., Ltd.; in the event of a chlorine leak, there is a high risk of safety hazards spreading. The supervision and inspection team recommended that the two companies should sign a safety agreement and establish an emergency response coordination mechanism.
According to the website of the Ministry of Emergency Management, on May 5th, the ministry issued a notice ordering the conduct of the first safety inspection and supervision campaign in 2022 for enterprises that handle major hazardous sources of chemicals. This special inspection and supervision effort is a concrete measure to implement the 15 safety production measures outlined by the State Council’s Safety Committee, as well as the national safety production inspections and the initiatives aimed at addressing safety risks associated with hazardous chemicals. It represents a systematic approach to strengthening the mechanism of cooperation between regulatory bodies and fire rescue services in managing hazardous chemicals over the past few years, and to improving the system for the regular monitoring and control of major hazard sources. Through corporate self-inspections, municipal inspections, provincial random checks, and ministerial supervision and verification, a comprehensive approach is taken to identify and address safety risks associated with major hazard sources, in order to firmly prevent serious and catastrophic accidents. The notice requires that a proper balance be struck between special inspections and supervision on the one hand, and the development of the service economy as well as overall epidemic prevention and control efforts on the other; progress should be made in a manner that takes into account changes in the epidemic situation ; Enterprises are encouraged to conduct self-inspections and make necessary corrections, adhering to a combination of inspections and services; those that fail to carry out such self-inspections and corrections as required will be dealt with strictly in accordance with the law ; Strengthen classified management, and focus on tracking and supervising the rectification of typical problems and major potential risks ; By utilizing the risk monitoring and early warning system for the safe production of hazardous chemicals, online entry of inspection results and online coordination are implemented to further enhance the level of informatization and intelligence. During this period, the Ministry of Emergency Management will increase the exposure of typical problems and major safety hazards, strengthen warning education, and, in conjunction with the comprehensive inspections and assessments on work safety carried out by the State Council’s Safety Committee, supervise the implementation of these special inspection and oversight efforts to ensure their effectiveness and to create a safe and stable environment for the successful holding of the Party’s * meeting.
Should we also check on the implementation of the “Three-Year Safety Action Plan”? No punishment? Did the local regulatory authorities fail in their duties?
This is an established company; over a decade has passed, yet these problems still exist
【Ministry of Emergency Management’s Special Inspection in 2022】Summary Edition https://bbs.hcbbs.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=3418729 (Source: Huahai Chuanliu – Haichuan Network)
It was found that the tetrachloroethylene toxic gas alarm AT—01122 was continuously sounding alarms in both the control room and the field. By reviewing the alarm records and handling logs for this alarm, it was discovered that it had triggered alarms on multiple occasions; however, the handling records indicated no abnormalities, and the operators were unable to identify the cause of the alarms.
It was found that the liquid chlorine cylinder filling plant and the storage area for large liquid chlorine cylinders did not have a sealed structure, and control rooms for filling liquid chlorine cylinders and loading them onto tank trucks were installed in violation of regulations. Experts say that liquid chlorine is a highly toxic chemical with strong irritant and corrosive properties; it can vaporize into a gas at normal pressure, and inhalation by humans can lead to severe poisoning. Therefore, the liquid chlorine cylinder filling plants and liquid chlorine bulk storage areas should have a sealed structure, and the design or renovation of buildings and structures should take corrosion prevention into account. The supervision and inspection team immediately ordered the enterprise to make corrections, and urged the local emergency management department to ensure that the enterprise carried out thorough corrective actions and completed the process accordingly.