Is the safety of coal chemical industry reliable? Take a look at the three major safety hazards in coal chemical industry!

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Following the “8·12” massive explosion incident in Tianjin, society once again raised serious doubts regarding the safe production practices of chemical enterprises. Especially the coal chemical industry, which has gained popularity in recent years: on the one hand, it is developing at a rapid pace, with a large number of participants, and new projects are being launched everywhere ； On the other hand, most of the raw materials, auxiliary materials, intermediates, and finished products involved in the coal chemical industry’s production process are **chemicals**. For example, large-scale ammonia synthesis plants involve **dozens of different chemicals in their production process; among them, substances such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen, liquefied petroleum gas, methanol, sulfur, and carbon disulfide are flammable and explosive, while gases like water gas, hydrogen sulfide, liquid ammonia, and liquid chlorine are highly toxic. Sulfuric acid, on its part, is highly corrosive, and so on. If these substances escape and get out of control, they will inevitably cause severe explosions, poisoning, and pollution incidents, and the consequences will be no less serious than those of the major explosion accident on August 12 in Tianjin. So, is the safety of coal chemical industry sufficient to reassure the Chinese people? Therefore, the reporter conducted a search in the media over a period of nearly 5 years. This incident isn’t that serious, but its consequences were truly chilling for the journalists – the safe operation of the gasification furnace remains unguaranteed. For a coal chemical project to operate successfully, the first issue that needs to be addressed is the safe, stable, and long-term operation of the gasification furnace. Almost all types of gasifiers share one common feature: they have extremely high requirements regarding the type of coal used. Once the coal ingested is not to taste, it can cause minor issues such as damage to internal components and plant shutdowns; in severe cases, it may lead to leaks that result in fires and explosions. However, for the current coal chemical industry, the issue of adapting to different types of coal has not been fully resolved; in other words, the safe operation of gasifiers, which are key equipment in production, has not been truly achieved. On April 6, 2013, just 3 months after its trial operation, the 500 million cubic meters per year coal-to-gas project owned by Guanghui Energy in Xinjiang suffered a fire caused by an explosion (on April 10, 2013, 21st Century Business Herald reported: “Guanghui Energy’s 8 billion yuan project catches fire; chairman sends urgent message to relevant authorities to seek reassurance”). It was later determined that the cause was an explosion triggered by the corrosion of the gasifier’s walls due to chemical substances in the raw coal; this led to the rupture of the tank, resulting in a massive leak of oil-containing water and subsequently a fire. This accident was attributed to an inappropriate coal type. It’s a pity that the Guanghui Energy accident did not serve as a lesson. On January 13, 2014, another poisoning incident occurred at the Datang Keshiketeng Coal-to-Gas Project, resulting in 2 deaths and 4 injuries (Xinhua News Agency, January 18, 2014: “Poisoning incident at Inner Mongolia Datang International Keshiketeng Coal-to-Natural Gas Company leaves 2 dead and 4 injured”). Upon investigation, the cause was almost the same: the gasification furnace in this project was not suitable for the quality of the Mengdong lignite used, which led to corrosion of the furnace’s inner walls as well as problems with the internal jacketing components. Datang Keqi has adopted the Lurgi coal pulverization pressurized gasification technology gasifier. The project went through pilot and pilot-scale tests, faced no obstacles along the way, was launched officially to widespread applause, and won numerous awards; yet it failed just one month later. It is worth mentioning that there are **dozens of other domestic projects that also use this technology and follow the model of the Keqi project, including the Datang Fuxin coal-to-gas project with a total investment of 24.5 billion yuan and an annual production capacity of 4 billion cubic meters, as well as the Xinjiang Qinghua coal-to-gas project with a total investment of 27.8 billion yuan and an annual production capacity of 5.5 billion cubic meters. The occurrence of safety accidents in model projects that have been highly regarded and replicated by numerous initiatives serves as a reminder to those interested in investing in coal chemical projects: the goal of operating gasifiers in a ‘long, safe, and full’ manner, which has plagued the coal chemical industry for decades, has yet to be achieved. In particular, the safety issues associated with gasifiers remain a constant concern and cannot be taken lightly. Apart from the gasification furnace, other units in the coal chemical production process also frequently face various problems. On June 28, 2015, an explosion occurred during the production process at Jiuding Chemical Co., Ltd., part of the Ordos Yidong Group. The accident was caused by a hydrogen leak from the heat exchanger in the company’s purification workshop, which led to an explosion; 3 people died and 6 were injured (China Radio Network, June 28, 2015: “Explosion at an chemical plant in Ordos kills 3 and injures 6”). Even after the severe \"8-12\" explosion accident in Tianjin, coal chemical industry safety incidents continued to occur. On September 18, 2015, a pipeline in the ammonia synthesis tower at Henan Zhonghong Coal Chemical Company burst, resulting in an ammonia leak that caused 20 people to be poisoned (September 18, 2015, China News Network: “Ammonia leak at a chemical plant in Pingdingshan, Henan: 20 people poisoned, 5 in critical condition”). Logistics has become the most risky link in the chemical production process; it is originally the stage with the highest safety risks. According to statistics, about 200 million tons of hazardous chemicals are transported by land in our country each year. 77% of hazardous materials safety accidents occur during transportation, with leaks accounting for 67% of all such accidents. Coal chemical projects involve large volumes of material inflow and outflow, with the transportation of most raw materials and products relying on railways and roads. Given the distribution of resources and markets in our country, coal chemical production takes place mainly in the west, while the markets are primarily located in the east. Due to the approaching saturation of railway capacity from the west to the east, many companies must rely on road transport for their external shipments. And the cost of road transport is much higher than that of rail transport. Therefore, controlling transportation costs has become a top priority for coal chemical enterprises. As a result, accidents have occurred frequently during transportation. On December 26, 2011, a methanol tanker and a liquefied gas tanker in Shaanxi Province successively fell into a river along the Taibai section of Provincial Highway 210. Methanol leaked from the tanks, resulting in 2 deaths and 3 injuries (International Online, November 27, 2011: “Methanol tanker and liquefied gas tanker fall into river in Taibai County, Shaanxi, killing 2 and injuring 3”). On August 26, 2012, a heavy tank truck carrying methanol collided with a double-decker sleeper bus in Yan’an, Shaanxi, resulting in a large spill of methanol and an explosion that set the bus on fire. 36 people on board the bus died and 3 were injured (according to the Information Times on August 27, 2012: “Collision between sleeper bus and methanol truck in Yan’an causes massive fire, killing 36 people”). In 2015, a methanol-loaded vehicle overturned and leaked in Shaanxi, causing delays to 8 trains (Hua Shang Net, July 26, 2015: “Overturning of methanol-loaded vehicle in Shaanxi leads to delays of 8 trains”). However, even with such serious security concerns, when coal chemical industry executives talk about logistics, their main concern remains cost. To cut costs, some companies opt to work with third-party logistics providers that lack the necessary qualifications. This leads to issues such as illegal transportation, inadequate safety measures, mixed loading of goods, speeding, and overloading. Coupled with the highly flammable and explosive nature of products like methanol, liquid ammonia, and concentrated sulfuric acid, trucks carrying these materials are like time bombs on the roads! The storage process also lacks adequate safety measures. To cut costs, many manufacturing and logistics companies take risks by failing to strictly adhere to **safety standards, and even treat hazardous chemicals as ordinary goods. Many warehouse workers wear safety helmets but don’t use any other protective gear. When the weather is hot, some people even carry things with their shirts off. Some workers even said they didn’t know what those chemicals were, but they were tightly sealed and properly stored in boxes; as long as there was no fire, it was fine and safe. According to statistics, 70% to 80% of warehouse workers in first-line chemical product warehouses have not received formal vocational training, with migrant workers accounting for 33.57% of them. In the eyes of these people, Wei** isn’t dangerous at all. They may not know that it was these \"harmless\" chemicals that claimed 165 lives in the Tianjin explosion. Environmental pollution resulting from excessive emissions constitutes a more serious safety hazard. Although it doesn’t cause as much upheaval or attract as much attention as explosion accidents, its harm is actually greater and its impacts more profound. On December 31, 2012, an aniline leak occurred at a tank in Shanxi Tianji Coal Chemical Group due to a rupture in the transfer hose. It was not until 5 days later that the relevant departments in Shanxi Province received a report and began emergency response measures. Initially, the amount of aniline leaked was reported to be only 1.5 tons, but it was later determined that the actual amount released was around 8.78 tons. Due to \"a lack of awareness of the potential hazards,\" **large amounts of the chemical and carcinogenic substance aniline were released into the Zhuozhang River, affecting areas such as Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan. (January 7, 2013, Southeast Express: “Aniline Leak; Report Released Only After Five Days”). Ironically, this company has received various honors such as the title of “Advanced Unit in National Chemical Industry Environmental Protection Work” on multiple occasions. On August 1, 2014, Datang Dolun Coal Chemical Industry experienced a pollution incident when untreated wastewater was released due to a malfunction in the process equipment. According to the documents provided by the Environmental Protection Bureau of Tuolun County, the cause of the accident was that the factory failed to use the accident pond as required by environmental assessment regulations, and instead altered its purpose for other uses. The company failed to detect – or report – any wastewater leaks until 8 p.m. on August 4, when the Environmental Protection Bureau of Duolun County received reports from the public, and the pollution was then discovered (October 8, 2014, China News Service reprinted an article from China Environment News titled “Dagang Duolun Coal Chemical Plant Faces Another ‘Dead Fish’ Incident 170 Days After Its Desulfurization Equipment Was Shut Down”). Another piece of news is worth mentioning. A news item titled “Datang Duolun Coal Chemical Improves Emergency Management” (published on November 4, 2013, by ChemNet, reposting content from China Chemical Industry News) indicates that since 2008, the company has developed 25 various safety emergency plans and 62 on-site response plans. From January to September 2013, it organized a total of 103 emergency drills, with over 2,100 participants in total. According to the report titled “Dagang Duolun Coal Chemical Plant’s Desulfurization Equipment Out of Service for Over 170 Days Before Facing Another Crisis”, the plant’s desulfurization facilities were shut down for more than 170 days throughout 2013, meaning that production was halted for over half a year. While companies actively carry out various safety inspections and improve their emergency response plans, the main environmental protection facilities remain ineffective; it is clear that environmental protection is not part of the safety concept in some companies. Evaporation ponds are also having problems. Evaporation ponds were originally intended to act as a buffer against waste discharge, but some coal chemical companies irresponsibly used them as a cover to carry out illegal discharges without restraint. As a result, the pollution in the Tengger Desert shocked the whole country, and the guise of \"zero emissions\" used by these coal chemical projects was completely exposed. As a result, coal chemical industry became associated with “severe pollution” and “excessive emissions”; coal chemical projects were removed from the list of encouraged industries in the 12 western provinces and regions. **There has been a fundamental shift in attitude toward the development of the coal chemical industry in the western region.** Emergency response plans often end up being mere formality. On the website of Tianjin Ruihai International Logistics Company, the company responsible for the severe explosion on August 12 in Tianjin, the few corporate news items and updates about company activities that are available focus on safety emergency response plans. Judging from articles on the company’s website regarding emergency drills for fires involving major hazard sources carried out in November 2013, as well as drills for responding to chemical leaks conducted in March 2014, and also from articles about safety inspections and guidance provided to the company by various departments such as the Safety Supervision Department of the Port Authority, the public security authorities, and fire departments, it is clear that the company not only has emergency plans in place but also attaches great importance to safety measures. It is clear that this company also understands what safety means to it. However, after the accident, Sina published an article titled \"Ruihai Company’s Fire Safety and Security Measures Are Full of Flaws,\" in which chemical industry experts identified dozens of safety hazards based solely on the articles and images posted on Ruihai Company’s official website. For example, during the **chemical spill emergency response drill, employees did not wear chemical protective gear as required; fuel forklifts were brought into the warehouse without any explosion-proof measures in place; the plugs of the emergency lights were exposed; explosion-proof doors were not used; and there were no anti-static measures in the warehouses where flammable and explosive materials were stored... It is still unknown which minor detail led to the disaster, but it is certain that all the measures intended to prevent accidents were merely superficial and ultimately proved ineffective. Following the severe explosion accident that occurred in Tianjin on August 12, chemical enterprises across the country immediately launched a large-scale inspection campaign to ensure safe production. However, just 10 days after the accident, another explosion occurred at Shandong Runxing Chemical Technology Co., Ltd. It is said that official documents requiring a \"thorough investigation to completely eliminate safety hazards and weak points, as well as effective prevention and firm suppression of all types of production safety accidents\" were issued in a timely manner, and safety supervision teams also went deep into the enterprises. However, the day after the inspection team left, an explosion occurred at Runxing Chemical. It is understood that during this extensive safety inspection campaign, whether it was the company’s safety officers or the relevant higher-level authorities, they basically followed the inspection forms by checking off each item; once all items were checked, it was considered satisfactory. As for whether companies’ security awareness has truly improved, it seems that no one pays attention to it, and there are no means to verify it. Even whether the procedures and documents are complete is not part of the safety inspection. Otherwise, the eagerness of many coal chemical enterprises to achieve quick results and to start construction without proper approval represents the biggest safety hazard.